.HISTORY 


OF  THE 


AMERICAN    CIVIL  WAR.  . 


JOHN  WILLIAM  DRAPER,  M.D.,  LL.D.,    (%. 

PROFESSOR   OF   CHEMISTRY   AND   PHYSIOLOGY   IX   THE    UNIVERSITY   OF   NEW   YORK  ; 

AUTHOR   OF    "a   TREATISE   ON   HUMAN   PHYSIOLOGY,"    "a   HISTORY  OF 

THE   INTELLECTUAL   DEVELOPMENT   OF   EUROPE,"   ETC.,   ETC. 


IN   THREE  VOLUMES. 


Vol.  II. 


CONTAINING  THE  EVENTS  FROM  THE  INAUGURATION  OF  PRESIDENT  LINCOLN 
TO  THE  PROCLAMATION  OF  EMANCIPATION  OF  THE  SLAVES. 


•     oCji  • 


NEW    YORK: 

HARPER    &    BROTHERS,    PUBLISHERS, 

FRANKLIN     SQUARE. 

1868. 


7<5-/o 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred 
and  sixty-eight,  by 

HARPER  &  BROTHERS, 
In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  Southern  District  of  New  York. 


INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  SECOND  VOLUME. 


The  events  considered  in  this  volume  occurred  between  the  ac- 
cession of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  the  Proclamation  of  Freedom  to  the 
Slaves.  Chronologically  they  range  from  the  4th  of  March,  1861, 
to  the  1st  of  January,  1863,  inclusive. 

An  examination  of  these  events  shows  that  they  may  be  conven- 
iently grouped  under  certain  sections  or  heads.  By  that  means 
they  are  more  easily  borne  in  mind,  and  their  relation  to  each  other 
more  clearly  understood. 

The  secession  movement  exhibited  the  character  of  a  conspiracy 
for  some  time  after  the  accession  of  Lincoln.  There  may  be  a  dif- 
ference of  opinion  as  to  the  exact  epoch  at  which  it  lost  that  char- 
acter, but,  for  reasons  subsequently  mentioned,  I  have  placed  the 
limit  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  which  also  coincides  with  the 
translation  of  the  Confederate  seat  of  power  to  Richmond,  mani- 
fested by  the  assembly  of  a  Congress  in  that  city  on  July  20th, 
1861. 

The  battle  of  Bull  Run  satisfied  both  the  national  government 
and  its  antagonist  that  the  results  sought  by  each  could  not  be  at- 
tained by  the  tumultuary  levies  which  the  people,  then  unacquaint- 
ed with  war,  had  up  tp  that  time  supposed  would  be  sufficient.  It 
had  become  plain  that  real  armies  must  be  called  into  existence. 
The  period  during  which  the  resources  on  both  sides  were  organ- 
ized is  closed  by  Lincoln's  general  War  Order  of  the  27th  of  Jan- 
uary, 1862,  commanding  an  advance  of  the  national  forces. 

Meantime,  however,  certain  small  military  afiairs  had  been  taking 
place.  These,  though  they  excited  public  attention  very  much  at 
the  time,  exerted,  in  reality,  little  or  no  influence  on  the  general  re- 
sult.    We  may  therefore  regard  the  actions  at  Bethel,  Ball's  Bluff, 


lY  INTRODUCTION. 

and  even  the  campaign  in  Northwestern  Virginia,  in  the  light  of 
personal  encounters,  constituting  in  their  aggregate  a  mere  prelude 
to  the  true  war. 

Thousrh  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  had  the  effect  of  convincinor  the 
nation  that  its  military  operations  must  be  intrusted  to  professional 
soldiers,  in  contradistinction  to  politicians,  it  was  not  possible,  con- 
stituted as  the  government  is,  but  that  political  ideas  should  have 
<xreat  influence  in  determining?  the  form  of  the  war.  There  are  mil- 
itary  critics  who,  judging  from  subsequent  events,  are  of  opinion 
that  the  course  then  resolved  upon  was  far  from  being,  in  a  scien- 
tific point  of  view,  correct.  Nevertheless,  it  was  probably  at  the 
time  unavoidable. 

The  armed  force  of  the  nation  was  called  upon  to  accomplish 
three  objects : 

(1.)  To  put  the  seceding  states,  on  their  inland,  river,  and  sea 
boundaries,  under  strict  blockade.  This  beleaguering,  or  state  of 
siege,  was  effectually  accomplished. 

(2.)  To  open  the  Mississippi  River,  obstructed  by  the  inhabitants 
of  its  lower  banks.  The  achievement  of  this  constituted  the  war- 
idea  of  the  Free  West. 

(3.)  To  capture  Richmond.  This  constituted  the  popular  war- 
idea  of  the  East. 

In  addition  to  the  military  and  naval  operations  incident  on  these 
requirements,  there  are  various  other  subjects,  such  as  the  finances 
of  the  republic,  the  progress  of  the  anti-slavery  movement,  the  at- 
titude assumed  by  the  Western  European  powers,  etc.,  which  it  is 
necessary  to  consider.  These  may  be  conveniently  grouped  to- 
gether under  the  title  of  Foreign  Relations  and  Domestic  Policy  of 
the  Republic. 

Guided  by  these  views,  I  therefore  divide  this  volume  into  the 
seven  following  sections,  continuing  the  enumeration  from  the  sixth 
section  of  Volume  I. : 

Section 

VII.  The  progress  and  culmination  of  the  Conspiracy. 
Vni.  Vast  development  of  the  Warlike  Operations.     Correspond- 
ing Legislative  and  Military  Preparations. 
IX.  Prelude  to  the  great  Campaigns. 


INTRODUCTION.  y 

Section 

X.  Campaigns  for  opening  the  Mississippi,  and  piercing  the  east 
and  west  line  of  the  Confederacy. 
XL  Campaign  for  the  capture  of  Richmond. 
XII.  The  Blockade,  and  operations  connected  with  it. 
XIII.  Foreign  Relations  and  Domestic  Policy  of  the  Republic. 

In  the  composition  of  this  volume  I  have  been  greatly  indebted 
to  some  of  the  chief  actors  in  the  events  described.  I  can  not  suf- 
ficiently express  the  obligations  I  am  under  to  them.  They  have 
not  only  given  me  much  important — often  confidential— informa- 
tion, but  have  added  invaluable  counsel  as  to  the  treatment  of  the 
whole  subject. 

I  shall  esteem  it  a  favor  if  any  of  my  readers  who  may  find  on 
these  pages  errors  in  the  narrative  of  facts  will  communicate  to 
me  such  statements  as  they  may  consider  nearer  to  the  truth,  I 
will  give  to  their  suggestions  my  earnest  attention.  Contemporary 
history  must  pass  .the  ordeal  of  examination  of  many  thousand  eye- 
witnesses of  the  events  with  which  it  deals,  and  that,  indeed,  con- 
stitutes its  best  recommendation  to  future  times. 

The  remaining  volume,  containing  the  events  from  the  Emanci- 
pation Proclamation  to  the  close  of  the  war,  I  shall  publish  as  soon 
as  I  can. 

John  William  Deaper. 

Unlversiti/, 

Washington  Square, 

New  York. 

July,  ISCS. 


II.— A 


CONTENTS. 


SECTION  yii. 

THE  PROGRESS  AND  CULMINATION  OP  THE  CONSPIRACY. 
CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

THE    INAUGURATION   OF  ABRAHAM   LINCOLN  AND   ORGANIZATION   OF  HIS 
ADMINISTRATION. 

Lincoln's  Departure  from  Springfield,  13. — Davis's  Journey  to  Montgomery;  Lin- 
coln's Views  of  Secession,  14. — Lincoln's  Journey  to  Washington,  15. — His  In- 
augural Address,  16. — Buchanan  leaves  the  White  Ho^s^e,  17. — Influence  of  the 
Secretary  of  State,  18. — Difficulties  of  the  Administration/19. — Formation  of  the 
Cabinet,  20. — Arrival  of  Commissioners  Forsyth  and  Crawford,  21. — Their  Ap- 
plication for  a  Reception,  22,  23. — Offensive  Character  of  their  Correspondence, 
24. — Lincoln  calls  out  the  Militia  and  summons  Congress,  25. — The  Free  States 
furnish  Troops,  26. — The  Slave  States  refuse  Troops,  27. — Proclamation  of  the 
Blockade,  28. — Blockade  and  Port-closure,  29.— Secessionist  Letters  of  Marque, 
29. — Seizure  of  Telegrams ;  additional  Troops  called  out,  30. — Suspension  of 
Habeas  Corpus;  Attitude  toAvard  Foreign  Powers,  31. — Belligerent  Acknowl- 
edgment by  England,  32.— Instruction  to  Foreign  Ministers,  33.— The  Political 
Ideas  of  the  Time,  34. — Position  of  the  Democratic  Party,  35. — Lincoln's  Posi- 
tioilT^C. — Lincoln  and  Davis,  37. — Lincoln  in  Retirement,  38. — Peculiarities  of 
his  Character,  39,  40. 

CHAPTER  XXXV. 

RETROSPECT   OF  THE   PROGRESS    OF  THE    CONSPIRACY  AT  THE   INAUGURATION 

OF    LINCOLN. 

Two  Phases  of  the  Secession  Movement,  41. — The  favorable  Period  for  Treason, 
42. — Preliminary  Steps  of  the  Conspirators,  43. — Measures  determined  on,  44. — 
Washington  to  be  seized,  45. — The  Attorney  General  Stanton,  45. — Holt,  the 
Secretary  of  War,  46. — Dix,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  47. — Holt's  Report, 
48. — Projected  Seizure  of  Washington,  49,  50. — Troops  brought  to  Washington, 
51. — Attempts  to  have  them  removed,  52. — Report  of  the  Naval  Committee,  53. 
— Censure  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  54. — Attempts  to  introduce  Spies  into 
the  Government  Departments,  55. — Attempts  to  bring  Maryland  and  Virginia 
over  to  the  Conspiracy,  56. — Success  of  the  Conspiracy,  57. 

CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

THE  BOMBARDMENT  OF  FORT  SUMTER. 

Difficulty  of  relieving  Sumter;  the  Administration  inclines  to  surrender  it,  58. — 
Finally  sends  an  Expedition,  59. — The  Frigate  Powhatan  detached,  59. — Beau- 


Viii  CONTENTS. 

regard  ordered  to  attack  the  Fort,  GO. — Proposals  to  Anderson,  61. — Strength  of 
the  Assailants,  62. — Bombardment  of  the  Fort,  63. — Its  Surrender,  64. — Criti- 
cisms on  the  Defense,  65. — The  Fort  might  have  been  relieved,  GG,  67. 

CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

DETERMINATION  OF  THE  NORTH  TO  UPHOLD  THE  REPUBLIC. 

Political  Necessity  for  Aggression  in  the  South,  68. — Effect  of  the  Fall  of  Sumter, 
69. — Action  of  the  Northern  People,  70. — Rumored  Intention  of  seizing  Wash- 
ington, 71. — Troops  hurried  to  its  Defense,  72. — They  are  resisted  in  Baltimore  ; 
the  Massachusetts  Regiments  assailed,  73. — Concessions  of  the  Government,  74. 
— Christian  Association,  75. — The  Troops  reach  Annapolis,  76,  and  relieve  Wash- 
ington, 77. — Butler  seizes  Baltimore,  78. 

CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 

THE    SECESSION   OF  VIRGINIA. 

Virginia  reluctant  to  secede,  79. — She  yields  a  qualified  Assent,  80. — She  joins  the 
Confederacy,  81. — Her  Resources  given  to  the  Confederacy,  82. — Capture  of 
Harper's  Ferry  Arsenal,  83. — The  Norfolk  Navy  Yard,  84. — It  is  inadequately 
protected,  85. — Report  of  the  Virginia  Commissioner,  86. — Report  of  the  Senate 
Committee,  87. — Richmond  made  the  Confederate  Capital,  88. — Its  Social  Con- 
dition, 89. — Difficulties  in. its  Domestic  Economy,  90. — Extravagant  Prices  of  the 
Necessaries  of  Life,  91. — Surrender  of  the  Pens.acola  Navy  Yard,  92. — Defense 
of  Fort  Pickens,  93. 

CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

SOCIAL   CONDITION   OF  THE    SOUTH   AT  THE   OPENING    OF  THE   CONFLICT. — HER 
MILITARY  AND   POLITICAL   PREPARATIONS. 

War  Preparations  of  the  Confederacy,  94. — Its  Defenses,  95. — The  Cotton  Paradise, 
96. — Principles  of  the  Leaders  of  Secession,  97. — Population  of  the  Confederacy 
classified,  98.— First  Class,  98.— Second  and  Third  Classes,  99.~Fourth  Class, 
100.— Conversion  of  the  Slaves,  100.— Their  Conduct,  101,  102.— The  South  in 
a  State  of  Siege,  103. — Construction  of  its  Political  System,  104. — Richmond 
made  the  Capital,  105. — Washington  and  Richmond  compared,  106. — Possible 
Transfer  of  the  United  States  Capital,  106. — Opening  of  the  Congress  at  Rich- 
mond, 107. 

CHAPTER  XL. 

THE  ATTEMPTED    SEIZURE    OF  THE    CAPITAL  AND   MEXICANIZATION   OF  THE 
REPUBLIC— ^BATTLE    OF  BULL  RUN. 

Intended  Seizure  of  Washington,  108. — Troops  concentrated  at  Manassas,  109. — 
National  Troops  concentrating  in  Washington,  110. — Preparations  for  its  Defense, 
111. — Invasion  of  Virginia,  112. — Confederates  blockade  the  Potomac,  113. — The 
opposing  Forces  near  Washington,  114. — The  March  of  McDowell,  115. — First 
Plan  of  the  Battle  of  Bull  Run,  116.— Second  Plan,  117.— Distribution  of  the 
Confederate  Force,  118. — McDowell  gains  the  Initiative,  119. — The  Battle  of 
Bull  Run,  120. — The  Battle  during  the  Morning,  121 ;  during  the  Afternoon, 
122,  123,  124.— Conflict  on  the  Plateau,  125.— Rout  of  the  National  Army,  126. 
— Davis's  Telegram  of  Victory,  127. — Johnston's  Explanation  of  his  Conduct, 
128.— Political  Interpretation  of  the  Battle,  129, 130. 


CONTENTS.  \x 


SECTION  VIIL 

VAST  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  WARLIKE  OPERATIONS.    CORRESPONDING 
LEGISLATIVE  AND  MILITARY  PREPARATIONS. 

CHAPTER  XLI. 

OF  THE   FORM  ASSUMED   BY  THE  AVAR. 

The  Second  Phase  of  the  War,  131.— The  Protestations  of  the  Confederates,  132.— 
Accusations  of  the  Congressional  Committee^  133. — The  South  thrown  from  the 
Beginning  on  the  Defensive,  134. — Interior  of  the  Confederacy,  135. — Its  Mili- 
tary Topography,  136. — Investment  of  the  Confederacy,  137. — Vastness  of  the 
Siege,  138. — The  necessary  Military  Opej-ations,  139. — The  East-west  Line,  140. 
— Eftects  of  breaking  it,  141. — Solution  of  the  Problem  of  the  Mississippi,  142. — 
Objective  of  the  Atlantic  Region,  143. — Effect  of  Attrition,  144. — Reaction  of  the 
Slavery  War-cry,  145. — Application  of  these  Principles  by  Grant  and  Sherman, 
145. — Changes  in  the  Quality  of  the  Armies,  14G. — Predominating  Power  of  the 
North,  147.— Influence  of  the  Slave  Force,  148. 

CHAPTER  XLII. 

ACTS    OF  THE   PROVISIONAL  AND   PERMANENT   CONFEDERATE    CONGRESSES. 

Secrecy  of  the  Confederate  Congressional  Proceedings,  149. — Various  Acts  of  Con- 
gress, 150. — Abstract  of  Davis's  Message,  151  to  157. — His  Treatment  of  the 
Slave  Question,  158. — Treatment  of  State  Rights,  159. — Necessity  of  Centraliza- 
tion in  the  Confederacy,  IGO. — Acts  of  the  Extra  Session,  161. — The  Congress  at 
Richmond,  162. — Session  of  the  18th  of  November,  163. — The  Permanent  Con- 
gress, 163. — War  Legislation,  164. — The  Conscriptions,  165. — The  Conscript  Sol- 
diers, 166. — The  August  Session,  167. — Arbitrary  Course  of  the  Government,  168. 
— Decline  of  the  Influence  of  Davis,  169. — A  Reign  of  Terror,  170. — Deplorable 
Condition  of*Domestic  Affairs,  171,  172. 

'    CHAPTER  XLIII. 

THE   EXTRA    SESSION   OF  THE   NATIONAL  CONGRESS. 

Composition  of  the  Houses,  173. — Position  of  the  Democratic  Party,  174. — Mr. 
Douglas's  Letter,  175. — Abstract  of  Lincoln's  Message,  175  to  179. — The  Presi- 
dent's War  Acts,  180. — Reports  of  the  Secretaries,  181. — Action  of  the  House, 
182.— Action  of  the  Senate,  103.— Resume'  of  the  Acts,  184.— Character  of  the 
Opposition  encountered,  184. — Pledge  of  Congress,  185. 

CHAPTER  XLIV.         >c 

CREATION   OF  THE    NATIONAL  ARMY. 

The  Army  at  the  Beginning  and  End  of  the  War,  186. — Change  in  the  Morale  of 
the  Army,  187. — Progi-ess  of  Enlistments  and  Armaments,  188. — Regulars  and 
Volunteers,  189. — Loyalty  of  the  West  Point  Academy,  190. — Oath  taken  by  the 
Graduates,  191. — McClellan's  Report,  191.— His  Views  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  192. — Proposed  Composition  of  the  Army,  193. — Subordinate  Movements, 
194. — increase  in  the  Strength  of  the  Army,  195. — Organization  of  the  Infantr}', 
195;  of  the  Cavalry  and  Artillery,  196;  of  Corps  d'Arme'c,  197.— The  Potomac 
and  Western  Armies,  198. — Actual  Strength  of  the  Armies,  199,  200. 


V 


X  CONTENTS, 

CHAPTER  XLV. 

CREATION    OF  THE    NATIONAL  NAVY. 

Duties  required  of  tlie  Navy,  201. — The  Navy  and  Dock  Yards  at  the  Opening  of 
the  War,  202.— Requirements  of  the  Blockade,  203.— Of  the  Sea  Navy,  204.— 
Peculiarities  of  American  Construction  and  Armament,  205. — The  small  Gun- 
boats, 205. — The  Kearsarge  Class,  205. — The  Double-ender  and  the  Lackawan- 
na Class,  206.— The  Wampanoag  Class,  207.— The  Armored  Ships,  207.— The 
Monitors,  208.— The  Monitor  Frigates,  209.— Of  the  River  Navy,  210.— The 
Eivcr  Gun-boats,  211.— Energy  in  building  them,  212.— River  Monitors,  Tin- 
clads,  Mortar  Boats,  213. — American  Ordnance,  214,  2157 


SECTION  IX. 

PRELUDE  TO  THE  GREAT  CAMPAIGNS. 
CHAPTER  XLVI. 

TRANSACTIONS    CIVIL  AND   MILITARY  IN   KENTUCKY. 

Minor  Military  Affairs  of  1861. — Early  War  Movements  incorrect,  217. — The  Bor- 
der States,  218. — Their  Geographical  and  Political  Position,  219. — Their  Opin- 
ions and  Interests,  220. — Effect  of  their  Neutrality,  221. — Movements  in  Ken- 
tucky, 222. — Political  Action  in  that  State,  223. — Attempts  of  her  Governor, 
224. — The  Confederates  invade  Kentucky,  225. — They  blockade  the  Mississippi, 
226. — Grant  attacks  them  at  Belmont,  226. 

CHAPTER  XLVir. 

^TSAKaACTIONg   CIVIL  A»D  MILlTJnSTTir  HISIOURI. 

Internal  Dissensions  in  Missouri,  227. — The  State  Convention  and  the  Governor, 
228. — He  seizes  the  Arsenal  at  Liberty,  228. — Lyon  captures  his  Camp  ;  Harney 
makes  a  Compact  with  him,  229. — The  Governor's  Proclamation,  230. — Lyon 
defeats  him  at  Booneville,  231. — The  Governor  declares  that  the  state  has  se- 
ceded, 231. — Fremont  in  Command  of  the  Department,  232. — Battle  of  Wilson's 
Creek  and  Death  of  Lyon,  233. — Capture  of  Lexington  and  Removal  of  Fremont, 
234. — Retreat  of  the  National  Army ;  Halleck  takes  Command,  235. — His  Slave 
Order,  236  ;  Curtis's  Advance  and  Battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  237,  238.— Indian  Allies 
of  the  Confederates,  239. — The  March  of  Curtis  to  Helena,  240. 

CHAPTER  XLVIII. 

TRANSACTIONS    CIVIL  AND   MILITARY  IN  VIRGINIA. 

Western  Virginia  adheres  to  the  Union,  241. — McClellan  crosses  the  Ohio,  242, — 
Affair  at  Romney,  243. — Johnston  evades  Patterson  ;  Affair  at  Rich  Mountain, 
244.— Carrick's  Ford,  245.— Cross  Lanes ;  Carnifex  Ferry,  246.— General  R.  E. 
Lee  in  Command,  246. — Lee  and  McClellan,  247. — Butler  at  Fortress  Monroe, 
248.— Affair  at  Bethel,  249.— Defeat  of  the  National  Troops,  250.— Tragedy  at 
Ball's  Bluff,  251,  252. 


CONTENTS.  xi 


SECTION  X. 

CAMPAIGN  FOE  OPENING  THE  MISSISSIPPI  AND  PIERCING  THE  GREAT  EAST 
AND  WEST  LINE  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY. 

CHAPTER  XLIX. 

FORCING   OF  THE   FIRST  CONFEDERATK   LINE.       CAPTURE   OP  FORTS   HENRY  AND 
DONELSON,  AND   OPENING    OF  THE   MISSISSIPPI  TO   MEMPHIS. 

Effect  of  the  Battle  of  Bull  Run,  254. — McClellan  Commander-in-Chief,  255. — Im- 
mobility of  the  Potomac  Army,  256. — The  President's  General  War  Order,  257. 
— Commencement  of  the  War,  258. — The  First  Line  of  Confederate  Defense, 
258.— Halleck's  War  Plan,  259.— Operations  on  the  TennesseS,  260.— Strength 
of  the  opposing  Armies,  261. — Operations  against  Fort  Henry,  262. — Capture  of. 
that  Fort,  263. — Operations  against  Fort  Donelson,  264. — The  premature  As- 
.  sault,  265.— Defeat  of  the  Gun-boats,  266.— Sortie  of  the  Garrison,  267.— Suc- 
cess of  the  Sortie,  268.— The  Confederates  forced  back,  269.— Floyd's  Night 
Council,  270.  — Surrender  of  Donelson,  271.  — Fall  of  Nashville,  272.  — Mill 
Spring,  273. — Pope's  Attack  on  New  Madrid,  274. — The  Confederates  evacuate 
it,  275. — Canal  of  Island  No.  10,  276. — Pope's  Passage  of  the  Mississippi,  277. — 
Surrender  of  the  Island,  277. — Destruction  of  the  Confederate  Fleet,  278. — Fort 
Pillow  and  Memphis,  279.— Fall  of  Memphis,  280. 

CHAPTER  L. 

THE   CAMPAIGN   OF  SHILOH.      FORCING   OF  THE    SECOND   CONFEDERATE    LINE. 

Grant's  Visit  to  Nashville,  281,  is  disapproved  of  by  Halleck,  282. — Sherman's 
Reconnoissance  up  the  Tennessee,  283. — The  Topography  around  Shiloh,  284. 
— Posting  of  the  Troops,  285. — Grant  restored  to  Command,  286. — Concentra- 
tion of  the  Armies,  287. — Beauregard's  Plan  of  Campaign,  288. — The  Field  of 
Shiloh,  289. — Position  of  Grant's  Army,  290. — Confederate  Attack  expected, 
291.— The  Battle  of  Shiloh,  292.— Resistance  of  Sherman,  293.— Grant's  Line 
forced  back,  294.— Death  of  Johnston,  295.— The  final  Confederate  Charge,  296. 
— Preparations  for  renewing  the  Battle,  297. — Beauregard's  Report,  298. — Ar- 
rival of  Buell,  299.— The  second  Day's  Battle,  300.— Aid  rendered  by  Buell,  301. 
—Retreat  of  the  Confederates,  302,  303.— Comments  on  the  Battle,  304.— Sher- 
man breaks  the  Railroad,  305. — Halleck's  Advance  to  Corinth,  306. — The  Fall 
of  Corinth,  and  unjust  Disgrace  of  Beauregard,  307. — Mitchell's  Expedition,  308. 
— His  Transfer  to  South  Carolina  and  Death,  309. 

CHAPTER  LL 

CONTINUATION   OF  THE    CAMPAIGN   OF  SHILOH.       THE   FIRST  VICKSBURG 
CAMPAIGN. 

Results  of  the  Shiloh  Campaign,  310.— The  Marches  of  Buell  and  Bragg,  311.— 
Removal  of  Halleck  to  Washington,  311. — Position  of  Grant's  Forces,  312. — The 
Confederate  Attempts  on  Corinth;  Affair  at  luka,  313. — Escape  of  Price  and 
Van  Dorn,  314.— Assault  on  Corinth,  315. — Gallant  Conduct  of  the  Confeder- 
ates, 316. — R^ecfans's  Report  of  the  Battle,  317. — The  first  Vicksburg  Cam- 
paign, 318.— Capture  of  Holly  Springs,  319.— Arrest  of  Grant's  March,  320.— 
The,  Chmkasaw  Bayou,  321,  322.— Sherman's  Attempt  at  Chickasaw,  323;  its 
•^4. 


Failur<f^4.— Arkansas  Post,  325 ;  its  Capture,  326. 


xii  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  LII. 

THE   FALL  OF  NEW  ORLEANS,  AND   FIRST  FORCING    OF  THE   MISSISSIPPI   KIVEK 
BY  FARRAGUT. 

Preparations  for  the  Capture  of  New  Orleans,  327. — The  Fleet  under  Farragut ; 
Topography  of  the  Mississippi,  328. — Defenses  of  New  Orleans,  329. — Farragut's 
Plan  of  Attack,  330.— Bombardment  of  the  Forts,  331. — Farragut's  Order  of 
Battle,  332.— The  Battle  of  the  Mississippi,  333  to  336.— The  Fleet  reaches  New 
Orleans,  337. — The  Surrender  demanded,  338. — The  National  Flag  insulted, 
339.  —  Surrender  of  the  City,  340. — Baton  Rouge,  341.— Operations  against 
Vicksburg,  342. — Attack  on  Williams's  Troops ;  Capture  of  Galveston ;  Butler 
in  New  Orleans,  343.— The  Woman  Order,  344.— The-  French  Consul,  345.— 
Investigation  of  Butler's  Administration,  346. — Butler's  farewell  Address  to  the 
People  of  New  Orleans,  346  to  349. 

CHAPTER  LHI. 

THE    SORTIE   OF  BRAGG  AND   ITS   REPULSE.       BATTLES    OF  PERRYVILLE  AND 
MURFREESBOROUGH. 

The  Military  Condition  of  the  Confederacy,  350. — The  Sortie  of  Bragg,  351. — Os- 
tensible Motive  for  it,  353. — Buell  obliged  to  fall  back,  354. — Bragg's  Political 
Proceedings,  355. — He  retreats  with  large  Supplies,  356. — The  Battle  of  Perry- 
ville,  357. — Failure  of  Bragg's  Sortie,  358. — He  is  ordered  to  renew  the  attempt, 
359. — Rosecrans's  Advance  toward  Murfreesborough,  360. — The  Battle  of  Mur- 
freesborough,  361  to  365.— Retreat  of  Bragg  to  Tullahoma,  366. 


SECTION  XL 

CAMPAIGN  FOR  THE  CAPTURE  OF  RICHMOND. 
CHAPTER  LIV. 

THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN.       FIRST  PERIOD.      THE  ADVANCE. 

The  War-cry  of  the  East,  367.— Problem  of  the  Richmond  Campaign,  368.— Mili- 
tary Principles  involved,  369. — Errors  of  the  Campaign,  370. — Political  Influ- 
ences; McClellan's  Inactivity,  371. — Strength  of  the  Opposing  Armies,  372. — 
Public  Dissatisfaction,  373. — The  Prince  de  Joinville's  Statement,  374. — The 
Confederates  evacuate  Manassas,  375. — Appointment  of  Corps  Commanders,  376. 
— Their  Opinions  respecting  the  Protection  of  Washington,  377. — The  Peninsu- 
lar Expedition  sails,  378. — Lincoln's  Letter  to  McClellan,  379.— Siege  of  York- 
town,  380.— Battle  of  Williamsburg,  381.— Retreat  of  the  Confederates,  382.— 
Surrender  of  Norfolk,  383.— Battle  of  Fair  Oaks  and  Seven  Pines,  384  to  388.— 
Stuart  rides  round  the  Army,  388. — Lee  appointed  to  command  the  Confeder- 
ate Army,  389. 

CHAPTER  LV. 

THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN.       SECOND   PERIOD.       THE   RETREAT. 

Stonewall  Jackson's  Campaign  in  the  Valley,  390. — He  checks  ^remont  and  at- 
tacks Kenly,  391. — Banks's  Retreat  to  the  Potomac,  393. — Consternation  in  Wash- 
ington and  Call  for  more  Troops,  394. — Jackson's  Retreat,  395. — Pqg^Republic 
and  Cross  Keys,  396. — Inactivity  of  the  Potomac  Army,  397. — Mc(^eHan  at 
length  advances,  but  immediately  recedes,  398. — The  Confederates  take  the  Of- 
fensive, 398. — Perilous  Position  of  the  Potomac  Army,  399. — The  seven  Days'  * 


CONTENTS.  •  xiii 

Campaign,  400. — Battles  of  Mechanicsville  and  the  Chickahominy,  401. — Battle 
of  the  Chickahominy,  403,  404. — McCIellan's  Accusations  against  the  Govern- 
ment, 405. — The  Retreat,  406,  407. — Savage's  Station,  408. — Battle  of  Frazier's 
Farm,  409,  410.— Malvern  Hill,  411.— Battle  of  Malvern  Hill,  412,  413.— Retreat 
to  Harrison's  Landing,  414. — Lee's  Report  of  the  Campaign,  415. — Withdrawal 
of  the  Army  from  the  Peninsula,  41G,  417. 

CHAPTER  LVL 

THE   BATTLE    OF  THE    IRON   SHIPS. 

Construction  of  the  Merrimack,  419. — She  comes  out  of  Norfolk,  419,  destroys  the 
Cumberland,  420,  and  the  Congress,  421. — Arrival  of  the  Monitor,  422. — Battle 
between  the  Monitor  and  Merrimack,  423,  424. — Results  of  the  Battle,  425. — End 
of  the  ]\Ierrimack  and  Monitor,  426. 

CHAPTER  LVII. 

THE    SORTIE    OF  LEE.       FORCING   OF  THE   NATIONAL  ARMY  UNDER   POPE   INTO  THE 
DEFENSES    OF  WASHINGTON. 

Pope  in  Command,  427. — His  offensive  Order,  428. — His  Advice  to  the  Govern- 
ment, 429. — Halleck  made  General  in  Chief,  430. — Advance  of  the  Confederates 
to  the  Rapidan,  431. — Pope's  Principles  of  the  Campaign,  431. — Retaliatory 
Measures  of  the  Confederates,  432. — Cedar  Mountain,  433. — The  Turning  of 
Pope's  Right,  435. — Pope  falls  back,  436. — Movements  of  Pope  and  Jackson, 
437,  438. — The  Battle  of  Gainesville,  439,  440,  441. — Pope's  Accusations  against 
Porter,  442. — Retreat  to  Centreville,  443. — Chantilly,  444. — Pope's  Conduct  in 
the  Campaign,  445. — Critical  Position  of  the  Government,  446,  447. 

CHAPTER  LVni. 

THE  SORTIE  OF  LEE  AND  ITS  REPULSE.  THE  BATTLE  OF  ANTIETAM.  THE  CON- 
FEDERATES RETURN  TO  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKS- 
BURG. 

Invasion  of  Maryland,  449. — Lukewarmness  of  the  Marylanders,  450. — Object  of  the 
Sortie,  451. — McClellan  follows  Lee,  452. — Forcing  of  Turner's  Gap,  453. — For- 
cing of  Crampton's  Gap,  454. — Capture  of  Harper's  Ferry,  455. — Lee  falls  back 
to  the  Antietam,  456. — Topography  of  Antietam,  457. — The  Battle  of  Anlietam, 
458  to  465. — Lee  recrosses  the  Potomac,  466. — Stuart's  Pennsylvania  Raid,  467. 
— Burnside  at  Fredericksburg,  468  to  470. — The  Battle  of  Fredericksburg,  471 
to  474. — Hooker  in  Burnside's  Stead,  475. — Condition  of  the  Confederate  Army, 
476  to  479. 


SECTION  XII. 

THE  BLOCKADE  AND  OPERATIONS  CONNECTED  WITH  IT. 
CHAPTER  LIX. 

NAVAL  OPERATIONS  CONNECTED  WITH  THE  BLOCKADE. 

Classification  of  Naval  Affairs,  480.— The  Port  Royal  Expedition,  481  to  484.— 
Blockade  of  Savannah,  485. — Reduction  of  Fort  Pulaski,  486,  487. — Expedition 
to  Fernandina,  488,  489.— Expedition  to  Hatteras,  490,  491.— The  Roanoke  Ex- 
pedition, 492,  495.— Capture  of  Fort  Macon,  496.— Stone  Blockade,  497.— Con- 
federate Privateers,  498,  499. — Attack  on  the  Mississippi  Squadron,  500. 


r 


+ 


+ 


Xiv  CONTENTS. 

SECTION  xm. 

FOREIGN  RELATIONS  AND  DOMESTIC  POLICY  OF  THE  REPUBLIC. 
CHAPTER  LX. 

FOREIGN  RELATIONS    OF  THE   REPUBLIC.       STATE    OF  EUROPEAN   OPINION   ON 
AMERICAN  AFFAIRS. 

Expectations  of  the  National  Government  and  the  Confederacy,  501.^^^pinion  of 
various  Classes  in  England,  502,  503. — Influence  of  English  Journalism,  504.— 
Parallel  between  the  Colonial  and  Confederate  Movements,  505. — Tactics  of  the 
Newspapers,  506. — Criticisms  on  the  South,  507. — Secession  is  Treason,  508. — 
Prospective  Disasters  of  the  South,  509.— Effect  of  the  Morrill  Tariff,  510.— 
Partition  of  the  Union  inevitable,  511. — Liberal  Statesmanship  of  the  South,  512. 
-^SA-Common  IiUerest  of  England  and  the  South,  513. — Neutrality  Proclamations, 

•014:.  JP-ef 

CHAPTER  LXI. 

THE   FRENCH   EXPEDITION  TO   MEXICO.       ITS    INFLUENCE    ON  THE   OPINION   OF 
EUROPE    RESPECTING  A3IERICAN  AFFAIRS. 

Origin  of  the  Mexican  Expedition,  515.— Proposed  Union  of  the  Southern  States 
and  Mexico,  516. — Secession  the  first  Step  in  the  Plot,  517. — Course  of  the  Eu- 
ropean Powers,  518. — Half  Measures  of  the  French,  519.— Intervention  in  Mex- 
ico,520. — Expectations  of  the  three  Powers,  521. — Letter  of  the  Emperor  Napo- 
leon, 522. — The  French  Expedition  sails,  523. — The  City  of  Mexico  seized,  524. 
— The  Mexican  Empire  established,  525. — Napoleon  abandons  Maximilian,  526. 
— Impolicy  of  the  Removal  of  the  French,  526. — Correspondence  of  Mr.  Seward, 
527. — Failure  of  the  Mexican  Empire,  528. — Disappointment  of  all  Parties  in 
the  Mexican  Expedition,  529,  530. 

CHAPTER  LXII. 

STATE   OF  EUROPEAN   OPINION   ON  AMERICAN  AFFAIRS  {continued).       THE  TRENT 

QUESTION. 

Attack  of  European  Journals  on  the  Union,  531. — Literary  Attacks,  532,  533. — 
The  South  rising  in  Favor,  534. — Advantages  of  Secession  to  Europe,  535. — 
Summary  of  the  Views  of  English  Journalism,  536. — Indifference  to  American 
Opinion,  537. — Retaliation  of  American  Journalists,  538. — Change  in  foreign 
Opinion,  and  its  Cause,  539. — The  Trent  Affair,  540,  541. — Views  of  the  English 
Government,  542  ;  "^tfeff  iF''^"^^iii^"JiCT°^^'^^-  ^^^' — Instructions  to  the  Amer- 
ican Minister,  544. — Restoration  of  the  Captkes,  545. — Lord  Lyons  on  the  State 
of  Affiiirs,  546,  547. 

CHAPTER  LXIII. 

RESOURCES  AND   DEFENSES    OF  THE   REPUBLIC    IN  1862.       ITS   FINANCES, 
ARMY,  AND   NAVY. 

Formation  of  a  Public  Debt  in  England,  549 ;  its  supposed  Advantages,  550. — Dis- 
advantages of  direct  Taxation  ;  Experience  of  the  Romans,  551. — Political  Ef- 
fect of  protective  Tariffs,  552. — Finance  Report  for  1860,  552. — Finances  in  1861, 
653,  554. — Intrusion  of  SlaA'ery  in  these  Afiiurs,  555.— Slave-owners  insulted  in 
London,  556. — Chase  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  557. — Financial  Provisions 
for  1862,  558. — Arrangements  with  the  Banks,  559,  560. — The  Provisions  prove 
inadequate,  561. — Additional  Taxes  recommended,  562. — Bank  Circulation,  563. 
— Advantages  of  a  National  Circulation,  564,  565. — Financial  Provisions  for 


CONTENTS.  XV 

18G3,  566. — Suspension  of  Specie  Payments,  567. — A  National  Circulation  rec- 
ommended, 568. — Congressional  Financial  Acts,  569. — Resume  of  the  Finances, 
570.— Receipts  and  Deficiency  for  the  Year,  571.— The  Value  of  Gk»ld,.572.— 
Financial  and  political  Effect  of  a  National  Circulation,  573.— Wealth  of  the  Re- 
public, 574. — Financial  Contrast  of  the  Republic  and  the  Confederacy,  575'. — 
The  Tendency  of  Wealth  to  Concentration,  576.— War  Report  for  1861,  576,  577. 
—Stanton's  War  Report  for  1862,  578.— Suppression  of  disloyal  Practices,  579.— 
Magnitude  of  the  Military  Operations,  580. — Necessity  of  using  the  Slave  Ele- 
ment, 581  to  583.— Loyalty  of  the  Slaves,  584.— Political  Weakness  of  the  South, 
585.— Navy  Report  for  1862,  585,  586.— Success  of  the  Naval  Operations,  587.— 
Development  of  the  Navy,  588,  589. 

CHAPTER  LXIV. 

PROGRESS   OF  THE  AKTI-SLAVERY  MOVE3IENT. 

Classification  of  Anti-slavery  Movements,  590. — Anti-slavery  Measures  of  Congress, 
591  to  595. — Anti-slavery  Acts  of  the  President,  596. — His  Views  respecting 
Slavery,  597. — He  proposes  compensated  Emancipation,  598. — His  Statements 
showing  his  Reluctance  to  emancipate  the  Slaves,  599. — Contradictory  Army 
Orders,  600. — Lincoln's  Plans  of  Colonization  and  compensated  Emancipation, 
601,  602. — His  Counter-proclamation  to  Hunter,  603. — His  Negotiations  with 
the  Border  States,  604.— His  Interview  with  certain  religious  Persons,  605,  606. 
— He  is  constrained^  resort  to  Emancipation,  607. — The  preparatory  Proclama- 
tion of  September  22d,  608,  609,  610. — His  religious  Interpretation  of  certain 
military  Events,  611. — The  Skives  expecting  Freedom,  612. — The  Emancipa- 
tion Proclamation  of  Januarv  1st,  1863,  613. — The  End  of  Slavery  in  America, 
614. 


THE  AMERICAN   CIVIL  WAR. 


SECTION  VII. 

THE  PROGRESS  AND  CULMINATION  OF  THE 
CONSPIRACY. 


CHAPTEE  XXXIV. 

THE  INAUGURATION  OF  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  AND  ORGANIZATION 
OF  HIS  ADMINISTRATION. 

Mr.  Lincoln's  accession  to  the  Presidency  and  formation  of  his  Cabinet. 

He  refused  to  receive  commissioners  sent  by  the  secessionists  to  Washington  seek- 
ing recognition.  Hereupon  an  attack  on  Fort  Sumter,  in  South  Carolina,  was 
ordered  by  the  authorities  at  Montgomery,  and  he  was  compelled  to  meet  force 
by  force.  Accordingly,  he  called  out  the  militia,  proclaimed  a  blockade,  and 
summoned  an  extra  session  of  Congi'ess. 

The  English  government  conceded  belligerent  rights  to  the  secessionists.  Charac- 
ter of  the  instructions  issued  by  the  American  government  to  its  foreign  minis- 
ters. 

State  of  public  opinion  at  the  time  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  accession. 

Mr.  Lincoln  left  his  home  at  Springfield,  Illinois,  on 
the  11th  of  February  (1861).  Bidding  farewell  to  his 
neighbors,  he  said : 

"  My  Friends, — I  can  not  sufficiently  express  to  you 

Lincoln's  departure  ^hc  saduess  I  fccl  at  this  parting.  To  you  I 
from  spnngtieid.     ^^^  ^-j^"!^  ^-j^^^  j  ^^^    Hcre  I  havc  lived  more 

than  a  quarter  of  a  century;  here  my  children  were  born, 
here  one  of  them  lies  buried.  I  know  not  how  soon  I 
shall  see  you  again.  A  duty  devolves  upon  me  ]3erhaps 
greater  than  that  which  has  devolved  upon  any  man  since 
the  days  of  Washington.    He  never  could  have  succeeded 


14  PRESIDENT  LINCOLN.  [Sect.  VII. 

except  for  the  aid  of  Divine  Providence,  upon  whicli  lie 
at  all  times  relied.  I  feel  that  I  can  do  nothing  without 
the  same  divine  aid  which  sustained  him,  and  on  that  Al- 
mighty Being  I  place  my  reliance  for  support.  I  hope 
that  you,  my  friends,  will  all  pray  that  I  may  receive  that 
divine  assistance  without  w^hich  I  can  not  succeed,  but 
with  which  success  is  certain.  I  bid  you  all  an  affection- 
ate farewell." 

Mr.  Lincoln's  journey  to  Washington  was  in  striking 
contrast  to  Mr.  Davis's  triumphant  progress  to  Montgom- 
ery. 

Davis,  enthusiastic  in  the  cause  of  which  he  had  be- 
come the  chosen  leader,  met  a  welcome  ev- 
Montgomery,  aud    evY  whcre.     He  had  to  deal  with  a  people 

his  lutentious.  .  -,  ,  r       r 

animated  by  one  influence,  seeking  one  ob- 
ject, and  comprehending  distinctly  the  means  to  which 
they  must  resort  for  success.  In  the  various  speeches  de- 
livered by  him,  there  is  no  hesitation  in  accepting  without 
reserve  his  position.  If  the  North  will  permit  his  people 
to  separate  peaceably,  it  is  well ;  but  if  not,  her  rich  val- 
leys shall  be  devastated,  her  cities,  the  growth  of  time, 
the  product  of  millions  of  money,  shall  be  a  prey  to  the 
torch ;  her  people  "  shall  smell  Southern  powder  and  feel 
Southern  steel." 

Lincoln,  on  the  contrary,  has  no  correct  idea  of  what 
Lincoln's  views  of  IS  before  hiiu.  He  has  none  of  the  feroc- 
ity of  his  opponent ;  he  is  full  of  peace,  and 
thinks  there  is  no  probability  of  war.  He,  the  elected 
chief  magistrate  of  the  whole  nation,  will  not  ungracious- 
ly obtrude  on  his  discontented  fellow-countrymen ;  per- 
haps he  may  collect  duties,  stop  the  mails,  endeavor  to 
retake  and  hold  the  forts.  He  affirms  that  nobody  is 
suffering  any  thing.  Overflowing  with  good-nature  him- 
self, he  "  deems"  that  nothing  more  is  necessary  than  to 
state  the  exceeding  absurdity  of  the  doctrine  of  secession, 


Chap.  XXXIV.]       HIS  JOURNEY  TO  WASHINGTON.  15 

and  tliat  its  upliolders,  listening  to  reason,  will  forth  with 
submit.  He  can  not  understand  how  it  is  that  a  state 
should  assert  a  right  to  rule  all  that  is  less  than  itself, 
and  ruin  all  that  is  greater,  nor  what  is  to  prevent  a 
county,  a  town,  an  individual  claiming  a  like  power.  In 
his  eyes  the  Nation  is  every  thing.  States  nothing. 

When  he  reached  Philadelphia  on  his  way  to  Washing- 
His  opinions  change  tou,  hls  opiulous,  howevcr,  bcgau  to  change. 
duringhisjourney.    jj^  ^^^^^  ^^^^  ^j^^  difficulty  he  had  to  facc 

was  something  more  than  an  election  squabble.  Informa- 
tion was  privately  conveyed  to  him  from  General  Scott 
and  Mr.  Seward  that  there  was  an  intention  to  assassin- 
ate him,  either  by  throwing  the  train  off  the  track  or  by 
shooting  him  as  he  passed  through  Baltimore.  It  was  in 
reference  to  this  that  he  said,  in  a  speech  delivered  in 
Philadelphia,  "  I  would  rather  be  assassinated  on  this 
spot  than  surrender  that  sentiment  in  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  which  gives  liberty  not  alone  to  the  people 
of  this  country,  but,  I  hope,  to  the  whole  world,  for  all  fu- 
ture time."  Acting  under  the  advice  of  those  who  under- 
stood the  malignant  condition  of  the  communities  through 
which  he  had  to  pass  much  better  than  he,  and  who  were 
profoundly  impressed  with  the  importance  of  his  personal 
He  reaches  Wash-  Safety  to  the  uatlou,  hc  submitted  to  be  con- 
ingtoA  in  safety:  ^^^^^^  ^^,^^^  HaiTisburg  iu  disguisc  I  thc  tel- 
egraph wires  were  cut,  and  he  passed  through  Baltimore 
in  safety  at  an  unexpected  hour. 

There  was  no  need  for  Lincoln's  friends  to  view  that 
manner  of  his  entrance  into  Washington  with  humilia- 
tion :  they  would  have  deserved  censure  had  they  advised 
him  otherwise  than  they  did.  Their  course  was  more 
than  justified  by  his  subsequent  assassination  in  the  the- 
atre at  Washington. 

It  had  been  declared  in  the  South  that  he  should  never 
live  to  be  inaugurated.     There  was  an  expectation  that 


10  THE  INAUGURAL  ADDRESS.  [Sect.  VII. 

he  would  be  assassinated  in  the  act  of  taking  the  oath  of 
office ;  but  military  arrangements  ^v^ere  made  which  ena- 
bled him  to  pass  through  that  ordeal  in  safety.  In  a  cool 
manner,  and  with  a  clear,  audible  voice,  he  delivered  his 
address  from  the  eastern  portico  of  the  Capitol.  The  day 
(March  4th,  1861)  was  serene,  though  cold,  as  are  often 
the  first  days  of  spring. 

In  this  inaugural  address  he  hastened  to  assure  the 
people  of  the  Southern  States  that  they  had 

His  inangnral  ad-  ^  ,  ,'".,,  ,        ,  i      • 

dress  at  the  Cap-    uo  cause  lor  appreheusiou  either  as  to  their 

itol.  n  1  '  n 

property  or  persons  from  the  accession  of  a 
Kej)ublican  administration,  affirming  that  he  had  no  pur- 
pose to  interfere  directly  or  indirectly  with  slavery  in  the 
states  where  it  existed.  "I  believe  I  have  no  lawful  right, 
and  I  have  no  inclination  to  do  so."  Referrino;  to  the 
disruption  of  the  Union,  heretofore  only  menaced,  but 
now  formidably  attempted,  he  declared  that  he  held  the 
Union  to  be  perpetual — a  government,  and  not  a  mere 
association  of  the  states ;  that  no  state  of  its  own  mere 
motion  can  lawfully  go  out  of  the  Union ;  that  resolves 
and  ordinances  to  that  effect  are  legally  void;  and  that 
in  this  view  he  should  take  care,  as  enjoined  by  the  Con- 
stitution, that  all  the  laws  of  the  Union  should  be  faith- 
fully executed  in  all  the  states ;  that  in  doing  this  there 
should  be  no  bloodshed  or  violence  unless  this  should  be 
forced  upon  the  national  authority ;  that  the  power  con- 
fided to  him  would  be  used  to  hold,  occupy,  and  possess 
the  property  and  places  belonging  to  the  government,  and 
to  collect  the  duties  and  imposts ;  that  he  should  not  at- 
tempt to  force  obnoxious  strangers  in  the  federal  offices 
among  the  people  of  the  dissatisfied  states;  that  the  mails, 
unless  repelled,  should  be  furnished  to  all  parts  of  the 
Union ;  that  he  should  do  whatever  he  could  with  a  view 
to  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  national  troubles  and  the  res- 


Chap.  XXXIV.]  THE  INAUGUEAL  ADDRESS.  17 

toration  of  fraternal  sympathies  and  affections.  Reason- 
ing witli  those  who  still  held  an  attachment  to  the  Union, 
he  earnestly  asked  them  to  point  out,  if  they  could,  a  single 
instance  in  which  a  plainly  written  provision  of  the  Con- 
stitution had  ever  been  evaded.  He  tells  them  that  either 
the  minority  or  the  majority  must  submit,  or  the  govern- 
ment must  cease.  If  a  minority  will  secede  rather  than 
submit,  they  make  a  pi:ecedent  for  their  own  ruin — a 
minority  of  their  own  will  again  secede  whenever  a  ma- 
jority refuses  to  be  controlled ;  and  hence  it  is  plain  that 
the  central  idea  of  secession  is  anarchy.  If  majorities  are 
not  to  rule,  anarchy  or  despotism  is  all  that  is  left. 

"  In  your  hands,  my  dissatisfied  fellow-countrymen,"  he 
added, "  not  in  mine,  is  the  momentous  issue  of  civil  war. 
The  government  will  not  assail  you.  You  can  have  no 
conflict  without  being  yourselves  the  aggressors." 

The  inauguration  over,  Buchanan'  rode  with  Lincoln 
Buchananieavestiie  ^^  thc  presidential  resideucc  —  the  White 
White  House.  House  —  and  bade  him  adieu,  a  heartfelt 
adieu,  at  the  door.  The  ex-President,  relieved  from  his 
heavy  burden  of  cares,  retired  to  the  house  of  his  friend, 
Mr.  Ould.  Even  in  this  trifling  incident  may  be  seen  the 
character  of  President  Buchanan's  associations,  the  quali- 
ty of  the  social  atmosphere  in  which  he  had  been  living. 
Mr.  Ould  shortly  after  left  Washington  and  entered  into 
the  service  of  the  Confederacy. 

Every  effort  was  made  by  the  conspirators  to  pervert 
The  inaugural  is  ^^^  mcauing  of  the  inaugural  address,  and 
SiouShouTthe  exasperate  the  feeling  of  the  South  against 
^''''^^-  the  President.     The  most  ferocious  inten- 

tions were  attributed  to  him :  he  was  accused  of  a  blood- 
thirsty purpose  of  devastating  the  innocent  and  much- 
enduring  Southern  States. 

The  American  political  system  is  liable  to  bring  inex- 
II.— B 


Ig  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  STATE.     [Sect.  VII. 

perience  to  tlie  helm  of  state.  The  affairs  of  thirty  mil- 
lions may  have  to  be  administered  by  the  nnskillfulness 
which  would  scarcely  answer  for  three.  Lincoln  mider- 
took  his  task,  not  with  the  decision  of  knowledge  and 
confidence,  but  with  the  trepidation  of  unacquaintance 
and  doubt. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  at  this  time  he  submitted  to 
the  guidance  of  Mr.  Seward,  who,  he  was 

Lincoln,  in  his  in-  ,-,-,.  ,         i     t  it 

experience,  relies    willino;  to    believe,  had   more    experience, 

upon  Seward.  ^      .  i  ^      ,,  i      \        ^' 

clearer  views,  and  a  better  understanding 
of  the  political  difficulty.  But,  on  his  part,  Mr.  Seward 
did  not  realize  the  vastness  and  energy  of  secession.  A 
veteran  politician,  he  mistook  the  inflexible  determina- 
tion of  a  more  than  Catilinean  conspiracy  for  the  shift- 
ing intrigues  of  a  caucus. 

Lincoln  had  no  knowledge  of  the  past.  He  perpetu- 
ally felt  that  deficiency  in  contemplating  the  probable 
Aiture.  He  saw  that  he  must  trust  to  his  Secretary  of 
State,  wto,  in  the .  earlier  periods  of  the  war,  was  to  him 
historian  and  prophet  combined. 

The  affairs  of  the  nation  were  assuming  a  most  ominous 
aspect ;  every  day  was  adding  not  only  to  the  audacity, 
but  to  the  success  of  the  conspirators.  Though  it  was 
well  known  that  the  IS'orfolk  navy  yard  would  be  seized, 
and  that  from  its  vast  supplies  the  Confederacy  would 
be  armed,  nothing  was  for  sl  long  time  done  either  to  pro- 
tect or  to  destroy  it.    The  administration  only  looked  on. 

But,  even  had  Lincoln  been  conversant  with  the  man- 
agement of  public  affairs,  it  was  hardly  pos- 

He  must  satisfy  the       mi/*!*         'ii*  i*t  j1  i. 

clamor  of  place-  siolc  lor  him,  lu  tliis  particular,  to  nave  act- 
ed  otherwise  than  he  did.  Washington  was 
overflowing  with  bands  of  insatiate  office-seekers,  fero- 
cious in  the  pursuit  of  their  objects.  Their  demands  must 
be  attended  to  first;  the  election  pledges  must  be  redeem- 
ed.    If  the  President  had  thought  that  the  idea  of  state- 


Chap.  XXXIV.]    DIFFICULTIES  OF  THE  ADMINISTRATION.  l^ 

rio^lits  had  become  extinct  in  the  North,  he  now  fonnd  his 
mistake.  Place-hunters  had  to  be  satisfied,  and  patronage 
The  consequent  ^^^^^ted  according  to  states.  Not  more  than 
procrastination.  ^^  msnij  must  be  gratified  from  this,  not 
more  than  so  much  bestowed  upon  that.  The  deafening 
clamor  must  be  harmonized  geographically.  There  was 
more  urgency  to  satisfy  the  vociferous  demand  of  some 
locally  influential  politician  than  to  strike  down  the  hand 
clutching  at  the  throat  of  the  nation. 

It  was  plain  that  the  republic  was  on  the  brink  of 
Accusationsagainst  g^^^*  evcnts ;  that  ucw  political  uecessitics 
the  administration.  -^Yeie  aiisiug;  that,  to  mcct  the  unscrupulous 
acts  of  those  who  detested  the  Union  and  scorned  the 
Constitution,  something  more  than  the  legal  forms  of  the 
Constitution  would  be  required.  But  it  is  not  true,  as 
its  enemies  afiirmed,  that  "  the  secret  history  of  the  acts 
of  the  administration  at  its  first  assumption  of  power  was 
a  lamentable  and  degrading  record  of  double-dealing,  vac- 
illation, turpitude,  and  colossal  ignorance."  On  the  con- 
trary, the  worst  that  can  be  said  of  it  is  that  it  was  a 
history  of  good  intentions  unintelligently,  and  therefore 
inadequately  sustained. 

The  political  purity  of  the  republic  of  the  Eevolution 
Change  in  the  char-  ^^^  altogether  passcd  away.  A  new  soci- 
actero  the  nation.   ^^^  j^^^  come  luto  existeucc,  animated  by 

new  desires  and  guided  by  new  ideas.  The  character  of 
the  nation  had  changed.  Necessarily  the  formulas  of  its 
life  must  also  change.  When  great  and  powerful  com- 
munities had  resolved  that  they  would  no  longer  be 
bound  by  written  law,  and  were  determined  to  secure 
their  ends  by  violence,  when  only  a  political  bribe  could 
deter  them  from  resorting  to  force,  it  was  plain  that 
there  was  imminent  peril  of  the  Mexicanization  of  the 
country. 

In  reference  to  ijhis  impending  danger,  Lincoln  said, "  I 


20  FORMATION  OF  THE  CABINET.  [Sect.  VII. 

will  suffer  death  before  I  will  consent,  or  ad- 

Prevalence  of  Mexi-       .  (*  *        t      i  ,     , 

can  ideas  in  the       vise  mv  iriends  to  consent,  to  any  concession 

South.  -^  .  1  .    1     1       1       1M        T 

or  compromise  wnicii  looks  like  buying  tne 
privilege  of  taking  possession  of  the  government,  to  wliicli 
we  have  a  constitutional  right,  because  whatever  I  might 
think  of  the  merit  of  the  various  propositions  before  Con- 
gress, I  should  regard  any  concession  in  the  face  of  men- 
ace as  the  destruction  of  the  government  itself,  and  a  con- 
sent on  all  hands  that  our  system  shall  be  brought  down 
to  a  level  with  the  existing  disorganized  state  of  affairs 
in  Mexico." 

Impartial  observers  saw  clearly  that  the  political  diffi- 
culty could  only  be  overcome  by  the  appli- 
needfui  to'JSort    catiou  of  forcc.     The  Southern  States,  un- 
scrupulously resorting  to  arms,  universally 
declared  that  if  the  administration  could  not  compel  then- 
obedience,  it  had  no  right  to  claim  to  be  their  govern- 
ment.    In  the  Eepublic,  as  first  formed  from  the  Old  En- 
glish Colonies,  the  doctrine  that  government  rests  on  the 
consent  of  the  governed  had  been  found  an  acceptable 
and  sufficient  rule ;  but  it  had  now  become  painfully  ap- 
parent that  a  very  different  maxim  was  necessary,  where 
a  vast  continent,  with  many  conflicting  interests,  was  in 
question. 

The  first  great  public  duty  of  the  President  was  the 
Formation  of  Lin-  appoiutmcut  of  thc  cabiuct.  Liucolu  had 
coin's  cabinet.  ^^^^  pledged  to  luakc  Mr.  Seward  Secretary 
of  State,  though  there  were  misgivings  in  the  Republi- 
can party  that  this  able  man  would  be  found  not  un- 
willing to  postpone  the  strict  application  of  its  principles 
for  the  sake  of  the  consolidation  of  its  power.  '  For  the 
other  ministerial  offices  there  were  rivalries  and  bitter 
contentions,  but  in  the  end  the  following  cabinet  was 
formed :  • 


Chap.  XXXIV.]    ARRIVAL  OF  THE  SECESSION  COMMISSIONERS.    21 

William  H.  Sewaed Secretary  of  State. 

Salmon  P.  Chase "  "  the  Treasury^ 

Simon  Camekon "  "  War. 

Gideon  Welles "  "  the  Navy. 

Caleb  B.  SanxH "  "     "    Interior. 

Montgomery  Blair Postmaster  General. 

Edward  Bates Attorney  " 


In  a  few  days  (Marcli  12tli)  after  the  inauguration,  Mr. 
Arrival  of  secession  Forsyth,  of  Alabama,  and  Mr.  Crawford,  of 
agents.  Georgia,  Came  to  Washington.     They  an- 

nounced themselves  as  representatives  of  the  Confederate 
government,  which  had  instructed  them  to  make  overtures 
to  the  government  of  the  United  States  for  the  opening 
of  negotiations  with  a  view  to  a  peaceful  solution  of  all 
questions  in  dispute,  and  requested  the  appointment  of  a 
day  on  which  they  might  present  their  credentials  to  the 
President. 

The  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Seward,  respectfully  de- 

seward  declines  to  ^^^^^^  ^^  iutcrvlew  with  them,  and  in  a 
receive  them.  memorandum  declared  that  he  could  not 
recognize  in  the  late  events  an  accomplished  revolution 
or  an  independent  nation ;  that  he  could  not  admit  that 
the  states  referred  to  had  withdrawn  or  could  withdraw 
from  the  Union  without  the  consent  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States ;  that  he  could  not  regard,  or  in  any  way 
admit,  the  so-called  Confederate  States  as  a  foreign  power 
with  whom  diplomatic  relations  ought  to  be  established ; 
that  his  duties  as  Secretary  of  State  confined  him  to  the 
conducting  of  the  foreign  relations  of  the  country,  and 
did  not  embrace  domestic  questions.  Unable,  therefore, 
not  only  to  comply  with  the  request  of  the  applicants  to 
appoint  a  day  for  their  visit  to  the  President,  he  must 
also  state  that  he  had  no  authority  to  recognize  them  as 
diplomatic  agents,  or  hold  any  communication  with  them. 
He  concluded  by  saying  that,  under  a  strong  desire  to 


22  APPLICATION  OF  THE  COMMISSIONERS.        [Sect.VIL 

practice  entire  directness,  and  to  act  in  a  spirit  of  perfect 
respect  and  candor  toward  Messrs.  Forsyth  and  Crawford, 
and  to  that  portion  of  the  Union  in  whose  names  they 
present  themselves,  he  had  submitted  this  paper,  though 
there  was  no  necessity  for  his  so  doing,  to  the  President, 
who  coincided  in  his  views,  and  sanctioned  his  decision 
declining  official  intercourse  with  those  gentlemen. 

To  this  memorandum  the  Confederate  commissioners 
Eepiy  of  the  seces-  replied  that  their  object  was  to  invite  friend- 
sion  agents  to  him.  j^  rclatious  bctwecu  the  government  of  the 
United  States  and  the  new  government  of  the  people  who 
had  rejected  its  authority.  The  territories  of  the  two 
powers  being  contiguous,  their  relations  must  be  either 
friendly  or  hostile ;  that,  in  the  spirit  of  humanity  and 
Christian  civilization,  the  government  of  the  Confederate 
States  had  commissioned  them  to  present  the  olive-branch 
of  peace. 

They  continued — that  the  United  States  government 
had  not  met  them  in  a  like  conciliatory  and  peaceful 
spirit,  but  with  a  persistence  untaught,  and  uncured  by 
the  ruin  that  had  been  wrought,  refused  to  recognize  the 
great  fact  of  a  complete  and  successful  revolution ;  that, 
had  they  been  met  with  frankness  and  manliness,  they 
would  not  now  have  had  to  return  home  to  tell  their  gov- 
ernment that  its  earnest  efforts  in  behalf  of  peace  had 
been  futile,  and  that  the  United  States  meant  to  subju- 
gate them  by  force  of  arms ;  that  impartial  history  must 
record  the  innocence  of  the  government  of  the  Confeder- 
ate States,  and  place  the  responsibility  of  the  bloodshed 
and  mourning  that  might  ensue  on  those  who  had  set 
naval  and  land  armaments  in  motion  to  subject  the  peo- 
ple of  one  portion  of  the  land  to  the  will  of  those  of 
another  portion. 

They  likewise  informed  the  secretary  that  the  old 
Union  was  broken  up,  and  that  its  disintegration  had  be- 


Chap.  XXXIV.]  APPLICATION  OF  THE  COMMISSIONERS.  23 

2:iin.     They  considered  it  proper  to  advise 

They  announce       O  J  x       x 

unfiS^iXoken   ^^"^  ^^  disHiiss  all  hopes  that  the  people 
"P"  of  the  Confederate  States  would  ever  be 

brought  to  submit  to  the  authority  of  the  United  States 
government ;  that  he  was  only  dealing  with  delusions 
when  he  sought  to  separate  the  Confederate  people  from 
their  government,  and  characterized  their  sovereign  act 
as  a  "perversion  of  a  temporary  and  partisan  excitement;" 
that  he  would  awake  to  find  these  dreams  as  unreal  and 
unsubstantial  as  others  in  which  he  had  recently  indulged. 
They  added  that  they  clearly  understood  the  refusal  of 
an  interview  with  the  President  to  be  made  on  the  ground 
that  this  would  be  a  recognition  of  the  independence  and 
separate  nationality  of  the  Confederate  States;  but  that, 
in  truth,  no  such  recognition  had  been  asked  by  them : 
they  only  sought  the  peaceful  adjustment  of  the  new  rela- 
tions springing  from  the  accomplished  revolution  in  the 
government  of  the  late  Union ;  that  the  refusal  to  enter- 
tain these  overtures  and  the  intention  to  provision  Fort 
Sumter  were  received  by  them,  and  could  be  received  by 
the  world,  only  as  a  declaration  of  war  against. the  Confed- 
erate States.     They  therefore,  in  behalf  of 

And  that  they  ac-      ,  t      .  j  l  i  i   1 1 

cept  an  appeal  to  thcir  govemmeut  and  people,  accept  the  gage 
of  battle  thus  thrown  down  to  them,  and, 
appealing  to  God  and  the  judgment  of  mankind  as  to  the 
righteousness  of  their  cause,  the  people  of  the  Confederate 
States  will  defend  their  liberties  to  the  last  against  this 
flagrant  and  open  attempt  at  their  subjugation  to  sec- 
tional power. 

The  commissioners  finally  explained  the  causes  of  a  de- 
lay of  about  three  weeks  in  presenting  this  their  commu- 
nication, that  they  had  indulged  in  hopes  of  a  pacific  solu- 
tion of  the  difficulties  through  unofficial  efforts,  and  that  it 
was  only  when  it  became  clear  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had  deter- 
mined to  appeal  to  the  sword, "  to  reduce  the  people  of 


24    OFFENSIVE  NATURE  OF  THEIR  CORRESPONDENCE.    [Sect.VII.. 

the  Confederate  States  to  the  will  of  the  section  whose 
President  he  is,"  that  they  had  resumed  official  negotia- 
tions. 

In  these  communications  to  the  national  government 
the  seceding  states  were  not  more  fortunate 

Insincere  and  oflFen-      ,  ^        ii       r^         t  t       t    i  /       -t     » 

give  character  of  the  tuau  boutu  Oarolma  had  been  (vol.  i.,  p. 

correspondence.  \    •         i  t  \  ?  i 

545)  m  the  correspondence  of  her  commis- 
sioners at  Washington.  Impartiality  could  not  approve 
of  such  an  air  of  defiance  and  audacity.  The  commis- 
sioners seemed  to  forget  that  in  the  eye  of  public  law 
they  were  traitors,  and  that  an  energetic  government 
would  have  seized  them  and  tried  them  for  their  lives. 
The  self  complacent  grandeur  they  exhibited  might  have 
been  appropriate  at  the  close  of  a  triumphant  war,  but 
not  at  the  inception  of  a  conspiracy. 

Under  such  insincere  and  clamorous  pretenses  for  peace, 
the  leaders  of  secession  were  incessantly  pressing  on  their 
preparations  for  war.  They  were  expecting  to  secure 
great  military  resources  by  the  forcible  seizure  of  nation- 
al property.  Their  Congress  had,  on  the  9th  of  March, 
passed  an  act  for  the  organization  of  an  army ;  they  were 
rapidly  constructing  offensive  works  in  Charleston  Har- 
bor for  the  reduction  of  Fort  Sumter ;  they  had  prohibit- 
ed the  supply  of  fuel,  water,  provisions  to  national  ships; 
one  of  their  states — Florida,  the  territory  of  which  had 
been  bought  from  Spain  with  the  money  of  the  Union, 
and  rescued  from  the  Indians  by  the  national  army — had 
actually  passed  a  law  punishing  with  death  any  of  its 
citizens  who  should  hold  office  under  the  United  States 
after  a  collision  had  taken  place.  Above  all,  they  over- 
looked that  a  revolt  against  an  established  government, 
whether  successful  or  unsuccessful,  must  in  modern  times 
justify  itself  in  the  sight  of  law  and  order,  and  that,  even 
admitting  that  the  Confederacy  had  already  triumphant- 


Chap.  XXXIV.]   LINCOLN  ISSUES  A  PROCLAMATION.  25 

ly  and  permanently  established  itself,  the  insolent  spirit 
of  its  correspondence  could  not  be  tolerated  by  any  for- 
eign power. 

As  soon  as  it  was  known  that  the  commissioners  would 

not  be  received  at  Washington,  the  conspir- 

der^anTt?ackon°^'  ators  took  mcasurcs  for  brinsring;  their  case 

Fort  Sumter.  ^        .,  i      .  rTii  t  i   ,i      • 

to  a  forcible  issue,  ihey  ordered  their  gen- 
eral, Beauregard,  to  effect  the  reduction  of  Fort  Sumter, 
and  wrest  from  the  national  government  that  public  work. 

By  this  high-handed  measure — a  measure  of  defiance — 
they  did  indeed  secure  the  co-operation  of  the  Slave 
States,  but  they  accomplished  more  than  that  —  they 
united  the  Free  States. 

There  was  no  other  course  for  Lincoln  but  to  resist.  It 
Lincoln  com  eiied  ^^^  imposslblc  that  such  au  attack  on  the 
JL'mimiranVsum-  Hatloual  authorlty  should  pass  without  a 
mons  Congress.  yindicatiou  by  him  of  the  national  suprem- 
acy.  On  the  15th  of  April  he  therefore  issued  the  fol- 
lowing proclamation,  calling  forth  the  militia,  and  sum- 
moning an  extra  session  of  Congress : 

"  Whereas  the  laws  of  the  United  States  have  been  for  some  thne 
past  and  now  are  opposed,  and  the  execution  thereof  obstructed  in 
the  states  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Florida,  Mississippi, 
Louisiana,  and  Texas,  by  combinations  too  powerful  to  be  suppress- 
ed by  the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceedings  or  bj  the  powers 
vested  in  the  marshals  by  law — now,  therefore,  I,  Abraham  Lincoln, 
President  of  the  United  States,  in  virtue  of  the  power  in  me  vested 
by  the  Constitution  and  the  laws,  have  thought  fit  to  call  forth  the 
militia  of  the  several  states  of  the  Union,  to  the  aggregate  number 
of  seventy-five  thousand,  in  order  to  suppress  said  combinations, 
and  to  cause  the  laws  to  be  duly  executed. 

"  The  details  for  this  object  will  be  immediately  communicated 
to  the  state  authorities  through  the  War  Department.  I  appeal  to 
all  loyal  citizens  to  favor,  facilitate,  and  aid  this  effort  to  maintain 
the  honor,  the  integrity,  and  existence  of  our  national  Union,  and 
the  perpetuity  of  popular  government,  and  to  redress  wrongs  al- 
ready long  enough  endured.  I  deem  it  proper  to  say  that  the  first 
service  assigned  to  the  forces  hereby  called  forth  will  probably  be 


26  THE  FREE  STATES  FURNISH  TROOPS.  [Sect.  VII. 

to  repossess  the  forts,  places,  and  property  which  have  been  seized 
from  the  Union,  and  in  every  event  the  utmost  care  will  be  ob- 
served, consistently  with  the  objects  aforesaid,  to  avoid  any  devas- 
tation, any  destruction  of,  or  interference  with  property,  or  any  dis- 
turbance of  peaceful  citizens  of  any  part  of  the  country.  And  I 
hereby  command  the  persons  composing  the  combinations  aforesaid 
to  disperse  and  retire  peaceably  to  their  respective  abodes  within 
twenty  days  from  this  date. 

"  Deeming  that  the  present  condition  of  public  affairs  presents 
an  extraordinary  occasion,!  do  hereby,  in  virtue  of  the  power  in  me 
vested  by  the  Constitution,  convene  both  houses  of  Congress.  The 
senators  and  representatives  are  therefore  summoned  to  assemble 
in  their  respective  chambers  at  1 2  o'clock,  noon,  on  Thursday,  the 
4th  day  of  July  next,  then  and  there  to  consider  and  determine 
such  measures  as  in  their  wisdom  the  public  safety  and  interest 
may  seem  to  demand. 

"  In  witness  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused 
the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

"Done  at  the  City  of  Washington  this  15th  day  of  April,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  sixty-one,  and 
of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States  the  eighty-fifth. 

"Abraham  Lincoln^. 
"  By  the  President : 

"Wm.  H.  Seward,  Secretary  of  State.^' 

Scarcely  was  this  proclamation  issued  when  one  of  the 

chief  hopes  of  the  conspirators  was  extin- 

compirwith\is     2:uished.     They  had  expected  that  the  Free 

call  for  troops.         ^  •'  ^ 

{States  would  make  no  warlike  resistance, 
and  had  inculcated  that  expectation  on  their  communi- 
ties. They  found,  however,  that  not  only  had  the  Presi- 
dent's demand  upon  those  states  been  complied  with  in 
a  few  hours,  but  that  in  all  directions  vast  preparations 
were  making  for  a  contest  which,  regarding  it  now  as  in- 
evitable, the  North  accepted.  The  Northern  governors 
thoroughly  sustained  the  President,  and  in  their  turn  were 
enthusiastically  supported  by  their  people. 

They  who  had  denied  that  slavery  had  any  thing  to 
do  with  the  public  troubles,  and  had  asserted  that  it  was 
the  tariff  or  other  subordinate  matters  which  had  caused 


Chap.  XXXIV.]    THE  SLAVE  STATES  EEFUSE  TROOPS.  27 

the  alienation,  received  in  wliat  now  took  place  a  complete 
answer.  The  geographical  boundary  between  allegiance 
and  opposition  to  the  government  was  at  once  ascertained 
to  be  the  slave  line. 

The  governors  of  Maryland  and  Delaware  only  prof- 
The  Slave  States    ^^^^^  troops  for  the  dcfense  of  Washington 

refuse.  Q[j.j^      ^J]  ^{^  ^^j  ^Jj^  ^^^^^^  gj^^^g  StatCS  WaS 

refused.  The  Governor  of  Virginia  replied  that  he  should 
furnish  none  for  any  such  purpose  as  that  proposed.  He 
denounced  the  object  as  for  the  subjugation  of  the  South- 
ern States,  and  accused  the  President  of  inaugurating  civil 
war.  The  Governor  of  North  Carolina  declared  that  he 
would  be  no  party  to  such  a  wicked  violation  of  the  laws 
of  the  country,  and  to  a  war  on  the  liberties  of  a  free  peo- 
ple. The  Governor  of  Kentucky  replied,  "I  say  emphati- 
cally that  Kentucky  will  furnish  no  troops  for  the  wicked 
purpose  of  subduing  her  sister  Southern  States."  The 
Governor  of  Tennessee  would  not "  furnish  a  single  man 
for  coercion,  but  fifty  thousand,  if  necessary,  for  the  de- 
fense of  our  rights  and  those  of  our  Southern  brethren." 
The  Governor  of  Missouri  replied,  "  Your  requisition  is 
illegal,  unconstitutional,  revolutionary,  inhuman,  diaboli- 
cal, and  can  not  be  complied  with."  The  Governor  of 
Arkansas  replied, "  Your  demand  is  only  adding  insult  to 
injury." 

The  calling  forth  of  the  militia  was  immediately  fol- 
lowed by  another  very  important  measure, 

Lincoln  establishes     ,^  iiti  i/»tiit  t  t 

a  blockade  of  the     thc  establishment  01  a  blockadc.     In  a  sub- 

Southern  ports.  •  ,  *, 

sequent  chapter  1  shall  consider  the  politic- 
al necessities  which  demanded  the  prohibition  of  South 
ern  commerce. 

There  were  two  methods  by  which  this  might  be  done : 
(1),  by  the  establishment  of  a  blockade;  (2),  by  the  clos- 
ure of  the  ports.     Of  these  the  former  was  selected. 


28  THE  BLOCKADE.  [Sect.  VII. 

Events  showed  tliat  the  course  thus  adopted  was  in- 
correct. But  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  Mr.  Seward 
had  not  in  the  State  Department  a  board  of  confidential 
advisers  such  as  exists  in  similar  departments  in  EurojDC, 
and  much  must  in  excuse  be  attributed  to  the  urgency 
and  confusion  of  the  times,  and  to  the  inexperience  of  a 
new  administration. 

The  blockade  proclamation  bore  upon  its  face  a  pure- 
The  proclamation  ^  dcfensivo  charactcr.  It  recited  that  an 
of  the  blockade,  insurrcctiou  had  broken  out  in  South  Caro- 
lina, Georgia,  Alabama,  Florida,  MississijDpi,  Louisiana, 
and  Texas,  in  which  states  the  revenue  laws  could  no 
longer  be  executed ;  that  the  persons  combined  in  this 
insurrection  had  threatened  to  grant  letters  of  marque 
asrainst  the  commerce  of  the  United  States.  It  called  at- 
tention  to  the  President's  proclamation  just  previously 
issued,  and  announced  that  a  blockade  of  the  ports  of  the 
states  aforesaid  would  be  forthwith  established.  It  con- 
cluded by  declaring  that  persons  molesting  the  commerce 
of  the  United  States  in  the  manner  threatened  would  be 
held  amenable  to  the  laws  of  the  United  States  for  the 
prevention  and  punishment  of  piracy. 

On  the  27th  of  April,  by  another  proclamation,  the 
Anadditionaibiock-  ports  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina  were 

ade  proclamation.       i^^l^^J^^J^       ^hc    wholc    Southem    COast    WaS 

therefore  now  embraced. 

The  political  effect  of  a  blockade  is  different  from  that 
of  a  closure  of  ports :  the  latter  is  purely 

Respective  effects  of         -,  , .         m  •         ,t        n  •  • ,  i     •  i 

a  blockade  and  of  a  a  domcstic  affair ;  the  tormer  carries  with  it 

port-closure.  ,  ,      '  , 

grave  international  consequences.  A  nation 
can  not  blockade  its  own  ports,  but  only  those  of  a  for- 
eign power.  In  the  special  case  under  the  consideration 
of  the  government,  the  course  which  was  taken  invested 
by  implication  the  Southern  Confederacy  with  the  rights 
of  an  independent  power,  raising  it  into  the  position  of  a 


Chap.  XXXIV.]  THE  BLOCKADE.  29 

lawful  belligerent,  and  conceding  that  it  was  not  to  be 
treated  as  in  rebellion,  but  as  engaged  in  lawful  war. 

Had  a  closure  of  the  ports  been  resorted  to,  all  ques- 
tions arising  under  it  would  have  been  dealt  with,  not  by 
international,  but  by  municipal  law.  The  government 
might,  if  such  were  its  pleasure,  consider  those  engaged 
in  secession  in  the  light  of  rebels,  and  apply  against  them 
the  penalties  of  treason. 

It  must  not  be  overlooked,  however,  that  in  effective- 
ness the  Blockade  has  advantages  over  the  Closure.  Ac- 
tion against  an  offender  under  the  latter  could  take  place 
lawfully  only  in  American  waters ;  under  the  former  there 
might  be  pursuit  out  in  the  open  sea. 

The  incorrect  position  into  which  things  were  brought 
by  this  selection  was  quickly  discovered.  In 
mSiShfpSdainv  a  dispatch  of  Mr.  Seward  to  Mr.  Adams, 
May  21, 1861,  it  had  been  declared  that  the 
crews  of  Confederate  privateers  should  be  treated  as  pi- 
rates, as  had  been  announced  in  the  proclamation;  but  the 
government  was  constrained  to  recede  from  that  position, 
and  consider  them  as  prisoners  of  war.  The  blockade  had 
acknowledged  them  as  belligerents. 

Nor  was  it  alone  as  regards  persons  taken  at  sea  that 
the  consequences  of  this  false  step  were  manifested.  The 
government  had  evidently  brought  itself  into  an  embar- 
rassed position  in  all  its  dealings  with  the  Confederacy. 
It  had  given  to  foreign  powers  disposed  to  unfriendly 
acts  the  excuse  that  it  had  itself  been  the  first  to  confer 
on  the  insurgents  belligerent  rights# 

But  the  conspirators,  on  their  side,  were  not  inactive. 
Not  only  had  they  issued  a  proclamation  of- 

The  secessionists      p     .  i    i  ,  o  •       .     ,  i 

issue  letters  of      lermg  Icttcrs  01  uiarquc  against  the  com- 
merce of  the  nation :  they  had  garrisoned 
all  the  forts  they  had  seized ;  they  were  rapidly  transport- 
ing an  army  of  20,000  men  into  Virginia ;  they  had  ob- 


30  DEFENSIVE  MEASUEES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT.   [Sect.  VII. 

tained  a  loan  of  eight  millions  of  dollars  for  war  pur- 
poses. 

They  raised  a  ciy  throughout  the  South  against  the 
tyrannical  coercion  to  which  they  affirmed  the  govern- 
ment was  about  to  resort.  In  the  tempest  of  passion  thus 
excited  the  secession  of  Virginia  was  accomplished. 

Finding  itself  environed  by  treason,  the  government, 

on  the  20th  of  April,  caused  to  be  seized  all 

seiJef SgmSs  of  the  dispatches  which  had  accumulated  in 

the  past  year.  /■  i         rv*  t        •  i 

the  various  telegraph  omces  during  the  past 
year,  the  avowed  object  being  the  detection  of  movements 
that  had  been  made  in  aid  of  the  conspiracy.  A  more 
important  end,  however,  was  gained  in  the  paralyzing  or 
prevention  of  such  movements  for  the  future.  Later,  in 
the  summer  (August  26th),  with  a  view  of  preventing 
the  post-offices  being  used  for  disloyal  purposes,  the  Post- 
master General  directed  that  certain  newspapers,  which 
had  been  presented  by  a  grand  jury  as  disloyal,  should 
not  be  forwarded  by  the  mails. 

During  May  and  June  the  secessionists  were  energet- 
ically raising   and  organizing  troops   and 
aratious  of  the  se-  transporting:  them  to  Vir^rinia  and  the  oth 
er  Border  States.     At  the  close  of  that  pe 
riod  the  force   amounted  to   more  than  100,000  men 
There  was  no  other  course  for  the  United  States  govern 
ment  than  to  make  similar  preparations  for  its  own  de 
fense.     On  the  3d  of  May  the  President  issued  a  procla- 
mation  calling  for  42,034   volunteers  for 
caifs^o°S™r     three  A^ears,  ordering:   22,714   officers  and 
men  to  be  added  to  the  regular  army,  and 
18,000  seamen  to  the  navy.     Shortly  afterward,  by  a  proc- 
lamation dated  May  10  th,  he  ordered  the  commander  of 
the  United  States  forces  in  Florida  to  permit  no  person  to 
exercise  any  office  or  authority  upon  the  islands  of  Key 
West,  the  Tortugas,  and  Santa  Rosa  inconsistent  with 


Chap.  XXXIV.]    ATTITUDE  TOWAKD  FOREIGN  POWERS.  3I 

the  laws  and  Constitution  of  the  United  States ;  author- 
And  suspends  the  ^^mg  Mm,  if  needful,  to  suspend  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus.  Jiahecis  covpus,  aud  to  remove  from  the  vicin- 
ity of  the  United  States  fortresses  all  dangerous  or  sus- 
pected persons." 

The  attitude  assumed  toward  foreign  powers  by  the 
government  is  indicated  by  the  instructions 

Kelations  of  the  re-       .  ,        -11  r         at  i  i  •     •    i  j     j  i 

public  to  foreign      2:iven  to  Mr.  Adams,  the  minister  at  the 

countries.  ^  •        t 

English  court.  He  is  directed  to  express 
the  appreciation  of  the  American  government  for  the 
marks  of  good- will  which  had  been  shown  to  the  United 
States,  but  to  be  careful  not  to  rely  on  any  such  sympa- 
thies or  national  kindness.  He  is  to  make  no  admission 
of  the  weakness  of  his  government,  but  rather  to  assert 
its  strength.  He  is  to  listen  to  no  suggestions  of  compro- 
mise of  the  present  disputes  under  any  foreign  auspices. 
If  he  finds  the  English  government  tolerating  the  appli- 
instructionstothe   catlou  of  the  scccdiug  states,  or  wavering 

ministers  abroacL        r^^^^    j^^  j^^    ^^^^    ^^^  ^^^    ^.  mOmCUt  leaVO 

them  to  suppose  that  they  can  gi-ant  that  application  and 
remain  friends  of  the  United  States.  Promptly  he  is  to 
assure  them  that  if  they  determine  to  ret^ognize,  they 
must,  at  the  same  time,  prepare  to  enter  into  alliance  with 
the  enemies  of  the  republic.  He  is  to  represent  in  Lon- 
don his  whole  country,  not  a  part  of  it.  If  he  is  asked  to 
divide  that  duty  with  others,  diplomatic  relations  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  the  American  republic  will  be 
at  once  suspended. 

He  is  forbidden  .to  rest  his  opposition  to  the  applica- 
tion of  the  Confederate  States  on  any  ground  of  favor,  or 
to  draw  into  debate  before  the  British  government  any 
opposing  moral  principles  at  the  foundation  of  the  exist- 
ing controversy.  He  must  indulge  in  no  expressions  of 
harshness,  disrespect,  or  even  impatience  toward  the  seced- 
ing states  or  their  people,  but  steadfastly  bear  in  mind 


32  ATTITUDE  TOWARD  FOEEIGN  POWERS.         [Sect.  VII. 

that,  notwithstanding  the  present  temporary  delusion, 
these  states  must  always  continue  to  be  honored  mem- 
bers of  the  Federal  Union. 

Before  Mr.  Adams  could  reach  London,  the  British  gov- 
The  secessionists  ^mmeut  had  determined  to  acknowledge  the 
remgereu^tfbV'  Confedcratcs  as  a  belligerent  power.  The 
England.  Frcuch   govemmeut    also    took    a    similar 

course.  Against  this  Mr.  Adams  was  directed  to  protest 
energetically.  .The  ministers  of  those  governments  at 
Washington  requested  an  interview  with  the  Secretary 
of  State,  that  they  might  read  to  him  the  instructions 
they  had  received.  This  was  declined,  it  being  under- 
stood that  the  purport  of  the  paper  was  to  the  effect  that 
the  British  government  had  arrived  at  the  decision  that 
"  this  country  is  divided  into  two  belligerent  parties,  of 
which  this  government  represents  one,  and  that  Great 
Britain  assumes  the  attitude  of  a  neutral  between  them." 
Mr.  Seward,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Adams  (June  19th),  says, 
"  This  government  could  not,  consistently  with  a  just  re- 
gard to  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States,  permit  itself 
to  debate  these  novel  and  extraordinary  positions  with 
the  government  of  her  Britannic  majesty,  much  less  can 
we  consent  that  that  government  shall  announce  to  us  a 
decision  derogatory  to  that  sovereignty  at 

Instructions  to  Mr.         i»t«ii  •         t';i  ,  •  i 

Adams,  the  minis-   which  it  has  arrivcd  without  previously  con- 

tcr  to  England.  ,  i  .  rm 

terring  with  us  upon  the  question,  ine 
United  States  are  still  solely  and  exclusively  sovereign 
within  the  territories  they  have  lawfully  acquired  and 
long  possessed,  as  they  have  always  .been.  They  are  at 
peace  wath  all  the  world,  as,  with  unimportant  exceptions, 
they  have  always  been.  They  are  living  under  the  obli- 
gations of  the  law  of  nations,  and  of  treaties  <*^vith  Great 
Britain,  just  the  same  now  as  heretofore.  They  are,  of 
course,  the  friend  of  Great  Britain,  and  they  insist  that 
Great  Britain  shall  remain  their  friend  now  just  as  she 


Chap.  XXXIV.]    ATTITUDE  TOWARD  FOREIGN  POWERS.  33 

has  Mtherto  been.  Great  Britain,  by  virtue  of  their  re- 
lations, is  a  stranger  to  parties  and  sections  in  this  coun- 
try, whether  they  are  loyal  to  the  United  States  or  not, 
and  Great  Britain  can  neither  rightfully  qualify  the  SOV' 
ereignty  of  the  United  States,  nor  concede,  nor  recognize 
any  rights,  or  interests,  or  power  in  any  party,  state,  or 
section  in  contravention  to  the  unbroken  sovereignty  of 
the  Federal  Union.  What  is  now  seen  in  this  country  is 
the  occurrence,  by  no  means  peculiar,  but  frequent  in  all 
countries,  more  frequent  even  in  Great  Britain  than  here, 
of  an  armed  insurrection  engaged  in  attempting  to  over- 
throw the  regularly  constituted  and  established  govern- 
ment. There  is,  of  course,  the  employment  of  force  by  the 
government  to  suppress  the  insurrection,  as  every  other 
government  necessarily  employs  force  in  such  cases.  But 
these  incidents  by  no  means  constitute  a  state  of  war,  im- 
pairing sovereignty,  creating  belligerent  sections,  and  en- 
titling foreign  states  to  intervene  or  to  act  as  neutrals  be- 
tween them,  or  in  any  other  way  to  cast  off  lawful  obli- 
gations to  the  nation  thus  for  the  moment  disturbed. 
Any  other  principle  than  this  would  be  to  resolve  gov- 
ernment every  wl\ere  into  a  thing  of  accident  and  caprice, 
and  ultimately  all  human  society  into  a  state  of  perpetual 
war." 

The  American  ministers  at  all  the  foreign  courts  re- 
iDstructions  to  oth-  cclved  iustructious  of  a  similar  tenor.  They 
erforeiguministers.  ^^^^  emphatically  told, " You  cau  uot  bc  too 

decided  or  explicit  in-'making  known  to  the  government 
that  there  is  not  now,  nor  has  there  been,  nor  will  there 
be,  the  least  idea  existing  in  the  government  of  suffering 
a  dissolution  of  this  Union  to  fake  place  in  any  way 
whatever." 
Political  ideas  at       At  the  time  of  the  inauguration  of  Lin- 

the  time  of  Lin-  t.i  ,  ti«t»t 

coin's  accession,    colu  there  wcre  two  political  ideas  strug- 
gling for  supremacy  in  the  republic. 
II.— C 


o^  THE  POLITICAL  IDEAS  OF  THE  TIME.  [Sect.  VIL 

Tke  first  may  be  conveniently  designated  the  New  En- 
dand  idea.     Its  embodiment  would  have 

The  New  England    P  ,,       tt    •  i*  ii  xi 

idea.  heen  tne  Union  expanding  all  over  tne  con- 

tinent— a  vast  republic  inhabited  altogether  by  free  men, 
and  resting  on  individual  intelligence. 

The  second  or  Southern  idea  would  have  been  realized 
by  the  consolidation  of  the  Slave  States  un- 
The  Southern  idea.  ^^^  ^^^  ^^^^^^  government  of  a  purely  mil- 
itary type,  and  separated  from  the  Free  States  of  the 
Union.  Such  a  government,  accepting  negro  slavery  as 
its  essential  basis,  would  have  renewed  the  African  trade. 
It  would  have  looked  forward  to  territorial  expansion 
round  the  Mexican  and  Caribbean  Seas,  and  expected 
eventually  to  embrace  the  West  India  Islands.  In  cot- 
ton, sugar,  coffee,  and  other  tropical  products 'it  would 
have  found  sources  of  vast  wealth,  and  in  the  possession 
of  the  mouths  of  the  Mississippi  a  control  over  all  th^ 
interior  of  the  North  American  continent. 

An  embodiment  of  the  first  of  these  ideas  would  there- 
fore have  been  a  republic  founded  on  Eeason ;  an  embod- 
iment of  the  second  would  have  been  a  military  empire 
founded  on  Force. 

The  former  had  innate  strength;  it  was  in  harmony 
with  the  spirit  of  the  age ;  it  accepted  the  traditions  of 
the  republic  founded  by  Washington.  It  had  therefore 
a  past  history,  and  was  identified  with  Liberty,  Justice, 
Progress. 

The  second  was  in  opposition  to  the  conclusions  of 
modern  civilization.  Its  success  implied  Injustice,  Op- 
pression, and  Violence.  Nevertheless,  as  a  political  con- 
ception, it  was  not  without  barbaric  splendor. 

Simultaneously  there  also  existed  with  these  two  ideas 

a  minor  but  not  unimportant  influence.    Its 

fiSu  of'the  DemJ-   rcprescntatives  were  found  in  a  portion  of  the 

cratic  party.         Democratlc  party — that  party  which  long, 


Chap.  XXXIV.]  THE  DEMOCRATIG  PARTY.  gg 

and  often  witli  brilliant  success,  had  swayed  the  destinies 
of  the  republic.  The  political  movements  of  the  civil 
war  can  not  be  understood  without  a  clear  appreciation 
of  the  position  and  action  of  this  influence. 

The  retention  of  power  by  the  Democratic  party  had 
heretofore  depended  on  an  alliance  between  the  slave 
interest  of  the  South  and  the  democracy  of  the  North. 
That  democracy  had,  however,  in  the  course  of  time,  be- 
come affected  by  the  spirit  of  the  age.  The  contagion 
was  not  limited  to  its  lower  ranks,  for  among  the  great 
statesmen  who  guided  it  there  were  some  whose  actions 
plainly  indicated  that  they  could  no  longer  accept  the 
rigid  traditions  of  the  past.  The  South  took  alarm  when 
she  saw  what  their  intentions  were  in  relation  to  the  na- 
tional territories.  Imperious  and  impetuous,  she  broke 
with  them.  After  the  meeting  of  the  Convention  for 
the  nomination  of  a  President  in  Charleston  (1860),  the 
quarrel  could  no  longer  be  concealed. 

At  this  moment,  therefore,  the  Democratic  party  was  di- 
vided in  itself,  and  hence  was  intrinsically  weak.  There 
were  very  many  persons  belonging  to  it  animated  by  the 
purest  patriotism,  who  had  accepted  its  maxims  as  not 
unsuitable  in  times  of  peace,  but  who  repudiated  them 
instantly  and  utterly  when  it  became  apparent  that  the 
life  of  the  nation  was  about  to  be  assailed.  Among  them 
the  republic  found  some  of  its  noblest  and  ablest  defend- 
ers. Democracies  never  betray  theix  country.  That  is 
done  only  by  privileged  classes. 

But  there  was,  as  has  been  said,  a  portion  of  the  party 
who  sought  only  for  a  perpetuation  of  place  and  power. 
These  were  ignobly  insensible  to  the  scorn  with  which 
the  angry  South  was  treating  them.  They  had  a  seces- 
sion scheme  of  their  own.  If  New  England,  with  her 
troublesome  ideas  and  dangerous  influence,  could  be  cut 
off,  a  predominance  would  once  more  be  given  to  the 


36  LINCOLN.  [Sect.  VII. 

Southern  scale  of  tlie  balance,  and  they,  with  their  old 
ally,  might  enjoy  another  period  of  power.  They  took 
encouragement  from  the  belief  that  in  revolutions  it  is 
factions  which  always  rule. 

Surprise  has  been  sometimes  expressed  at  the  extraor- 
dinary deception  which  the  South  apparently  practiced 
on  herself  in  looking  for  a  divided  North,  and  aid  in  her 
warlike  proceedings  from  the  Democratic  party,  which 
party  must  have  become  a  nonentity  with  the  success  of 
secession.  That  expectation,  however,  rested  on  a  knowl- 
edge of  this  state  of  things. 

This  fragment  of  the  Democratic  party  was  therefore 
selfish  and  ignominious  in  its  aim.  With  protestations 
of  devotion  to  human  liberty,  it  did  not  shrink  from  be- 
ing the  accomplice  of  slavery.  It  reflected  none  of  the  re- 
publican grandeur  issuing  from  the  first  idea,  none  of  the 
imperial  splendor  of  the  second.  Ignobly  hunting  for 
place,  it  offered  as  a  price  the  life  of  the  nation,  and  was 
spurned  with  unutterable  contempt  by  that  very  South 
whose  favor  it  sought  to  conciliate. 

With  infinite  labor  and  anxiety,  Lincoln  had  at  length 
organized  his  administration,  and  settled  its  domestic  and 
foreign  policy. 

One  of  his  Illinois  neighbors,  who  had  long  known  him, 
says, "  This  tall,  gaunt,  melancholy  man  float- 

Lincoln  gains  the         -i    •     ,  ,--«or»-i'  r»*i 

support  of  the  peo-  ed  luto  Qur  couuty  m  I80I  m  a  trail  canoe 
down  the  North  Fork  of  the  Sangamon  Eiver, 
friendless,  penniless,  powerless,  alone — ^begging  for  work 
in  this  city — ragged,  and  struggling  for  the  common  nec- 
essaries of  life.  This  man,  this  peculiar  man,  left  us  in 
1861  the  President  of  the  United  States,  backed  by 
friends,  and  power,  and  fame."  Notwithstanding  his  rus- 
tic manners  and  want  of  social  polish,  there  was  some- 
thing in  his  demeanor  which  made  even  those  who  were 


Chap.  XXXIV.]  LINCOLN  AND  DAVIS.  37 

greatly  his  superiors  in  these  respects,  but  who  looked 
only  to  the  good  of  the  country,  feel  that  its  administra- 
tion was  safe  in  his  hands.  Such  as  were  hoping  for 
the  overthrow  of  the  government  regarded  him  with 
hatred  and  disgust.  When  Mr.  Seward  desired  to  pre- 
sent to  him  Mr.  Mason,  who  subsequently  became  one 
of  the  agents  of  the  Confederacy  in  Europe,  that  senator, 
with  a  scowl  of  horror  and  scorn,  shook  his  head  and  de- 
clined. 

But  Lincoln  soon  found  that  there  was  a  sustaining 
power  behind  him  on  which  he  could  securely  rely — the 
people— the  plain  people,  as  he  affectionately  called  them. 
They  cared  nothing  about  his  fashionable  short-comings; 
they  looked  only  to  the  greatness  of  his  purposes.  If  he 
chose  to  speak  in  parables,  they  knew  that  it  was  not  the 
first  time  in  the  world  that  that  had  been  done,  and  that 
parables  have  been  delivered  which  will  instruct  the  hu- 
man race  to  the  end  of  time.  When  it  was  said  in  for- 
eign countries  Davis  is  creating  a  nation  and  making  his- 
tory in  Richmond,  and  Lincoln  is  telling  stories  in  Wash- 
ington, they  were  content  to  await  the  event. 
paredTfthuSt    They  knew  that  for  nations  splendid  talents 

of  Davis. 

are  not  always  the   safest   guide. '^   While 
Davis  was  driving  his  rivals  from  his  presence, 'and  throw- 
ing into  obscurity  or  exile  the  ablest  men  o^4he  South — 
those  who  could  have  made  the  rebellion'Jsuccessful,  had 
that  been  possible — Lincoln  was  selecting  his  advisers 
from  his  political  opponents.     Davis  was  exasperating 
the  passions  of  his  people,  and  teaching  them  revenge ; 
the  weakness  of  Lincoln  was  benevolence.    And  the  issue 
was    such   as  might  have  been   expected. 
dedine?"in"kiflu^   Thc  euthusiastlc  devotion  which  had  wel- 
comed Davis  to  power  was  succeeded  by 
distrust,  dissatisfaction,  hatred.     The  wreck  of  the  Con- 
federacy, the  ruin  of  the  people,  were  at  last  imputed  to 


S%  LINCOLN.  [Sect.  VII. 

him.  On  tlie  other  hand,  the  misgivings  which  attended 
Lincoln's  accession  were  replaced  by  confidence ;  he  end- 
ed by  becoming  politically  omnipotent. 

Clad  in  black,  the  ungainly-looking  President  might  be 
seen,  after  the  hour  had  come  for  visitors  to  be  excluded, 
pacing  to  and  fro  past  the  windows  of  his  apartment,  his 
hands  behind  him,  his  head  bent  forward  upon  his  breast, 
lost  in  profound  meditation,  a  picture  of  sorrow,  care,  and 
Lincoln  in  his  hours  auxicty.  Tho  artlst  Carpenter,  who  enjoyed 
of  retirement.  frequcut  Opportunities  of  thus  observing  him 
in  his  moments  of  retirement,  says, "  His  was  the  saddest 
face  in  repose  that  I  ever  knew.  His  eyes,  of  a  bluish  gray 
tint,  always  in  deep  shadow  from  the  upper  lids,  which 
were  unusually  heavy,  gave  him  an  expression  remark- 
ably pensive  and  tender,  often  inexpressibly  sad.  A  pe- 
culiar dreaminess  sometimes  stole  over  his  face." 

As  is  not  unfrequently  observed  of  Western  men,  there 
were  mysterious  traits  of  superstition  in  his 

The  superstitious        i  .  a^*        t  •  ••         it 

traits  of  his  char-    cuaractcr.   A  mend  once  inquirins:  the  cause 

acter.  J-  c 

of  a  deep  depression  under  which  he  seemed 
to  be  suffering, "  I  have  seen  this  evening  again,"  he  re- 
plied, "what  I  once  saw  before,  on  the  evening  of  my 
nomination  at  Chicago.  As  I  stood  before  a  mirror,  there 
were  two  images  of  myself — a  bright  one  in  front,  and 
one  that  was  very  pallid  standing  behind.  It  complete- 
ly unnerved  me.  The  bright  one,  I  know,  is  my  past,  the 
pale  one  my  coming  life."  And  feeling  that  there  is  no 
armor  against  Destiny,  he  added, "  I  do  not  think  I  shall 
live  to  see  the  end  of  my  term.  I  try  to  shake  off  the 
vision,  but  it  still  keeps  haunting  me." 

He  began  to  receive  threatening  letters  soon  after  his 
nomination.  He  kept  them  by  themselves,  labeled,  "Let- 
ters on  Assassination."  After  his  death,  one  was  found 
among  them  connected  with  the  plot  which  had  suc- 
ceeded. 


Chap.  XXXIV.]  LINCOLN.  3.9 

"  I  can  not  help  being  in  this  way  "  lie  said ;  ^^  my  father 
was  so  before  me.  He  dreamed  that  he  rode  through  an 
unfrequented  path  to  a  strange  house,  the  surroundings 
and  furnishing  of  which  were  vividly  impressed  on  his 
mind.  At  the  fireside  there  was  sitting  a  woman  whose 
features  he  distinctly  saw.  She  was  engaged  in  paring 
an  apple.  That  woman  was  to  be  his  wife.  Though  a 
very  strong-minded  nmn,  he  could  not  shake  off  the  vision. 
It  haunted  him  incessantly,  until  it  compelled  him  to  go 
down  the  unfrequented  way.  He  quietly  opened  the 
door  of  what  he  recognized  to  be  the  house,  and  saw  at  a 
glance  that  it  was  where  he  had  been  in  his  dream. 
There  was  a  woman  at  the  fireside  engaged  in  paring  an 
apple.     And  the  rest  of  his  dream  came  to  pass." 

"  There  will  be  bad  news  to-night,"  he  said  on  another 
occasion.  "  Why,  how  do  you  know  that,  Mr.  President  ?" 
"  I  dropped  asleep,  and  saw  in  a  dream  what  has  often  be- 
fore been  the  precursor  to  me  of  disaster.  I  saw  a  ship 
sailing  very  fast."    And  that  night  bad  news  came ! 

Perhaps,  in  the  opinion  of  the  supercilious  critic,  these 
idle  stories  are  unworthy  of  the  page  of  history.  The 
materialist  philosopher  may  say, "  Had  Lincoln  taken  the 
trouble  to  hold  up  a  candle  before  his  mirror,  he  might 
have  seen  a  dozen  pale  images  of  it !  That 
have^'expeSceT''  is  vcrv  truc.     But  docs  uot  Mstory  record 

gimilar  delusions.  _  "^  ^    _  ,       ,        i  t  ,     , 

that  some  of  the  greatest  soldiers,  statesmen, 
lawgivers — men  who  have  left  ineffaceable  marks  on  the 
annals  of  the  human  race— have  been  influenced  by  like 
delusions?  There  was  connected  with  the  most  import- 
ant of  all  proclamations  ever  issued  by  an  American  Pres-  ^ 
i^ent — the  proclamation  of  slave  emancipation — an  inci- 
dent of  the  kind :  a  vow  that  in  a  certain  contingency  it 
should  be  put  forth.  Lincoln  implicitly  believed  that  it 
is  the  Supreme  Ruler  who  determines  our  fate.  Trifles 
though  these  may  be,  it  is  not  for  the  historian  to  hide 


40  LINCOLN.  [Sect.VIL 

them  from  his  reader,  who  perhaps  may  add  the  reflec- 
tion that  it  is  better  to  have  the  child -like,  innocent 
dreams  of  Lincoln,  than  the  guilty  and  appalling  mid- 
night visions  of  the  conscience-stricken  Davis. 

Under  a  weight  of  responsibility  and  care  pressing 
upon  him  unceasingly  by  day  and  by  night,  Lincoln  in- 
stinctively felt  the  necessity  of  momentary  relief     An 
anecdote  well  told,  an  amusing  incident,  would  rescue  him 
His  necessity  for    ^om  dccp  dcprcssion.    A  strip  of  steel  must 
relaxation.  |^^  puUcd  back  bcforc  it  can  spring  forward. 

And  so  it  was  with  Lincoln's  mind — it  must  be  relaxed 
before  it  could  display  its  force.  Perhaps  this  was  never 
more  strikingly  seen  than  on  the  occasion  of  his  submit- 
ting the  Proclamation  of  Emancipation  to  his  cabinet — 
declared  by  himself  to  be  the  great  and  central  act  of  his 
administration.  He  introduced  it  by  riding  some  ©f  the 
grotesque  sayings  of  Artemus  Ward. 

Day  by  day  the  good  sense  and  integrity  of  the  rustic 
President  shone  forth  more  brightly  in  the  sorest  trials. 
It  is  not  in  foreign  wars,  but  in  domestic  troubles  that 
the  greatness  of  a  ruler  is  seen.  In  a  country  of  the  in- 
habitants of  which  it  is  said  that  every  one  forgets  yes- 
terday, the  massive  virtues  of  the  President 

The  unbounded  con-  ,  .  .      t        -tt*  i  i 

fidence  of  the  people  wcrc  bomc  m  mmd.    His  countrymen  learn- 

in  him.  ,  ^  , 

ed  by  experience  to  look  upon  him,  unpol- 
ished as  he  was,  as  a  monolith  hewn  out  of  the  living 
rock,  and  capable  of  safely  sustaining  the  heaviest  weight 
of  empire. 


CHAPTER  XXXV.      ^ 

RETROSPECT  OF  THE  PROGRESS  OF  THE  CONSPIRACY  AT  THE 
INAUGURATION  OF  LINCOLN. 

The  conspirators,  taking  advantage  of  the  approaching  Presidential  interregnum, 
had  appointed  a  Convention  to  be  held  at  Montgomery,  and  taken  measures  for 
raising  an  army.  They  proposed  to  seize  Washington,  and  prevent  the  inaugu- 
ration of  Lincoln.  They  attempted  to  bring  over  the  Border  States  to  their 
cause,  and  succeeded  with  Virginia,  agreeing  to  the  conditions  she  exacted,  that 
her  internal  slave-trade  should  be  protected,  and  that  Richmond  should  be  made 
the  seat  of  the  proposed  government. 

The  conspiracy  may  be  considered  as  ending  in  complete  success  at  the  epoch  of 
the  opening  of  the  Confederate  Congress  at  Richmond. 

After  that  epoch  the  Secession  authority  presented  the  character  of  an  organized 
government. 

The  entire  secession  movement  presents  two  phases: 

1st.  A  conspiracy  of  individuals  against  the 

phases  in  th^esecea-  rcpublic.     2d.  The  action  of  an  or2:anized 

sion  movement.  •*■  *-" 

government. 

It  may  be  a  question  at  what  point  we  ought  to  place 
the  line  of  demarcation  between  these  phases.  Some 
persons  may  be  disposed  to  select  the  epoch  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  Confederate  government  at  Montgomery; 
but  for  a  long  time  subsequently  to  that  event  the  aspect 
The  boundary  be-  of  a  cousplracy  was  uot  lost.  This  is  par- 
em  ticularly  manifested  in  the  case  of  the  seces- 
sion of  Virginia,  which  was  brought  about  partly  by  in- 
trigue ,and  partly  by  violence.  But  it  committed  to  the 
movement  the  most  powerful  of  all  the  Slave  States,  and, 
by  the  seizure  of  the  navy  yard  at  Norfolk,  contributed 
to  it  essential  war-supplies.  Had  Virginia  not  joined  the 
secessionists  they  could  have  had  no  hopes  of  success. 

Again,  there  are  reasons  which  would  lead  us  to  adopt 


42  EETKOSPECT  OF  THE  CONSPIKACY.  [Sect.  VII. 

is  the  battle  of  Bull  ^s  the  "bouiidary  -  mait  the  opening  of  the 
hig''oftheco1i?eS-  Confederate  Congress  at  Kichmond  and  the 

ate  Congress.  .  .,.. 

contemporaneous  military  occurrence,  the 
battle  of  Bull  Kun.  The  ewnts  of  the  time  seem  to  har- 
monize very  well  Vith  this  view,  and  accordingly  I  shall 
venture  to  #opt  it.  Such  artificial  divisions  are  very 
useful  for  historical  purposes,  since  they  enable  us  to 
group  events  more  distinctly,  and  discover  their  mutual 
relations. 

The  primary  object  of  the  conspirators  was  the  reten- 
tion of  political  power  long  enjoyed,  but  which  they 
plainly  perceived  was  about  to  slip  from  their  grasp. 
The  first  seat  of  their  action  was  the  United 
conspiracy  was  in    Statcs  Scuate ;  thc  most  effcctivc  of  their 

Washington.  ' 

earlier  co- laborers  were  ministers  in  the 
cabinet  of  Buchanan.  History  furnishes  no  parallel  to 
the  midnight  treachery  of  that  cabinet  except  in  the 
dai'k  and  bloody  mysteries  of  the  palaces  of  Oriental 
iQonarchs. 

There  is  a  period  in  the  affairs  of  the  republic  which 
The  favorable  peri-  siugularly  favors  the  perpetration  of  treason. 
It  is  during  the  last  days  of  a  retiring,  and 
the  first  days  of  an  incoming  President.  He  who  is  about 
to  lay  down  power  has  but  little  motive  for  energetic 
action.  He  desires  to  close  his  administration  in  tran- 
quillity. He  feels  that  his  strength  is  gradually  declin- 
ing— that  the  men  around  him  are  turning  from  the  set- 
ting, and  expecting  the  rising  sun.  Nothing  is  done  to- 
day if  it  can  possibly  be  postponed  until  to-morrow ;  no 
trials  and  dangers  are  encountered  if  they  can  be  left  for 
the  succeeding  administration  to  meet.  And  this,  in  its 
turn,  offers  facilities  to  the  conspirator.  It  takes  posses- 
sion of  the  government  unfamiliar  with  practical  details, 
and  hardly  knowing  what  it  ought  to  do.     For  a  season 


Chap.  XXXV.]   PKELIxAIINARY  STEPS  OF  THE  CONSPIRATOES.       43 

r 

^t  can  not  give  due  attention  to  public  affairs,  no  matter 
Low  urgent  they  may  be;  the  clamorous  demands  of 
those  who  have  promoted  it  to  power  for  office  and  emol- 
ument must  be  attended  to  first.  Sweeping  removals  are 
made  in  every  department;  the  new-comers  are  ill-in- 
formed of  the  business  of  the  offices  they  have  gained. 
Still  worse,  all  this  does  not  occur  unexpectedly ;  it  is 
foreseen,  and  hence  may  constitute  an  essential  element  in 
a  plot.  In  Europe,  no  one  can  tell  when  the  sovereign 
will  die;  his  successor  has  long  been  ascertained,  and 
when  the  change  occurs  the  machinery  of  state  moves  on 
without  embarrassment. 

In  previous  chapters  I  have  related  how,  through  the 
Origin  of  the  con-  opcratiou  of  Physical  and  Polifical  Causes, 
spnacy.  ^  tcndcucy  to  partition  in  the  republic  had 

arisen.  Wherever  such  a  tendency  exists,  it  eventually 
finds  an  actual  expression.  So  here  and  there  through- 
out the  South  there  were  not  wanting  persons,  each  of 
whom  had  his  own  plan  of  secession.  For  example,  there 
were  Virginians  who  would  have  seized  Washington  in 
1856  if  Fremont  had  been  elected.  In  South  Carolina, 
in  Alabama,  and  indeed  throughout  the  Cotton  States, 
there  were  many  different  disunion  schemes;  but  the  one 
which  at  length  reached  a  fatal  issue  was  organized  by 
United  States  senators  and  members  of  the  cabinet  of 
Buchanan. 

Though  these  men  did  not  know  the  strength,  they 
knew  well  the  weaknesses  of  the  government  they  under- 
took to  betray.  They  knew  what  was  the ,  proper  time 
Adoption  of  a  popu-  for  actiou,  aud  that  "Danger  to  slavery" 
!''^^^^'  was  their  correct  war-cry.     With  that  the 

Southern  people  could  be  unified.  By  dexterous  manip- 
ulations with  the  governors  and  Legislatures  of  the  Bor- 
der States  they  expected  to  attach  those  important  eomr 
munities  to  their  cause,  and  oppose  them  as  a  bulwark  to 


44  PRELIMINAEY  STEPS  OF  THE  CONSPIRATORS.    [Sect.  VII. 

Measures  first  deter-  the  attacks  of  the  lojal  portioii  of  the  nai 
mined  on.  ^.^^^     They  intended  to  seize  Washington, 

to  prevent  the  inauguration,  or  to  depose,  perhaps  to  dis- 
pose of,  the  new  President,  to  secure  the  government — to 
Mexicanize  the  nation.  They  concerted  for  the  capture 
of  all  the  national  works  in  the  Slave  States,  and  pre- 
pared garrisons  for  them ;  they  entrapped  the  army,  and 
dispersed  the  navy  of  the  nation,  which  they  insidiously 
disarmed.  Taking  advantage  of  the  offices  they  control- 
led, they  threw  into  confusion  its  finances,  robbed  its 
treasury,  and  broke  into  its  mints.  They  stripped  its  ar- 
senals of  rifles  and  cannon,  its  dock-yards  of  ships.  They 
rendered  nugatory  its  courts  of  law,  and  seduced  from 
their  allegiance  the  officers  of  its  army  and  navy.  They 
introduced  insubordination  into  the  public  service,  and 
thereby  paralyzed  it.  They  kept  their  confederates  in 
Congress  for  the  express  purpose  of  obstructing  legisla- 
tion, and  ruining  the  government  which  had  been  intrust- 
ed to  their  hands.  They  tried  to  exclude  from  Washing- 
ton all  means  of  defense,  and. thereby  make  it  easy  of 
capture. 

Posterity  will  regard  such  hideous  crimes  with  detesta- 
tion. It  will  look  with  admiration  on  that  great  govern- 
ment which  at  length,  after  many  trials,  having  these  mal- 
efactors at  its  mercy,  could  nobly  refrain  from  vengeance, 
and  act  on  the  principle  recommended  by  Caesar  to  the 
Senate  of  Rome  respecting  the  culprits  of  the  conspir- 
acy of  Catiline, "  not  to  retaliate,  but  to  consider  rather 
what  was  worthy  of  its  own  majesty  than  what  might 
justly  be  inflicted  on  its  enemies." 

A  secret  meeting  of  the  conspirators  had  been  held  in 
Washington  (January  5th,  1861),  at  which  the  senators 
from  Georgia,  Alabama,  Louisiana,  Arkansas,  Texas,  Mis- 
sissippi, and  Florida  were  present.  They  decided  on  the 
plan  of  action  subsequently  carried  out,  and  determined 


Chap.  XXXV.]  WASHINGTON  TO  BE  SEIZED.  45 

that  a  Convention  of  the  seceding  states 

A  Convention  to  be,         ^  -.  ,,  ,  ~%ir       ,  t»  it 

held  at  Moutgome-  should  assemble  at  Montgomery  during  the 
following  month.  The  secession  of  the  Slave 
States  which  had  not  yet  joined  in  the  movement  was  to 
be  secured,  if  possible,  without  submitting  the  matter  to 
a  vote  of  the  people ;  but  their  senators  and  representa- 
tives were  to  remain  in  Congress  as  long  as  they  could,  to 
paralyze  any  movements  hostile  to  the  conspiracy;  the 
arming  of  the  South  was  to  go  on  unceasingly;  munitions 
of  war  of  every  kind  were  to  be  assiduously  provided, 
.  ,    and  such  preparations  made  that  a  military 

and  an  army  raised.  J-       -■•  ,  ^    *' 

force  of  100,000  men,  exceedmg  any  thing 
that  it  was  supposed  the  government  could  raise,  was  to 
be  in  readiness  at  the  time  of  Lincoln's  inauguration. 
Every  exertion  was  to  be  made  to  obtain  possession  of, 
the  forts,  dock-yards,  arsenals,  custom-houses,  mints,  and 
other  public  property,  to  induce  the  resignation  of  a];my 
and  navy  officers,  and  to  constrain  the  various  legal  and 
other  agents  in  the  South  to  refuse  to  do  their  duty. 

The  seizure  of  Washington  had  become  a  part  of  the 
Washington  is  to  be  plau,  aud  hcuce  the  importance  ofprohibit- 
seized.  .^g^  ^_^  Congressional  action,  if  possible,  the 

accumulation  of  troops  in  it.  If  that  could  be  accom- 
plished, and  Lincoln's  inauguration  prevented,  his  elec- 
tion was  to  be  declared  unconstitutional,  and  possession 
of  the  government  taken  by  the  conspirators  under  plea 
of  the  right  of  self  preservation. 

During  these  dark  days  the  fortunes  of  the  republic  de- 
pended on  the  firmness  of  the  attorney  general,  Stanton. 

When  the  cabinet  of  Buchanan  had  become  disorgan- 
ized through  the  resignation  of  so  many  of  its  members, 
there  were  three  things  of  supreme  importance  to  the  na- 
tion to  be  done:  1st,  to  secure  the  Secretaryship  of  War; 
2d,  to  secure  the  Secretaryship  of  the  Treasury ;  3d,  to 
make  Washington  safe  from  seizure. 


46  HOLT,  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR.  [Sect.  VII. 

As  respects  the  War  Office,  wlieii  tlie  defalcation  in 
the  Department  of  the  Interior  was  detect- 

Importance  to  the         -,  -.   f-^-,        -,.  ,  n  t    *  i 

nation  of  securing   ed,  and  1*  lovd  s  acccptanccs  lound  m  place 

the  War  Office.  '  '^  -T        t      '    ^  • 

of  the  stolen  Indian  bonds,  it  became  imjDos- 
sible  for  that  minister  to  continue  any  longer  in  the  cabi- 
net. With  the  deepest  reluctance  was  Buchanan  con- 
strained to  admit  Floyd's  complicity.  Often  was  he 
heard  by  his  friends  to  exclaim,  "  He  can  not  have  done 
it,  he  can  not  have  done  it!"  When  Floyd's  letter  of 
resignation  was  handed  to  him,  foreseeing  its  purport,  his 
emotion  could  not  be  concealed.  His  trembling  hand  set 
the  crisp. and  crumpling  sheet  nearer  and  then  farther 
•from  his  eyes,  w^hich  seemed  to  refuse  their  office.  With 
difficulty  he  deciphered  the  well-known  but  now  mazy 
and  swimming  characters.  The  fortunate  star  of  the  re- 
public was  for  the  moment  in  the  ascendant,  and,  at  the 
Holt  appointed  Sec-  eamcst  recommcudation  of  the  attorney 
retaryofwar.  general,  Joscph  Holt,  a  Kentuckian,  who 
was  true  to  the  nation,  received  the  vacant  appointment. 
The  peril  to  the  republic  would  have  been  extreme 
Importance  of  se-    tad  the  War  Office  and  the  Treasury  pass- 

curxngtheTreasury.    ^^   j^^^    ^j^^   j^^^^^    ^^  ^^^    COnnCCtcd   with 

the  secession  conspiracy.  As  respects  the  latter,  on  the 
resignation  of  Cobb,  of  Georgia  (December  lOtli),  Mr. 
Thomas,  who  had  been  Commissioner  of  Patents,  was 
-placed  in  his  stead ;  but  there  was  reason  to  apprehend 
that  Buchanan,  regarding  this  as  a  temporary  arrange- 
ment, might  confer  the  office  on  some  one  who  could  not 
be  trusted.  The  bitter  altercations  going  on  unceasingly 
around  him  perfectly  unmanned  him.  Thu§,  when  news 
came  of  the  movement  into  Fort  Sumter,  he  was  sitting 
at  the  fireside  in  a  faded  dressing-gown,  his  slippers  on 
his  feet.  At  once  he  turned  ghastly  pale.  With  out- 
stretched hands  and  in  a  tremulous  voice,  he  piteously  im- 
plored forbearance.  Some  of  the  conspirators  were  in  an 
adjoining  room. 


Chap.  XXXV.]   DIX,  THE  SECKETARY  OF  THE  TREASURY.  ^J 

For  once,  the  financial  embarrassments  of  tlie  nation 
proved  to  be  its  salvation.  The  condition  of. the  Treasury 
was  deplorable.  The  government  could  do  nothing  with- 
out the  aid  of  the  capitalists  of  New  York.  Again  the 
influence  of  the  attorney  general  came  to  the  public  suc- 
cor. Instructed  partly  by  their  own  patriotism,  and  part- 
ly by  his  clear  information  of  the  existing  imminent  dan- 
ger, a  deputation  of  those  capitalists  hastened  to  Wash- 
ington, and  gave  the  President  distinctly  to  understand 
that  the  Treasury  Department  must  be  placed  in  charge 
of  one  in  whom  they  had  confidence,  and  that  they  should 
not  be  satisfied  unless  John  A.  Dix,  of  their 

Dix  appointed  Sec-       .     ,  i       .     t         tt  t-»       i 

retary  oftheTreas-  statc,  was  selcctcd.     Hcreupon  jDUchanan 

gave  him  the  appomtment. 

A  French  writer  (Laugel)  says,  "  Stanton,  Holt,  and 

Dix    saved  Washington   to    the    Union.'' 

HoS  Sure  Wash-  Aud  SO,  ID.  truth,  it  was.     The  oblierations 

ington.  ,  ,     ,       ^ 

of  the  republic  to  those  three  ministers,  and 
especially  to  the  first,  can  never  be  repaid.  Had  the  Vir- 
ginians succeeded  in  their  intention  and  seized  the  city, 
nothing  could  have  prevented  the  Mexicanization  of  the 
nation. 

But  the  resolute  action  of  these  three  determined  men 

was   signally  aided  by  the  course   of  the 

aidS  b^rthe'^Gov^  Govemor  of  Maryland.     It  was  the  plan  of 

ernor  of  Maryland.  ,  •'  ,         ,      . 

the  conspirators  to  use  m  their  movements 
the  Legislatures  of  the  Border  States.  Hicks,  the  Gov- 
ernor of  Maryland,  desiring  to  steer  a  middle  course,  re- 
fused to  call  an  extra  session  of  his  Legislature,  though 
vehemently  urged  to  that  step.  While  he  was  dreaming 
that  the  great  conflict  might  be  composed  through  the 
mediation  of  a  foreign  embassador,  and  when  he  did  call 
his  Legislature  together,  declaring  to  them  that  "  the  safe- 
ty of  Maryland  lay  in  maintaining  a  neutral  position," 
events  were  rapidly  marching  on.    Maryland,  as  a  state, 


48  HOLT'S  REPORT.  [Sect.  VII. 

could  not  be  brought  to  act;  Virginia  would  not  act  with- 
out her.  During  this  condition  of  indecision  and. impedi- 
ment, the  three  energetic  cabinet  ministers  found  means 
to  make  the  capital  of  the  nation  secure. 

The   salvation  of  the  metropolis  lay  in  the   celerity 
with  which  troops  could  be  brouerht  into 

Holt's  report  on  the    .,         tt   il    ii        o  ,  p  ttt         •  i 

^^ojjct^d  seizure  of  it.  Holt,  tuc  feccrctary  01  War,  m  reply  to 
a  resolution  of  inquiry  passed  by  the  House 
of  Eepresentatives,  made  to  the  President  a  report  (Feb- 
ruary 18th,  1861)  as  to  the  circumstances  under  which 
this  had  been  done.  "  I  shall  make  no  comment,"  he  says, 
"upon  the  origin  of  the  revolution  which  for  the  last 
three  months  has  been  in  progress  in  several  of  the  South- 
ern States.  That  revolution  has  been  distinguished  by 
a  boldness  and  completeness  of  success  rarely  equaled 
in  the  history  of  civil  commotions.  Its  history  is  a  his- 
tory of  surprises  and  treacheries.  The  forts  of  the  United 
States  have  been  captured  and  garrisoned,  and  hostile 
flags  unfurled  upon. their  ramparts.  The  arsenals  have 
been  seized,  and  the  vast  amount  of  public  arms  they 
contained  appropriated  to  the  use  'of  the 

He  relates  the  early  ,  .,  xi  i     i/?  -it  p 

success  of  the  Con-  captors,  whilc  morc  than  halt  a  million  of 

federates.  -^ 

dollars  found  in  the  Mint  at  New  Orleans 
have  been  unscrupulously  applied  to  replenish  the  coffers 
of  Louisiana.  Officers  in  command  of  revenue  cutters 
of  the  United  States  have  been  prevailed  on  to  violate 
their  trusts  and  surrender  the  property  in  their  charge, 
and,  instead  of  being  branded  for  their  crimes,  they,  and 
the  vessels  they  betrayed,  have  been  cordially  received  into 
the  service  of  the  seceded  states.  These  movements  were 
attended  by  yet  more  discouraging  indications  of  immo- 
rality. It  was  generally  believed  that  this  revolution  was 
guided  and  urged  on  by  men  occupying  the  highest  po- 
sitions in  the  public  service,  and  who,  with  the  responsi- 
bilities of  an  oath  to  support  the  Constitution  still  rest- 


Chap.  XXXV.]   PROJECTED  SEIZURE  OF  WASHINGTON.  49 

ing  upon  their  consciences,  did  not  hesitate  secretly  to 
plan,  and  openly  to  labor  for  the  dismemberment  of  the 
republic  who^e  honors  they  enjoyed,  and  upon  whose 
treasury  they  were  living.  The  unchecked  prevalence  of 
the  revolution,  and  the  intoxication  which  its  triumphs 
inspired,  naturally  suggested  wilder  and  yet  more  desper- 
ate enterprises  than  the  conquest  of  ungarrisoned  forts, 
or  the  plunder  of  an  unguarded  mint.  At  what  time 
the  armed  occupation  of  Washington  City 

Their  intention  of    ,  j         r»    j1  l     i.* 

capturing  Wash-  bccame  a  part  oi  the  revolutionary  pro- 
gramme is  not  certainly  known.  More 
than  six  weeks  ago  the  impression  had  already  exten- 
sively prevailed  that  a  conspiracy  for  the  accomplishment 
of  this  guilty  purpose  was  in  process  of  formation,  if  not 
fully  matured.  The  earnest  endeavors  made  by  men 
known  to  be  devoted  to  the  revolution  to  hurry  Virginia 
and  Maryland  out  of  the  Union  were  regarded  as  pre- 
paratory steps  for  the  subjugation  of  Washington.  This 
plan  was  in  entire  harmony  with  the  aim  and  spirit  of 
those  seeking  the  subversion  of  the  government,  since  no 
more  fatal  blow  at  its  existence  could  be  struck  than  the 
permanent  and  hostile  possession  of  its  seat  of  power. 
It  was  in  harmony,  too,  with  the  avowed  designs  of  the 
revolutionists,  which  looked  to  the  formation  of  a  con- 
federacy of  all  the  Slave  States,  and  necessarily  to  the 
conquest  of  the  capital  within  their  limits.  It  seemed 
not  very  indistinctly  prefigured  in  a  proclamation  made 
upon  the  floor  of  the  Senate,  without  qualification,  if  not 
exultingly,  that  the  Union  was  already  dissolved — a  proc- 
lamation which,  however  intended,  was  certainly  calcu- 
lated to  invite,  on  the  part  of  men  of  desperate  fortunes 
or  of  revolutionary  states,  a  raid  upon  the  capital.  In 
view  of  the  violence  and  turbulent  disorders  already  ex- 
hibited at  the  South,  the  public  mind  could  not  reject 
such  a  scheme  as  at  all  improbable.  That  a  belief  in  its 
II.— D 


50  PROJECTED  SEIZUKE  OF  WASHINGTON.        [Sect.  VII. 

existence  was  entertained  by  multitudes  there  can  be  no 
doubt,  and  tliat  belief  I  fully  shared.  My  conviction  rest- 
ed not  only  on  the  facts  already  alluded  to,  but  upon  in- 
formation, some  of  which  was  of  a  most  conclusive  char- 
acter. Superadded  to  these  proofs  were  the  oft-repeated 
declarations  of  men  in  high  political  positions  here,  and 
who  were  known  to  have  intimate  affiliations  with  the 
revolution,  if,  indeed,  they  did  not  hold  its 
?he  inaupSon^  rclus  iu  their  hands,  to  the  effect  that  Mr. 
Lincoln  would  not  and  should  not  be  inau- 
gurated in  Washington.  Such  declarations  from  such 
men  could  not  be  treated  as  empty  bluster.  They  were 
the  solemn  utterances  of  those  who  well  understood  the 
import  of  their  words,  and  who,  in  the  exultation  of  the 
temporary  victories  gained  over  their  country's  flag  in 
the  South,  felt  assured  that  events  would  soon  give  them 
the  power  to  verify  their  predictions.  Simultaneously 
with  these  prophetic  warnings,  a  Southern  journal  of 
large  circulation  and  influence,  and  which  is  published 
near  the  City  of  "Washington,  advocated  its  seizure  as  a 
possible  political  necessity. 

"  The  nature  and  power  of  the  testimony  thus  accumu- 
lated may  be  best  estimated  by  the  effect  produced  upon 
the  popular  mind.     Members  of  Congress  too,  men  of 
calm  and  comprehensive  views,  and  of  undoubted  fidelity 
to  their  country,  frankly  expressed  their  solicitude  to  the 
The  President  is     Prcsidciit  aud  to  thls  Department,  and  form- 
tr?ops\°o\he  me-    ^^7  lusistcd  that  the  defenses  of  the  capital 
tropoiis,  gj^^^j^  ^^  strengthened. 

"  Impressed  by  these  circumstances  and  considerations, 
I  earnestly  besought  you  to  allow  the  concentration  in 
this  city  of  a  sufficient  military  force.  To  those  who  de- 
sire the  destruction  of  the  republic,  the  presence  of  these 
troops  is  necessarily  offensive ;  but  those  who  sincerely 
love  our  institutions  can  not  fail  to  rejoice  that  by  this 


Chap.  XXXV.]  ATTEMPTS  TO  HAVE  THE  TROOPS  REMOVED.       5  J 

which  is  according-  timely  precaution  they  have  possibly  es- 
lydone.  caped  the  deep  dishonor  which  they  must 

have  suffered,  had  the  capital,  like  the  forts  and  arsenals 
of  the  South,  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  revolutionists, 
who  have  found  this  great  government  weak  only  because, 
in  the  exhaustless  beneficence  of  its  spirit,  it  has  refused 
to  strike  even  in  its  own  defense,  lest  it  should  wound 
the  aggressor." 

But  this  bringing  of  troops  to  the  city  was  not  accom- 
plished without  opposition.  A  resolution  was  offered  in 
the  House  of  Representatives  "  that  the  quartering  of 
troops  of  the  regular  army  in  the  District  of  Columbia 
and  around  the  Capitol,  when  not  necessary  for  their  pro- 
The  secessionists  in  ^^ctjon  from  a  hostllc  cucmy,  and  during  the 
Sve^Sti-oopfre'^  scssiou  of  Cougrcss,  is  impoUtic  and  offen- 
'^°^^'^'  sive,  and,  if  permitted,  may  be   destructive 

of  civil  liberty ;  and,  in  the  opinion  of  this  House,  the  reg- 
ular troops  now  in  this  city  ought  forthwith  to  be  re- 
moved therefrom." 

That  resolution  was  offered  by  a  member  from  North 
Carolina ;  but  Jefferson  Davis,  who  was  soon  to  become 
the  representative  of  the  secession  movement,  would  not 
only  have  extended  the  principle  of  national  disarmament 
thus  proposed  to  be  applied  to  Washington  to  all  the  se- 
ceding states — he  would  even  have  armed 

and  to  provide  for    ,,  ,        ,i  •      t  ^  x1  j_ 

the  arming  of  their  thcm  to  the  prciudice  01  tuc  sfovemment. 

states  X      o  o 

In  the  Senate  (January  2d,  1861)  he  had  of- 
fered the  following  joint  resolution : 

"  J?e  it  resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  JRepresentatwes,Th2X 
upon  the  application  of  a  state,  either  through  a  Convention  or  the 
Legislature  thereof,  asking  that  the  federal  forces  of  the  army  and 
navy  may  be  withdrawn  from  its  limits,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  shall  order  the  withdrawal  of  the  federal  garrisons,  and  take 
the  needful  security  for  the  safety  of  the  public  property  which  may 
remain  in  said  state.  And  he  it  further  resolved^  That  whenever  a 
State  Convention  duly  and  lawfully  assembled  shall  enact  that  the 


52  ATTEMPTS  TO  EAVOR  SECESSION.  [Sect.  VII. 

safety  of  the  state  requires  it  to  keep  troops  and  ships  of  war,  the 
President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  authorized  and 
directed  to  recognize  the  exercise  of  that  power  by  the  state,  and 
by  proclamation  to  give  notice  of  the  fact,  for  the  information  and 
government  of  all  parties  concerned." 

Mr.  Mason,  of  Virginia,  also,  shortly  after,  offered  a 
joint  resolution  to  tlie  effect  that,  in  view 

and  to  suspend  the       ^.t  •  n  a        ii     r^         t  iji 

national  laws  in       01  the  secession  01  feonth  Carolina,  and  the 

South  Carolina,  ,  /»     i        i 

consequent  suspension  of  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  therein,  and  to  avoid  any  hostile  collision 
between  the  authorities  of  that  state  and  those  of  the 
United  States,  that  the  laws  of  the  United  States  direct- 
ing the  mode  in  which  the  President  shall  use  the  army 
and  navy  in  aid  of  the  civil  authorities  executing  the  laws, 
and  all  laws  for  the  collection  of  revenue,  be  suspended 
and  made  inoperative  in  the  State  of  South  Carolina. 

A  representative  from  North  Carolina  (February  11th, 
1861)  offered  the  following  resolution: 

"  Whereas  the  States  of  South  Carolina,  Florida,  Alabama,  Geor- 
gia, Mississippi,  and  Louisiana  have  seceded  from  the  Confederacy 
of  fhe  United  States,  and  have  established  a  government  under  the 
name  of 'the  Confederacy  of  the  United  States  South;'  and  where- 
as it  is  desirable  that  the  most  amicable  relations  should  exist  be- 
tween the  two  governments,  and  war  should  be  avoided  as  the 
greatest  calamity  which  can  befall  them — 

.    '^Hesolved  hy  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives,  etc.,  Th2it 
the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  is  hereby  required  to  ac- 
knowledge the  independence  of  the  said  government  as  soon  as  he 
is  informed  officially  of  its  establishment,  and  that  he  receive  such 
envoy,  embassador,  or  commissioner  as  may  or  shall 
edge  uie^independ-  ^^  appointed  by  such  government  for  the  purpose 
Sg^states^^  ^^^^^"  ^^  amicably  adjusting  the  matters  in  dispute  with 
said  government." 

Such  were  the  attempts  to  secure  the  military  disarm- 
Meantime  the  navy  i^g  ^^  *^^  government.  Its  naval  disarm- 
is  dispersed.  jjjg  }^^^  \)eeji  already  and  effectually  accom- 
plished. 


Chap.  XXXV.]   REPORT  OF  THE  NAVAL  COMMITTEE.  53 

In  reply  to  a  resolution  of  inquiry  of  tlie  House  of 
Kepresentatifes  respecting  the  navy,  tlie 
mittee  o^n  Nrvar"""  commlttee  reported  (February  21st,  1861) 
"  That  the  entire  naval  force  available  for 
the  defense  of  the  whole  Atlantic  coast  consisted  of  the 
steamer  Brooklyn,  twenty-five  guns,  and  the  store-ship  Re- 
lief, two  guns,  and  that  the  former  was  of  too  great  a 
draught  to  permit  her  to  enter  Charleston  Harbor  with 
safety  except  at  spring  tides,  and  the  latter  was  under  or- 
ders to  the  coast  of  Africa,  with  stores  for  the  African 
squadron.  Thus  the  whole  Atlantic  sea-board  has  been 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  without  defense  during  all  the 
period  of  civil  commotion  and  lawless  violence  to  which 
the  President  has  called  our  attention  as  of  "such  vast 
and  alarming  proportions  as  to  be  beyond  his  power  to 
check  or  control." 

Commenting  on  the  fact  that  several  of  the  most  im- 
portant ships  had  been  dispatched  to  distant  stations 
since  the  secession  troubles  had  begun,  the  committee 
proceed  to  say : 

"  To  the  committee  this  disposition  of  the  naval  force 
at  this  critical  time  seems  most  extraordinary.  The  per- 
mitting of  vessels  to  depart  for  distant  seas  after  these 
unhappy  difficulties  had  broken  out  at  home,  the  omission 
to  put  in  repair  and  commission,  ready  for  orders,  a  single 
one  of  the  twenty-eight  ships  dismantled  and  unfit  for 
service  in  our  own  ports,  and  that,  too,  while  $646,639  79 
of  the  appropriation  for  repairs  in  the  navy  in  the  pres- 
ent year  remained  unexpended,  were,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  committee,  grave  errors  in  the  administration  of  the 
Navy  Department,  the  consequences  of  which  have  been 
manifest  in  the  many  acts  of  lawless  violence  to  which 
they  have  called  attention.  The  committee  are  of  opin- 
ion that  the  secretary  had  it  in  his  power,  with  the  pres- 
ent naval  force  of  the  country  at  his  command,  and  with- 


54  CENSURE  OF  THE  SECEETARY  OF  THE  NAVY.    [Sect.  VII. 

out  materially  impairing  tlie  efficiency  of  tlie  service 
abroad,  at  any  time  after  the  settled  purpose  of  over- 
throwing the  government  had  become  manifest,  and  be- 
fore that  purpose  had  developed  itself  in  overt  acts  of 
violence,  to  station  at  anchor,  within  reach  of  his  own  or- 
ders, a  force  equal  to  the  protection  of  all  the  property 
and  all  the  rights  of  the  government  and  the  citizens,  as 
well  as  the  flag  of  the  country,  from  any  outrage  or  insult 
at  any  point  on  the  entire  Atlantic  sea-board.  The  fail- 
ure to  do  this  is  without  justification  or  excuse." 

The  committee  proceeded  also  to  comment  with  great 
severity  on  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  in  that  he  had  ac- 
cepted the  resignations  of  navy  ofiicers,  citizens  of  the  dis- 
loyal states,  thereby  enabling  them  to  join  the  service  of 
the  insurgents  without  incurring  the  penalties  of  treason. 
They  presented  in  detail  several  cases  of  an  aggravated 
character,  and  recommended  the  adoption  of  the  follow- 
ing resolution : 

^^ Resolved,  That  the  Secretary  of  the  Kavy,  in  accepting,  without 

delay  or  inquiry,  the  resignations  of  officers  of  the 

Censure  of  seces-    navv  who  were  in  arms  against  the  government 

sionist  Secretary  ,*'  ,.  .  Tr.-i  -, 

of  the  Navy.  when  tcndermg  the  same,  and  of  those  who  sought 

to  resign  that  they  might  be  relieved  from  the  re- 
straint imposed  by  their  commissions  upon  engaging  in  hostilities 
to  the  constituted  authorities  of  the  nation,  has  committed  a  grave 
error,  highly  prejudicial  to  the  discipline  of  the  service,  and  injurious 
to  the  honor  and  efficiency  of  the  navy,  for  which  he  deserves  the 
censure  of  this  House." 

The  resolution  was  agreed  to  by  the  House. 

As  the  time  approached  for  the  contemplated  meeting 

Montgomery  be.    ^}  Moutgomcry,  the   chicf  couspirators  re- 

qSers^of^tife^'    tired  to  that  place,  many  persons   of  less 

conspiracy.         importance,  who  were  in  hopes  of  place  and 

emolument  in  the  projected  Confederacy,  accompanying 

them.     There  remained,  however,  still  in  Washington,  no 

inconsiderable  number  of  their  friends,  who  held  clerk- 


Chap.  XXXV.]  TREASON  IN  WASHINGTON.  55 

ships  and  various  other  positions  in  the  government  of- 
fices ;  they  remained  partly  for  the  sake  of  making  them- 
selves useful  for  the  purposes  of  the  conspiracy,  but 
chiefly  on  account  of  their  salaries.  Though  ostensibly 
the  capital  of  the  nation,  Washington  was  essentially  a 
Southern  town ;  the  predominance  of  Southern  influence 
in  the  government  had  filled  it  with  Southern  placemen 
and  their  dependents.  These  persons,  foreseeing  the  loss 
of  their  emoluments  through  the  incoming  of  a  Repub- 
lican administration,  constituted  a  most  embittered  class. 
They  acted  as  spies  upon  the  government,  and  transmit- 
ted whatever  information  they  could  gather  to  Mont- 
gomery. That  city  soon  replaced  Washington  as  the 
focus  of  revolutionary  action,  and  to  it  these  persons,  as 
they  were  removed  by  the  incoming  administration  from 
the  offices  they  had  enjoyed,  instinctively  repaired.  The 
tone  of  Washington  society  remained,  however,  for  a  long 
time  unchanged;  it  was  essentially  that  of  a  slaveholding 
town. 

The  new  administration  sometimes  barely  escaped  in- 
Attempttointro-  ^Idlous  attempts  to  establlsh  an  espionage 
thrDlpai^ments  ^^  i^s  offices.  Thus,  at  the  time  of  the  seiz- 
at  Washington.  ^^^  ^^  ^^^  Southem  forts,  it  was  of  the  ut- 
most importance  to  the  conspirators  to  know  the  move- 
ments of  the  national  ships.  In  the  evening  of  the  1st 
of  April,  a  package  was  brought  from  the  President  by 
his  private  secretary,  and  handed  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy.  It  ordered  the  removal  of  Commodore  String- 
ham,  a  loyal  officer,  to  a  distant  station,  and  the  appoint- 
ment of  Captain  Samuel  Barron  in  his  stead.  It  was  di- 
rected that  the  latter  should  be  put  in  possession  of  full 
information  concerning  the  navy,  its  officers,  its  move- 
ments. Unwilling  to  have  a  person  w^hom  he  had  reason 
to  distrust  placed  in  his  department  in  such  a  confiden- 
tial position,  the  secretary  forthwith  sought  an  interview 


56  SUCCESS  OF  THE  CONSPIRACY.  [Sect.  VII. 

with  the  President,  and  explained,  to  him  that  the  sym- 
pathies of  Captain  Barron  were  altogether  with  the  con- 
spirators. The  order  was,  of  course,  revoked.  "This 
dangerous  paper  must  have  passed  through  high  places 
somewhere  before  it  could  have  reached  the  President. 
Captain  Barron  soon  after  deserted  his  flag,  openly  es- 
poused the  rebel  cause,  and  was  one  of  the  very  first  of- 
ficers captured  after  the  war  began." 

In  Montgomery  every  influence  was  used,  and  every 
^,,     ,  ,  ,.      exertion  was  made,  to  secure  the  secession 

Attempts  to  ormg  ' 

virgiStheSi^  of  Maryland  and  Virginia.  It  was  supposed 
epiracy.  ^-^^^  •£  those  statcs  could  accomplish  that 

movement  successfully,  they  would  necessarily  carry  the 
District  of  Columbia  with  them.  Notwithstanding  this, 
as  we  shall  presently  see,  Maryland  was  not  only  thwart- 
ed in  her  intention  of  attaching  herself  to  the  Confed- 
eracy, but  also  in  her  attempt  to  prevent  the  passage  of 
Northern  troops  through  her  territory  for  the  defense  of 
The  conditions  ex-  WasHugtou ;  aud  as  to  Virginia,  she  did 
acted  by  Virginia.  ^^^  gccede  uutll  shc  had  exacted  a  thorough 
protection  for  her  domestic  slave-trade,  and  the  transfer 
of  the  Confederate  government  to  Eichmond. 

Events  have  shown  that  the  views  taken  by  Davis 
of  the  impolicy  of  this  latter  measure,  the  removal  to 
Eichmond,  were  correct.  He  strenuously  resisted  it  at 
first,  and  gave  a  reluctant  consent  only  when  overborne 
by  extraneous  considerations. 

Few  conspiracies  recorded  in  history  have  been  more 
Success  of  the  con-  succcssful  than  this  of  Secession.  It  had 
spiracy.  Completely  effected  the  establishment  of  an 

insurrectionary  government,  organized  in  all  its  branches, 
and  able  to  resist  the  legitimate  government.  It  had  ac- 
complished nearly  all  the  objects  it  had  proposed,  the 
seizure  of  forts,  public  works,  munitions  of  war,  the  ex- 
clusion of  the  national  authority  from  its  domain,  the 


Chap.  XXXV.]  SUCCESS  OF  THE  CONSPIRACY.  57 

imiiication  of  its  own  communities.  The  enthronement 
of  the  Confederate  authority  in  Eichmond,  as  manifest- 
ed by  the  opening  of  its  Congress,  may  be  regarded  as 
the  culmination  and  clo^e  of  its  labors. 

But  there  was  not  reserved  for  the  Confederate  govern- 
ment that  success  which  had  been  vouchsafed  to  its  pre- 
cursor, the  Conspiracy.  As  will  be  seen  on  the  following 
pages,  from  occupying  at  first  the  pinnacle  of  power,  it 
exhibited  a  continuous  decline,  and  fell  in  utter  exhaus- 
tion at  last. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

THE  BOMBARDMENT  OF  EORT  SUMTER. 

The  administration  was  constrained  by  public  sentiment  to  defend  Fort  Sumter, 

and  fitted  out  a  relieving  expedition,  which  failed. 
The  fort  was  bombarded  by  orders  from  Montgomery,  and,  after  a  feeble  defense, 

surrendered. 

Oisr  the  day  after  his  inauguration,  President  Lincohi 
Difficulty  of  reiiev-  received  a  communication  from  Major  An- 
ing  urn  er.  (iersou  to  the  effect  that  Fort  Sumter  could 

not  now  be  relieved  by  less  than  a  force  of  20,000  men.  In 
this  opinion  General  Scott,  who  had  earnestly  and  repeat- 
edly drawn  the  attention  of  the  preceding  administration 
to  the  subject  at  a  time  when  re-enforcements  could  have 
been  sent  without  difficulty,  coincided.  Animated  by  a 
desire  to  avoid  hostilities,  the  new  administration  had  ac- 
tually entertained  an  intention  of  surrender- 
der  if^  to  Barren-  ing  the  fort,  aud  of  viudlcatiug  the  national 
honor  by  making  a  stand  at  Fort  Pickens. 
But  it  was  found  that  the  people  would  not  be  satisfied 
with  that  substitute.  In  Charleston  the  government  had 
Public  opinion  in-    bceu  scomcd  and  defied,  and  there  the  battle 

sists  on  its  defense.       /»  1 1  <  •  j   t        p         t  i         m  •  / 

01  the  nation  must  be  fought,  ihis  exter- 
nal pressure  eventually  decided  Lincoln,  and  at  a  cabinet 
meeting  (March  21st)  it  was  determined  that  an  attempt 
should  be  made  to  re-enforce  and  provision  the  garrison. 
It  so  happened  that  the  only  feasible  plan  of  accom- 
A  fleet  is  fitted  out  pHshiug  this  iuvolvcd  the  employment  of 

the  frigate  Powhatan,  then  at  New  York. 
Orders  were  therefore  given  to  have  that  ship  fitted  for 


Chap.  XXXVI.]    ATTEMPT  TO  RELIEVE  FORT  SUMTER.  59 

sea  at  tlie  earliest  moment,  and  on  Marcli  30th  Captain 
Fox  was  sent  to  'New  York  to  superintend  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  expedition.  This  consisted  of  three  war  ships, 
three  transports,  and  two  steam -tugs.  Three  hundred 
sailors,  and  a  full  supply  of  armed  launches  were  re- 
quired, and  they  were  carried  by  the  Powhatan. 

The  ships  duly  sailed  from  New  York,  but  when  the 
The  frigate  pow-  Powhatau  was  passlug  Staten  Island,  an  or- 
hatan  detached,  ^^^  ^^g  brought  ou  board,  directing  her  cap- 
tain to  transfer  her  to  Lieutenant  Porter,  who  took  her  to 
Fort  Pickens  instead  of  Fort  Sumter.  The  Sumter  relief 
expedition  therefore  necessarily  failed.  "  This  order  was 
extracted,  on  the  recommendation  of  Secretary  Seward, 
from  President  Lincoln  himself."  The  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  was  not  consulted,  and,  indeed,  knew  nothing  about 
it.  He  supposed  the  ship  had  gone  to  Charleston.  "  It 
was  charged  at  the  time,  or  as  soon  as  the  facts  were 
and  the  expedition  tuowu,  that  the  Secretary  of  State,  havijig 
^^"^*  committed  himself  unofficiaUy  to  the  rebel 

commissioners,  determined  to  thwart  the  purpose  of  the 
President,  and  prevent  the  relief  of  the  fort."  President 
Lincoln,  however,  assumed  the  responsibility  of  the  affair, 
and  stated  that  the  sending  away  of  the  Powhatan  was 
"an  accident."  In  accordance  with  an  understanding 
which  had  been  entered  into  with  the  South  Carolina 
authorities,  notice  was  given  to  the  governor  of  that  state 
(April  8th)  of  the  attempt  about  to  be  made. 

At  this  period  Mr.  Seward  exercised  a  predominating 
influence  in  the  government,  the  necessary  consequence 
of  the  eminent  position  he  had  held  among  the  poli- 
ticians of  the  triumphant  Eepublican  party.  Even  the 
President  was  for  a  time  under  his  control.  It  was  Mr. 
Seward's  sincere  belief  that  there  would  be  no  war;  pos- 
sibly there  might  be  a  disturbance,  but  it  would  be  over 
in  a  few  days.     He  had  been  accustomed  all  his  life  to 


60        BEAUBEGAKD  OEDEBED  TO  ATTACK  IT.   [Sect.  VH. 

the  management  of  parties,  and  supposed  that  the  princi- 
ples so  advantageously  resorted  to  with  them  would  be 
sufficient  still — that  promises  and  compromises  would 
compose  the  trouble.  He  did  not  comprehend  that  the 
South  was  determined  to  be  satisfied  with  nothing  less 
than  separation,  and  resolved  to  have  that,  no  matter 
what  it  might  cost. 

The  diverting  of  the  Powhatan  from  the  Sumter  ex- 
pedition, without  the  knowledge  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  was  not  the  only  indication  that  other  members 
of  the  administration  could  not,  as  yet,  exert  their  proper 
influence.  In  the  cabinet  meetings  at  which  Buchanan 
in  his  day  had  presided,  the  order  of  business  had  been 
conducted  with  precision  and  circumstance;  he  was,  as 
Davis  well  said, "  a  stickler  for  the  ceremony  of  power." 
But  in  the  early  months  of  Lincoln's  administration  such 
meetings  were  very  far  from  being  stately  ceremonials. 
The  President's  unfamiliarity  with  formal  affairs,  and 
especially  his  genial  disposition,  had  given  them  a  differ- 
ent turn.  Some  of  the  most  important  movements  were 
the  result  of  conversations  with  his  friend  the  Secretary 
of  State,  and  occasionally  they  caused  no  little  surprise 
to  the  other  responsible  cabinet  ministers. 

The  secession  authorities  were  now  moved  by  three  con- 
Motives  for  attack-  siderations:  1st.  The  failure  of  their  commis- 
ing  the  fort.  sloucrs  to  obtalu  an  audience  with  the  Pres- 

ident in  Washington  (p.  22) ;  2d.  The  impending  pro- 
visioning of  the  fort;  3d.  The  necessity  of  powerfully  ex- 
citing the  flagging  enthusiasm  of  their  people.  They  de- 
termined, therefore,  to  send  orders  (April  10th)  to  Beau- 
regard, whom  they  had  placed  in  command  at  Charleston, 
to  require  the  immediate  surrender  of  the  fort,  and,  if  this 
were  refused,  to  reduce  it.  Accordingly,  on  the  next  day, 
the  demand  was  made  by  that  officer,  and  compliance 


Chap.XXXVL]  proposals  to  ANDERSON.  gj 

with  it  promptly  declined.  But  Anderson,  tlie  command- 
ant of  tlie  fort,  having  remarked  to  the  aids  who  had 
brought  the  summons  that  he  should  be  starved  out  in  the 

Proposals  are  made    ^^^^'^^  ^^  ^  ^^^  dajS,  it  WaS  prOpOSCd  tO  him 

to  Anderson,  ^^^^j.  ^f  ]^g  would  stato  the  time  at  which  he 

must,  under  those  circumstances,  evacuate,  and  agree  not 
to  use  his  guns  in  the  interval,  unless  Fort  Sumter  was 
fired  upon,  his  assailants  would  abstain  from  attacking 
him.  To  this  Anderson  replied  that  he  would  evacuate 
the  fort  on  the  15th  instant,  should  he  not  receive,  prior 
to  that  time,  controlling  instructions  from  his  government, 
or  additional  supplies;  that  he  would  not,  in  the  mean 
time,  open  fire,  unless  compelled  to  do  so  by  some  hostile 
act  against  the  fort  or  against  the  American  flag. 

It  is  to  be  remarked  that  the  main  point  of  this  nego- 

and  are  declined    tiatiou  had  reference  to  the  expected  relief 

by  him.  ■Q.eet    Had  Anderson  accepted  Beauregard's 

terms,  he  would  have  incapacitated  himself  from  assisting 

or  protecting  the  fleet  in  its  attempt. 

Beauregard  now  hastened  the  attack.  The  summons 
to  surrender  had  been  given  at  two  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon ;  the  letter  of  inquiry  was  dated  at  eleven  of  the 
same  night,  and  before  daybreak  Anderson  was  notified 
that  in  an  hour  the  batteries  would  open  on  him. 

Fort  Sumter  has  already  been  described  (vol.  i.,  p.  542) ; 
strength  of  the  ^^^  force  Originally  brought  into  it  consisted 
garrison.  ^^  55  artillcnsts,  9  officers,  30  laborers,  15 

musicians ;  the  artillerists  had,  however,  been  reduced  to 
35.  ]^o  preparation  had  been  made  for  resistance.  There 
were  only  700  cartridges.  No  means  of  pointing  the 
guns  properly  were  at  hand ;  they  could  be  fired  only  by 
guess.  The  garrison  had  no  bread;  the  rice  had  been  ac- 
cidentally mixed  with  fragments  of  glass  through  the 
shattering  of  some  window-panes.  The  wooden  barracks 
had  not  been  removed.     So  little  prevision  had  been  ex- 


62 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  ASSAILANTS. 


[Sect.  VII. 


Strength  of  the 
assailants. 


ercised  that  the  spare  material  whicli  could  have  been 
used  for  that  purpose  had  not  been  turned  into  cartridge 
bags. 

For  many  months  the  assailants  had  been  permitted  to' 
construct  their  works  unmolested.  They 
had  now  14  batteries  of  30  heavy  guns  and 
17  mortars  which  they  could  bring  into  play.  One  of 
these  batteries  on  Morris  Island  was  sheathed  with  rail- 
road iron,  and  a  floating  structure  was  protected  in  the 
same  manner.  It  was  intended  to  be  used  as  a  battering 
raft,  but,  being  found  unsuitable,  was  grounded  on  Sulli- 
van's Island  and  used  as  a  fixed  battery. 


THE  HARBOR  OF  CHARLESTON. 


At  the  expiration  of  the  notified  hour  fire  was  open- 
ed on  the  fort  from  a  battery  on  James  Island.     Soon 


Chap.  XXXVI.]         BOMBARDMENT  OF  THE  FORT.  gg 

Fire  opened  on    afterward  all  the  guns  were  in  operation. 
the  fortress,        jj^   jt^q   course  of  thirty  -  four  hours  there 

were   thrown  into  the  work  2360  shot  and  980  shell. 

There  were  about  3000  men  engaged,  and  4000  or  5000 

in  reserve. 

Fort  Sumter  made  no  reply  for  nearly  three  hours.  At 
and  answered  ^  ^'^l^^l^  ^^  Friday  momiug,  April  12th, 
^y"'  1861,  Captain  Abner  Doubleday .  fired  the 

first  shot  in  the  Civil  War  in  defense  of  the  American 

government. 

'  It  was  very  soon  found  that,  in  consequence  of  the  se- 
But  the  means  of  ^^rity  of  the  Confederate  vertical  fire,  the 
defense  fail.         barbcttc  guus — from  which  alone,  under  the 

circumstances,  shell  could  be  thrown — -could  not  be  used. 

Anderson  was  restricted  to  his  lower  tier.     In  five  hours 

he  had  exhausted  his  cartridges,  and  new  ones  had  to  be 

made  out  of  blankets  and  articles  of  clothing.     There 

were  only  six  needles  which  could  be  used  for  sewing 

cartridge  bags. 

About  noon  on  Friday  the  relief  fleet  was  seen  off 

The  relief  fleet  at     ^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^J  ^^^  sigUals  WCrC  CX- 

^^''^-  changed  with  it.     At  dark  the  embrasures 

were  closed,  and  no  answer  was  made  to  the  Confeder- 
ate fire. 

On  Saturday  the  reply  of  the  fort  was  necessarily  very 

The  barracks  fii-ed  languid.  At  about  9  o'clock  thc  barracks 
by  hot  shot.  ^^j,^  gg^  ^^  ^j.Q  -^j  j^-^Q  red-hot  shot  of  the 

Confederates,  and  so  dense  was  the  smoke  that  the  men 
could  not  see  each  other,  nor  breathe  except  through  wet 
cloths.     The  flag-staff  was  repeatedly  struck. 

As  the  conflagration  spread,  the  garrison  found  it  neces- 
sary to  close  the  magazine,  and  eventually 
to  throw  most  of  the  powder  brought  from 
it  into  the  sea.  All  but  five  barrels  were  thus  disposed 
of    The  flag,  which  again  had  been  shot  away,  was  nailed 


The  fort  surren- 
ders. 


04  THE  SURRENDER.  [Sect.  VII. 

to  a  temporary  staff  and  raised  on  the  ramparts.  At  tlie 
time  when  it  was  down,  Mr.  Wigfall,  who  had  formerly 
been  a  United  States  Senator  from  Texas,  appeared  at  one 
of  the  embrasures,  and,  representing  himself  as  a  messen- 
ger from  Beauregard  to  offer  terms,  was  admitted.  He 
was  shortly  after  succeeded  by  other  officers,  who  stated 
that  he  had  acted  without  Beauregard's  knowledge. 
Terms  of  evacuation  were,  however,  agreed  upon. 

In  his  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  Anderson  says, 
"  Having  defended  Fort  Sumter  for  thirty-four  hours,  un- 
til the  quarters  were  entirely  burned,  the  main  gates  de- 
stroyed by  fire,  the  gorge  wall  seriously  injured,  the  mag- 
azine surrounded  by  flames,  and  its  door  closed  from  the 

effects  of  the  heat,  four  barrels  and  three  car- 
Anderson's  report.  ^  ii"  -tit  i 

tridges  01  powder  only  being  available,  and 
no  provisions  but  pork  remaining,  I  accepted  the  terms 
of  evacuation  offered  by  General  Beauregard,  being  the 
same  offered  by  him  on  the  11th  inst.,  prior  to  the  com- 
mencement of  hostilities,  and  marched  out  of  Foii:  Sumter 
on  Sunday  afternoon,  the  14th  inst.,  with  colors  flying  and 
drums  beating,  bringing  away  company  and  private  prop- 
erty, and  saluting  my  flag  with  fifty  guns." 

In  Charleston  the  bells  were  chiming,  the  guns  were 
Rejoicings  in  firing,  the  ladies  waving  handkerchiefs,  the 
Charleston.  people  chceriug.  It  was  regarded  as  the 
greatest  day  in  the  history  of  South  Carolina.  The  gov- 
ernor of  the  state,  in  a  speech  which  he  made  to  the  citi- 
zens on  the  evening  of  the  evacuation,  exultingly  said, 
"  We  have  humbled  the  flag  of  the  United  States.  I  say 
unto  you  it  is  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  country 
that  the  stars  and  stripes  have  been  humbled.  We  have 
defeated  their  twenty  millions ;  we  have  brought  down 
in  humility  the  flag  that  has  triumphed  for  seventy  years  ; 
but  to-day — on  this  thirteenth  day  of  April — it  has  been 
humbled,  and  humbled  before  the  glorious  little  state  of 
South  Carolina." 


Chap.  XXXVI.]        CRITICISMS  ON  THE  DEFENSE.  *      ^5 

Not  one  of  the  combatants  on  either  side  had  been 
Public  criticisms    billed,  and  hence  the  defense  of  Fort  Sumter 
-of  the  defense.      ^[^  ^^^  p^gg  -^vithout  public  criticism.     In 
Virginia  it  gave   rise   to  bitter   disappointment.     The 
Unionists  said,  "Anderson  has  made  a  feeble  defense,  or 
no  defense  of  Sumter.     He  told  Beauregard  on  the  first 
summons  that  he  would  evacuate  the  fort  in  two  days.'' 
They  inquired  "  how  many  shell  were  thrown  from  Sum- 
ter in  these  two  days  of  terrific  cannonading,  and  nobody 
hurt  on  either  side,  and  the^ag  of  the  United  States  low- 
ered to  Ring  Cotton?"     In  Europe  the  enemies  of  the  re- 
public already  began  to  sneer:  they  said,  "An  American 
battle  is  not  as  dangerous  as  an  American  steam-boat.'- 
Captain  Foster,  the  engineer  officer  of  the  fort,  in  his 
Report  of  tiie      I'^port  to  the   Secretary  of  War,  remarks, 
engineer.  "After  the  cessatlou  of  fire,  about  600  shot-^ 

marks  on  the  face  of  the  scarp  wall  were  counted,  but 
they  were  so  scattered  that  no  breached  effect  could  have 
been  expected  from  such  a  fire.  The  only  effect  of  the 
direct  fire  during  the  two  days  was  to  disable  three  bar- 
bette guns,  knock  off  large  portions  of  the  chimneys  and 
brick  walls  projecting  above  the  parapet,  and  to  set  the 
quarters  on  fire-  with,  hot  shot.  The  Vertical  fire  pro- 
duced more  effect,  and  it  prevented  the  working  of  the 
upper  tier  of  guns,  which  were  the  only  really  effective 
ones  in  the  fort. 

"  But  we  could  have  resumed  the  firino;  as  soon  as  the 
walls  cooled  sufficiently  to  open  the  magazines,  and  then, 
having  blown  down  the  walls  left  projecting  above  the 
parapet  so  as  to  get  rid  of  flying  bricks,  and  built  up  the 
main  gates  with  stones  and  rubbish,  the  fort  would  actu- 
ally have  been  in  a  more  defensible  state  than  when  the 
action  commenced.  The  weakness  of  the  defense  lay  prin- 
cipally in  the  lack  of  cartridge  bags.  The  want  of  pro- 
visions would  soon  have  caused  the  surrender  of  the  fort; 
II.— E 


QQ     •  CRITICISMS  ON  THE  DEFENSE.  [Sect.  VII. 

but,  with  plenty  of  cartridges,  the  men  would  have  cheer- 
fully fought  &ve  or  six  days,  and,  if  necessary,  much  lon- 
ger, on  pork  alone,  of  which  we  had  a  sufficient  supply. 
I  do  not  think  that  a  breach  could  have  been  effected  in 
the  gorge  at  the  distance  of  the  battery  on  Cummings's 
Point  within  a  week  or  ten  days,  and  even  then,  with  the 
small  garrison  to  defend  it,  and  means  for  obstructing  it 
at  our  disposal,  the  operation  of  assaulting  it  with  even 
vastly  superior  numbers  would  have  been  very  doubtful 
in  its  result." 

The  commandant  of  the  fort,  however,  did  all  that  was 
The  fault  lay  with  P^sslble  lu  thc  circumstauccs  of  the  case. 
not  with  A^dTr-      His  apparent  indecision  was  in  truth  the 

necessary  consequence  of  the  irresolution  of 
the  government.  How  was  it  possible  for  him  to  act 
when  the  government  could  not  determine  what  it  would 
order  him  to  do  ?  The  fort  was  in  fact  surrendered  when 
the  Confederates  were  permitted  to  establish  batteries 
within  reach  of  its  guns,  and  the  garrison  left  unprovis- 
ioned  and  unre-enforced  for  fear  that  the  Charlestonians 
might  be  angry. 

The  engineer  officer  whom  I  have  just  quoted,  in  his 

rep(5rt  to  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
been  ?Iii™?d  with-^  the  War,  remarks,  "Almost  every  day  we 

out  difficulty.  '  .       \  .    '^  •^ 

saw  new  batteries  m  progress,  intended  to 
destroy  the  fort  that  we  were  placed  to  defend.  In  ad- 
dition, after  these  works  were  completed  and  armed,  their 
garrisons  practiced  the  guns  with  shot  and  shell  to  ob- 
tain our  range,  and  frequently  burst  their  shells  on  differ- 
ent sides  of  the  fort,  and  sometimes  over  it.  Not  content 
with  this,  the  iron-clad  battery  on  Morris  Island,  in  its 
morning  practice  on  the  8th  of  March,  1861,  fired  a  solid 
shot  at  the  sally-port  of  the  fort,  barely  missing  it  by 
striking  the  sea  wall." 

"  Thus  terminated  the  siege  of  Fort  Sumter  after  over 


Chap.XXXVL]    SUMTER  might  have  been  believed.  Q^ 

three  montlis'  duration,  during  all  of  wMch  time  it  could 
easily  Lave  been  re-enforced  by  vessels  running  in  at 
night.  As  a  proof  of  this,  witness  the  ease  with  which 
the  blockade-runners  during  the  war  ran  into  Charleston, 
sometimes  even  through  three  lines  of  blockading  vessels, 
and  past  our  batteries  on  Morris  Island." 


CHAPTEK  XXXVII. 

DETERMINATION  OF  THE  NORTH  TO  UPHOLD  THE  REPUBLIC. 

The  conspirators  were  constrained  by  their  political  necessities  to  aggression.  By 
the  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter  they  drew  the  whole  South  to  their  cause. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Northern  people  rose  up  as  one  man  to  vindicate  the 
honor  of  the  national  flag  and  to  sustain  the  republic. 

The  plot  of  the  secessionists  was  to  prevent  the  passage  of  troops  through  Balti- 
more, and  to  seize  Washington  while  in  a  defenseless  condition. 

The  Northern  troops  forced  their  way  through  Maryland,  held  that  state  in  subjec- 
tion, and  saved  Washington  from  capture. 

"  Strike  a  blow :  tlie  very  moment  tliat  blood  is  slied, 
Virginia  will  make  common  cause  with  her  sisters  of  the 
S-outh."  "  Sprinkle  blood  in  the  faces  of  the  people  of 
Alabama,  or  else  they  will  be  back  in  the  Union  in  less 
than  ten  days." 

In  the  interior  of  Fort  Sumter,  a  Carolinian  commis- 
sioner, who  knew  well  the  frantic  condi- 

Political  necessity        .  r»i«  iit  ti  "i 

for  aggression  in  tiou  01  his  pcoplc,  had  soufifht  au  intcrview 

the  South.  .lAT^.  T 

with  Anderson.  "  Give  up  the  fort ;  m  the 
name  of  humanity,  I  conjure  you  to  give  it  up,  or  thou- 
sands will  howl  round  these  walls,  and  pull  the  bricks 
out  with  their  fingers." 

Such  were  the  exclamations  of  the  leaders  of  secession 
throughout  the  South — such  the  pitch  of  frenzy  to  which 
they  had  wrought  up  their  people. 

Not  less  intense  was  the  feeling  produced  in  the  North 
as  soon  as  Fort  Sumter  fell.  It  found  expression,  how- 
ever, in  a  different  manner.  Already  those  constitutional 
peculiarities  which  distinguished  the  two  antagonists  on 
many  a  subsequent  bloody  field  were  manifesting  them- 


Chap.  XXXVII.]    EFFECT  OF  THE  FALL  OF  SUMTEE.  ^9 

selves.     In  the  supreme  moment  of  rushing  to  a  charge, 
the  battle-cry  of  the  Southern  troops  is  "  a  yell  of  de- 
fiance ;"  that  of  the  Northern  troops,  a  "  deep-toned  cheer." 
Very  truthfully  had  the  conspirators  declared  that  it 
would  be  hard  to  provoke  the  North  t( 
North  iS'^lnteroS    fis^ht.    To  the  last,  when  it  was  certain  that 

the  war.  *-'  '       , 

war  could  not  be  avoided,  she  hoped  against 
hope ;  she  prayed  to  be  delivered  from  the  trial.  When 
the  news  came  that  Sumter  had  fallen,  and  that  the  flag 
of  the  nafion  was  dishonored,  the  instant  effect  produced 
Effect  of  the  fall  of  was  that  of  solcmu  silence  —  that  silence 
Sumter.  wMch,  iu  thc  rcsolutc  man,  is  the  precursor 

of  irrevocable  determination ;  and  then  there  arose  all 
through  the  country,  from  the  Canadian  frontier  to  where 
the  Ohio,  rolling  his  waters  westwardly  for  a  thousand 
miles,  separates  the  lands  of  freedom  from  those  of  slav- 
eiy,  not  the  yell  of  defiance,  but  the  deep-toned  cheer. 
.•   The  political  interpretation  of  the  effect  of  the  bom- 
interpretation  of  bardmcut  of  Sumtcr  on  the  North  is  that 
that  effect.  -^  ^^  ^^^^  produced  a  coalescence  of  the — J 

Union  and  anti-slavery  sentiment j^^STFe  South  it  irre- 
sistibly carried  whatever  Union  sentiment  existed  into 
secession.      On  each  side  of  the  Ohio  the  populations 
were  unified.    That  river  at  once  became  their  separating    - 
line. 

In  vain  some  of  the  journals^  which,  through  their  an- 
Effect  on  the  jour-  tipathy  to  the  KepubHcan  party,  had  leaned 
uaiism  of  the  North.  ^^  ^-^^  g|^^^  intcrcst,  accuscd  thc  govern- 
ment of  commencing  war,  and  blamed  it  for  irritating 
South  Carolina  by  sending  relief  to  Fort  Sumter ;  in  vain 
they  declared  that  the  South,  fighting  for  its  dearest  in- 
terests, could  never  be  conquered ;  in  vain  they  clamored 
for  a  treaty  of  peace,  and  begged  that  the  dissatisfied 
states  might  be  permitted  to  depart :  the  people  intuitive- 
ly saw  the  true  position  of  affairs,  and  that  the  only 


f^Q  DETERMINATION  OF  THE  NORTH.  [Sect.  VII. 

course  to  be  taken  was  an  energetic  support  of  the  gov- 
ernment. 

y  The  journals,  which  drift  with  public  opinion,  felt  that 
it  was  impossible  to  resist  the  torrent,  and,  as  is  their  cus- 
/  torn,  boisterously  proclaimed  that  they  had  all  along 
Counseled  the  policy  w^hich  it  was  evident  must  now  be 
followed.  Some  of  them,  which  but  a  few  days  previ- 
ously had  accused  Lincoln  of  picking  a  quarrel  with  the 
South,  became  at  once  his  loud  supporters.  The  North 
would  no  longer  tolerate  treason,  no  matter  what  guise  it 
might  assume. 

The  garrison  of  Fort  Sumter  lowered  their  flag  and 
marched  out  of  the  work  on  Sunday,  April 

The  surrender  of  the    _,,-,  -\Ti  •  t,i  i 

fortfoiiowedbythe  14th.     JNcxt  momino;  appeared  the  procla- 
mation  of  the  President  of  the  United  States 
(p.  25),  calling  forth  the  militia,  appealing  to  the  people, 
and  summoning  an  extra  session  of  Congress. . 

The  governors  of  all  the  Northern  States  at  once  re-, 
sponded  to  the  proclamation:  they  infused 

Determination  of  •iiit«»,,»  rri 

the  North  to  resist   encrsfv  luto  the  administration,     lo  an  eve- 

the  insurrection.  .  ,  *' 

Witness  there  was  something  very  impress- 
ive in  the  action  of  the  people.  A  foreign  observer  re- 
marked, "  With  them  all  is  sacrifice,  devotion,  grandeur 
and  purity  of  purpose — with  the  poor,  if  possible,  even 
more  than  with  the  rich."  In  the  large  cities  great  meet- 
ings were  held,  in  which  men  of  all  parties  united.  Par- 
ty lines  vanished.  There  was  none  of  that  -frantic  de- 
lirium which  was  manifested  in  the  Slave  States,  but  a 
solemn  acceptance  of  what  was  clearly  recognized  to  be 
a  fearful  but  unavoidable  duty—"  Faint  not,  falter  not ; 
the  republic  is  in  peril." 

If  the  Northern  communities  had  been  thrown  into  a 
Contemplated  seiz-  momcutary  reverfc,  followed  by  indignation 
ure  of  Washington.   ^^  ^-^^  outrage  ou  the  uatioual  flag  at  Fort 

Sumter,  they  were  thoroughly  roused  to  resistance  on 


Chap.  XXXVII.]    RUMORED  SEIZURE  OF  WASHINGTON.  J^ 

finding  that  an  attempt  was  fortliwitli  to  be  made  for  the 
seizure  of  Washington  City.  The  highway  to  that  cap- 
ital lay  through  Baltimore.  The  plot  of  the  secessionists 
was  for  Maryland  to  stop  the  passage  of  all  re-enforce- 
ments through  her  territofy,  under  the  plea  that  such  pro- 
ceedings outraged  her  sovereignty,  and  Virginia  might 
then,  with  a  prospect  of  success,  attempt  to  capture  the 
place. 

Once  committed  to  the  insurrection,  there  were  four 
great  captures  which  it  was  essential  that 
ties  devolving  on    Virginia   should  make  :    ( 1.)  Washington 
\irgima.  City ;  (2.)  Fortrcss  Monroe;  (3.)  The  Ar- 

mory  at  Harper's  Ferry ;  (4.)  The  Navy  Yard  at  Norfolk 
She  did  accomplish  the  third  and  fourth ;  the  first  and 
second  were  beyond  her  power.  Had  she  been  able  to 
carry  out  her  intention  fully,  the  Union  would  have  been 
in  the  most  imminent  peril.  The  loss  of  Fortress  Mon- 
roe would  have  been  a  great  military  calamity  to  the 
nation ;  that  of  Washington  would  perhaps  have  been 
fatal. 

All  through  the  winter  there  had  been  rumors  that  the 
Plans  for  its  ac-  Virgiuiaus  coutemplatcd  a  surprise  of  Wash- 
.  compiishment.  jngton.  Whcu  it  was  plain  that  their  state 
was  on  the  brink  of  secession,  it  became  certain  that  th«e 
attempt  would  be  made.  It  was  expected  that  a  few  res^ 
olute  conspirators  would  carry  it  by  a  coup  de  main.  A  ^ 
Texan  adventurer  was  affirmed  to  be  at  the  head  of  the 
plot.  The  President,  his  cabinet,  and  other  chief  officers 
of  state  were  to  be  sent  as  hostages  to  the  South.  ISTot 
that  there  was  any  intention  of  a  permanent  occupation 
under  Southern  rule.  All  that  was  proposed  was  to 
blow  up  the  Capitol  and  the  Treasury  building,  to  burn 
the  President's  house  and  other  public  edifices,  and  to 
leave  in  the  blackened  wreck  of  the  ruined  city  a  proof 
to  the  world  that  the  Union  was  ruined. 


75  TROOPS  HURRIED  TO  ITS  DEFENSE.  [Sect.  VU. 

It  is  impossible  to  give  an  adequate  idea  of  tlie  effect 
of  these  tidings  on  the  Northern  people.  They  literally 
rose  np  as  one  man.  When,  as  we  are  now  to  find,  all 
communication  with  Washington  was  for  several  days 
cut  off  by  the  partial  success  of  the  plot,  and  nothing  was 
known  of  what  had  befallen  the  government,  the  patriot- 
ic fervor  knew  no  bounds. 

On  the  day  after  the  proclamation  was  issued  some 
Pennsylvania  companies  reported  for  duty  in 
the  defense  of  the  Washington.  They  marched  at  once  to  the 
Capitol,  and. were  quartered  in  the  Hall  of 
Representatives.  They  were  just  in  time  to  prevent  the 
seizure  of  the  city.  Matters  had  become  so  urgent  that 
Senator  Wilson  had  already  telegraphed  to  the  Governor 
of  Massachusetts  to  send  instantly  twenty  companies. 
Four  regiments  forthwith  mustered  with  full  ranks  on 
Boston  Common.  General  Butler  was  commissioned  by 
the  governor  as  a  brigadier  general.  The  Massachusetts 
Sixth  was  ordered  without  delay  through  Baltimore ;  an- 
other regiment  was  dispatched  to  secure  Fortress  Monroe. 
Thus,  in  four  days,  that  state,  true  to  her 
ing^thegwei^iT'''  glorious.  amials,  had  troops  five  hundred 
miles  on  their  march,  and  in  less  than  a 
week  her  whole  quota  was  far  advanced  toward  Wash- 
ington. The  Legislature  of  Pennsylvania  passed  a  resolu- 
tion pledging  the  faith  and  power  of  that  state  to  support 
the  government,  sanctioned  a  loan  of  three  millions  of 
dollars,  and  organized  a  reserve  corps.  The  Legislature 
of  New  York,  instead  of  furnishing  17,000  men  for  three 
months,  gave  30,000  for  two  years,  and  added  a  war  loan 
of  three  millions  of  dollars.  Many  other  of  the  states 
acted  in  like  manner.  Rhode  Island  not  only  instantly 
sent  her  quota  and  added  a  loan,  but  her  governor, 
Sprague,  went  at  the  head  of  her  troops. 

The  Sixth  Massachusetts  left  Boston  on  the  I7th,  and 


Chap.  XXXVIL]    THEY  ARE  RESISTED  IN  BALTIMORE.  73 

reached  Baltimore  on  the  19tli.  They  found 
sachSsetS  troopr*  that  clty  the  scene  of  great  excitement,  news 

having  just  arrived  of  the  capture  of  Har- 
per's Ferry  by  the  Virginians.  The  slavery  and  seces- 
sion party  received  them  with  threatening  cheers  for  "  the 
Southern  Confederacy  and  President  Davis,"  and  in  pass- 
ing from  the  Philadelphia  to  the  Washington  Eailroad 
station  they  were  assaulted  by  a  mob.  A  part  of  the  reg- 
Attemptstopreveut  ^^^^^  ^hich  happened  to  be  in  the  rear  cars 
SSS't™gJ  was  separated,  and  compelled  to  fight  its 
that  city.  ^^y  through  an  infuriated  rabble  who  had 

obstructed  the  track  in  the  streets.  The  mayor,  with  a 
police  force,  attempted  to  clear  the  way;  but  one  of  the 
soldiers  being  shot  dead  with  his  own  musket,  wrested 
from  him  by  a  rioter,  the  troops  were  compelled  to  fire, 
killing  eleven  and  wounding  four  of  their  assailants.  Th^ 
fire  being  returned  with  revolvers  and  muskets,  the  loss 
of  the  regiment  was  three  killed  and  eight  wounded.  In 
this  manner  they  forced  their  way  for  two  miles  and  a 
half,  from  the  Philadelphia  to  the  Washington  station  in 
Baltimore,  bricks,  stones,  pieces  of  iron  being  thrown 
from  the  upper  windows  of  the  houses  upon  them.  Even 
after  they  had  reached  the  cars  for  Washington  they  were 
fired  at,  and  attempts  were  made  to  tear  up  the  rails. 

As  soon  as  the  news  reached  Massachusetts,  the  gov- 
ernor of  that  state  telegraphed  to  the  Mayor  of  Balti- 
more: 

"  I  pray  you  to  cause  the  bodies  of  our  Massachusetts  soldiers 
dead  in  Baltimore  to  be  laid  out,  preserved  in  ice,  and  tenderly  sent 
forward  by  express  to  me.  All  expenses  will  be  paid  by  this  Com- 
monwealth." 

To  this  the  mayor  returned  an  appropriate  reply,  de- 
ploring the  event,  and  declaring  that  the  authorities  had 
exerted  themselves  to  the  best  of  their  ability  to  prevent 
the  trouble;  but  that  the  people  viewed  the  passage  of 


74  OBSTRUCTIONS  TO  BE-ENFORCEMENTS.         [Sect.  VII. 

armed  troops  of  another  state  through  the  streets  as  an 
invasion  of  their  soil,  and  could  not  be  restrained. 
The  Governor  of  Massachusetts  replied : 

"I  appreciate  your  kind  attention  to  our  wounded  and  our  dead. 
I  am  overwhelmed  with  surprise  that  a  peaceful  march  of  American 
citizens  over  the  highway  to  the  defense  of  our  common  caj^ital 
should  be  deemed  aa^grressive  to  Baltimoreans." 

The  excitement  had  now  reached  such  a  pitch  that 
CQpcessionsofthe  President  Lincoln  was  obliged  to  interfere, 
government.  jj^  rcqucstcd  thc  Govcruor  of  Maryland  and 
the  Mayor  of  Baltimore  to  come  to  him  for  consultation. 
The  governor  happening  to  be  absent,  the  mayor  went 
without  him,  and  was  informed  by  the  President  that 
either  troops  must  be  brought  through  Maryland,  or  the 
capital  surrendered  to  armed  treason.  The  wishes  of  the 
Baltimoreans  were,  however,  so  far  gratified  that  some 
Pennsylvania  troops  then  approaching  by  railroad  were 
ordered  back  to  their  own  state. 

This,  however,  did  not  end  the  commotion.  Maryland 
was  full  of  emissaries  from  the  Cotton  States. 

The  bridges  barned.  .        t      i         ^t-t      ^  • 

ihe  rioters  were  determined  that  Washing- 
ton should  not  be  relieved.  They  therefore  destroyed 
the  bridges  over  the  streams.  They  stopped  the  mails,^ 
cut  the  telegraph  wires,  and  detained  military  stores  be- 
longing to  the  government.  The  more  audacious  of  them 
made  ready  for  an  attack  on  Fort  M'Henry.  Still  un- 
willing to  be  drawn  into  a  collision,  though  compelled  to 
have  troops  from  the  North  to  defend  the  national  capi- 
tal, the  President,  under  the  advice  of  General  Scott,  di- 
rected that  the  regiments  should  march  round  Baltimore, 
and  not  through  it. 

Among  the  influences  brought  to  bear  upon  the  Presi- 
dent by  the  Baltimoreans  was  that  of  a  so- 
christian  Asso-     clcty  kuowu  as  the  Young  Men's  Christian 
Association.     A  deputation  from  this  body 


Chap.  XXXVII.]       THE  CHRISTIAN  ASSOCIATION.  /^5 

requested  that  an  end  should  be  put  to  the  unnatural 
conflict  impending  by  a  concession  of  all  the  demands  of 
the  Slave  States;  that  the  forces  in  Washington  should 
be  dismissed;  and  particularly  that  no  more  troops  should 
be  brought  to  the  capital  through  Maryland.  Religious 
men  throughout  the  South  had  become  blind  to  the  atroc- 
ity of  slavery.  They  had  forgotten  what  their  great 
statesman  Jefferson  had  written :  "We  must  wait  with' pa- 
tience the  workings  of  an  overruling  Providence,  and  hope 
that  that  is  preparing  the  deliverance  of  these  our  breth- 
ren. When  the  measure  of  their  tears  shall  be  full- 
when  their  groans  shall  have  involved  heaven  itself  in 
darkness,  doubtless  a  God  of  Justice  will  awaken  to  their 
distress.  Nothing  is  more  certainly  written  in  the  Book 
of  Fate  than  that  this  people  shall  be  free."  "I  tremble 
for  my  country  when  I  reflect  that  God  is  just ;  that  his 
justice  cannot  sleep  forever;  that,  considering  numbers, 
nature,  and  natural  means  only,  a  revolution  in  the  wheel 
of  Fortune,  an  exchange  of  situation,  is  among  possible 
events — that  it  may  become  probable  by  supernatural  in- 
terference !  The  Almighty  has  no  attribute  which  can 
take  side  with  us  in  such  a  contest." 

Encouraged  by  the  forbearance  that  had  been  shown, 
the  Governor  of  Maryland  again  (April  2  2d) 
MarjriaSr'^dSires  eutrcatcd  the  President  that  no  more  troops 
should  be  brought  through  the  state,  and 
that  those  at  present  in  it  should  be  sent  elsewhere.  He 
farther  urged  that  a  truce  should  be  offered  to  the  insur- 
gents, and  suggested  that  the  English  minister  should  be 
asked  to  mediate  between  the  contending  parties. 

To  this  the  President  directed  the  Secretary  of  State 
Eepiyofthesecre-  ^^  ^^PV  that  the  forccs  brought  through 
tary  of  state  to  him.  Maryland  wcro  intended  solely  for  the  de- 
fense of  the  capital;  that  "the  national  highway  had  been 
selected,  after  consultation  with  prominent  magistrates 


76 


THE  TROOPS  EEACH  AIWAPOLIS, 


[Sect.VII. 


and  citizens  of  Maryland,  as  tlie  one  wMcli,  wliile  a  route 
is  absolutely  necessary,  is  farthest  removed  from  the  pop- 
ulous cities  of  tlie  state,  and  witli  the  expectation  that  it 
would  therefore  be  the  least  objectionable."  With  re- 
spect to  the  suggestion  of  foreign  mediation,  he  added 
that "  no  domestic  contention  whatever  that  mio;ht  arise 
among  the  parties  of  this  republic  ought  in  any  case  to 
be  referred  to  any  foreign  arbitrament,  and  least  of  all  to 
the  arbitrament  of  a  European  monarchy." 

General  Butler,  on  arriving  at  the  Susquehanna  (April 
The  Massachusetts  ^Oth)  with  Ms  dctachmcut  of  Massachusetts 
wa^towasMn^^^^^  troops,  fouud  tli0^ridges  burned.  Deter- 
*''°*  mined  to  make  his  way  to  Washington,  he 

seized  a  steam-boat  at  the  ferry  of  Havre  de  Grace,  and 


THE  NORTHERN  RAILROADS  TO  WASHINGTON. 

President." 


carried  his  forces  to  An- 
napolis. The  governor 
again  protested  against 
this  landing  of  North- 
ern troops  on  the  soil  of 
Maryland.  "They  are 
not  ISTorthern  troops,"  re- 
plied Butler ;  "  they  are 
a  part  of  the  whole  mili- 
tia of  the  United  States, 
obeying  the  call  of  the 


Chap.  XXXVII.]         AND.  RELIEVE  WASHINGTON.  ^7 

The  Massachusetts  troops  resumed  their  march  from 
Annapolis  on  the  24:th,  repairing  the  bridges  and  laying 
rails  as  they  went.     At  Annapolis  Junction  they  reached 
a  train  of  cars  from  Washington,  and,  with  the  New  York 
Seventh  Kegiment  in  advance,  arrived  in  that  city  on  the 
25th.     From  the  day  of  the  attack  on  the  Massachusetts 
troops  in  Baltimore,  Washington  had  been  cut  off  from 
The  public  build-   *^^  ^OYth.     The  Treasury  building  and  the 
taf  ocfu5lild  by"     Capitol  had  been  barricaded,  and  howitzers 
the  troops.  p^^   ^^  their  passages  ;    subsequently  the 

basement  of  the  Capitol  was  turned  into  a  bake-house, 
and  the  chambers  of  the  Senate  and  Representatives  con- 
verted into  barracks.  The  only  guard  had  been  some 
Pennsylvania  companies,  a  few  regulars  collected  together 
by  General  Scott,  and  a  body  of  volunteers  under  Cassius 
M.Clay. 

When  the  Legislature  of  Maryland  met,  the  governor, 
ActiorioftheMary.^^  ^^^  mcssagc,  admitted  that  the  passage  of 
laud  Legislature,  troops  through  the  statc  to  the  capital  could 
not  be  prevented,  and  he  earnestly  counseled,  as  the  only 
safety,  the  maintenance  of  a  strict  neutrality,  so  that, "  if 
there  must  be  war  between  the  North  and  the  South,  we 
may  force  the  contending  parties  to  transfer  the  field  of 
battle  from  our  soil,  and  our  lives  and  property  be  se- 
cure." Reluctantly  consenting  to  these  views,  the  Legis- 
lature accordingly  resolved  not  to  secede  from  the  Union. 
Secession,  however,  had  now  become  impossible,  for  But- 
Baitimore  seized  ^^r  had  takcu  military  posscsslou  of  Balti- 
by  Butler.  morc.     Hc  entered  it  with  a  detachment  of 

the  same  Massachusetts  regiment  which  had  been  assault- 
ed in  its  streets,  and,  encamping  on  Federal  Hill,  had  the 
city  completely  under  command.  In  vain  the  Legislature 
declared  that  the  war  against  the  Confederate  States  was 
unconstitutional  and  repugnant  to  civilization;  in  vain 
they  protested  that  they  sympathized  with  the  South  in 


73  BALTIMORE  SEIZED.  [Sect.VII. 

this  struggle  for  its  rights;  in  vain  they  resolved  that 
Maryland  implores  the  President,  in  the  name  of  God,  to 
cease  this  unholy  war ;  that  she  consents  to,  and  desires 
the  recognition  of,  the  independence  of  the  Confederate 
States.  She  could  do  nothing  against  the  overwhelming 
power  of  the  North,  and  she  was  forced  to  succumb. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 

THE  SECESSION  OF  VIRGINIA. 

Virginia  acceded  to  secession  after  exacting  the  foremost  rank  in  the  Confederacy, 
and  protection  for  her  slave  interests. 

She  then  seized  the  National  Armory  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  the  Navy  Yard  at  Nor- 
folk, with  its  vast  war-supplies,  turning  them,  with  all  her  own  military  resources, 
over  to  the  Confederacy. 

Her  chief  city,  Richmond,  was  made  the  capital  of  the  new  republic. 

Ephemeral  glory  of  the  new  metropolis. 

The  secession  movement  was  not  advancing  so  trium- 
The  reluctance  of    ptantlj  as  its  orfginators  had  hoped.     At 

Virginia  to  secede.     ^^^    ^^^'^    ^^  j.^^^    Sumtcr    Onlj    SCVCH    Skve 

States  had  joined  the  Confederacy ;  the  others  were  va- 
cillating. It  was  absolutely  necessary  for  the  insurrec- 
tionists at  Montgomery  to  induce  or  compel  them  to  act. 

Pre-eminent  among  these  lingering  states,  through  her 
traditions,  through  her  geographical  position,  and  through 
her  political  power,  was  Virginia.  To  a  very  large  por- 
tion of  her  people  the  souvenirs  of  the  Union  were  sources 
of  honorable  pride ;  the  Constitution  had  been,  to  no  in- 
considerable degree,  the  work  of  her  great  men,  who  also, 
through  so  many  of  the  earlier  years  of  the  republic,  had 
administered  the  government. 

Virginia  had  been  very  far  from  approving  of  the 
thoughtless  haste  of  the  South  Carolinians 

She  is  influenced  by    .  .  ,  •,      .  -,,  n,  .  tt 

her  traditions  and  lu  passiusT  thcir  ordmaucc  01  sccessiou.  Her 
inhabitants,  characterized  by  more  mental 
maturity  (vol.  i.,  p.  102)  than  those  of  the  Gulf  States, 
looked  to  the  consequences  of  their  acts.  The  inevitable 
course  which  the  new  Confederacy  must  take  was  alto- 
gether in  opposition  to  her  interests.     Whatever  might 


80  VIRGINIA  RELUCTANT  TO  SECEDE.  [Sect.  VII. 

be  the  present  protestation,  it  was  perfectly  clear  tliat  the 
logical  issue  of  the  Confederacy,  if  successful,  was  the  re- 
opening of  the  African  slave-trade.  But  Virginia  was  at 
this  epoch  the  chief  slave-producing,  slave-selling  state. 
The  resumption  of  that  trade  would  have  destroyed  this, 
her  great  source  of  profit.  Influenced  thus  by  her  tradi- 
tions and  her  interests,  she  was  reluctant  to  join  the  Slave 
Confederacy. 

Ten  days  after  the  passing  of  the  ordinance  of  secession 
by  South  Carolina,  a  commissioner  from  Vir- 

She  sends  comrais-         .     .  .        -,    ,        ^~.,        ,       ,  ,-,,         ~f-        ,   , 

sioners  to  South   OTuia  amved  111  Charlcstou.     The  Lesrisla- 

■  Carolina,  ^  P 

ture  of  his  state  had  declared  its  desire  to 
procure  amendments  to,  or  guarantees  in  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States.  The  Carolina  General  Assembly, 
however,  declined  co-operation  for  such  purposes.  They 
answered  that  they  took  no  farther  interest  in  that  Con- 
stitution, and  considered  that "  the  only  appropriate  ne- 
gotiation they  could  have  with  the  federal  government 
was  as  with  a  foreign  state." 
But,  though  at  this  time  Virginia  unquestionably  looked 

with  disapproval  on  what  the  Cotton  States 

and  yields  a  quali-  ,     .  ,  ^         ,    ,  ip    /        t 

fled  consent  to  se-  were  cLomo:,  siie  sunered  nerseli  to  become 

cession.  y-^ 

entangled  in  their  movements  by  consenting 
that  if  the  government  should  resort  to  coercion  of  the 
seceding  states,  she  would  make  common  cause  with 
them.  It  therefore  only  remained  for  them  to  provoke 
the  use  of  force  not  only  to  secure  her  alliance,  but,  as 
they  hoped,  that  of  all  the  other  Border  States,  which  it 
was  thought  would  follow  her  movement.  This  was  one 
of  the  motives  that  induced  them  to  make  an  attack  on 
Fort  Sumter. 

On  the  day  of  the  surrender  of  that  fort,  delegates  from 

She  sends  a  com-    Virginia  had  an  interview  with  the  Presi- 

coin.  dent,  their  ostensible  object  being  to  infonn 

him  that,  the  industrial  and  commercial  interests  of  the 


Chap.  XXXVIIL]     SHE  JOINS  THE  CONFEDERACY.  gl 

country  were  suffering ;  that  a  disturbance  of  the  public 
peace  was  threatened.  They  desired  to  know  from  him 
what  policy  he  intended  to  pursue.  But  events  were 
marching  more  rapidly  than  negotiations.  Lincoln  was 
compelled  (April  15th),  by  what  was  taking  place  in 
Charleston,  to  issue  the  proclamation  calling  forth  the 
militia,  and  summoning  Congress  to  meet.  To  the  dele- 
gates that  was,  of  course,  an  answer.  Nevertheless,  he 
courteously  replied  to  them,  referring  them  to  what  he 
had  said  in  his  inaugural  address,  and  explaining  some 
portions  of  it. 

The  proclamation  was  imperatively  required  by  the 
Eifectoftheprocia-  Imminent  danger  in  which  it  was  apparent 
mation  on  her.  ^^^^  ^j^^  Capital  was  placcd.  But  it  gave  to 
the  dissatisfied  Virginians  their  opportunity.  On  the 
17th  of  April  their  ordinance  of  secession  was  passed. 
This  was  done  by  their  Convention  in  secret  session,  and 
The  secession  ordi-  ^^^  injunctiou  of  sccrccy  has  not  been  re- 
nance  passed.  moved.  Thc  votes  Were,  however,  subse- 
quently discovered  and  published.  It  then  appeared 
that  there  were  88  yeas  and  55  nays.  One  delegate  was 
excused,  and  eight  did  not  vote. 

So  strong  was  the  disapproval  of  the  Carolinian  move- 
ment in  Virginia,  that  all  those  arts  which 

Difficulty  in  per-  t,»»  n         ,i  tt  j.i? 

suading'her  peo-    politiciaus  use  lor  tuc  accomplisnment  oi 

T)lc  to  SGC6d.G.  -_« 

their  ends  had  to  be  resorted  to.  The  le- 
gal Convention  was  overawed  "by  an  irresponsible  gath- 
ering of  unauthorized'  persons  from  various  parts  of  the 
state,  who  called  themselves  a  people's  spontaneous  Con- 
vention. Prominence  was  given  to  this  assemblage  by 
the  recognition  the  leading  secessionists  extended  to  it. 
Thus  Mr.  Wise  and  ex-President  Tyler  entered  it  arm  in 
arm  to  announce  the  result  of  the  deliberations  of  the 
legal  Convention,  and  the  former  of  these  personages,  in  a 
speech  he  made  before  it,  lamented  "the  blunders  which 
II.— F 


32         GIVES  HER  EESOURCES  TO  THE  CONFEDERACY.    [Sect.  VH. 

had  prevented  Virginia  from  seizing  Washington  before 
the  Republican  hordes  got  possession  of  it."  The  latter 
declared  that  if  the  Slave  States  only  presented  a  united 
front,  no  war  of  any  consequence  would  ensue.  When 
the  President's  proclamation  reached  Eichmond,  every  ex- 
ertion was  made  by  the  malcontents  to  misrepresent  it. 
They  succeeded  in  causing  such  an  excitement  that  under 
cover  of  it  the  secession  ordinance  was  passed. 

To  that  ordinance  another  was  added,  adopting  the 
Constitution  of  the  provisional  g-overnment 

Her  resources  -••  <-> 

tlTctnfet  ^"^     ^^  Montgomery,  and  also  an  agreement  giv- 
eracy.  ^^^  ^^  ^j^^^  govemmeut  the  whole  military 

resources  of  the  state,  and  turning  over  to  it  whatever 
public  property  Virginia  might  seize  from  the  United 
States.  These  were  passed,  however,  upon  condition  that 
the  vote  of  the  people  upon  the  ordinance  of  secession 
should  sustain  it,  and  that  vote  was  directed  to  be  taken 
one  month  subsequently  (May  23d).  With  a  view  of 
enabling  the  people  to  come  to  a  suitable  conclusion, 
some  minor  points  were  enacted,  as  that  any 

Means  used  to  se-     -^-j^.       ..  ^--,. 

cure  the  popular  Virsimian  holdin^:  omce  under  the  United 
States  after  the  31st  of  July  should  be  ban- 
ished from  the  state  and  declared  an  alien  enemy,  and 
any  Virginian  undertaking  to  represent  the  state  in  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  should,  in  addition  to  the 
above  penalties,  be  considered  guilty  of  treason,  and  his 
property  be  liable  to  confiscation. 

But  this  submission  to  the  people  was  insincere.  The 
allotted  month  had  scarcely  begun,  before  the  affair  had 
passed  out  of  their  control.  Without  a  moment's  delay, 
the  leaders  of  the  movement  made  war  on  the  Union ; 
they  attempted  to  seize  the  United  States  Arsenal  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  took  possession  of  the  navy  yard  at 
Norfolk.  Indeed,  they  actually  commenced  obstructing 
the  channel  to  the  latter  place  on  April  16th,  the  night 


Qhap.  XXXVIII.]       CAPTURES  HARPER'S  FERRY.  g^ 


f 


before  tie  ordinance  was  passed.  And  wlien  tlie  popu- 
lar vote  for  secession  was  taken,  a  large  part  of  it  came 
from  soldiers  of  the  Confederate  army  who  liad  just  ar- 
rived from  other  states. 

Through  all  the  subsequent  years  of  the  war  it  was  a 
Her  failure  to  seize  s^urce  of  profouud  rcgret  in  the  Confeder- 
Fortress  Monroe.  ^^^  that  Virginia  had  acted  so  tardily,  and 
that  she  had  not  at  this  time  secured  the  great  national 
work— Portress  Monroe.  It  would  have  been  of  incal- 
culable advantage  to  her,  and  have  changed  the  whole 
current  of  events.  Her  governor  had  contemplated  the 
possibility  of  seizing  it  even  before  the  state  had  seceded, 
but  had  been  less  resolute  than  the  South  Carolinians. 
In  his  annual  message  to  the  Legislature  of  the  state  (De- 
cember 31st,  1861),  he  regretted  that  it  was  not  in  his 
possession.  He  stated  that  he  had  "  consulted  with  a  per- 
son of  experience  whose  position  enabled  him  to  know  all 
about  the  fortress,"  and  that  he  had  been  discouraged,  by 
reason  of  the  strength  of  the  place,  from  attempting  its 
capture ;  that  at  no  time  previously  to  secession  had  Vir- 
ginia a  military  organization  powerful  enough  for  that 
purpose. 

The  attack  on  Harper's  Ferry  was  made  on  the  18th 
of  April.     The  officer  in  charge  of  that  es- 

She  captures  the,,,.,  ,iti  t  /» 

arsenajatHar-     tablishmcut  had,  howcvcr,  become  aware  oi 

per  8  Ferry.  ^  '  ' 

what  was  intended.  He  blew  up  or  set  on 
fire  the  various  workshops  and  the  arsenal,  and  effected 
a  safe  retreat  into  Pennsylvania.  Though  many  arms 
were  in  this  manner  destroyed,  much  of  the  machinery 
was  saved  by  the  assailants,  and  subsequently  carried  to 
Richmond. 

.  Simultaneously  with  the  attack  on  Harper's  Perry,  Vir- 
vaiue  of  ihe  naval  ghiia  accomplishcd  the  seizure  of  the  great 
station  at  Norfolk.    ^^^^^  statiou,  thc  Gosport  uavy  yard,  near 

•Norfolk.     It  contained  founderies,  ship-yards,  docks,  ma- 


84 


THE  NORFOLK  NAVY  YARD. 


[Sect.  VII. 


chine  shops.  There  were  in  it  at  least  two  thousand  can- 
non, three  hundred  of  them  being  Dahlgren  guns.  In 
connection  with  it,  too,  were  magazines  containing  more 
than  a  quarter  of  a  million  pounds  of  gunpowder,  and 


great  quantities  of  shot  and  shell.  There  were  twelve 
war  ships,  of  various  rates.  Among  them  may  particular- 
ly be  mentioned  the  Merrimack,  a  very  fine  steam  frigate 
of  40  guns.  The  value  of  the  entire  establishment  was 
estimated  at  more  than  ten  millions  of  dollars. 

No  measures  had  been  taken  for  the  protection  of  this 
Its  inefficient  de-  g^cat  dcpot  bcyoud  general  instructions  to 
fense.  Captalu  M^Caulcy,  the  officer  in  command, 

to  "put  the  shipping  and  public  property  in  condition  to 
be  moved  and  placed  beyond  danger,  but  in  doing  so  to 
take  no  steps  that  could  give  needless  alarm  "  In  Nor- 
folk the  militia  was  defiantly  paraded,  and  threats  made 
that  if  any  action  were  taken  by  the  government  for  the 
protection  of  the  yard,  it  should  be  attacked.  On  the 
night  of  April  16th,  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  was  ob- 


Chap.  XXXVIIL]        THE  NORFOLK  NAVY  YAKD.  §5 

structed  by  sinking  two  liglit-sliips.  Captain  M^Cauley 
suffered  himself  to  be  overpersuaded  by  the  sinister  ad- 
vice of  his  junior  officers,  and  acted  with  irresolution.  Or- 
ders had  been  received  from  Washington  on  April  12th 
to  have  the  Merrimack  instantly  removed  to  Philadel- 
phia, the  chief  engineer  being  sent  down  to  Norfolk  ex- 
pressly for  that  purpose.  Yet  when  her  steam  was  up, 
and  she  was  ready  to  leave,  Captain  M^Cauley  directed 
her  to  be  detained,  notwithstanding  the  remonstrances 
of  the  engineer. 

Indeed,  it  was  not  imtil  many  of  his  officers,  who  were 
from:  the  Slave  States,  had  resigned,  and  the 

The  officers  in  com-    r^        n    i         ,  imTj>  tt  •        ■^ 

mand  destroy  or      Contedcrate  g-eneral  ialiaierro  had  arrived 

abandon  it,  -r»'iii 

from  Kichmond,  that  he  seemed  to  compre- 
hend the  condition  of  things.  On  the  19th  he  made  prep- 
arations for  abandoning  the  place,  and  commenced  'spik- 
ing the  guns,  doing  it,  for  the  most  part,  ineffectually,  with 
cut  nails.  Next  day.  he  promised  the  insurgents  that 
none  of  the  vessels  should  be  taken  away,  nor  a  shot  fired 
except  in  defense.  He  then  ordered  all  the  ships,  except 
the  Cumberland,  of  24  guns,  to  be  scuttled.     That  ship, 

with  a  full  armament  and  crew  on  board, 

thongh  they  had      ,  .  _  ,    ,  ' 

ftTdefens?""^  ^'''"  ^^^  ^^  ^^  -  ^  positiou  as  to  commaud  thc 
entire  harbor,  the  cities  of  Norfolk  and  Ports- 
mouth, the  navy  yard,  and  the  approaches  to  it.  The 
mere  threat  of  her  broadside  Avould  have ,  quelled  the 
trouble.  The  whole  militia  force  of  the  place  was  not 
^ve  hundred  men,  inadequately  armed,  and  with  only 
eight  or  ten  little  field-pieces. 

The  government,  now  becoming  alarmed,  sent  Captain 
Paulding  from  Washington  with  orders  to  take  command 
of  all  the  naval  forces  afloat  at  Norfolk,  and  defend  the 
property  of  the  United  States,  repelling  force  by  force. 
He  had  fully  1000  men,  among  whom  were  350  Massa- 
chusetts troops  obtained  at  Fortress  Monroe.     But,  in  his 


gl  THE  NORFOLK  NAVY  YARD.  [Sect.  VII. 

judgment,  notliiDg  remained  except  to  complete  tlie  work 
of  destruction,  and  abandon  tlie  place.  The  scuttled  ships 
were  in  the  act  of  settling  under  the  water.  He  there- 
fore gave  directions  to  fire  the  yard  and  what  remained 
of  the  ships.  The  ships,  which  might  have  been  removed, 
were  accordingly  destroyed,  but  the  shops  in  the  yard 
were  unaccountably  spared,  and  were  subsequently  of 
great  use  to  the  Confederacy.  A  large  amount  of  war  ma- 
terial fell  into  the  hands  of  the  insurgents.  A  commis- 
sioner of  the  State  of  Virginia,  subsequently 

Report  of  the  Vir-  ,i      ■  '    -  t   ,       ,    i  •  ,  (*  ,^ 

ginia  commissioner  authoRzed  to  takc  au  luveutorv  01  the  prop- 
on  its  acquisition.  i  •!  tit  t 

ertj  thus  seized,  reports :  "1  had  purposed 
some  remarks  upon  the  vast  importance  to  Virginia,  and 
to  the  entire  South,  of  the  timely  acquisition  of  this  ex- 
tensive naval  depot,  with  its  immense  supplies  of  muni- 
tions of  war,  and  to  notice  briefly  the  damaging  effects  of 
its  loss  to  the  government  at  Washington ;  but  I  deem  it 
unnecessary,  since  the  presences',  at  almost  every  exposed 
point  on  the  whole  Southern  coast,  and  at  numerous  in- 
land intrenched  camps  in  the  several  states,  of  heavy 
pieces  of  ordnance,  with  their  equipments  and  fixed  am- 
munition, all  supplied  from  this  establishment,  fully  at- 
tests the  one,  while  the  unwillingness  of  the  enemy  to  at- 
tempt demonstrations  at  any  point,  from  which  he  is  ob- 
viously' deterred  by  the  knowledge  of  its  well-fortified 
Tjondition;  abundantly  proves  the  other,  especially  when 
it  is  considered  that  both  he  and  we  are  wholly  indebted 
for  our  means  of  resistance  to  his  loss  and  our  acquisition 
of  the  Gosport  navy  yard." 

This  great  national  disaster,  which,  as  thus  affirmed,  in 

reality  armed  the  South,  and  gave  it  the 

Disastrons  conse-  n         *    i  i       1 1  .  i.  i. 

quences  to  the      mcaus  01  rcsistaucc  to  the  s:overnment,  must 

nation.  ,  .  ,       .  4^^      -, 

be  imputed  paxtly  to  irresolution  at  Wash- 
ington, and  partly  to  the  indecision  of  the  commanding 
officer.     The  money  loss  to  the  government  was  great, 


Chap.  XXXVIII.]        THE  'NORFOLK  NAVY  YARD.  gy 

but.it  was  a  totally  inadequate  measure  of  the  intrinsic 
value  of  the  war  material  at  that  moment.  The  South 
was  armed  and  the  North  disarmed.  The  indirect  con- 
sequences were  of  incalculable  importance.  When  Cap- 
tain JVrCauley  gave  orders  that  the  frigate  Merrimack 
should  not  sail,  and  thereby  left  her  to  be  raised  and  con- 
verted into  an  iron-clad  ram,  he  closed  the  James  River, 
and  prepared  unspeakable  disasters  for  the  subsequent 
peninsular  campaign. 

A  select  committee  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States, 
directed  to  inquire  into  these  subjects,  re- 
at?coinmittle  oS"  portcd  that,  lu  thclr  judgmcut,  (1.)  The  ad- 
ministration of  Mr.  Buchanan  was  guilty  of 
neglect  in  not  taking  extraordinary  care  and  employing 
every  possible  means  to  protect  and  defend  the  Norfolk 
navy  yard  after  indications  of  danger  had  manifested 
themselves ;  (2.)  The  administration  of  Mr.  Lincoln  can 
not  be  held  blameless  for  suffering  thirty-seven  days  to 
elapse  after  he  came  into  power  before  making  a  move- 
ment for  the  defense  of  the  yard ;  (3.)  Captain  M'Cauley 
was  highly  censurable  for  neglecting  to  send  the  Merri- 
mack from  the  yard  as  he  was  ordered,  and  also  for  scut- 
tling the  ships  and  preparing  to  abandon  the  yard  before 
any  attack  was  made  or  seriously  threatened,  when  he 
should  have  defended  it  and  the  property  intrusted  to 
him,  repelling  force  by  force,  as  he  was  instructed  to  do 
if  the  occasion  should  present  itself  Captain  Paulding 
was  likewise  considered  by  the  committee  to  be  censura- 
ble for  ordering  the  property  to  be  burned  and  the  yard 
abandoned  before  taking  proper  means  to  satisfy  himself 
that  any  necessity  for  such  measures  existed. 

Thus  Virginia  severed  her  connection  with  that  repub- 
lic which  her  great  men  of  the  former  generation  had 


g3  RICHMOND  THE  CONFEDERATE  CAPITAL.       [Sect.  VII. 

done  so  mucli  to  establish,  and  wMcli  she  had  so  long 

ruled.     She  accepted  a  measure  leading  at  once  to  civil 

war,  to  public  calamity,  and  domestic  sorrow.    Few  social 

lessons  can  be  more  instructive  than  her  ex- 

Eichmond  as  the  .  •        ,i         /»  t*  ^^         '  i  •! 

Confederate  cap-  pericuces  lu  the  lour  lollowmg  years  while 
Richmond  had  the  vain  glory  of  being  the 
capital  of  the  new  Confederacy — experiences  which  have 
been  recorded  by  her  own  people.  Let  us  listen  to  what 
one  of  her  daughters  relates — the  serpent  beguiled  her 
and  she  did  eat — in  a  very  instructive  little  volume  she 
tells  us  how  the  apple  of  secession  tasted. 

She  says  that  during  the  Secession  Convention  the  hall 
of  meeting;  became  the  favorite  place  of  re- 

The  delight  of  its  ,       n  ,t  •        i  •  ii  ^ 

inhahitauts  at  se-    sort  01  the  womcn,  who  occasionally  ens-acred 

cession.  '  •/         o    o 

in  political  discussions  in  the  intervals  of  the 
meetings  of  the  members.  Every  woman  in  Richmond 
was  a  politician.  On  the  ordinance  of  secession  being 
passed,  the  people  were  in  a  delirium  of  joy ;  the  cannon 
were  saluting,  the  bells  ringing,  neigbbors  shaking  hands 
with  each  otker,  the  ladies  waving  their  handkerchiefs. 
In  the  evening  there  was  an  illumination,  the  favorite 
form  being  the  Southern  cross ;  the  sky  was  alive  with 
Roman  candles  and  variegated  rockets.  At  this  time 
Richmond  was  in  a  very  prosperous  condition ;  its  trade 
was  flourishing,  articles  of  food  and  clothing  were  very 
cheap,  and  pauperism  was  actually  unknown.  All  this 
was,  however,  considered  as  nothing  in  comparison  with 
the  prosperity  which  it  was  expected  that  secession  would 
bring.  The  clergy,  forgetting  the  terrible  denunciation 
that  Jefferson  had  formerly  pronounced  against  slavery, 
declared  that  the  smiles  of  God  were  upon  the  cause ;  and 
it  was  thought  to  be  more  than  a  mere  omen  that  on  the 

Sunday  following  the  passai^e  of  the  ordi- 

Secession  Sunday.  ,,  t'iii  n         ji 

nance  there  occurred  m  the  lesson  tor  the 
day,  as  read  in  the  Episcopal  churches,  the  words  "  I  will 


Chap.  XXXVIII.]    SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  RICHMOND.  "gg 

remove  far  off  from  you  tlie  JSTorthern  army,  and  v^ill 
drive  him  into  a  land  barren  and  desolate,  witli  his  face 
toward  the  east  sea,  and  his  hinder  parts  to  the  utmost 
sea,  and  his  stink  shall  come  up,  and  his  ill  savor  shall 
come  up,  because  he  hath  done  great  things." 

Soon,  however,  the  population  began  to  change,  and 
Gradual  changes  in  strauge  faccs  appeared  in  the  streets.  Sol- 
Eichmoud  society,    ^-^^.g  ^^^^  ^-^^  Cottou  States  Were  pouring 

in.  They  were  followed  by  that  loose  society,  male  and 
female,  which  always  hovers  round  armies.  The  first 
regiments  that  appeared  were  from  South  Carolina.  They 
received  a  hearty  welcome.  The  gay  throng  who  had 
lately  crowded  the  halls  of  the  Secession  Convention  was 
now  wandering  through  the  camps.  But  the  pride  of 
the  young  ladies  was  touched  to  the  quick  by  the  gas- 
conade of  their  new  friends.  "We  have  come  here  to 
fight  the  battles  of  you  Virginians."  Estrangement  was 
embittered  by  the  reflection  that  the  blows  so  wantonly 
provoked  by  South  Carolina  must  fall  first  on  Virginia. 
But,  though  the  Carolinians  gave  no  offense,  save  that 
arising  from  their  conceit,  it  was  not  so  with  the  troops 
of  the  Southwest.  The  New  Orleans  Zouaves  stole  what- 
ever they  could  lay  their  hands  upon,  robbed  and  insult- 
ed citizens  in  the  public  streets,  caroused  riotously.in  the 
restaurants  and  hotels,  and  told  the  proprietors  to  charge 
the  bills  to  the  Confederate  government. 

An  elegant  establishment  w^as  provided  for  President 

The  president  and     T^^vls.       RcceptioUS  llkc  thoSC  lu  thc  WMtO 

Richmond  life.  jj^^^^  ^^  Washiugtou  wcrc  held.  It  was 
necessary  that  every  man  should  appear  in  the  streets  in 
a  military  garb.  There  was  the  reveille  in  the  morning 
and  taps  at  night.  In  the  autumn  of  that  first  year  of 
the  war  the  weather  was  more  beautiful  than  for  a  long 
time  had  been  known ;  the  Indian  summer  brought  an 
exquisite  dreamy  haze;  the  gorgeous  foliage  of  the  forest 


ff^  SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  EICHMOND.  [Sect.  VII. 

was  Absolutely  magnificent.  This  was  Avhile  M^Clellan 
was  holding  his  great  army  at  Washington  waiting  for 
the  weather  to  improve.  The  president  of  the  Confed- 
eracy was  often  seen  riding  on  horseback  through .  the 
city  with  one  of  his  children  before  him.  It  was  thought 
to:  be  an  affecting  sight. 

By  ,  degrees,  however,  things  changed.  Speculators, 
Decline  of  patriotic  g^mblcrs,  aud  pci'sons  of  bad  character 
sentiment.  flocked    iuto    the    ucw    mctropolis.      The 

blockade  began  to  be  felt  The  vilest  extortions  were 
practiced  by  dealers  in  provisions.  They  ran  up  the 
price  of  coffee  to  fifty  dollars  per  pound.  Dried  leaves 
of  the,  sage,  willow,  currant,  were  substituted  for  tea. 
The  president  declined  in  public  esteem ;  his  arbitrary 
control  of  military  affairs  irritated  the  chief  generals.  It 
was  remarked  that  the  first  anniversary  of  the  fall  of 
Sumter  was  signalized  by  the  fall  of  Pulaski.  Then 
came  M^Clellan's  peninsular  campaign,  and  trouble  in 
Difficulties  in  do-  the  domcstlc  economy  of  Eichmond.  It 
mestic  economy,  ^^^g,  ^^^  -j^^^^^  ^^^  fair  iuformaut  plaintive- 
ly says,  to  procure  a  dinner  at  all.  Then  followed  the 
Chickahominy  battles.  "  The  month  of  July  can  never 
be  forgotten;  we  lived  in  one  immense  hospital;  we 
breathed  the  vapors  of  a  charnel-house."  The  Confeder- 
ate Congress,  on  M'Clellan's  approach,  had  run  away; 
when  the  members  returned  in  August  after  he  was  gone, 
they  were  unmercifully  twitted  for  their  flight  by  the 
women.  The  chief  magistrate,  embittered  by  the  course 
of  events,  had  now  become  a  stern  autocrat ;  he  kept 
both  houses  of  Congress  in  mortal  terror.  A  public 
The  president  be-  clamor  arosc  that  his  cabinet  should  be 
comes  unpopular,  ^haugcd.  Hc  tumcd  a  deaf  ear  to  it.  It 
was  said  that  his  obstinacy  was  strengthened  by  the  flat- 
tery of  the  parasites  around  him — the  dependents  on  his 
will.     In  his  first  report  to  the  permanent  Congress  he 


Chap.  XXXVm.]  RICHMOND  AS  A  CAPITAL.  ^ 

had  represented  the  financial  condition  as  one  of  safety ; 
"  in  less  than  twelve  months  the  currency,  was  at  a  dis- 
count of  a  thousand  per  cent."  There  was  a  pitiable 
a.d  necessary  nrti-  scarcity  of  the  most  ueccssary  articles;  for 
cies  very  scarce,  instauce,  paper  could  hardly  be  had.  The 
old  and  respectable  residents,  who  had  long  lived  in  eas6 
on  their  competent  resources,  were  now  reduced  to  dire 
necessities.  The  women  turned  their  well-worn  dresses 
upside  down  and  inside  out  to  pass  them  off  as  new, 
and  grimly  jested  at  the  seedy  aspect  of  their  male 
friends,  whose  garb  was  incapable  of  that  device.  De- 
cayed gentility  saw  with  indignation  the  splendid  car- 
A  gloom  settles  on  I'lagcs  of  upstart  spccuktors  rolling  through 
theci^y.  the  streets,  and  listened  perhaps  with  too 

much  credulity  to  stories  of  the  vast  fortunes  wrung  by 
contractors  out  of  the  impoverished  state.  The  >  cheerful 
sounds  of  the  piano  became  less  frequent  in  the  houses ; 
they  were  replaced  by  the  hum  of  the  spinning-wheel. 

Not  without  curiosity,  mingled  with  sympathy,  do  we 
Extravagant  prices  ^^^^  ^^^  declaration  of  our  fair  Confederate 
of  clothing.  £j,j^^^^  that  "the  wardrobe  of  a  lady  be- 

came enormously  expensive  at  last."  .  "For  an  ordinary 
calico,  for  which  we  formerly  paid  12  J  cents  a  yard,  we 
were  forced  to  pay  from'  thirty  to  thirty-five  dollars ;  for 
an  English  or  French  chintz  the  price  was  fifty  dollars  a 
yard.  A  nice  French  merino  or  mohair  dress  was  from 
eight  hundred  to  a  thousand  dollars.  A  cloak  of  fine 
cloth  was  worth  from  one  thousand  to  fifteen  hundred 
dollars.  A  pair  of  Balmoral  boots  for  ladies,  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty  dollars.  French  gloves  sold  at  from  one 
hundred  and  twenty-five  to  one  hundred  and  seventy-five 
dollars  per  pair.  Irish  linen  commanded  from  fifty  to 
one  hundred  dollars  per  yard."  But  it  is  needless  to 
continue  this  catalogue  of  feminine  sorrows :  something 
infinitely  sadder  was  coming. 


92  SURRENDER  OF  PENSACOLA.  [Sect.  VII. 

The  inevitable  hour  struck  at  last.     Kichmond,  aban- 
doned and  defenseless,  stood  alone  in  pres- 
Richmon/Sa      euce  of  the  Great  Power  it  had  defied.     The 
Confederate   authorities  had  fled,  and  had 
given  orders  to  set  it  on  fire.     In  vain  the  inhabitants, 
pallid  with  terror,  implored  to  be  spared  that  atrocity. 
.It  is  fired  by  these-  With  exquisite  wickedness,  the  hose  of  the 
cession  officers.       fire-engiucs  had  been  cut.     There  was  noth- 
ing to  stop  the  devouring  flames.     An  unparalleled  con- 
flagration was  the  result.     Kichmond,  once   the  great 
mart  of  the  internal  slave-trade,  was  entered  by  conquer- 
ing regiments  of  negro  troops.     They  came  through  the 
smoke,  amidst  blazing  houses,  bursting  shells,  and  explod- 
ing magazines,  singing  "  Old  John  Brown."     They  came, 
not  to  revenge,  but  to  protect. 

And  the  republic  founded  by  Washington,  a  Virgin- 
ian, for2:ettin2:  in  a  moment  the  long;  asrony 

and  its  people  saved      -,         ^       -,     t  -,        ,  t  7,    it 

from  famine  by  the  suc   had   Dceu   made  to  endure,  stretched 

United  States.  n       i     i        t     i  t  t  i 

forth  both  her  hands  to  succor  and  sustam 
bleeding  and  fainting  Virginia.  Men,  women,  and  chil- 
dren who  were  famishing  in  Richmond,  were  fed  by  the 
merciful  conqueror. 

In  connection  with  the  capture  of  the  navy  yard  at 
Surrender  of  the    Norfolk  may  bc  mcutioued  the  disgraceful 
pensacoiayard.     g^rreudcr  of  that  at  Pensacola,  in  Florida, 
by  the  officers  having  charge  of  it,  and  the  honorable  de- 
fense of  Fort  Pickens. 

Florida,  purchased  from  Spain  by  the  money  of  the 
Union,  had  seceded  on  January  12th,  and  immediately 
made  a  demand  for  the  yard.  Of  the  works  guarding  it 
the  most  important  was  Fort  Pickens,  a  stone  casemated 
structure  on  Santa  Eosa  Island.  On  the  shore  opposite 
to  it  there  was  a  smaller  work.  Fort  M'Rea;  and  a  third, 
Fort  Barrancas,  about  a  couple  of  miles  distant.     At  the 


Chap.  XXXVIII.  ]        DEFENSE  OF ,  FORT  PICKENS. 


93 


Pensac 


Q^NiVY    ov   \K\.^\^Ci 


THE  DEFENSES  OF  PENSACOLA. 


time  when  the  American  flag  was  hauled  down  at  the 

navy  yard,  and  the  stores,  guns,  and  munitions  turned 

over  to  the  insurgents,  Fort  Barrancas  was  abandoned. 

But  this  scene  of  military  disgrace  was  not  consum- 

Defense  of  Fort    ^uatcd.     The  little  Fort  M'Eea  was  in  charge 

Pickens.  ^£  ^  young  officer.  Lieutenant  Slemmer.     He 

collected  together  what  force  he  could,  and,  obtaining 

some  marines  from  the  steamer  Wyandotte,  in  all  about 

eighty  men,  he  spiked  the  guns  of  M^Kea,  and  threw 

himself  into  Fort  Pickens,  holding  that  important,  work, 

which  was  one  of  the  keys  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  until 

the  middle  of  April,  when  it  was  effectually  garrisoned 

and  provisioned  by  the  government. 


CHAPTEE  XXXIX. 

SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  THE  SOUTH  AT  THE  OPENING  OF  THE 
CONFLICT.     HER  MILITARY  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATIONS. 

The  South  secured  her  sea-coast  line  by  seizing  the  national  fortresses  ;  her  north- 
ern line  by  asserting  the  rights  of  neutrality  of  the  Border  States.  On  the  West 
she  blockaded  the  Mississippi. 

Shut  up  thus  within  herself,  she  established*  throughout  her  territory  an  iron  des- 
potism. 

Inhere  were  four  classes  in  her  population.  Their  condition  became  that  of  a  state 
of  siege.  .    t 

Comparison  of  the  political  value  of  Richmond,  the  metropolis  of  the  Confederacy, 

^'  with  that  of  Washington. 

I  .Though  assuraviices  were  perpetually  given  by  the  lead- 
watpreparationsia  ers  of  secessioH  that  their  design  would,  sue- 
the  confederacy.  ^^^^  wlthout  difficulty,  and  perhaps  with- 
put  a  resort  to  war,  they  made  every  preparation  to  ob- 
tain military  security  for  their  new .  Confederacy.  They 
commenced  by  seizing  all  the  fortresses  and  depots  estab- 
lished  in  their  limits  by  the  United  States  for  the  defense 
of  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts.  Some  of  these  had  been 
very  costly;  several  were  very  powerful  works— a  cor- 
don along  the  shore  Judged  to  be  amply  sufficient  to  give 
security  to  that  part  of  the  republic  in  case  of  European 
war,  but  capable  of  being  appropriated  without  difficulty 
by  the  people  it  was  intended  to  defend,  since  it  was  vir- 
tually ungarrisoned. 

The  sea  and  Gulf  fronts  of  the  new  Confederacy  thus 
protected,  it  was    supposed  that  the  land- 

The  coast  front  and    t,         /it.  ,t  i     ,  t     ,-•        t-i 

SadeTafe^''"''^  ^^""^  irout,  lookiug  uorthward  toward  the  ±"ree 

States,  might  be  made  secure  by  resorting 

to  the  apparently  peaceable  measure  of  playing  off  the 


Chap.  XXXIX.]   DEFENSES  OF  THE  CONFEDERACy.  95 

Constitution  against  itself.  No  pains  were  spared  to  se- 
cure in  the  Border  States — the  tier  of  states  intervening 
between  the  cotton  region  and  the  free  North — reliable 
governors  and  Legislatures.  These  states,  by  assuming  a 
position  of  neutrality,  might  ward  off  the  forces  of  the 
republic  under  the  plea  that  they  had  done  nothing  to 
justify  invasion  by  it.  Meantime  their  military  popula- 
tion was  individually,  and  therefore,  it  might  be  said,  im- 
perceptibly, able  to  re-enforce  the  armies  of  the  Confeder- 
acy, and  their  military  resources  could  be  quietly  added 
to  its  strength. 

Under  the  protection  of  this  vast  breastwork,  this  tier 
of  ostensibly  peaceable  and  neutral  states,  reaching  from 
beyond  the  Mississippi  eastward  to  the  Atlantic  Ocean, 
the  people  who  had  revolted  from  the  republic  expected 
to  organize  their  political  institutions  in  security;  and 
that,  even  should  war  break  out,  its  shock  would  not  fall 
trpon  them.  The  Border  States  must  be  the  battle-field 
of  the  Confederacy. 

Distance,  and  the  impracticability  of  carrying  on  mili- 
the  west  front  inac-  ^^^J  opcratlous  iu  a  sparscly  peopled  country 
cessibie,  — ^  country  v^ithout  good  roads  and  with- 

out available  resources,  seemed  to  give  ample  security  on 
the  western  frontier.  The  Mississippi  Eiver,  as  a  central 
and  the  Mississippi  avcuuc  to  the  iutcrlor  rcccsscs  of  the  Con- 
federacy, might  be.  closed  without  difficulty 
against  all  adventurers.  The  forts  at  New  Orleans  pror- 
hibited  any  ascent,  and  batteries  could  easily  be  construct- 
ed below  the  junction  of  the  Ohio  at  Cairo  that  would 
bar  all  descent  down  the  stream. 

If  such  was  the  encouraging  prospect  when  the  de- 
The  national  army  feuscs  of  thc  Confederate  territory  were  con- 
andna^y  dispersed.  gi(Jepg(^^  ;qq^  jggg  gatisfactory  was  thc  condi- 
tion of  its  expected  assailant.  With  provident  care  for 
the  success  of  the  conspiracy,  Floyd  had  dispatched  the 


96  DEFENSES  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY.  [Sect.  VII. 

mass  of  the  United  States  army  to  tlie  frontier.  The 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  had  sent  the  national  ships  to  dis- 
tant parts  of  the  world.  History  lent  no  countenance  to 
the  supposition  that  it  would  be  possible  to  put  a  shore- 
line of  many  thousand  miles  under  a  valid  blockade. 
When  Lincoln  came  into  power  he  had  only  forty-two 
national  ships  with  which  to  do  that  and  meet  all  other 
naval  requirements. 

It  was,  therefore,  not  without  reason,  expected  that  the 
The  Confederacy    cultlvatlou  of  tobacco  aud  cottou,  thosc  great 
go'^od'^vSeVS?      sources  of  wealth,  could  be  carried  on  as 
''^''^^'  heretofore;  that  unrestrained  access  to  the 

ocean  on  the  one  side,  and  the  urgent  necessities  of  Eu- 
rope on  the  other,  would  continue  the  profitable  com- 
merce which  for  so  many  years  past  had  enriched  the 
South.  So  clear  did  this  appear,  that  it  was  not  consid- 
ered necessary  by  the  leaders  of  secession  to  resort  to  any 
measures  for  the  immediate  transportation  of  the  great 
stock  of  those  staples  on  hand  to  Europe,  it  being  con- 
cluded that,  should  the  government  undertake  any  such 
measures  as  a  closure  of  the  ports  or  the  establishment 
of  a  blockade,  the  western  powers  of  Europe  would  at 
once  interfere. 

Behind  the  impregnable  rampart  of  the  Border  States 
Life  in  the  Cotton  ^^^^^  would  thus  cxist,  iu  pcacc  and  secu- 
Pdradise.  j.-^.^^  ^  Cottou  Paradisc,  its  free  inhabitant 

relieved  from  the  primeval  curse,  and  gaining  his  bread 
by  the  sweat  of  another  man's  brow.    Should  the  African 
trade  be  reopened,  every  one  of  the  ruling  race  might 
have  as  many  laborers  as  he  pleased.     It  was  not  very 
material  what  terms  were  contained  in  the  written  Consti- 
tution of  the  new  nation,  since  the  recognized  right  of 
peaceable  secession  covered  every  difficul- 
dyfor^aii  political   ty.     Should  South  Carolina,  in  the  course 
of  events,  readopt  the  policy  she  had  at  the 


Chap.  XXXIX.]  THE  EIGHT  OF  SECESSION.  97 

close  of  the  last  English  war,  aided  in  imposing  on  the 
old  Union — the  tariff  policy — and  should,  as  probably 
might  be  the  case,  her  associates  object  to  her  proceed- 
ings, what  more  would  be  needful  for  her,  if  determined 
to  gratify  her  own  willfulness,  than  to  retire  from  the 
Confederacy,  as  she  had  formerly  retired  from  the  Union. 
Or,  should  Florida,  recalling  her  traditions,  and  remem- 
bering that  on  her  soil  the  African  first  set  his  foot  on 
this  continent,  desire  a  reopening  of  the  profitable  Guinea 
trade,  and  make  ready  her  depots  at  Pensacola  and  St. 
Augustine,  in  vain  would  the  slave-breeding  states  of  the 
Confederacy  exert  their  opposition.  Falling  back  on  her 
sovereign  rights,  it  was  only  for  her  to  secede  from  her 
associates  and  carry  out  her  intent. 

But  the  founders  of  the  Confederacy  never  seriously 

contemplated  the  recognition  of  such  a  po- 

the^'ieadeys  of  se-     Htical  absurdltv  as  the  rig-ht  of  secession ;  it 

cession.  *^  .       .    , 

was  too  slippery  a  principle;  they  never 
practically  accepted  its  kindred  delusion  of  individual 
state  rights  as  against  the  united  whole ;  they  never  be- 
lieved that  a  powerful  dominion  could  be  constructed 
out  of  disconnected  communities.  They  were  too  astute 
to  attempt  to  build  a  tower  whose  top  was  to  reach  to 
the  sky,  with  nothing  but  slime  for  mortar.  They  knew 
that  when  something  of  that  kind  was  formerly  tried,  it 
led  to  a  confusion  of  tongues  and  the  dispersion  of  the 
projectors. 

On  the  contrary,  once  in  possession  of  power,  they  sub- 

They  institute  a     J^ctcd  everything  to  a  despotism  of  iron. 

despotism.  Instead  of  a  garden  of  Eden,  in  which  every 

one  might  gratify  his  own  will,  the  South  became  a  vast 
intrenched  camp,  and  instant  obedience  was  exacted  to 
the  orders  of  a  military  sujDerior.  The  poor  white,  who 
had  innocently  amused  himself  with  a  day-dream  of  an- 
ticipated idleness,  riches,  pleasure,  and  liberty  to  the  verge 
IL— G 


98  CLASSES  OF  THE  POPULATION.  [Sect.  VIL 

of  license,  was  aghast  wlien  lie  found  that  he  was  torn 
from  his  home,  and  even  from  his  state,  and  compelled  to 
march  to  the  battle  front  by  order  of  a  central  authority 
at  Eichmond. 

The  population  of  the  proposed  Confederacy  may  be 
considered  as  havins:  presented  four  distinct- 

The  population  of,  tit«'  .... 

the  Confederacy  ly  marked  divisious  or  groups,  constituting, 
socially  and  intellectually,  a  descending  se- 
ries. (1.)  The  planters,  or  great  land  and  slave  owners ; 
(2.)  Persons  constrained  by  their  circumstances,  more  or 
less  narrow,  to  occupy  themselves  in  certain  industrial 
pursuits  —  professional  politicians,  clergymen,  lawyers, 
merchants,  mechanics,  farmers,  laborers;  (3.)  Domestic 
slaves;  (4.)  Field  slaves.  It  is  not  necessary  to  add  to 
these  the  free  negroes,  for  they,  in  truth,  were  of  little  po- 
litical importance. 

(1.)  The  planters  were  a  true  aristocracy — a  ruling 
class.     They  were   educated,  wealthy,  hos- 

The- first  class.  >  *i  i 

pitable.  Foreseeing  that,  under  the  opera- 
tion of  the  existing  Constitution,  the  North  must  neces- 
sarily take  from  them  that  control  of  the  national  govern- 
ment, which  they  had  so  long  enjoyed,  they  had  become 
alienated  from  it.  Accustomed  to  command,  impatient 
of  any  control,  a  civil  government  of  the  representative 
type  suited  them  far  less  than  a  purely  military  rule — 
one  readily  adapting  itself  to  actual  occurrences,  and  able 
to  enforce  its  laws  and  resolves  promptly  and  emphatic- 

ally. 

As  forming  what  might  be  termed  a  section  of  this 
group  were  its  young  men.  Brave,  splendid  riders,  cap- 
ital shots,  bold  to  rashness,  they  held  labor  in  absolute 
contempt,  and  pined  for  the  maddening  excitements  of 
war. 

(2.)  The  small  farmers,  mechanics,  merchants,  profes- 
sional men.    This  group  probably  numbered  three  fourths 


Chap.  XXXIX.]       CLASSES  OF  THE  POPULATION.  99 

of  the  white  population.     They  had  no  real 

The  SGPond  cIrss  x      a  •/ 

interest  in  the  establishment  of  a  Southern 
Confederacy.  Some  were  led,  and  some  driven  to  take 
the  risk  of  war ;  they  hoped  to  be  benefited  by  it  some- 
how, but  they  knew  not  how.  Guided  by  the  opinions 
of  the  great  slaveholding  planters,  they  had  become  intol- 
erant supporters  of  the  overshadowing  institution. 

One  portion  of  this  group — the  clergy — has  still  to 
The  course  of  the  render  to  the  world  an  account  of  its  con- 
^^®'^^'  duct.     At  the  bar  of  civilization  it  has  yet 

to  explain  or  to  defend  its  support  of  slavery.  It  took 
the  responsibility  of  training  the  women  of  the  South  in 
the  belief  that  that  institution  is  authorized  by  Chris- 
tianity. 

(3.)  Of  the  slave  groups,  the  domestic  slaves  had  gained 
The  third  class,  do-  ^  ccrtalu  dcgrco  of  intellectual  culture  from 
mestic  slaves,  '      ^^^^^  ^j^^^^  assoclatiou  with  the  whites. 

When  it  is  said  that  the  proportion  of  mulattoes  to  the 
whole  slave  population  had  risen  in  1860  to  one  eighth, 
the  statement  does  not  convey  the  whole  truth.  It  was 
on  the  class  of  domestic  slaves  that  the  adulteration  chief 
ly  fell.  Persons  who  were  extensively  and  familiarly  ac- 
quainted with  Southern  society  were  disposed  to  believe 
that  more  than  a  majority  of  this  group  showed  unmis- 
takable traces  of  white  blood.  The  women  of  it,  from 
their  necessary  connection  with  the  household,  were  more 
exposed  to  their  masters,  and  perhaps  they  were  not  less 
attractive  from  the  fact  that  many  of  them  possessed  lin- 
eaments of  a  European  cast,  and  had  lost  the  repulsive 
features  of  the  African.  As  a  general  thing,  they  were 
treated  with  kindness ;  but,  from  the  political  knowledge 
they  incidentally  acquired ;  from  their  comparative  physi- 
ological elevation  above  the  true  black,  aris- 
ing from  the  white  constituent  of  their 
blood ;  from  the  bitterness  awakened  in  them  against  the 


IQO  CONVERSION  OF  THE  NEGRO.  [Sect.  VII. 

whites  througli  the  trivial  daily  incidents  of  their  lives, 
they  constituted  emphatically  the  dangerous  class  of  the 
South. 

(4.)  As  for  the  field  slave,  every  thing  tended  to  em- 
The  fourth  class,  fitter  him.  On  him  fell  heavily  all  the 
field  slaves.  hardships  of  the  plantation — yet  not  on  him 
alone,  for  the  female  field  slaves  shared  all  the  toils  of 
the  men.  It  was  the  intention  of  the  slave  system  to 
keep  these  people  in  animal-like  ignorance ;  it  considered 
them  in  the  light  of  machines,  useful  for  the  gains  they 
could  create.  And  yet,  even  under  these  most  disad- 
vantaojeous  conditions,  human  nature  would  often  assert 
its  power.  There  were  many  of  this  class  who  manifest- 
ed no  uncertain  tokens  of  a  capacity  for  better  things ; 
who  endeavored,  with  what  intelligence  they  had,  to  act 
faithfully  in  the  station  in  which  Providence  had  placed 
them,  and  who  found  a  consolation  for  the  sorrows  of  the 
present  life  in  the  religious  hope  of  a  happier  future  be- 
yond the  grave. 

Justice  has  not  yet  been  done  to  the  white  women  of 

the  South  for  their  conduct  to  the  slave 

slaves  to  Chris-      poDulatlou.     Throuo-li  their  benevolent  in- 

tianity.  -'•■'•  *^ 

fluence,  and  not  through  any  ecclesiastical 
agency,  was  the  Christianization  of  this  African  race  ac- 
complished— a  conversion  which  was  neither  superficial 
nor  nominal,  but  universal  and  complete.  The  paganism 
of  the  indigenous  negro  had  absolutely  disappeared  from 
the  land.  Nor  must  it  be  supposed  that  this  wonderful 
change  was  accomplished  merely  by  the  passive  example 
of  the  virtues  which  adorn  the  white  woman ;  she  took 
an  active  interest  in  the  eternal  well-being  of  those  who 
were  thus  cast  upon  her  hands,  administering  consolation 
to  the  aged,  the  sick,  and  the  dying,  and  imparting  relig- 
ious instruction  to  the  young.  The  annals  of  modern 
missionary  exertion  offer  no  parallel  success. 


Chap.  XXXIX.]  CONDUCT  OF  THE  SLAVES.  IQl 

"  Our  clergy  and  our  women  are  the  real  leaders  of  se- 
cession"— sucli  was  tlie  declaration  of  Southern  political 
writers,  and  such  was  unquestionably  the  truth.  We  can 
not  fail  to  remark  that  there  was  hardly  a  war  order  is- 
sued by  a  Southern  general  which  did  not  contain  a  ref- 
erence to,  or  derive  inspiration  from,  the  women.  It 
will  ever  remain  a  psychological  paradox  that  they  who 
were,  in  a  moral  point  of  view,  most  outraged  by  slavery, 
should  not  have  been  its  bitterest  enemies;  that  the 
Southern  matron,  recognizing  the  lineaments  of  her  own 
children  in  the  young  slaves  playing  round  her  door, 
should  not  have  regarded  it  with  the  most  implacable 
jealousy  and  hatred. 

It  was  impossible  to  foresee  what  would  be  the  rela- 
tions between  these  white  and  black  races 

Doubtful  position      •       ■  i        •  t  i-r  t    , 

ofthe  slaves  be-  lu  the  impeudmg  War.  Very  contradictory 
opinions  were  held. ,  In  the  North  slavery 
was  looked  upon  as  a  source  of  weakness  to  the  Confed- 
eracy; it  was  believed  that  an  insurrection  was  inevita- 
ble. On  the  contrary,  in  the  South  the  institution  was 
considered  as  imparting  great  strength.  The  fidelity  of 
the  neo-roes  to  their  masters  in  the  wars  of  the  Revolu- 
tion  and  of  1812  was  often  cited  as  indicating  what 
would  now  take  place.  In  this  sanguine  expectation,  it 
was  perhaps  forgotten  that  a  great  mental  change  had, 
during  the  last  thirty  years,  happened  to  the  slaves. 
They  had  gathered  hopes  of  freedom,  and  were  univer- 
sally expecting  that  the  North  would  be  their  deliverer. 
Their  conduct  during  the  war  was  above  all  praise. 
Their  conauctdur-  ^^  cxtortcd  tho  admlratlou  of  even  their 
iug  the  war.  mastcrs.  The  plantations  were  left  at  their 
mercy;  the  women  and  children  were  almost  without 
protection.  And  yet  the  slaves  took  no  advantage  of 
their  opportunity;  no  j)assion  was  gratified,  no  wrong 
avenged.     In  regions  at  a  distance  from  military  move- 


102  CONDUCT  OF  THE  SLAVES.  [Sect.  VII. 

ments,  they  continued  peaceably  tlieir  accustomed  agri- 
cultural labors ;  in  those  near  which  the  national  armies 
passed,  they  merely  escaped  to  freedom.  But  if,  on  the 
one  hand,  they  nobly  abstained  from  retaliation,  on  the 
other  they  exhibited  fidelity  to  their  friends.  The  na- 
tional officers,  many  of  them  reluctantly,  but  all  in  the 
end,  frankly  bore  testimony  to  the  invaluable  services 
they  rendered.  The  information  they  gave  was  uniform- 
ly found  to  be  true — so  true  that  great  army  movements 
sometimes  depended  on  it.  They  never  deceived  and 
never  betrayed  the  Yankee. 

Many  very  affecting  narratives  have  been  published  of 
the  escape  of  national  prisoners  of  war  from  their  Confed- 
erate guards.  In  all  these  it  is  the  same  story ;  the  fugi- 
tive is  passed  on  from  one  negro  cabin  to  another;  he  is 
hidden  by  day  and  guided  by  night;  he  is  fed,  and 
clothed,  and  comforted. 

But,  if  thus  the  negro,  by  abstaining  from  riot,  insur- 
rection, and  the  perpetration  of  private  atrocities,  in  part 
repaid  to  the  female  society  of  the  South  in  its  hour  of  des- 
olation and  distress,  the  deep  obligation  he  was  under  for 
his  conversion  from  a  pagan  to  a  Christian  life,  he  showed 
that  he  could  vindicate  himself  as  a  man  when  publicly 
called  upon  by  the  authority  of  his  country,  and  clothed 
in  the  uniform  of  her  soldiery.  Then  he  met  his  former 
master  in  open  wairfare  face  to  i^ce,  and  on  many  a  blood- 
stained field  made  good  his  title  to  freedom. 

By  the  blockade,  and  the  armies  gathered  on  the  fron- 
tier, the  slave  power  was  shut  out  from  the  world.  It 
was  encircled  with  a  wall  of  fire. 

Far  from  being  the  paradise  predicted  by  the  authors 
of  secession,  that  in  closure  was  a  scene  of 

Actual  condition  of  -,  ^^  .,,  •        ii 

the  South  during     tyrauuv  and  woe.     JMo  one  will  ever  lustly 

the  war.  ^  *>  •ii'i 

measure  the  desperate  energy  with  which 


Chap.  XXXIX.]    THE  SOUTH  IN  A  STATE  OF  SIEGE.  IQ^ 

its  inhabitants  tried  to  burst  througli  tlie  investing  line ; 
no  one  will  ever  fully  know  the  agony  they  endured. 
As  soon  as  military  operations  assumed  a  determinate 
fof.  .f    character,  the  Southern  States  stood  in  the 

It  was  a  state  of  ^  ' 

^^^°^-  attitude  of  a  beleaguered  fortress — the  war 

was,  in  truth,  a  vast  siege ;  that  fortress  covered  an  area 
of  more  than  700,000  square  miles ;  the  lines  of  invest- 
ment around  it  extended  over  more  than  10,500  miles. 
Eight  millions  of  people  of  European  descent,  their  men 
second  to  none  on  earth  in  those  virtues  which  insure 
military  glory,  and  yielding  only  to  their  own  women  in 
fervid  patriotism,  were  shut  up  with  four  millions  of  Af 
rican  slaves.  It  was  a  siege,  but  such  a  siege  as  had 
never  been  witnessed  before. 

In  two  particulars  the  South  had  at  the  outset  of 

the  movement  great  advantage.     Her  lead- 
Advantages  pos-  in  I T     •    1  1  • 

sessed  by  its  rui-  ers  wcrc  mcu  who,  from  their  long  connection 
with  the  United  States  government,  had  be- 
come familiar  with  the  methods  of  administration.  The 
president  of  the  Confederacy,  Davis,  had  for  many  years 
been  the  national  Secretary  of  War.  In  this  respect  he 
stood  in  signal  contrast  to  his  antagonist,  Lincoln;  the 
one  had  a  practical  knowledge  of  all  the  requirements 
and  all  the  details  of  military  life,  but  the  wordy  warfare 
of  country  law-courts,  the  noisy  disputations  of  contested 
elections,  were  the  only  preparation  of  the  other. 

In  a  second  particular  the  South  had  a  great  advant- 
age.   She  entered  upon  the  conflict  not  only 
manner  of  arm-     armcd,  but  armcd  at  the  cost  of  her  enemy. 
The  warlike  munitions  she  obtained  throusrh 
the  acts  of  Twiggs  in  Texas,  and  Floyd  in  Washington ; 
through  the  seizure  of  so  many  forts  upon  the  coast,  and 
of  dock-yards,  armories,  and  other  places  of  depot,  gave 
her  all  that  at  the  outset  she  required.     The  value  of 
these  acquisitions  was  not  to  be  measured  merely  by 


104  CONSTRUCTION  OF  ITS  POLITICAL  SYSTEM.     [Sect.VII. 

their  money  worth,  though  that  was  very  great,  amount- 
ing to  many  millions  of  dollars.  Their  opportuneness 
was  of  equal  moment.  The  South,  Minerva-like,  sprang 
to  the  contest  ready  both  in  head  and  hand. 

To  Europeans,  by  whom  these  great  advantages  were 
at  first  imperfectly  understood,  the  South 

Rapid  construction  ,      -,  .  .  ^ 

of  their  political  prcseutcd  a  very  imposmg  spectacle.  Even 
to  those  who  regarded  her  movement  with 
unfriendly  eyes,  the  sudden  completion  of  her  political 
fabric  appeared  very  surprising.  In  the  Old  World  rev- 
olutionary movements  have  been  commonly  undertaken, 
not  by  those  who  have  been  all  their  lives  habituated  to 
public  office,  who  are  familiar  with  every  state  secret,  who 
have  had  for  years  an  opportunity  of  shaping  the  course 
of  things  to  suit  their  own  ends,  who  are  in  a  position  to 
seize  a  large  part  of  the  material  means  of  the  state,  but 
by  persons  whose  position  is  unfavorable,  and  whose 
means  often  inadequate.  The  organization  of  an  efficient  i 
government  by  the  Confederates  loses  much  of  its  impos- 
ing appearance  when  it  is  remembered  that  Davis  did  no 
more  than  is  done  by  any  new  President  of  the  United 
States  on  his  accession.  Lincoln,  in  fact,  had  much  more 
formidable  difficulties  to  encounter.  He  had  to  make 
provision  against  treachery. 

I  have  already  related  the  facts  connected  with  the 
formation  of  the  Confederate  government  at  Montgomery 
(vol.  i.,  p.  528,  etc.),  and  in  a  subsequent  chapter  shall 
speak  of  its  more  important  special  acts.  Of  these, 
however,  there  is  one  which  it  is  needful  now  to  bring 
into  prominence:  it  is  the  transference  of 

Richmond  made  the    , ,  ,       n  ,    n  ht        i  i 

capital,  to  allure  the  tuc  scat  01 2:overnment  irom  Monteromery  to 

Border  states.  -r,.i  ttt  t  •  Tin 

Richmond.  It  has  been  mentioned  that,  all 
things  considered,  this  offers  perhaps  the  most  suitable 
point  of  division  between  the  secession  consjDiracy  and 
the  establishment  of  an  organized  government. 


Chap.  XXXIX.]      RICHMOND  MADE  THE  CAPITAL.  1Q5 

The  Conspiracy  had  no  intention  originally  of  establish- 
ing its  seat  of  government  at  Richmond.  That  was  a  part 
of  the  price  exacted  by  Virginia  for  her  secession,  and  it 
was  not  paid  without  reluctance.  It  is  to  be  remember- 
ed that  at  that  time  every  thing  seemed  to  turn  on  what 
the  Border  States  would  do.  Lincoln  spared  no  exertion 
to  induce  them  to  retain  their  allegiance :  it  was  that  con- 
sideration alone  that  caused  him  to  deal  so  reluctantly 
with  the  slave  question.  On  the  other  hand,  Davis,  both 
by  promises  and  by  violence,  sought  to  draw 

That  measure  was     ,  t  ,      -,  »  -,         tx     i        n        •  i  i 

due  to  political  ne-  thcm  ovcr  to  his  sidc.  Had  a  Southern  town, 
as  Montgomery,  been  selected  for  a  capital, 
measures  like  those  which  were  actually  carried  into  ef- 
fect for  the  defense  of  Richmond  must  have  been  resort- 
ed to.  Virginia,  the  most  powerful  of  the  Southern  States, 
must  have  been  stripped  of  her  troops  for  the  defense  of 
a  distant  point,  as  Florida  and  Arkansas  were,  and  there- 
by left  an  unresisting  prey  to  the  devastation  of  Northern 
armies;  but  by  establishing  the  seat  of  government  at 
Richmond,  it  became  certain  that  the  most  powerful  of 
the  Southern  armies  would  always  be  present  in  Virginia. 
If  Virginia  had  been  abandoned,  all  the  Border  States 
would  have  gone  with  the  North. 

So  far  as  the  permanent  interests  of  the  Confederacy 

were  concerned,  the  views  of  those  who  look- 
Richmond  was  not       1        ',1      T    o  ,1  1  '    1  •  i?  -r»'  1 

the  seat  of  power  to  CQ  With  disiavor  ou  thc  selection  oi  Ricn- 

the  Confederacy.  t        t     i  t^  •       ^ 

mond  were  doubtless  correct.  But,  m  fact, 
in  such  movements  as  that  of  secession,  the  seat  of  power 
lies  not  in  any  territorial  locality;  it  is  in  the  army. 
Richmond  might  have  been  taken,  as  Nashville  was,  and 
that  without  producing  any  definite  result.  Had  M'Clel- 
lan  crowned  his  Peninsular  campaign  with  its  capture,  it 
would  have  availed  nothing  so  long  as  there  were  power- 
That  was  in  the  f^l  armics  still  in  the  field.  The  overthrow 
^''"'^*  of  the  Confederacy  could  be  accomplished 


106  WASHINGTON  AND  EICHMOND.  [Sect.  VII. 

only,  and,  indeed,  was  accomplished  only,  by  tlie  destruc- 
tion or  surrender  of  those  armies. 

Very  different  was  it  with  Washington ;  that  was  rec- 
ognized all  over  the  world  as  the  lon2:-estab- 

But  Washington  is    , .    ,       ,  j       p ,  i         a  •  t 

the  seat  of  power  of  iisJiecl  scat  01  the  Amcricau  erovernment.   Its 

the  nation.  *-' 

fall  would  have  been  to  the  North  an  irrep- 
arable loss.  There  is  now  but  little  doubt  that,  had  the 
Confederacy  been  able  to  seize  it,  European  recognition 
would  at  once  have  followed.  It  was  the  clear  percep- 
tion  of  this  relative  value  that  controlled  Lincoln's  move- 
ments in  the  Peninsular  campaign:  he  perceived  that 
Richmond  was  no  equivalent  for  Washington.  And,  on 
the  other  hand,  there  never  was  a  moment  at  which  Davis 
would  not  have  been  glad  that  Richmond  should  have 
been  wrested  from  him,  if,  at  the  same  time,  he  could  have 
secured  Washington. 

It  may,  perhaps,  not  be  inappropriate  here  to  remark 

that  the  reasons  which  ori2;inally  led  to  the 

Coincidence  of  the         ,         .  ^^^-,      ,  .  ^,         *'  ^. 

metropolis  with  the  sclcctiou  01  Washins^ton  as  the  metropolitan 

centre  of  power.  ,  .  ^  r 

Site  have  m  the  course  of  events  lost  their 
weight.  So  long  as  the  republic  consisted  of  the  colonial 
settlements  on  the  Atlantic  border,  Washington  was  cen- 
trally situated.  But  what  might  answer  for  a  narrow 
coast  border  does  not  apply  to  a  continent.  Washington 
has  been  captured  by  a  foreign  army  once,  and  has  been 
in  imminent  peril  of  capture  again  and  again  during  the 
Civil  War.  It  has  ceased  to  be  the  appropriate  site  for 
the  metropolis  of  the  great  continental  republic.  During 
the  recent  strife  its  defense  not  only  cost  many  thousands 
of  lives  and  many  millions  of  money :  it  also  paralyzed 
some  of  the  most  important  movements  of  the  war.  But 
as  the  old  colonial  states  decline  in  relative  political  sig- 
nificance, and  the  weight  of  power  settles  in  the  West,  it 
Possible  transfer-  is  uot  improbable  that  Western  influence 
Bissippi  Valley.       predominating  will  draw  the  capital  into  the 


f 


Chap.  XXXIX.]         WASHINGTON  AND  EIGHMOND.  107 

Mississippi  Valley,  in  absolute  security  from  all  foreign 
attack,  and  territorially  central. 

The  Confederates  having  determined  on  the  transfer  of 
their  seat  of  government  to  Eichmond,  the 

Opening  of  the  Con-  , .  t    i     i  ^ 

federate  Congress  in  ucccssary  preparations  vs^ere  completed,  and 
their  Congress  opened  its  first  session  in  that 
city  on  the  20th  of  July,  1861. 


CHAPTER  XL. 

THE  ATTEMPTED  SEIZURE  OF  THE  CAPITAL  AND  MEXICANIZA- 
TION  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.     BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 

The  Confederate  authorities  concentrated  troops  at  Manassas  for  the  purpose  of 

capturing  Washington  and  Mexicanizing  the  republic. 
Lincoln  was  compelled,  by  their  encroachments  upon  him,  to  invade  Virginia,  and 

to  construct  fortifications  for  the  defense  of  Washington. 
He  was  constrained  to  use  the  three-months'  men,  obtained  by  the  proclamation, 

to  attack  the  Confederates  on  the  line  of  Bull  Run. 
The  Battle  op  Bull  Run.     The  South  was  dissatisfied  that  its  great  victory 

was  not  crowned  by  the  capture  of  Washington. 
Political  interpretation  of  the  battle. 

When  the  news  of  the  fall  of  Fort  Sumter  reached 

Montgomery,  the  Confederate  Secretary  of 

expect  to  seize       War,  Mr.  Walker,  declared  I  "No  man  can 

Washiugton,  n      i  t>     t 

foretell  the  events  of  the  war  now  inausru- 
rated ;  but  this  I  will  venture  to  predict,  that  the  Con- 
federate flag  will,  before  the  1st  of  May,  float  over  the 
dome  of  the  Capitol  at  Washington." 

That  minister  had  reasons  for  his  prophecy.  He  knew 
and  engage  in  plots  that  "  a  formidable  organization  had  existed 
for  that  purpose.  ^^^  ^^^  ^j^^^^  -^  Baltimore,  and  in  the  coun- 
ties adjacent  to  Washington,  having  for  its  object  the  cap- 
ture of  that  city,  the  seizure  of  the  government  oflicers, 
and  the  inauguration  of  a  provisional  government  in  the 
interests  of  the  South.  The  conspirators  expected  by  this 
step  to  obtain  control  of  the  Army,  Navy,  and  Treasury. 
Their  forces  were  under  the  orders  of  two  leading  South- 
ern men — one  from  Texas,  who  was  subsequently  slain  in 
battle ;  the  other  from  Virginia." 

In  a  speech  delivered  at  Atlanta,  Alexander  H.  Ste- 


Chap.  XL.]        PROPOSED  CAPTURE  OP  WASHINGTON.  109 

phens  declared  that,  "  if  Maryland  secedes,  the  District  of 
Columbia  falls  to  her  by  reversionary  right,  as  Sumter 
fell  to  South  Carolina.  When  we  have  that  right  we 
will  demand  the  surrender  of  Washington  just  as  we  did 
in  other  cases,  and  will  enforce  our  demand  at  every  haz- 
ard and  at  whatever  cost." 

This  desperate  scheme,  originally  plotted  in  secrecy, 
was  soon  publicly  hailed  with  transport.  In  all  direc- 
tions the  Southern  newspapers  urged  that  it  should  be 
instantly  carried  into  effect.  They  declared  that  it  was 
the  unanimous  resolution  of  the  Southern 
ra?sed"for  its  cap-  pcoplc,  aud  that  Prcsidcnt  Davis  would  soon 
march  an  army  through  North  Carolina  and 
Virginia  to  Washington.  They  recommended  volunteers 
to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  join  the  expedition. 

Accordingly,  as  soon  as  Virginia  had  resolved  to  join 
the  Confederacy,  and  had  placed  her  military  resources 
at  its  command,  the  most  strenuous  exertions  were  made 
to  accomplish  this  great  object. 

Troops  from  all  parts  of  the  South  were  hurried  to 
Troops  concentra-  Mauassas  Juuctiou,  a  poiut  ou  the  railroad 
ted  at  Manassas,     ^^^^r^^^  Washiugtou  aud  Eichmoud,  whcro 

a  branch  comes  in  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  It  was 
no  especial  prevision  of  military  science  which  led  to  the 
selection  of  that  position.  It  was  no  perception  that  the 
Confederacy  must  be  first  defended  at  its  outworks,  for, 
so  far  from  supposing  that  it  would  be  put  into  a  state  of 
siege,  the  universal  belief  was  that  the  war  on  which  it 
was  entering  was  to  be  an  expedition  of  invasion,  an  of- 
fensive movement  against  the  North.  Manassas  Junction 
was  selected,  not  because  it  covered  Eichmond,  but  be- 
cause it  threatened  Washington.  It  is  about  thirty  miles 
from  the  latter  city. 

This  important  point  secured,  the  next  step  would  have 
been  the  occupation  of  Arlington  Heights,  which  over- 


110  PROPOSED  CAPTURE  OF  WASmNGTON.         [Sect.  VII. 

look  Waslaington,  and  command  it.     Could 

Batteries  to  be  con-    .t  »     ^  -,  tit  tt-«  t 

structed  on  Ariing-  this  liave  been  accomplished,  and  Lincoln  ex- 

ton  Heights.  -"■  ' 

pelled  before  the  fourth  of  July,  the  day  on 
which  Congress  was  summoned  to  meet,  the  nation  would 
have  been  Mexicanized,  and  European  recognition  of  the 
Confederate  authorities  as  the  de  facto  government  of  the 
United  States,  or  recognition  of  the  separation  and  inde- 
pendence of  the  Confederacy  probably  insured. 

If  Washington  was  to  be  retained,  or  rather  preserved 
— for  the  Confederate  authorities  had  no  intention  of 
holding  it  as  their  permanent  capital,  which  obviously 
must  be  in  a  more  central  position  in  the  South — there 
was  no  time  to  be  lost.  Already  their  outposts  were  oc- 
cupying the  heights,  and  their  engineers  selecting  suita- 
ble positions  for  batteries. 

But  if  Southern  soldiers  had  been  pressing  forward  to 
Meanwhile  national  Mauassas,  Northem  soldici's  had  been  press- 
I3yrnwash"hfg-"  ing  forward  to  Washington.  As  we  have 
related,  on  the  first  note  of  alarm  the  militia 
of  Pennsylvania,  New  York,  and  Massachusetts  had  quick- 
ly found  their  way  to  the  capital.  They  were  merely  the 
advance-guard  of  a  vast  body  making  ready  to  concen- 
trate at  the  threatened  point.  Soon  there  was  no  danger 
that  the  republic  would  have  to  endure  the  ignominy  of 
having  its  capital  seized  by  the  coup  de  main  of  an  insig- 
nificant band  of  conspirators,  headed  by  a  desperado;  its 
capture  could  be  accomplished  now  only  by  the  rush  of 
a  large  and  formidable  mass. 

At  this  moment  the  opinions  of  both  contending  par- 
■         ,,.,,,    ties  was  that  the  difference  between  them 

Expectation  that 

bauTe,Tuuiota     would  bc  quicHy  settled.     They  saw  that 

"'''''•  there  would  inevitably  be  a  battle,  but  no 

one  had  risen  to  the  belief  that  there  would  be  a  war. 

It  was  universally  supposed  by  each  that  the  overthrow 

of  its  antagonist  in  the  struggle  at  hand  would  be  an  end 


Chap.  XL.]  DEFENSE  OF  WASHINGTON.  m 

of  the  strife.  No  one  as  yet  compreliended  that  that 
would  be  attained  only  after  many  years,  by  the  absolute 
military  exhaustion  of  whichever  should  prove  to  be  the 
weaker. 

But,  even  at  this  early  stage,  one  of  the  cardinal  condi- 
The  defense  of    ^^^^^  ^^  ^^®  coutest  had  become  obvious. 
Sme^sa^pa?a?^"    The  defguse  of  Washington  was  instinctive- 
mountduty.        ^j  recoguized  by  the  loyal  Atlantic  States 
as  their  incumbent  duty,  just  as  the  forcing  open  of  the 
Mississippi  became  the  battle-object  of  the  Northwest. 
And  this — the  safety  of  the  metropolis — was  never  lost 
sight  of  in  all  the  subsequent  changing  fortunes  of  the 
war.     All  the  great  movements  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac were  predicated  on  an  absolute  recognition  of  that 
condition. 

It  was  in  accordance  with  these  ideas  of  a  sharp  and 
It  was  thought  that  couclusive  strffc  that  President  Liucolu  had, 
molZ  would  be''"  ^s  we  havc  seen,  on  April  15th,  called  forth 
enough.  seventy-five  thousand  of  the  militia  for  a 

period  of  three  months,  unless  sooner  discharged.   A  force 
was  thus  speedily  made  available  for  the  protection  of 
the  seat  of  government ;  but  not  without  the  utmost  re- 
luctance was  any  thins:  beyond  that  under- 

The  government  is         ,  ^.  "^  ^         K 

the'sSTth*'' '''^'''^^  taken.     Lmcoln  was  unwillmg  to  be  the 
first  to  cross  what  had  now  apparently  be- 
come the  boundary-line ;  he  did  not  wish  to  incur  the  re- 
sponsibility of  invading  Virginia. 

But,  though  he  was  thus  circumspectly  unwilling  to 
press  upon  his   antag-onist,  his   antao-onist 

but  the  Confeder-  •/»     T"    t  t  •n« 

fnvlde^ the'^Nortl  *°  mamtested  no  such  unwillmgness  to  press 
upon  him.  From  his  residence,  the  White 
House,  Lincoln  might  see  the  Confederate  flag  flying  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Potomac :  with  his  field-glass  he 
might  observe  Confederate  engineers  busy  selecting  suit- 
able points  for  the  establishment  of  batteries  to  expel 


112  INVASION  OF  VIRGINIA.  [Sect.  VII. 

him  from  the  city.  There  was  truth  in  what  he  so  sol- 
emnly remarked  subsequently :  "  I  have  not  controlled 
events,  but  events  have  controlled  me ;"  and  accordingly 
now  he  found  himself  compelled  to  invade 
in  self-defense  to  in-  Vii's-ima.   If  hc  failed  to  do  that,  he  must  be 

vade  Virginia.  ,    .  °        .  .     .  I  . 

driven  ignominiously  irom  Washington. 
On  the  night  of  May  23d  national  troops  were  there- 
The  national  troops  ^^^^  throwu   aci'oss  the  Potomac  into  Vir- 

cross  the  Potomac.     ^-^-^^       rpj^^^  ^^^^  pOSSCSSioU  of  the   city  of 

Alexandria,  on  the  Potomac,  nine  miles  below  Washing- 
ton. 

Without  delay,  earthworks  were  constructed  on  Ar- 
and  defenses  for  the  lingtou  Hcights  aud  lu  thc  vicluity,  aud  the 
city  thiowu  up.  capital  made  safe  from  the  Confederate 
troops  threatening  it  at  Manassas  Junction.  The  com- 
mand of  the  forces  thus  thrown  into  Virginia  was  given 
McDowell  assigned  ^o  Gcucral  McDowcll.     Gciieral  Scott,  the 

to  the  command.  T'l*/?  i  ii  !•/» 

commander-m-chiei,  was  too  old  and  mnrm 
to  take  the  field  himself,  and,  from  the  patriotic  motive 
of  setting  an  example  of  loyalty,  was  unwilling  to  resign 
his  position  to  another.  In  this  determination  he  was 
sustained  by  many  political  aspirants,  who  supposed  that 
in  case  of  his  brilliant  military  success  he  would  not  stand 
in  their  way  for  the  next  presidency. 

In  taking  possession  of  Alexandria,  an  incident  occur- 
The  tragedy  at  Ai-  1'^^  which  at  thc  time  gave  rise  to  a  deep 

sensation.  Such  sad  events,  however,  be- 
came common  enough  in  the  Border  States  before  the 
summer  was  over.  A  Confederate  flag  had  been  seen 
from  the  President's  residence  in  Washington  flying  over 
an  inn,  the  Marshall  House,  kept  by  a  person  of  the  name 
of  Jackson.  This  flag  Colonel  Ellsworth,  of  the  New 
York  Fire  Zouave  regiment,  accompanied  by  three  or 
four  of  his  soldiers,  removed,  and,  on  coming  down  the 
stairs  of  the  house,  was  shot  by  Jackson,  who  was  him- 


Chap.  XL.  ]  THE  CONFEDERATES  AT  MANASSAS.  1 1 3 

self  instantly  killed  by  one  of  Ellsworth's  companions. 
THe  colonel's  body  was  carried  to  tbe  President's  house, 
where  funeral  services  were  performed,  Mr.  Lincoln  him- 
self being  one  of  the  mourners.  Throughout  the  South 
Jackson  was  regarded  as  a  patriotic  martyr  who  had  lost 
his  life  in  the  defense  of  his  fireside. 

Batteries  were  constructed  by  the  Confederates  on  the 
Virginia  bank  of  the  Potomac  below  Alex- 

The  Confederates  ^    .  -,  ^^        n*  1  •  n 

blockade  the  Po-    audria,  and  small  aiirays  were  contmually 

tOIUEC  7  «  V 

occurring  between  them  and  the  national 
shipping  on  the  river.  Eventually  these  works  proved 
to  be  not  only  a  troublesome  inconvenience,  but  also  a 
public  indignity.  They  kept  the  river  approaches  to 
Washington  under  blockade. 

The  term  for  which  the  three-months'  troops  had  en- 
gaged would  end  about  the  close  of  July. 
th??hree-monthl   A  clamor  had  arisen  in  the  North  that  some- 

troops, 

thing  should  be  done  to  obtain  an  advan- 
tage from  the  large  army  which,  at  so  much  expense,  had 
been  collected,  before  it  should  spontaneously  dissolve. 
It  was  of  course  impossible  to  permit  that  to  take  place 
while  the  Confederates  still  remained  intrenched  and  un- 
touched at  Manassas.  The  passive  resistance  of  the  troops 
in  Washington  was  not  enough.  Unless  something  more 
were  done,  the  enemy  had  only  to  bide  his  time  quietly  in 
his  camp,  and  when  the  national  army  had  dispersed  by 
the  limitation  of  its  own  enlistments,  to  move  forward 
and  take  possession  of  the  coveted  city. 

That  the  conflict  would  end  in  "  three  months  or  soon- 
er" was  already  discovered  to  be  a  delusion. 
the  Confederates    Evideutlv  the  csscutial  thing;  to  be  done 

at  Manassas.  •^  titt  'n 

could  not  be  accomplished  by  an  idle  en- 
campment round  Washington.    A  vigorous  blow  must  be 
struck  at  the  force  which  lay  at  Manassas.     That  force, 
IL— H 


114 


FORCES  ON  EACH  SIDE. 


[Sect.  VII. 


gathered  for  the  capture  of  Washington,  must  be  dispersed 
before  Washington  could  be  considered  safe.  In  addition 
to  this  paramount  consideration,  there  were  others-  of  se- 
rious weight  which  called  for  such  active  operations.  The 
Confederate  Congress  was  to  assemble  in  Richmond  on 
the  20th  of  July.  It  was  necessary  to  avoid  the  national 
discredit  that  must  arise  from  the  undisturbed  organiza- 
tion of  an  insurgent  government  in  its  newly-selected  cap- 
ital. 
The  force  under  McDowell  in  front  of  Washington  was 
about  45,000  men.     It  extended  from  Alex- 


Disposition  and 

strength  of 
McDowell's  force. 


strength  of         audrfa  to  the  Chain  Bridge.     At  Martins- 


burg,  toward   the    northwest,  there   were 
18,000  more,  under  the  command  of  Patterson. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Confederates  had  a  force  of 
20,000,  under  the  command  of  Beauregard, 

Disposition  and  ----  ^-,,         •!•         ,i»  .i 

strength  of  the  Con-  near  Mauassas.    Considenns;  this  as  the  cen- 

fgrtftratG  lOrCG 

tre  of  their  army,  their  right  rested  on  the 


^^j 


THE   BATTLE   OF   BULL   RUN. 


Potomac  below  Alexandria,  and  held  the  batteries  that 
were  blockading  the  river.    Their  left,  about  8000  strong, 


Chap.  XL.]  THE  MARCH  OF  McDOWELL.  115 

under  Joseph  E.  Jolinston,  lay  at  Wincliester,  in  the  Shen- 
andoah Valley. 

Patterson  and  Johnston,  therefore,  confronted  each  oth- 
patterson  enjoined  ^r.  Thc  former  was  strlctly  cnjomed  to  hoM 
to  hold  Johnston.  ^^^  Confedcratcs  at  Winchester,  and  prevent 
their  joining  Beauregard  at  Manassas. 

Orders  were  given  on  July  15th  for  McDowell  to  move 
McDowell  ordered  ^^^  attack  the  Confederate  position  at  Ma- 
to  attack  Manassas,  j^g^gg^g  Juuctiou.     Hc  couimenced  canylug 

them  into  effect  on  the  following  day.  '  His  marching 
force  was  about  30,000,  nearly  all  of  them  being  three- 
months'  men.  Among  them  were,  however,  800  regulars. 
Fifteen  thousand,  Runyon's  division,  had  been  left  for  the 
defense  of  Washington,  and  the  remainder,  in  four  divi- 
sions, under  Brigadier  General  Tyler,  and  Colonels  Hunt- 
er, Heintzelman,  and  Miles,  advanced. 
The  forward  movement  from  the  Potomac  was  executed 

^  '  in  four  columns,  con vereinsr  to  Fairfax  Court- 

Order  of  his  march,  ''     ,  i  .         t         .       t 

house.  On  nearmg  that  pomt,  barricades 
were  encountered,  but  they  were  eithel*  removed  or  passed 
round  without  difficulty.  It  had  been  expected  that  the 
Confederates  would  have  m^tde  a  stand  here,  but  it  was 
found  that  they  had  retired  through  Centreville  to  Bull 
Run,  a  stream  flowing  in  front  of  their  position  at  Ma- 
nassas Junction. 

Much  difficulty  had  been  experienced  in  obtaining  a 
and  its  disorderly  reliable  map  of  the  country  in  which  opera- 
character.  tious  wcrc  uow  to  bc  canicd  on,  though  it 

was  so  near  to  Washington.  McDowell  commenced  his 
movement  with  very  imperfect  information  in  that  re- 
spect. Neither  the  soldiers  nor  their  officers  knew  any 
thing  about  marching ;  the  army  was  little  better  than  a 
picturesque  mob  in  gay  uniform.  Under  a  burning  sun, 
for  the  weather  was  excessively  hot,  the  men  moved 
along  through  roads,  in  the  woods,  or  by  the  zigzag  fences 


115  FIRST  PLAN  OF  THE  BATTLE.  [Sect.  VIL 

of  maize-fields,  singing  and  joking  as  they  went.  They 
stopped  to  pick  blackberries,  stepped  aside  to  avoid 
mud-puddles,  and  refilled  their  canteens  at  every  stream. 
Many  of  the  houses  by  the  wayside  had  been  deserted, 
except  by  negroes,  who  were  here  and  there  peeping  at 
the  window-corners  or  at  the  half  closed  doors. 

McDowell's  first  intention,  on  finding  that  his  enemy 
had  evacuated  Centreville,  was,  under  cover 

McDowell's  first  «  .  -^  i        ,  •  ,  i      •       r»         . 

plan  of  the  bat-    01  a  visTorous  demonstration  on  their  front, 

tie.  ^ 

to  turn  their  right.  A  personal  reconnois- 
sance,  however,  satisfied  him  that  this  was  impracticable. 
The  country  was  too  densely  wooded  and  too  difficult. 
He  therefore  now  changed  his  plan,  and  made  prepara- 
tion for  turning  the  Confederate  left,  so  as  to  seize  the 
railroad  in  their  rear. 

But,  while  McDowell  was  exploring  the  Confederate 
right,  Tyler,  supposing  that  he  might  march 
attack,  and  is  worst-  without  much  difficulty  directly  on  Manas- 
sas, moved  down  from  Centreville  into  Bull 
Bun  Valley.  He  opened  an  artillery  fire  on  the  forest 
bank  opposite,  and  deployed  his  infantry  along  the 
stream.  When  too  late,  he  saw  the  twinkling  of  the  en- 
emy's bayonets  in  the  woods,  and  found  himself  exposed 
to  their  artillery  and  musketry.  They  were  so  concealed 
that  he  could  only  fire  at  the  flash  of  their  guns.  He  at- 
tempted to  dislodge  them  by  sending  several  regiments 
into  the  wood ;  but,  though  he  brought  up  Sherman  with 
the  third  brigade,  he  was  compelled  to  fall  back,  having 
suffered  in  this  imprudent  affair  a  loss  of  nearly  oiie 
hundred.  The  Confederate  loss  was  about  seventy.  This 
check  was  an  admonition  to  the  military  politicians  who 
were  swarming  into  the  army  that  the  harvest  of  glory 
they  were  expecting  would  not  be  easily  reaped.  By 
parading  their  doings  in  the  newspapers,  they  had  hoped 
to  create  election  and  office  capital. 


Chap.  XL.]  SECOND  PLAN  OF  THE  BATTLE.  117 

McDowell  now  made  ready  to  carry  into  effect  Ms  at- 

McDoweirs  second  ^^^P^  ^^  ^^^'^  ^^^  Confederate  left,  and  had 
plan  of  the  battle. ,  ^j^g  necessary  reconnoissance  made  on  Fri- 
day, the  19th.     Bull  Eun,  opposite  Centreville,  and  equi- 


4      ?<y"  ^ 

X 

\ 

V^  A              ^y            \               J 

^"i         /^              \          y 

^^^^^,^,^^ 

N 

y 

■ 

^         y             '%£A:::^'^^M^^^%^n^^^^f     ^  1   .           /            ^ 

y        ^,,,^,-isS^--^     Henry                    /      \\___/               /\      S     « 

\ 

A    r            \  /  A  \ 

■       ^' 

^Jui^^r 

/union  Mias 

V      FORD 

"■^vT^^ ,                     /      .^^^  *         /^ 

X. 

.^iiJp^ANASSAS                                         } 

\                                 ^ 

^;j^#^\-  JUNCTION                                        (f 

THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


distant  about  three  miles  between  the  headquarters  of 
the  national  and  Confederate  armies,  flows  from  the  north- 
west to  the  southeast.  A  road  descending  from  Centre- 
ville crosses  it  at  Blackburn's  Ford :  there  is  a  lower  one 
to  Union  Mills  Ford,  and  an  upper  one,  the  Warrenton 
Turnpike,  which,  at  four  miles  from  Centreville,  passes 
the  stream  over  a  stone  bridge.  These  three  points — the 
stone  bridge,  Blackburn's  and  Union  Mills  Fords,  were 
the  Confederate  left,  centre,  and  right,  respectively.  Be- 
The  topography  of  ^^^^^  thcsc,  two  milcs  abo  vc  the  Confederate 
BuiiKun.  2g£^  there  was  a  ford  near  Sudley's  Spring, 

but  only  a  path  through  the  woods  leading  to  it  from 


lis  POSITION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES.  [Sect.  VII. 

Centreville.  Between  tLe  Sudley's  Spring  Ford  and  the 
stone  bridge  was  Red  Hill  Ford,  and  again,  between 
Blackburn's  and  Union  Mills,  M'Lean's  Ford.  To  reach 
the  stone  bridge  or  the  ford  near  Sudley's  Spring,  a 
branch  of  Bull  Run,  called  Cub  Run,  must  be  crossed. 

McDowell  hoped  to  make  his  attack  on  the  20th.  As 
he  had  been  disappointed  in  reaching  Centreville,  the  in- 
experience of  his  officers  and  men  making  him  lose  a  day, 
McDowell's  attack  SO  uow  hc  was  again  disappointed  through 
IS  delayed,  ^  failure  in  receiving  his  supplies.    The  4th 

Pennsylvania  and  Varian's  battery  of  the  New  York  8th 
insisted  on  leaving  him,  their  term  having  expired.  He 
says  in  his  report  that,  "  on  the  next  morning,  when  the 
army  went  forward  into  battle,  these  troops  moved  to  the 
rear  to  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  cannon.  In  the  next 
and  his  troops  be-  f^w  days,  day  by  day,  I  shall  have  lost  ten 
gin  to  leave  him.  ^housaud  of  tho  bcst  armed,  drilled,  officer- 
ed, and  disciplined  troops  in  the  army."  He  had,  how- 
ever, now  28,000  men  and  49  guns. 

At  this  momeflt  the  Confederates  had  six  brigades 
Distribution  of  the  postcd  aloug  BuU  Ruu,  through  a  distance 

confederate  force.      ^^  ^-^^^  milcS,  iu  thc  followiug    Ordcr  I    (1.) 

Ewell's,  at  Union  Mills  Ford ;  (2.)  Jones's,  at  McLean's 
Ford ;  (3.)  Longstreet's,  at  Blackburn's ;  (4.)  Bonham's, 
at  Mitchell's;  (5.)  Cocke's,  at  Ball's  Ford;  (6.)  Evans's, 
at  the  stone  bridge.  The  brigades  of  Early  and  Holmes 
were  in  reserve  in  the  rear  of  the  right,  and  those  of  Jack- 
son and  Bee  on  the  left.  Their  total  strength  was  about 
22,000 ;  it  was  less,  therefore,  than  McDowell's,  but  they 
had  the  great  advantage  of  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
ground. 

Though  Patterson  had  received  the  most  positive  or- 
ders not  to  permit  Johnston  to  escape  from 
Patterson  and  joins  hiui,  hc  failed  to  do  SO.     Thc  Confederate 

Beauregard. 

general  marched  through  Ashby's  Gap  to 


Chap.  XL.]  McDOWELL  GAINS  THE  INITIATIVE.  H^ 

Piedmont,  and,  tliere  taking  tlie  railroad  to  Manassas, 
joined  Beauregard  on  tlie  20th  witli  about  6000  men. 

McDowell's  intention  was  to  turn  the  Confederate  left 
by  crossing  Bull  Kun  with  his  right  at  Sudley's  Spring 
Ford,  and  thereby  drive  them  from  the  stone  bridge, 
press  them  from  the  Warrenton  Turnpike,  and  seize  Ma- 
nassas Gap  Eailroad  in  their  rear.  He  supposed  that  he 
McDowell's  orders  should  thus  luterveue  between  Beauregard 
for  the  action.  ^^^  Johustou,  uot  kuowlug  that  a  junction 
had  already  taken  place  between  them  thro^ugh  Patter- 
son's fault. 

To  carry  this  out,  he  directed  Tyler  to  move  to  the 
stone  bridge,  threaten  it  in  front,  and,  at  the  proper  time, 
cross  it.  He  was  to  move  down  the  Warrenton  Turnpike, 
while  Hunter  and  Heintzelman,  following  him  for  a  cer- 
tain distance,  were  to  make  a  detour  to  the  north,  cross- 
ing Bull  Run  near  Sudley's  Spring,  and  thus  come  down 
on  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  Confederates  posted  at  the 
stone  bridge.  Miles,  who  was  to  remain  in  reserve  at 
Centre ville,  was  to  aid  in  the  operation  by  sending  a 
brigade  to  make  a  demonstration  at  Blackburn's  Ford. 

The  movement  was  to   commence   at  half  past  two 

The  troops  begin    o'clock  ou  Suuday  momiug,  July  21st,  the 

expectation  being  that  Tyler  would  reach 

his  point  when  day  broke,  at  about  four  o'clock,  and  that 

Hunter  and  Heintzelman  would  come  into  action  at  about 

six. 

But  simultaneously  the  Confederate  generals  had  also 
resolved  to  make  an  attack  without  delay  on  McDowell, 
before  Patterson  had  time  to  re-enforce  him.  They  sup- 
posed that  such  a  junction  would  take  place  as  soon  as 
it  was  discovered  that  Johnston  had  reached  Manassas. 
The  Confederates    Thcy  intended  to  cross  Bull  Run  on  the 

lose  the  initiative.     ^^-^^^     ^^    ^^^     ^Oth.        McDoWCll,    hoWCVCr, 

moved  first,  and,  as  will  be  seen,  threw  them  on  the  de- 
fensive. 


120  THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  [Sect.  VIL 

That  night  there  was  hardly  a  breath  of  air  in  the 
The  night  of  Bull  ^ale  of  Bull  Eun.  The  misty,  yellowish 
haze,  which  so  often  pervades  the  summer 
nocturnal  atmosphere  for  many  thousand  miles,  deprived 
the  sky  of  its  purity,  and  rendered  gray  or  invisible  the 
western  mountains,  which  by  daytime,  from  the  heights 
of  Centreville,  seem  of  a  purple  tint.  At  intervals  a 
cloud  passed  across  the  moon,  casting  on  the  forests  of 
Manassas  a  slowly-moving  shadow.  It  needed  but  little 
imagination  to  give  life  to  the  dusky  phantom.  Over 
those  woods  the  arch-fiend  Slavery,  poised  on  his  sail- 
broad  vans,  was  glaring  on  the  Genius  of  Freedom,  and 
making  ready  for  a  death-clutch  with  her  on  the  morrow. 

Tyler  delayed  his  movement  long  after  the  appoint- 
ed hour,  and  thus  prevented  Hunter  and 

Delays  in  the  march.    TT'ii  i        i      ^   ±       n  m  i* 

Hemtzelman,  who  had  to  follow  him  some 
distance  down  the  road,  from  commencing  their  march. 
On  leaving  the  turnpike  their  course  lay  through  an  un- 
frequented country  path,  made  undistinguishable  by  the 
moonshine  and  twilight  shadows  of  the  trees.  Heintzel- 
man  was  to  follow  Hunter  for  a  couple  of  miles,  and  then, 
turning  to  the  left,  was  to  cross  the  Kun  below  him.  The 
head  of  the  column  led  the  rustling  way  through  the 
dark  green  woods  on  either  hand,  dipping  down  into  the 
gloomy  hollows  of  the  road,  and  not  without  some  confu- 
sion ascending  the  slopes  of  the  hills.  Hunter's  soldiers 
lingered  for  a  while  on  reaching  the  Sudley's  Spring  Ford, 
some  filling  their  canteens,  and  some  bathing  their  feet  in 
the  stream. 

It  was  half  past  six  instead  of  four  when  Tyler  reached 
Turning  of  the  con-  thc  stouc  bHdgc  aud  fircd  his  signal  gun. 
federate  left.  j^  ^^^  nearly  ten  instead  of  six  when  Hunt- 

er had  moved  through  his  semicircular  detour,  and  was 
coming  down  toward  the  Warrenton  Turnpike.  After 
crossing  Sudley's  Ford,  he  had  turned  directly  down  the 


CiL^p.  XL.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  EUN.  121 

west  side  of  the  Eun,  and  marclied  about  a  mile  through 
the  woods ;  he  was  then  ready  to  pass  into  the  rolling 
and  open  fields,  which  would  bring  him  to  the  rear  of  the 
bridge.  The  tardiness  of  the  movement  had  so  exhaust- 
ed McDowell's  patience,  that,  though  very  ill,  he  mounted 
his  horse,  rode  through  the  troops,  and  showed  them  the 
way  to  their  battle-field. 

Colonel  Evans,  who,  with  only  a  regiment  and  a  half, 
Commencement  of  was  hoMlug  the  stoue  bridge  for  the  Con- 
the  front  attack,  federates,  bclieved  at  first  that  Tyler's  at- 
tack on  his  front  was  the  real  one ;  but,  perceiving  that 
a  large  force  was  passing  through  the  woods  on  his  left 
and  toward  his  rear,  he  discovered  what  was  about  to 
take  place,  and  changed  his  front,  so  as  to  become  paral- 
lel to  the  Warrenton  Eoad,  making  ready  to  receive  the 
enemy  as  soon  as  he  should  emerge.  At  about  ten.  Burn- 
side's  brigade,  of  Hunter's  division,  had  gained  the  open 
fields.  Porter's  came  out  on  his  right,  and  Griffin's  bat-* 
tery  was  quickly  got  into  position. 

As  soon  as  Burnside  emerged  from  the  woods  the  con- 
commencement  of  ^ict  bcgau.  Evaus,  uuexpectcdly  presscd  by 
the  national  troops,  was  compelled  to  call  for 
re-enforcements.  Accordingly,  Bee,  who  was  next  in  what 
had  now  become  his  rear,  descended  the  hill-side  toward 
the  turnpike.  With  him  came  six  guns  of  Imboden  and 
Kichardson.  It  was  necessary  for  Burnside  to  be  re-en- 
forced at  once,  and  Sykes's  regulars  were  sent  to  him  from 
Porter  on  the  right.  At  this  time  Hunter  was  wounded, 
and  Burnside  had  to  take  command  in  his  stead.  In  the 
sharp  contest  that  ensued,  every  thing  proved  favorable 
for  the  national  army. 

By  midday  McDowell  had  completely  carried  out  the 

The  Confederates    fi^st  part  of  his  plan.     He  had  turned  his 

''^''°'^'  antagonist's  left ;  he  had  pressed  him  from 

the  Warrenton  Turnpike;  he  had  uncovered  the  stone 


122  THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  ^Sect.  VII. 

bridge.  Slierman''s  brigade,  of  Tyler's  division,  had  crossed 
the  river  at  a  ford  just  above  the  stone  bridge.  On  the 
other  wing,  Porter  was  coming  down  the  Sudley  Road. 
The  Southern  troops  were  flying  in  the  utmost  disorder 
up  the  slope  in  their  rear.  They  had  been  resisting  Sher- 
man on  their  right,  Burnside  and  Sykes  at  their  centre, 
and  Porter  on  their  left,  and  these  were  all  now  conver- 
ging upon  them. 

The  left  wing  of  the  Confederates  had  thus  been  turned 
Close  of  the  first      ^^^  routed.    Thls  constitutes  the  first  phase 

phase  of  the  battle,     of  the  battle. 

During  the  early  morning  Johnston  and  Beauregard 
The  Confederate  l^^d  beeu  occupied  iu  preparing  the  attack 
generals  aroused.  ^-^^^  ^^^,^  intending  to  make  on  the  nation- 
al army,  which  they  supposed  was  still  encamped  at  Cen- 
treville.  At  about  half  past  ten  they  had,  however, 
discovered  McDowell's  movement.  It  therefore  became 
liecessary  for  them  at  once  to  abandon  their  intention. 
The  heavy  sound  -of  guns  informed  them  too  clearly  that 
their  antagonist  had  seized  the  initiative,  and  that  there 
was  serious  work  on  their  left.  Their  line,  which  had 
been  parallel  to  Bull  Run  from  Union  Mills  Ford  to  the 
stone  bridge,  must  be  broken,  to  send  re-enforcements  to 
the  endangered  point.  The  issue  was,  that  it  was  event- 
ually brought  round  nearly  to  a  right  angle,  and  stood 
concentrated  and  parallel  to  the  Warrenton  Turnpike. 

Bull  Run,  a  little  below  the  stone  bridge,  receives  a 
They  make  a  stand  crcck — Youug's  Crcck — comiug  ffom  the 
on  the  plateau.        ^^^^^    j^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^-^^  uorthem  slope  of  the 

valley  in  which  this  creek  flows  that  the  national  troops 
had  descended ;  it  was  up  the  opposite,  or  southern  slope, 
that  the  Confederates  had  been  driven.  Between  these 
slopes  Young's  Creek  runs  in  a  curve  concave  to  the  south, 
and  on  that  side  the  slope,  furrowed  by  ravines,  and  rising 
for  a  hundred  feet  or  thereabouts,  leads  to  a  flat  space  or 


Chap.  XL.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  123 

plateau.  This  plateau  is  of  an  oblong  form,  a  mile  in 
length  from  northeast  to  southwest,  and  about  half  a  mile 
in  width.  On  its  eastern  and  southern  brow  is  a  w^ood  of 
pines ;  on  its  west  the  Sudley  Koad  runs  through  a  broad 
belt  of  oaks.  There  were  three  houses  upon  it,  the  most 
northerly  being  that  of  Robinson ;  the  most  southerly 
that  of  Lewis ;  and  intermediate,  and  somewhat  to  the 
west,  that  of  Henry. 

And  now  occurred  McDowell's  fatal  mistake.  Thus 
McDowell's  mis-  ^^^^  ^^^  success  had  been  complete;  it  only 
take.  remained  for  him  to  carry  out  the  rest  of 

his  plan.  In  the  opinion  of  a  very  great  soldier,  w^ho  was 
present,  had  he,  instead  of  pursuing  his  flying  enemy  to 
the  hill  forest,  in  which  they  had  taken  refuge,  simply 
moved  beyond  the  range  of  their  rifles  to  Manassas  Depot, 
the  victory  would  have  been  his.  A  stream  of  Confed- 
erate fugitives,  momentarily  increasing  in  number,  and 
terrified  that  their  flight  w^ould  be  intercepted,  was  al- 
ready setting  to  that  point. 

But  Destiny  would  have  it  otherwise.    Instead  of  strik- 
ing at  Manassas  Depot,  McDowell  pursued 

StouewallJackson     i  .      /,     .  ,  .    ,  ,^  ^  ttti 

stops  the  flight  of    his  flyme:  anta2:onists  up  the  slope.     When 

the  Confederates,         -,       -,        ^  -ti 

the  broken  Confederates  gained  the  plateau, 
they  there  found  General  T.  J.  Jackson,  who  had  just  ar- 
rived; he  had  been  posted  behind  Bee,  with  ^ye  regi- 
ments, and  thus  constituted  a  reserve.  ^'They  are  beat- 
ing us  back,"  exclaimed  Bee."  "  Well,  sir,"  replied  Jack- 
son, "  we  will  give  them  the  bayonet."  Bee  rallied  his 
men  with  "  There's  Jackson  standing  like  a  stone  wall." 
^'Stonewall  Jackson!"  shouted  the  soldiers.  And  from 
that  moment  the  name  he  had  thus  received  in  a  baptism 
of  fire  displaced  that  which  had  been  given  him  in  the 
baptism  of  water.  Under  that  name  he  was  ever  after 
known,  not  only  by  his  affectionate  comrades,  but  by  all 
who  hold  a  brave  soldier  in  honor. 


124:  THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  [Sect.  VIL 

Tlie  air  had  now  become  excessively  hot  under  the 
midsummer  and  midday  sun ;  clouds  of  red 

who  thereupon         -,        .  r»  j  i  i  t  i 

stand  fast  ou  the    dust  rose  irom  the  slope  as  pursued  and 
pursuers  rushed  up  it;   a  fog   of  cannon 
smoke  was  already  surging  off  the  edge  of  the  plateau. 
As  the  assailants  attempted  to  make  good  their  ground 
over  the  crest,  they  were  received  with  a  bitter  but  inter- 
mitting fire ;  at  one  moment  the  musketry  lulled  off  to  a 
pattering,  and  then  rose  to  reverberating  volleys  again. 
It  was  nearly  twelve  o'clock  when  Johnston  and  Beau- 
regard reached  the  plateau.     They  found 
strlngthonThe     upou  it  a  forcc  of  about  7000  men,  with 

plateau.  .  ,  . 

thirteen  guns.  It  was  sheltered  in  the  thick- 
et of  pines.  The  battle  was  apparently  lost.  Johnston 
rallied  the  shattered  regiments  on  the  right,  Beauregard 
those  on  the  left.  It  was  none  too  soon  that  they  hast- 
ened up  the  brigades  of  Holmes,  Early,  Bonham,  Ewell, 
and  the  batteries  of  Pendleton  and  Albertis. 

The  second  phase  of  the  battle — the  contest  for  the 

plateau — was   now  reached.     Beauregard 

Opening  of  the  sec-  ,  j    •        j.i        n   ^  :i  J    t   i        x 

ond  phase  of  the      tooK  commaud  in  the  field,  and  Johnston 

battle 

stationed  himself  at  the  Lewis  House,  from 
which  there  was  a  good  view.  By  the  time  the  contest 
was  renewed,  they  had  upon  the  plateau  about  10,000 
men  and  twenty-two  guns.  By  degrees  the  lower  fords 
were  stripped,  Miles's  demonstrations  there  being  discov- 
ered to  be  a  mere  ruse,  and  every  man  who  could  be 
made  available  was  hurried  to  the  focus  of  the  fight. 
At  this  phase  of  the  battle — preparatory  to  the  attempt 
to  carry  the  plateau — on  the  national  side, 

McDowell  attempts    -r%       ,  n  -tt         ■       s      t     •    •  1 1  •     i  i 

to  carry  the  posi-  Forter,  of  Huuter  s  division,  was  on  the  right, 
Franklin  and  Wilcox,  of  Heintzelman's,  in 
the  centre ;  with  them  were  Grifiin's,  Ricketts's,  and  Ar- 
nold's batteries,  and  Sherman  and  Keyes,  of  Tyler's  divis- 
ion, on  the  left.     Howard's  brigade,  which  had  been  de- 


Chap.  XL.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  125 

tached  from  Heintzelman  in  tlie  morning,  was  upon  the 
Run.    Burnside  had  been  withdrawn,  his  ammunition  be- 
ing exhausted.    Schenck  was  ready  to  cross  at  the  bridge. 
For  the  attack  on  the  plateau  there  were  13,000  men 
and  sixteen  guns.     They  met  with  a  fierce 

A  desperate  conflict  .,  .p.  ,^     *  ,t  i 

on  the  right,  round   rcsistauce  lu  lorcms;  their  way  up  the  slope, 

the  batteries.  •/       x  j.     / 

but  their  right  gained  a  footing  on  its  west- 
ern edge,  Ricketts's  and  Griffin's  batteries  being  in  their 
front.  There  was  a  rise  of  ground  southeast  of  the  Henry 
House,  which,  if  it  could  be  seized,  would  enable  them  to 
enfilade  the  Confederate  batteries :  it  was  the  key  of  the 
position.  Five  regiments,  with  Eicketts's  and  Griffin's 
batteries,  attempted  to  carry  it ;  but  Ellsworth's  Zouaves, 
who  were  supporting  the  batteries,  mistaking  an  Ala- 
bama regiment  for  a  national  one,  were  broken  by  the 
fire  they  received,  and  ridden  through  by  some  cavalry. 
Their  disorganization  was  so  instant  and  complete  that, 
though  they  continued  to  fight  as  individuals,  they  ap- 
peared no  more  as  a  regiment. 

Other  regiments  were  now  ordered  up  to  rescue  the 
batteries,  the  horses  of  which  had  been  killed ;  but,  though 
thrice  re-enforced,  they  were  thrice  compelled  to  retire. 
The  battle  now  raged  with  alternate  success. 

While  this  was  occurring  on  the  right,  McDowell's  left 

Attack  bv  the  na-    ^as  also  attempting  to  carry  the  plateau. 

tionai  left.  j^  encouutcred  a  very  severe  fire — so  severe 

that  the  loss  in  Sherman's  brigade  was  nearly  one  fourth 

of  that  of  the  whole  army. 

Keyes,  who  was  on  the  extreme  left,  had  forced  his 
way  up  the  slope  and  reached  the  Robinson  House,  but 
so  furious  was  the  resistance  that  he  was  compelled  to 
fall  back.  He  moved  round  the  brow  of  the  plateau  un- 
til he  reached  its  eastern  edge,  unsuccessfully  endeavor- 
ing to  regain  his  foothold  upon  it. 

The  crisis  of  the  battle  had  come.     It  was  determined 


i:2B  THE  BATTLE  OF  BULL  KUN.  [Sect.  VIL 

tbrougli  Patterson's  fault  in  permittinsr  tlie 

The  crisis  of  the  bat-  -l  o 

tie.  Junction  of      cscapo  of  tliG  Confederates  from  his  front  in 

Johnston's  troops.  -^  .     .  -^ . 

Upper  Virginia.  Ricketts's  and  Griffin's  bat- 
teries had  been  taken  and  retaken ;  the  national  troops 
had  been  swept  from  the  plateau  and  had  recovered  their 
ground.  The  Confederates  had  brought  all  their  troops 
within  reach  from  the  fords  of  Bull  Run;  the  roar  of 
the  cannon  was  incessant.  At  that  moment  there  rushed 
across  the  fields  from  Manassas  1700  fresh  troops.  They 
were  Elzey's  brigade,  led  by  Kirby  Smith,  the  last  of  the 
re-enforcements  that  had  eluded  Patterson  in  the  valley. 
Hearing  the  noise  of  the  battle,  they  had  stopped  the 
cars  at  the  point  nearest  to  the  sound.  In  the  supreme 
moment,  they  struck  the  national  right  full  on  its  flank. 
Their  cross-fire,  added  to  the  fire  in  front,  was  irresistible. 
A  cry  went  through  the  national  ranks, "  Here's  Johnston 
Rout  of  the  national  ^^m  the  Valley !"  Instantaneously  McDow- 
^'^^'  ell  was  driven  from  the  plateau  and  head- 

long down  the  slope.     It  was  not  a  repulse,  but  a  rout. 

In  vain  McDowell  tried  to  cover  the  retreat  with  his 
800  regulars.  Howard's  brigade,  and  whatever  was  in 
the  way  of  the  fugitives,  was  swept  off  in  their  rush.  The 
men  threw  away  their  arms  and  encumbrances  as  they 
fled  toward  Bull  Eun;  but  it  was  not  until  they  con- 
verged to  the  bridge  at  Cub  Run  that  the  flight  became 
a  panic.  A  shell  had  burst  among  the  teamsters'  wagons, 
a  caisson  had  been  overturned,  and  the  passage  was  stop- 
ped. Horses  were  cut  from  their  traces ;  artillery  was  left 
to  be  captured ;  soldiers,  civilians,  camp  fol- 
lowers rushed,  not  only  to  Centreville,  but 
beyond  it  to  Washington,  where  they  spread  the  most  ex- 
aggerated reports  of  their  disaster. 

And  now  the  great  error  that  General  Scott  had  com- 
scott's  great  mis-   mittcd  was  discovcrcd  when  it  was  too  late. 
He  had  a  force  at  his  disposal  of  nearly 


Flight  of  the  panic 
etricken  soldiers. 


take. 


Chap.  XL.]   THE  CONFEDERATES  GAIN  THE  VICTORY.  127 

eighty  thousand  men :  lie  had  divided  it  into  three  parts, 
and  thrown  one  of  them  unsustained  on  the  enemy. 

Davis  had  left  Richmond  in  the  morning  as  soon  as  the 
telegraph  informed  him  that  the  battle  had  begun.  He 
reached  Manassas  Junction  about  four  o'clock,  with 
gloomy  forebodings,  for  he  encountered  the  Confederate 

fugitives  from  the  national  advance.     He 
victrnTtoS^"   rode  direct  to  the  front,  and  telegraphed 

that  night  to  the  Confederate  Congress : 

"Manassas  Junction,  Sunday  night. 

"Night  has  closed  upon  a  hard-fought  field.  Our  forces  were 
victorious.  The  enemy  was  routed,  and  fled  precipitately,  abandon- 
ing a  large  amount  of  arms,  ammunition,  knapsacks,  and  baggage. 
The  ground  was  strewed  for  miles  with  those  killed,  and  the  farm- 
houses around  were  filled  with  wounded. 

"  Pursuit  was  continued  along  several  routes  toward  Leesburg 
and  Centreville  until  darkness  covered  the  fugitives.  We  have 
captured  several  field  batteries,  stands  of  arms,  and  Union  and  State 
flags.  Too  high  praise  can  not  be  bestowed,  whether  for  the  skill 
of  the  principal  ofiicers  or  for  the  gallantry  of  all  our  troops.  The 
battle  was  mainly  fought  on  our  left.  Our  force  was  15,000  ;  that 
of  the  enemy  estimated  at  35,000. 

"  Jeffeeson  Davis." 

In  this  dispatch,  Davis's  estimate  of  the  strength  of  his 
antagonist  may  possibly  be  excused,  but  not  so  his  pur- 
posed falsification  of  his  own  force.  He  knew  very  well 
that  it  was  nearly  the  double  of  what  he  affirmed.  This 
Its  evil  effect  on  his  dcccptiou  Speedily  brought  disaster.  The 
^'^°'^'  Southern  soldiery  was  confirmed  in  its  su- 

preme contempt  for  its  antagonist.  The  troops  left  the 
army  in  crowds  and  returned  to  their  homes,  justly  infer- 
ring that  an  inconsiderable  force  against  such  a  cowardly 
enemy  was  all  that  w^ould  be  needful  to  establish  the 
Confederacy. 

The  Confederate  loss  in  this  battle  was  378  killed, 
_  ^  ^,  ,  1489  wounded.     The  national  loss  was  481 

T^nP  nRiTif*  losses 

killed,  1011  wounded,  and  1460  prisoners. 


Dissatisfaction  in 
the  South  that 
Washington  was 
not  taken. 


128  GENERAL  JOHNSTON'S  JUSTIFICATION.  [Sect.  VII. 

Surprise  and  indignation  were  soon  expressed  in  the 
Soutli  that  the  Confederate  General  John- 
ston made  no  energetic  pursuit,  and  failed 
to  enter  Washington  with  the  fugitives.  He, 
however,  himself  subsequently  (1867)  published  his  rea- 
sons, which  are  substantially  as  follows :  The  pursuit  was 
not  continued  because  the  Confederate  cavalry,  a  very 
small  force,  was  driven  hack  by  the  solid  resistance  of  the 
United  States  infantry.  Its  rear-guard  was  an  entire  di- 
vision, which  had  not  been  engaged,  and  was  twelve  or 
fifteen  times  more  numerous  than  our  two  little  bodies  of 
cavalry.  Expectations  and  hopes  of  the  capture  of  Wash- 
ington were  not  expressed  by  military  men  who  under- 
johnston'sjustiflca-  stood  the  state  of  affairs.  A  pursuit  would 
tion  of  his  conduct  ^^^^  ^^^^  frultless  I  we  couM  uot  have  car- 

ried  the  intrenchments  before  Washington  b}^  assault, 
and  had  none  of  the  means  to  besiege  them.  Our  assault 
would  have  been  repulsed,  and  the  enemy,  then  the  vic- 
torious party,  would  have  resumed  their  march  to  Rich- 
mond. And  if  even  we  had  captured  the  intrenchments, 
a  river  a  mile  wide  lay  between  them  and  Washington, 
commanded  by  the  heavy  guns  of  a  Federal  fleet.  We 
could  not  have  brought  20,000  men  to  the  banks  of  the 
Potomac.  Our  troops  believed  that  their  victory  had  es- 
tablished the  independence  of  the  South — that  the  war 
was  ended,  and  their  military  obligations  fulfilled.  They 
therefore  left  the  army  in  crowds  to  return  to  their  homes. 
The  exultation  of  victory  cost  us  more  than  our  antago- 
nists lost  by  defeat.  The  Federal  troops  south  of  the  Po- 
tomac were  not  a  rabble.  Mansfield's,  Miles's,  and  Run- 
yon's  divisions,  a  larger  force  than  we  could  have  brought 
against  them,  had  neither  been  beaten  nor  engaged ;  and 
the  reports  of  the  commanders  of  the  brigades  engaged 
show  that  they  entered  the  intrenchments  organized,  ex- 
cept those  who  fled  individually  from  the  field.     These 


Chap.  XL]  INTERPKETATION  OF  THE  BATTLE.  129 

latter  undoubtedly  gave  an  exaggerated  idea  of  the  rout 
to  the  people  of  Washington,  as  those  from  our  ranks  met 
by  President  Davis,  before  he  reached  Manassas,  on  h^ 
way  to  the  field,  convinced  him  that  our  army  had  been 
defeated.  The  failure  of  the  subsequent  invasions  con- 
ducted by  Lee  proves  that  the  Confederacy  was  too  weak 
for  ofi'ensive  war. 

It  remains  now  to  ascertain  the  political  interpretation 
Political  interpreta-  ^^  the  battle  of  Bull  Euu.  lu  a  military 
tion  of  the  battle,  ggnsc,  it  was  a  great  victory  for  the  Confed- 
eracy— a  humiliation  for  the  nation. 

But  military  movements  are  for  the  purpose  of  accom- 
plishing political  results.  They  receive  their  general, 
their  true  interpretation  when  the  degree  to  which  they 
have  advanced  their  political  intention  is  ascertained. 

Feeling  instinctively  this  truth,  the  Southern  people 
were  very  far  from  being  satisfied  with  their  splendid 
victory.  In  the  opinion  of  many  of  them,  and,  among 
others,  of  very  high  officials,  Johnston,  who  commanded  so 
brilliantly,  had  actually  passed  under  a  cloud.  They 
were  not  satisfied  with  what  had  been  done. 

Here  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  ask  two  questions:  (1.) 
The  object  sougi^t  ^hat  was  the  object  which  had  brought 
by  each  party.       ^-^^  Coufedcratcs  to  Mauassas  ?     (2.)  What 
was  the  intention  of  the  national  government  in  hurling 
its  three-months'  militiamen  on  the  line  of  Bull  Eun  be- 
fore their  term  expired  ? 

(1.)  The  seizure  of  Washington  was  at  this  period  the 
great  political  object  of  the  Confederate  authorities.  For 
that  alone  their  army  lay  at  Manassas,  and  had  its  out- 
posts almost  within  sight  of  the  Capitol.  But  the  vic- 
tory of  Bull  Eun.  did  not  secure  that  result,  and  in  this 
— the  political,  the  true  sense — the  Confederate  campaign 
was  a  failure. 
II.— I 


230  INTEKPKETATION  OF  THE  BATTLE.  [Sect.  VII. 

(2.)  The  object  of  the  national  government  in  its  of- 
fensive movement  was  so  to  use  its  three- 
9  vantage  to  the '    months'  militia  before  the  expiration  of  their 
term  as  to  paralyze  the  enemy's  force  at 
Manassas,  and  relieve  Washington  of  all  danger  from 
them.     Events  showed  that,  though  its  army  suffered  de- 
feat on  the  field  of  Bull  Eun,  the  political  intention  was 
secured.     A  blow  so  staggering  was  dealt  at  the  Con- 
federate force,  that,  as  its  commanding  general  declares, 
it  was  found  to  be  wholly  unable  to  undertake  any  thing 
serious  against  the  city. 

If,  then,  the  South  had  reason  to  be  vain  of  her  vic- 
tory, the  more  grave  and  reflective  North 

The  military  tri-  •iii  i     i     i       ^  ijy  i 

umph  was  to  the    might  also  congratulato  nerselt  on  a  sub- 
stantial result.    Fortune,  who,  as  the  Ro- 
mans used  to  say,  directs  all  the  affairs  of  men,  divided 
in  this  instance  her  favors,  giving  to  one  the  military,  to 
the  other  the  political  advantage. 

From  this  time  the  Mexicanization  of  the  republic 
ceased  to  be  possible.  The  Civil  War  presented  another, 
phase. 


SECTION  VIIL 

VAST  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  WARLIKE  OPERATIONS. 
—  CORRESPONDING  LEGISLATIVE  AND  MILITARY 
PREPARATIONS. 


CHAPTER  XLI. 

OF  THE  rOKM  ASSUMED  BY  THE  WAR. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  South  was  forced  to  take  the  defensive. 

The  chief  offensive  operations  on  the  part  of  the  National  Government  at  this  time 
were  of  three  kinds  : 

]  St.  A  blockade  of  the  Southern  sea  and  land  frontier ;  the  recapture  of  the  sea- 
coast  forts  ;  and  the  restoration  of  the  authority  of  the  republic  in  New  Orleans. 

2d.  Expeditions  in  the  rear  of  the  Mississippi  for  the  opening  of  that  river ;  break- 
ing the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad ;  and  having  -in  view  the  strategic 
point  Chattanooga. 

3d.  Operations  in  contemplation  of  the  capture  of  Richmond,  and  the  destruction  of 
the  army  defending  it. 

From  the  history  of  the  Conspiracy  which  culminated 
The  second  phase  ^^  the  Southem  victory  at  Bull  Eun,  we 
have  now  to  turn  to  the  details  of  the  sec- 
ond phase  of  the  war. 

To  the  tumultuary  rush  of  brave  but  inexperienced 
levies  the  deliberate  movement  of  powerful  armies  suc- 
ceeds. I  have  now  to  describe  how  great  military  and 
naval  forces  were  brought  into  existence,  and  the  manner 
in  which  they  were  used. 

In  this  section  there  are  ^ve  points  presented  for  con- 
sideration :  (1.)  The  form  assumed  by  the  war;  (2.)  The 
legislative  measures  of  the  Confederate  Congress;  (3.) 
Those  of  the  national  Congress ;  (4.)  The  creation  of  the 
national  army ;  (5.)  The  creation  of  the  national  navy. 
To  each  of  these  I  shall  devote  a  chapter. 


132  THE  FORM  OF  THE  WAR.  [Sect.  VIII. 

"  Let  US  alone  !" 

That  was  the  passionate  cry  of  the  people  of  the  South 
The  demand  of  the  — ^^^  in^iucere  demand  of  their  authorities. 
^^^^^'  It  had  become  clear  that  Washington  could 

neither  be  seized  by  a  band  of  conspirators,  nor  captured 
by  an  army  such  as  could  then  be  brought  into  the  field. 
After  her  overthrow  at  Bull  Run  the  republic  was  stun- 
ned for  a  moment,  but  it  was  only  for  a  moment.  Any 
observer  of  what  she  forthwith  prepared  to  do  might  be 
satisfied  that  it  was  no  longer  a  battle,  but  a  war  that 
was  at  hand. 

While  the  Confederate  troops  were  commencing  their 
The  protestations  of  movcmcut  toward  Mauassas,  the  President 
^^'''^'  of  the  Confederacy,  in  a  message  to  his  Con- 

gress, declared  :  "We  feel  that  our  cause  is  just  and  holy. 
We  protest  solemnly,  in  the  face  of  mankind,  that  \ve  de- 
sire peace  at  any  sacrifice  save  that  of  honor.  In  inde- 
pendence we  seek  no  conquest,  no  aggrandizement,  no  ces- 
sion of  any  kind  from  the  states  with  which  we  have  late- 
ly confederated.     All  we  ask  is  to  be  let  alone." 

But  Davis  and  his  co-laborers  for  many  months  past — 
Keportofthecom-  ^s  was  dcclarcd  by  the  national  Congres- 
mittee  of  congress    g-^^^^  Committce  ou  thc  Couduct  of  the 

War — "had  been  actively  and  openly  making  prepara- 
tions to  defy  the  jurisdiction  of  the  government,  and  re- 
sist its  authority.  They  had  usurped  the  control  of  the 
machinery  of  one  state  government  after  another,  and  had 
overawed  the  loyal  people  of  those  states.  They  had  even 
so  far  control  of  the  national  government  itself  as  to  make 
it  not  only  acquiesce  for  the  time  being  in  measures  for 
its  own  destruction,  but  to  contribute  to  that  end.  They 
had  seized  its  arms  and  munitions  of  war.     They  had 

tuatthesouthisnot  scattcrcd  and  demoralized  its  army.  They 
unoffending,  ^^^  ^^^^  -^^  ^^^^  ^^  ^-^^  ^^^^  distaut  parts 

of  the  world.     They  had  put  treason  in  the  executive 


Chap.xll]  keport  of  congressional  committee.  133 

mansion,  treason  in  tlie  cabinet,  treason  in  tlie  Senate  and 
House  of  Representatives,  treason  in  the  army  and  navy, 
treason  in  every  department,  bureau,  and  office.  They 
had  taken  possession,  almost  without  resistance,  of  every 
fort  and  harbor  on  their  sea-coast.  Fort  Pickens  at  Pen- 
sacola,  and  the  isolated  fortifications   and 

but  has  done  what    -,        -,  i?  m      j.  T    T7"         ttt     j.    1 

it  could  to  provoke  harbors  01  iortugas  and  Key  West,  being 
the  only  exceptions.  They  were  masters  of 
the  territory  of  the  revolted  states,  much  of  which  had 
been  purchased  with  the  national  money,  and  for  part  of 
which  the  nation  still  remained  in  debt — a  debt  which 
they  rejected.  Depots,  arsenals,  fortificationl^  had  been 
seized  by  them.  A  speedy  march  upon  the  capital,  a 
speedy  overthrow  of  the  legal  government,  a  speedy  sub- 
mission of  a  people  too  pusillanimous  to  maintain  its 
rights,  and  a  speedy  subjection  of  the  whole  country  to 
their  assumptions,  were  their  expectations." 
,  Such  was  the  accusation  brought  against  them  in  the 
and  had  even  com-  Cougrcss  of  the  uatlou.  It  denied  that  they 
mencedit.  wcrc  au  opprcsscd,  a  much-enduring,  an  in- 

nocent people.  It  declared  that  they  had  themselves  in- 
itiated war,  and  had  made  resistance  not  only  necessary, 
but  unavoidable.  Government  does  not  mean  influence — 
it  means  force;  a  government  which  has  neither  the  reso- 
lution nor  the  power  to  prevent  itself  being  assassinated 
has  no  right  to  live. 

So  thought  the  free  North.  She  foi^saw  that  the  par- 
The  North  is  com-  "titiou  of  the  Tcpublic  mcaut  the  end  of  all 
peiied  to  resist.  representative  government  on  this  conti- 
nent. It  meant  a  cordon  of  custom-houses  on  the  bound- 
ary-line, and,  more  than  tTiat,  vast  standing  armies.  If 
friends  could  not  make  laws  without  their  being  nullified, 
could  aliens  make  treaties  without  their  being  broken  ? 
The  history  of  the  republic  had  demonstrated  that  the 
slave  power,  in  the  necessities  of  its  existence,  was  essen- 


134  INTERIOR  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY.  [Sect.  VIII. 

tially  aggressive ;  to  invigorate  it  would  not 

The  slave  power  es-     -,          .  •»        p  xi     j.  t,  c<    li? 

sentiaiiy aggress-     deprive  it  01  that  quality.     Sell- preserva- 
tion compelled  the  North  to  resist.    She  saw 
that  every  thing  she  prized  was  at  stake.     Peace  based 
upon  partition  was,  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  illusory. 
In  the  former  and  happier  days  of  the  Union,  nothing 
had  given  rise  to  more  bitterness  of  feeling  than  the  es- 
cape and  non-restoration  of  fugitive  slaves.     Across  the 
separating  line  of  the  two  nations  would  they  cease  to 
flee  ?  and  was  it  to  be  supposed  that  they  would  ever  be 
returned  ^  But  if  not — w]^at  then  ?    Very  clearly  the 
condition  of  the  slave  power  in  America  was  this — it 
must  either  dominate  all  over  the  continent  or  die. 
But  in  the  clamor,  "Let  us  alone,"  there  was  something 
deeply  connected  with  the  topic  which  has 

The  South,  from  the    ,       t  » -,  t    •       .i  •         i         ,  ,i        /> 

begiuniug,  on  the  to  be  cousidcrcd  m  this  chapter — the  form 
of  the  war.  It  needed  but  little  penetration 
to  perceive  that  the  South  had  already  intuitively  discov- 
ered her  inevitable  position  in  the  coming  contest.  What- 
ever her  wishes,  her  passions  might  be,  in  the  momentous 
conflict  she  had  provoked  ske  was  compelled  to  take  the 
defensive. 

It  is  the  autumn  after  Bull  Eun.  Let  us  scale,  in  any 
View  of  the  interior  placo  that  WO  may,  the  rampart  of  the  Bor- 
of  the  Confederacy,  j^j,  States,  aud  pcer  iuto  the  recesses  of  the 
Confederacy  beydbd.  Confederacy  of  states !  is  that  what 
we  see  ?  Are  there  governors,  and  Senates,  and  Houses 
of  Representatives  enacting  and  executing  independent 
laws  ?  No !  but  sitting  in  Richmond  there  is  one  man 
who  is  holding  the  telegraphs  and  railroads.  Along  the 
former  he  is  sending  forth  his  mandates  which  no  one 
A  despotism  is  ai-   ^^y  disobcy ;  along  the  latter  he  is  drawing 

ready  inaugurated,     ^j,^^  ^J^^^g  ^^^^    ^^.  dlstaut   their  rcluctaut 

men  and  bounteous  means.    The  aristocracy  that  lords  it 


Chap.xll]        interior  of  the  confederacy.  135 

over  those  white  cotton  lands,  those  fields  of  tobacco  and 
maize,  has  engendered  its  natural,  its  inevitable  product. 
It  is  no  political  confederacy  that  we  look  upon — it  is  a 
Despotism. 

Along  the  sea-coast,  on  every  fort  a  flag  is  flying — - 
not  those  of  the  various  sovereign  states.  It  is  the  flag 
of  a  central  power,  every  where  the  same.  Men  are  con- 
structing fortifications  in  all  directions — some  in  the  in- 
terior, some  on  the  line  of  the  Mississippi,  some  along  the 
sea.  Cannon,  the  spoils  of  Norfolk  Navy  Yard,  are  being 
dragged  to  these  works.  In  every  town,  and  court-house, 
and  hamlet,  men  are  drilling ;  their  uniform  clothing  in 
gray  ^swers  to  the  uniform  flag.  The  pursuits  of  peace 
are  turned  over  to  slaves.  The  factories  that  are  busy 
are  armories,  machine-shops,  founderies  for  shot  and  shell, 
gunpowder  laboratories.  White  tents  that  are  dotting  it 
all  over  tell  us  that  this  is  not  the  agricultural  country 
it  used  to  be.     It  is  a  vast  military  camp. 

A  despotism  and  a  military  camp !  No  matter  under 
what  name  things  may  be  passing,  that  is  the  reality  to 
which  they  have  come ! 

To  the  eye  of  the  national  military  critic,  looking  from 
Miiitarytopography  tho  North,  thc  couutry  it  is  uow  proposcd 
of  the  Confederacy.  ^^  assail  prcscuts  thrcc  dlstiuctly  marked 
regions,  to  which  he  gives  the  designations  of  the  right, 
the  central,  the  left,  respectively.  They  are  not  bounded 
by  merely  imaginary  lines,  but  parted  by  grand  geograph- 
ical objects.  The  right  region  is  all  that  portion  of  the 
insurgent  territory  west  of  the  Mississippi  River ;  the 
Its  three  regions,  or  ccutral  rcgiou  IS  thc  couutry  lying  between 
^°''^^'  the  Mississippi  and  the  Alleghany  Mount- 

ains ;  the  left  is  that  lying  between  those  mountains  and 
-the  Atlantic  Ocean.  The  great  natural  lines  of  separa- 
tion thus  dividing  the  Confederacy  are  the  Mississippi 
River  and  the  Alleghany  Mountains. 


136  INTERIOR  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY.  [Sect.  VIII. 

These  three  military  regions  are  not  of  equal  impor- 
tance.   The  risrht,  or  trans-Mississippi,  is  nec- 

Their  relative  value.  t    ^       .  .     .  \  n 

essarily  weaker,  since  it  is  separated  from  the 
others  by  a  broad  and  difficult  river,  across  which  com- 
munication may  be  interrupted :  it  is  intrinsically  of  lit- 
tle military  value,  sparsely  peopled,  unhealthy,  its  resour- 
ces comparatively  little  developed,  its  roads  and  lines  of 
transportation  imperfect.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  left 
The  left  zone  the  TCgiou,  or  that  iucludcd  bctwceu  the  Alle- 
mostimportaut.     ^^^^^  Mouutaius  aud  the  Atlantic  Ocean, 

are  many  great  cities,  among  them  the  capital  of  the 
Confederacy.  This  region  has  a  dense  population,  many 
lines  of  locomotion,  and  abundant  facilities  for  transporta- 
tion. Virginia,  which  is  its  most  northerly  portion,  stands 
like  a  vast  bastion  to  the  Confederacy,  its  flanked  angle 
projecting  toward  the  Free  States.  The  upheaval  of  the 
Alleghanies  in  former  ages  (vol.  i.,  p.  68)  has  given  her 
a  system  of  longitudinal  valleys  running  to  the  north- 
Miiitarytopoc^raphy  ^^st :  hcT  mouutalu  rauges  consist  of  majes- 

of  Virginia.  '^  ^-^  £^^^g  ^£  ^^^  ^^^^1^,^  ^^^^^^  ^..^j^  ^-^^^^  ^^_ 

pressions  between  them.  Here  and  there  transversal  and 
secondary  valleys  cross  through  the  mountain  lines — gaps, 
in  the  country  language.  Screened  from  observation, 
through  the  main  valleys  as  through  sally-ports  the 
forces  of  the  Confederacy  may  securely  move. 

Such  was  the  general  aspect  of  the  South.    Her  capaci- 
ty for  war  lay  in  the  staple  products  she  had  on  hand 
and  those  that  her  slaves  might  be  found  willing  to  raise. 
Her  financial  strength,  which  was  the  meas- 

The  financial  capac-  /»t  i  ,t     i  t  /i 

ity  of  the  Cotton    urc  01  hcr  war-strenertn,  turned  on  the  pos- 

States  for  war.  -i  -t  n  •  i  t  • 

sibility  of  converting  those  products  into 
gold.  None  but  desperate  gamesters  would  undertake 
to  conduct  vast  military  movements  by  an  unlimited  is- 
sue of  paper  based  upon  nothing ;  but  the  rattle  of  dice 


Chap.  XLL]        INVESTMENT  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY.  ^37 

was  already  audible  in  tlie  council  chamber  at  Eichmond. 
There  were,  however,  many  able  and  patriotic  men  in  the 
seceding  states,  who,  accepting  as  an  accomplished  fact 
the  calamity  into  which  their  country  had  been  plunged, 
and  willing  to  make  the  best  of  it,  unceasingly  urged 
upon  the  Confederate  government  the  seizure  of  the  cot- 
ton and  its  rapid  shipment  to  Europe.     As 

Mistake  in  noi  send-    .  i       1 1  •       j  i  r>       i     ^ 

lug  the  cotton  to  Eu-  IS  commouly  tne  case  m  the  uproar  or  rebel- 
lions and  revolutions,  the  voice  of  wisdom 
was  not  heard. 

And  now  arose  before  the  national  government  the 
question  how  it  should  reduce  this  insurgent  population 
—a  population  brave  enough  and  numerous  enough  to 
accomplish  its  intention,  if  only  it  were  rich  enough.  But 
this  population  had  never  clothed  itself,  never  fed  itself. 
It  depended  on  foreign  sources.    If  such  had 

The  South  must  de-      t  t  •  i         t  i  •         •  ,     ,         n 

pend  on  foreign  sup-  always  Deeu  its  couditiou  m  a  state  oi  peace, 
much  more  must  it  be  so  now  in  a  state 
of  war :  rifles,  cannon,  munitions  of  every  kind  must  be 
brought  from  abroad.  Three  million  bales  of  cotton 
might,  perhaps,  be  raised  by  the  slave  force :  this  would 
go  far  to  meet  these  wants  if  it  had  an  unobstructed 
transit  across  the  sea. 

Such  considerations,  therefore,  settled  the  question  as 
to  what,  for  the  national  government,  was  the  proper  form 
of  war.     A  closure  of  the  Southern  ports  or  their  block- 
ade was  the  correct  antagonism.    In  the  ur- 
ports  determined    gcucy  ofthc  momeut  a  blockadc  was  adopt- 
ed.   Perhaps  it  had  been  better  (p.  29)  had 
a  simple  closure  been  preferred.    Practically,  however,  so 
far  as  the  government  and  its  opponent  were  concerned, 
the  same  force  must  be  resorted  to  in  either  case. 

Thus  the  character  or  aspect  which  the  war  must  needs 
Conditions  of  a  assume  was  quickly  manifested.  The  issue 
complete  blockade,  (^^^^i^^giy  ^umed  ou  this :  Had  the  govern- 


1^8  INVESTMENT  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY,         [Sect.  VIII. 

ment  sufficient  physical  power  to  enforce  and  maintain 
such  a  beleaguering  ?  Could  it  make  the  Atlantic  an  im- 
penetrable sea? 

But  more — it  must  arrest  ingress  and  egress  along  the 

,  north  front  of  the  Border  States,  and  along  the  west  front 

of  the  trans-Mississippi  regions.    To  accomplish  all  this,  it 

must  call  into  existence  powerful  navies  and  vast  armies. 

It  must  shut  up  hermetically  an  area  of  733,144  square 
The  vast  extent  of  Hiilcs ;  it  must  guard  by  armies  an  interior 
country  shut  up.  ]boundary-line  7031  miles  in  length,  and  by 
ships  a  coast-line  of  3523  miles,  a  shore-line  of  25,414 
miles — that  is,  actually  more  than  the  entire  circumfer- 
ence of  the  earth  (24,895  miles). 

What — viewed  as  a  military  operation — was  all  this  ? 
Was  it  not  a  vast  siege,  throwing  into  nothingness  all  pre- 
vious sieges  in  the  world's  history  ? 

We  may,  then,  excuse  the  incredulity  with  which  for- 
eign nations  regarded  the  attempt  of  the  re- 
Apparent  impossi-  IT,  ii        'ji*  n       -I       ' 

biiity  of  such  au     public  to  carrv  out  her  intention  ol  reducms; 

investment.  tt  i  mt  t*  i« 

to  obedience  twelve  millions  ot  people  in- 
trenched in  what  seemed  to  be  impregnable  works.  Es- 
pecially may  we  do  this  when  we  recall  the  fact  that  the 
initial  military  force  by  which  it  was  to  be  accomplished 
was  an  army  of  16,000  men,  and  a  navy  of  42  ships. 

But  it  was  not  merely  a  passive  encircling  of  the 
Character  of  the  ag-  Coufedcracy  which  was  needed ;  there  must 
gressive  operations,  ^jg^  ^^^  offeusivo  aud  aggrcsslvc  movemeuts. 

Hence  it  was  necessary  to   determine  what  were  the 

proper  points  of  the  application  of  force,  and  which  the 

correct  lines  of  its  direction. 

At  this  time  the  military  topography  of  the  country 
Preliminary  mis-  "was  little  kuowu,  aud  many  mistakes  were 
takes  committed,    ^ladc  lu  dealing  with  this  proMcm.    It  was 

•long  before  those  generals  who  had  true  professional 


Chap.xll]  the  necessary  military  operations.  139 

views  on  the  subject  could  secure  their  adoption,  and  ac- 
complish a  separation  of  crude  political  intentions  from 
scientific  military  movements.  In  the  inexperience  of  the 
times,  instead  of  one  grand  and  overwhelming  plan  of  op- 
erations, a  dozen  little  ones  were  resorted  to.  Wherever 
there  was  political  influence  there  was  a  political  clamor, 
and  to  that  point  a  military  force  must  be  sent.  In  the 
beginning  of  1862,  the  period  we  have  now  more  partic- 
ularly under  consideration, "there  were  not  less  than  ten 
different  national  armies,  and  as  many  different  lines  of 
operation,  all  acting  more  or  less  concentrically  on  the 
theatre  of  war.  Not  one  was  so  strong  but  that  the  Con- 
federates might  have  concentrated  a  stronger  against  it." 
The  ablest  military  critics  were  loudly  declaiming  against 
such  a  violation  of  the  rules  of  their  art. 

In  deciding  on  warlike  operations,  two  things  must  be 
considered :  1st.  The  political  object  proposed  to  be  at- 
tained. 2d.  The  military  movements  necessary  for  its  ac- 
complishment. Not  unfrequently  these  seem  to  involve 
contradictions. 

The  opening  of  the  Mississippi  was  the  political  object 

The  political  objects  of  the  Wcst ;  the  capture  of  Rlchmoud  that 
proposed.  ^£  ^]^g  j^^g^ .  ^^^^  -^  ^  military  sense,  neither 

of  these  could  in  itself  be  decisive,  and,  so  far  as  they 
might  be  made  the  ultimate  object  of  the  warlike  opera- 
tions, they  could  be  considered  only  as  mistakes. 

At  first  it  was  supposed  that  the  opening  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi must  be  accomplished  by  operations 
Se  MissiS'"'?^  ^^  ^^®  waters,  an  opinion  much  strengthened 
by  the  brilliant  success  of  Farragut  in  the 
capture  of  New  Orleans ;  but  that  great  officer  himself 
was  destined  to  furnish  a  proof  of  the  inadequacy  of  this 
method.  In  the  attack  he  made  on  Vicksburg,  though 
many  hundred  shot  and  shell  were  thrown  into  the  place, 
no  impression  whatever  was  made  upon  it ;  not  a  single 


140  THE  EAST-WEST  LINE.  [Sect.  VHI. 

gun  was  dismounted ;  only  seven  men  were  killed,  and  fif- 
teen wounded. 


Once  more  let  us  reconnoitre  the  recesses  of  the  Con- 
view  of  the  military  ^deracy,  examining  not  its  political,  but  its 
condition.  military  condition.     What  do  we  see  ? 

There  is  one  long  line  of  railroad- reaching  from  Mem- 
The  great  west^ast  P^^^,  ou  thc  Mississippi,  to  Charleston,  on 
line..  ,_.  ^^Q  Atlantic.     It  is  the  only  complete  east 

and  west  bond  connecting  the  Confederacy  through  its 
breadth.  What  if  this  vital  line  were  snapped  ?  It  would 
be  the  severing  of  the  Confederacy.  The  Atlantic  por- 
tion would  be  parted  from  the  Mississippi  portion.  The 
unity  of  the  Confederacy  hangs  on  a  very  slender  thread. 

The  Richmond  government  plainly  discerns  how  much 
is  depending  on  this  line.     Slender  though 

Means  prepared  by    . ,  -.,,,,      -f,  ,  ,  , 

the  Confederates      it  mav  06,  it  IS  indispeusablv  necessary  to 

for  its  (iGfCDSC  v  '  J.  •/  •/ 

them.  For  its  protection,  for  the  avoid- 
ance of  the  catastrophe  which  must  follow  its  rupture, 
they  have  established  parallel  to  it,  and  one  hundred 
and  fiffy  miles  to  the  north  of  it,  a  military  line  consist- 
ing; of:  fortresses,  armies,  an  intrenched  camp.  That  mil- 
itary line  extends  from  Columbus,  on  the  Mississippi, 
through  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  to  Bowling  Green. 

The  work  of  an  assailant  is,  therefore,  manifestly  to 
burst  through  the  military  line,  and  break  the  railroad 
line  beyond. 

But,  furthermore,  there  is  a  navigable  river,  the  Ten- 
nessee, flowing:  perpendicularly  throu2:h  the 

Availability  of  the      n      .        n  .^  1'  1  •  Vl    1    x 

Tennessee  for        first  01  thcse  Imcs,  aud  runumfi^  parallel  to 

breaking  it.  .        ,        ,  t      i 

the  second.  That  is  the  invader  s  true  path. 
Plainly  along  it,  and  not  down  the  iftipregnably  fortified 
and  impassable  Mississippi,  blows  fatal  to  the  Confed- 
eracy may  be  delivered.  The  Mississippi  itself  is. not  the 
true  line  of  attack.    Even  if  it  were  seized,  the  great  rail- 


Chap.  XLL] 


EFFECTS  OF  BREAKING  IT. 


141 


THE  EAST  AND  WEST  CONFEDERATE  RAILROADS. 

road  is  not  necessarily  touclied.  Moreover,  it  is  a  mili- 
tary consequence  that  the  strong  fortresses  on  the  Missis- 
sippi must  be  surrendered  on  the  passage  of  an  army  in 
their  rear. 

Two  great  events  will  therefore  necessarily  follow  the 
passage  of  an  army  strong  enough  to  main- 
lowing  that  opera-  taiu  itsclf  aloug  thc  Tennessce.  They  are : 
1st.  The  bisection  of  the  Confederacy,  its 
eastern  and  western  portions  being  severed.  2d.  The 
gratification  of  the  popular  demand  that  the  Mississippi 
should  be  opened. 


142  OPPOSING  EFFORTS  OF  THE  CONFEDEKATES.    [Sect.  VIII. 

Witli  the  railroad  untouclied,  the  Confederate  govern- 
ment can  rapidly  mass  its  troops  on  the  Atlantic  or  on 
the  Mississippi  region,  and  hurl  them  at  pleasure,  right  or 
left,  on  its  antagonist.  With  the  railroad  broken,  such 
movements  becomQ  very  difficult,  perhaps  even  imprac- 
ticable. 

If  the  eye  follows  the  line  of  this  road  from  Memphis, 
Military  importance  ^^  ^hc  Mississippi,  eastwardly,  it  is  seen  to 
of  Chattanooga.  (Jiyi(Je  whcu  it  rcachcs  the  great  strategical 
position  Chattanooga:  its  upper  branch  runs  northeast- 
wardly to  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy,  Eichmond ;  its 
lower  branch  runs  southeast wardly  to  the  important 
cities  Savannah  and  Charleston.  Chattanooga  and  its  im- 
mediate environs  present,  therefore^a  vital  military  point. 

To  General  Halleck  must  be  given  the  credit  of  the 
Correct  solution  of  solutiou  of  the  Mlsslssippi  problcm.  He 
optn^if'irthe  M?8^  showed  that  the  correct  movement  was  a 
sissippi.  march  on  the  line  of  the  Tennessee.     The 

truth  of  this  principle  was  strikingly  exemplified  by  the 
event.  The  victories  on  that  river  opened  the  Mississippi 
from  Cairo  to  Memphis,  and,  in  the  opinion  of  a  very  great 
military  authority,  had  Halleck's  army  at  that  time  pos- 
sessed the  tenacity  of  Sherman's  in  1864,  he  could  have 
completed  the  opening  by  continuing  his  march  south 
from  Corinth  to  Mobile. 

.  Such  were  the  views  taken  by  the  national  generals 
Opposing  efforts  of  who  succcssfully  solvcd  the  problem  of  the 
the  confederates,     ^^i^^^^^  dcstructiou  of  the  Confederacy.    On 

the  other  hand,  their  antagonists,  thrown  from  the  begin- 
ning on  the  defensive,  recognized  with  equal  precision  the 
correctness  of  these  principles.  When  one  military  line 
was  broken  through,  they  attempted  to  establish  a  sec- 
ond in  a  parallel  direction.  When  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad  was  effectually  severed,  they  made 
haste  to  construct  a  parallel  one  by  completing  the  more 


Chap.  XLI.]     OBJECTIVE  OF  THE  ATLANTIC  EEGIOK  I43 

southerly  line  from  Meridian  to  Selma.     This  likewise 
'was,  in  its  turn,  destroyed. 

Considered  thus,  so  far  as  military  topography  is  con- 
cerned, it  was  plain  that  decisive  operations 

General  course  of  .  •       j  i  1       1  *  •  x i 

the  correct  military  must  commcuce  lu  tuc  ccutral  rcgiou  with  a 
view  to  the  destruction  of  the  east  and  west 
line  of  communication,  and  securing  possession  of  the 
strategic  point  Chattanooga.  The  opening  of  the  Missis- 
sippi followed  as  a  corollary  upon  their  successful  issue. 
The  great  result,  however,  would  be  the  partition  of  the 
Confederacy. 

Whatever  armed  force  the  Confederacy  might  have  in 
the  Atlantic  region  would  now  be  placed  between  two 
antagonists,  one  threatening  it  from  the  north  of  Rich- 
mond, the  other  through  the  portal  of  Chattanooga. 

The  whole  male  population  of  the  Confederacy  being 
in  the  armies,  there  could  be  no  resistance  except  where 
those  armies  were.  The  decisive  result  could  alone  be 
reached  by  their  destruction. 

In  the  Atlantic  region  of  the  Confederacy,  to  the  cor- 
rect military  eye,  the  proper  obiective  was 

The  propet  object-    ,,  ^  ,,*'        *^     '  ^       ■^„^^.       ^    .  ^.    , 

ive  of  the  Atlantic  therefore  the  g-reat  armv  of  Vir^rmia.    Kich- 

region  ^  »/  o 

mond  and  Charleston  were  in  themselves 
nothing.  The  Confederacy  could  afford  to-  lose  one,  or 
both,  or  a  dozen  such,  and  would  not  be  weakened  there- 
by. And  that  these  views  were  correct  the  event  showed. 
Charleston  fell  by  the  march  of  Sherman,  who  never  took 
the  trouble  to  go  to  it ;  and  Richmond  fell  by  the  opera- 
tions of  Grant,  who  disdained  to  enter  it. 

The  military  object  to  be  aimed  at  was,  therefore,  not 

the  political  object  proposed.     It  was  not 

is  the  extermination    ,-,  ,.  «         .,  ,         .,  1       ,    .■, 

of  the  Virginia        thc  occupatiou  01  a  citv  or  territorv,  but  the 
extermination  oi  the  opposing  army. 
Battles  conducted  by  generals  of  not  unequal  skill,  and 


144  EFFECT  OF  ATTRITION.  [Sect.  VIIL 

ending  without  a  signal  catastrophe,  usually  exhibit  losses 
not  far  from  equal  on  the  opposing  sides.  In  armies  of 
equal  strength,  and  operating  in  a  similar  region,  the  waste 
of  life  in  the  hospitals  may  also  be  considered  as  equal. 

A  general  who  is  acting  upon  these  principles,  and  is 
Effect  of  incessant  aiming,  uot  at  the  seizure  of  territory,  but  at 
the  life  of  the  antagonist  army,  will  foresee 
an  inevitable  issue  to  his  campaign.  If  he  can  bring  into 
play  during  the  whole  operation  two  hundred  thousand 
men,  and  his  antagonist  only  one  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand, he  will  certainly  secure  his  result  when,  by  this 
process  of  attrition,  each  side  has  lost  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  thousand. 

Now  the  available  military  force  of  the  South  was 
never  numerically  equal  to  that  of  the  North,  and  the 
disparity  became  still  greater  when  the  slayes  were  armed 
by  the  North.  Military  errors  or  catastrophes  were  there- 
fore of  far  more  serious  moment  to  the  insurgents  than 
to  the  government.  There  was  danger  that  exhaustion 
would  ensue.     It  actually  did  at  last  occur. 

Doubtless  there  is  something  very  dreadful  in  a  meth- 
od which  looks  with  indifference  on  the  issue  of  battles, 
whether  there  has  been  a  victory  or  a  defeat,  but  inquires 
with  earnestness  how  many  of  the  enemy  have  been  de- 
stroj^ed,  and  discerns  with  a  frigid,  a  Machiavelian  sat- 
isfaction the  mathematically  inevitable  superiority  of 
the  greater  mass  after  equal  attrition  of  both  conflict- 
ing bodies. 

The  duration  of  resistance  of  the  weaker  party  in  this 
process  of  attrition  or  extermination  will  necessarily  turn 
on  the  magnitude  of  the  political  object  at  stake,  and  the 
facility  or  possibility  of  effecting  an  ostensible  compro- 
mise. But  it  is  politically  impossible  that  an  aggressive 
Aristocracy  and  an  aggressive  Democracy  should  coexist 
in  the  same  nation  after  they  have  once  been  in  open  con- 


Chap.  XLL]      EEACTION  OF  THE  SLAVERY  WAR-CRY.        .  I45 

flict.  And  tliat  was  tlie  real  character  of  tlie  contending 
antagonists  of  this  Civil  War.  Moreover,  though  the 
South,  at  the  beginning,  derived  most  important  advan- 
tages in  accomplishing  the  unifying  of  her  entire  popula- 
tion by  putting  forth  the  preservation  of  Slavery  as  the 
Reaction  of  the  graud  objcct  of  the  war,  it  led  eventually  to 
•  ^'^'''^  ^"'^•''•^-  a  fatal  result.  The  slave  became  at  last,  not 
fictitiously,  but  in  reality,  the  stake  played  for.  The  South 
could  not  lose  him  without  absolute  ruin.  It  was  the  loss 
of  her  labor-force,  without  which  her  lands  were  worth 
nothing. 

Persons  who  thus  considered  the  subject  perceived  that 
the  war  would  be  no  affair  of  ninety  days,  but  that  it 
would  go  on  until  the  weakerparty  was  utterly  exhaust- 
ed and  the  great  stake  woju^ 

By  those  skillful  officers  who  brought  the  war  to  a 
close,  these  principles  were  clearly  recog- 

Application  of  these       •1  -%  n  1 1  .       1 

principles  by  Grant  mzcd,  as  mav  06  secu  irom  the  stratesrv 

and  Sherman.  ^  i         rrn  t       t       t  n 

they  adopted.  Ihey  looked  upon  all  oper- 
ations in  the  right  region  as  without  effect ;  they  consid- 
ered it  as  incorrect  to  have  many  converging  lines  of  op- 
eration ;  they  perceived  the  true  function  of  the  central 
region,  and  the  inevitable  effect  of  a  powerful  movement 
through  it.  They  did  not  fall  a  second  time  into  the 
blunder  of  making  the  main  operation  in  the  left  region 
a  combined  one  of  the  army  and  navy,  as  was  done  in  the 
Peninsular  campaign.  Coast  operations  and  expeditions 
they  regarded  in  the  light  of  mere  indecisive  adventures. 
They  raised  no  cry  for  the  capture  of  Kichmond ;  they 
did  not  even  deign  to  enter  it  in  triumph  when  it  was 
spontaneously  falling,  but  pursued  the  fugitive  remnant 
of  the  ruined  army  with  inexorable  energy,  applying  the 
military  principle  that  had  been  inaugurated  in  the  Wil- 
derness, until  Appomattox  Court-house  was  reached. 
II.— K 


146  CHANGES  IN  THE  QUALITY  OF  THE  ARIMIES.    [Sect.  VIII. 

Viewed  in  tlie  manner  thus  presented,  tlie  various  op- 
erations of  the  war  stand  in  their  proper 

The  events  of  the  ...  t  tip  •     .  . 

war  interpreted     positiou,  snid  are  Capable  01  easy  mterpreta- 

on  these  ideas.  ■*- .  '  /»T-»n-r»  i 

tion.  Ihe  battle  of  Bull  Run,  as  we  have 
seen,  was  nearly  without  military  significance ;  politically, 
it  meant  the  failure  of  that  portion  of  the  plan  of  the  Con- 
spiracy which  had  reference  to  the  capture  of  Washing- 
ton. Nor  is  there  any  importance  to  be  attached  to  the 
affairs  of  Big  Bethel,  Ball's  Bluff,  Drainesville.  They  were 
merely  personal  encounters. 

In  fact,  true  warlike  operations  can  not  be  said  to  have 

begun  until  the  issue  of  Lincoln's  order  di- 
commencement  of  rectinsT  the  movemcuts  of  the  armies  on  Feb- 

the  war.  ^ 

ruary  22d,  1862.  The  issue  of  that  order 
followed  the  appointment  of  Stanton  as  Secretary  of  War, 
and  was  due  to  his  suggestions. 

Though  the  completion  of  the  organization  of  the  Army 
The  changes  in  its  ^^  ^^^  Potomac  by  General  McClellan  marks 
conduct.  ^i^g  ^i^gg  ^£  ^^Q  preparatory  period  and  the 

commencement  of  military  movements  properly  speaking, 
these  movements  still  continued  to  be  of  a  mixed  kind — 
not  purely  military,  but  influenced  also  by  political  con- 
siderations. There  may  be  discerned  on  the  part  of  the 
government  an  intention  to  give  to  certain  ofl[icers  the  op- 
portunity of  acquiring  military  reputation.  But  this  can 
not  be  regarded  as  altogether  blameworthy.  A  govern- 
ment influenced  by  profound  convictions  that  the  princi- 
ples on  which  it  is  acting  are  those  most  certain  to  insure 
the  welfare  of  the  nation  is  entitled  to  bring  into  fitting 
prominence  men  who  will  carry  those  principles  into 
effect. 

The  quality  of  the  armies  themselves  by  degrees  under- 
went an  observable  change.     It  is  a  great 
ally  reacl"ecFby  "'    stcp  from  McDowcll's  army  of  Bull  Run  to 

the  armies.  ■•■  .  *^     ,  .      . 

McClellan's  of  the  Penmsula,  but  it  is  a  still 


Chap.  XLI.]  POWER  OF  THE  NORTH.  14»^ 

greater  to  Grant's  army  of  the  final  Virginia  campaign. 
The  cohesion,  mobility,  and  co-ordination  of  all  its  parts, 
which  makes  an  army  like  a  beautiful  machine,  is  only 
slowly  attained.  "Not  until  after  Vicksburg  did  the 
armies  begin  to  assume  the  form  and  consistency  of  real 
armies ;  not  until  after  that  can  their  generals  be  held  to 
a  closer  criticism."  Halleck's  campaign,  ending  in  the 
breaking  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Eailroad,  is  the 
transition  to  the  great  campaigns  of  Grant  and  Sherman, 
which  were  conducted  with  purely  military  intentions, 
and  on  purely  military  principles.  * 

The  possibility  of  putting  the  Confederacy  in  a  state 
of  siege  demonstrated,  in  the  most  unmis- 

Predominating         ,     t      -i  ^  ,  i  t  •        .  • 

power  of  the  takaolc  mauucr,  the  predominating  power 
of  the  North ;  but  that  predominance  w^as 
not  to  be  measured  by  the  relative  population  of  the  two 
sections.  It  was  commonly  said  that  the  population  of 
the  insurgent  states  was  twelve  millions;  that  of  the 
loyal  states  eighteen;  but  the  disparity  between  them 
was  vastly  greater  than  is  indicated  by  those  numbers. 
The  machine  power  of  the  South  bore  no  appreciable  pro- 
portion  to  the  machine  powder  of  the  North;  and  more  par- 
ticularly was  this  true  of  marine  machinery ;  but  it  was 
upon  that  form  that  the  capability  of  maintaining  an  ef- 
fective blockade  depended. 

The  South  was  thus  thrown  upon  the  defensive  from 
Sorties  of  the  ^^^  beginning  of  the  struggle,  and  very  soon 
South.  effectually  beleaguered.    Her  four  great  mil- 

itary movements,  culminating  at  Antietam,  Murfreesbor- 
ough,  Gettysburg,  and  Nashville,  present  the  aspect  of 
sorties. 

There  was  another  fact  which  manifestly  and  seriously 
Eventual  influence  diminished  thc  intrfusic  powcr  of  the  South, 
of  the  slave  force.  Qf  thc  cstimatcd  twclvc  milHous  of  her  pop- 
ulation, one  third  was  negro  slaves.     As  long  as  her  an- 


148  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  SLAVE  FORCE.  [Sect.  VIII. 

tagonist,  from  political  motives,  refrained  from  touching 
tliis  element,  it  added  a  delusive  strength  to  the  Confed- 
eracy. The  slave  prepared  food  and  forage  in  the  fields 
while  the  master  and  his  sons  were  in  the  army.  It 
was,  however,  impossible  that  such  a  condition  of  things 
should  continue  long.  Legitimately  as  a  measure  of  war, 
the  government  might  detach  that  dangerous  class  from 
the  side  of  the  South — a  measure  w^hich,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, could  not  fail  to  be  decisive  of  the  strife. 


CHAPTEE  XLIL 

ACTS  OF  THE  PROVISIONAL  AND  PERMANENT  CONFEDERATE 
CONGRESSES. 

The  important  measures  of  the  Confederate  Congresses  were  transacted  in  secret 

sessions. 
At  the  meeting  specially  summoned  by  Davis  for  the  29th  of  April,  18G1,  he  gave 

an  exposition  of  the  causes  which  had  led  to  secession. 
The  provisional  Congress  ended  its  sessions  on  the  15th  of  February,  1862,  and  was 

succeeded  by  the  permanent  Congress.     The  chief  public  acts  of  each  related. 
The  government  of  the  Confederacy  became  so  despotic  in  its  conduct,  and  secret 

in  its  proceedings,  as  to  give  rise  to  great  dissatisfaction. 

The  public  acts  of  the  Confederate  Congress  present  a 
very  imperfect  view  of  the  measures  adopted  by  the  Con- 
federate government. 

Before  hostilities  commenced,  it  was  found  expedient 
that  all  the  more  important  of  those  meas- 

The  important  ses-  t         t  i  i  j  i  •  -r>i-       • 

sions  of  Congress     urcs  should  be  matuTcd  m  secrecy.    Durma: 

secret.  •  ^    i  •  ■^ 

the  war  the  necessity  of  this  course  became 
more  and  more  urgent.  A  standing  resolution  required 
that  all  war  business  should  be  transacted  in  secret  ses- 
sion, and  by  degrees  this  included  every  thing  of  general 
interest.  Attempts  were  repeatedly  made  by  different 
members  of  Congress  to  bring  about  a  change ;  but  they 
were  unavailing.  The  war  operations  controlled  all  oth- 
er movements ;  they  were  determined,  perhaps  too  often, 

by  the  Confederate  President  himself.     The 

The  President  con-  ,i«,  n  i_i        r\       (*    i  •  ,    , 

trois  all  military     sccrct  history  01  the  Coniederacy  is  not  to 

operations.  i        i       t       i     r»         •  i  • 

be  looked  for  m  the  secret  sessions  of  its 
Congress — not  even  in  the  councils  of  the  cabinet.  On 
the  President  rests  the  responsibility  of  what  was  done. 


150  ^CTS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  CONGRESS.      [Sect.  VIII. 

In  vain  all  over  tlie  Soutli  a  cry  was  raised  against  this 
secret  despotism.  Even  thoughtful  men  were  constrained 
to  submit  because  they  saw  it  was  unavoidable. 

In  the  Confederate  Congress,  after  the  inauguration  of 
Various congres-  ^  provisioual  President  (February  18th, 
sionai  acts.  1861),  a  rcsolutlou  was  offered  touching  the 

expediency  of  laying  a  duty  on  exported  cotton,  there  be- 
ing a  very  general  opinion  that  such  a  course  would  aid 
very  much  in  compelling  the  powers  of  Europe  to  ac- 
knowledge the  independence  of  the  Confederacy.  '  It  was 
one  of  the  delusions  of  the  South  that  the  great  military 
monarchies  of  Europe  could  be  coerced  by  trade  consid- 
erations. Her  politicians,  who  had  so  often  succeeded  in 
carrying  their  point  in  domestic  legislation  by  the  exer- 
cise of  pressure,  persuaded  themselves  that  similar  princi- 
ples might  with  impunity  be  resorted  to  in  foreign  affairs. 
When  financial  provision  was  made  for  fhe  war  by  au- 
thorizing the  borrowing  of  fifteen  millions  of  dollars,  an 
export  duty  was  at  length  laid  on  cotton,  but  it  was  with 
the  intention  of  creating  a  fund  to  liquidate  the  principal 
and  interest. 

An  act  was  passed  in  reference  to  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi,  declaring  it  free,  and  one  defining  the  punish- 
ment of  persons  engaged  in  the  African  slave-trade.  The 
postal  system  was  organized,  and  the  privilege  of  frank- 
ing abolished,  except  so  far  as  concerned  the  business  of 
the  post-office  itself.  Breadstuffs,  provisions,  munitions 
of  war,  and  merchandise  imj)orted  from  the  United  States 
before  the  14th  of  March,  were  admitted  duty  free. 

With  a  view  of  exerting  a  salutary  pressure  upon 
Northern  creditors,  a  bill  was  reported  to  the  effect  that, 
so  long  as  the  United  States  refused  to  acknowledge  the 
independence  of  the  Confederate  States,  no  court  of  the 
latter  should  have  cognizance  of  civil  cases  in  which  citi- 
zens of  the  former  were  concerned.     To  conciliate  the  lit- 


Chap.XLII.]       abstract  OF  MR.  DAVIS'S  MESSAGE.  I5I 

Authority  conceded  erapj  iiifluence  of  Europe,  the  President  was 
to  the  President,      auttorized  to  negotiate  international  copy 
right  treaties.    Four  days  before  the  inauguration  of  Lin 
coin,  the  provisional  Congress   authorized  Davis  to  as 
sume  control  of  the  military  operations  in  every  Confed 
erate  state.     Subsequently  (March  6th)  he  was  author 
ized  to  accept  the  services  of  one  hundred  thousand  vol 
unteers  for  twelve  months.     Anticipating  but  little  diffi 
culty  in  obtaining  European  recognition,  commissioners 
were  appointed  to  various  foreign  governments.     On  the 
11th  of  March  the  permanent  Constitution  was  adopted, 
and  the  Congress* adjourned. 

When  it  became  obvious  that  the  administration  of 
Extra  session  of  Llucolu  was  about  to  takc  a  more  resolute 
Congress.  actiou  than  that  of  Buchanan,  Davis  sum- 

moned (April  12  th)  the  Congress  to  meet  on  the  29th 
of  April.  In  the  interval  between  its  summons  and  its 
session  Lincoln  had  called  for  75,000  militia  (April  15th), 
and  had  announced  the  blockade  of  the  Southern  ports 
(April  19th). 

The  message  sent  by  Davis  to  the  Congress  on  this  oc- 
The  message  of  the  caslou  is  pcrhaps  thc  ablcst  of  his  state 
President.  papcrs.     Hc  bcgau  by  congratulating  that 

body  on  the  ratification  of  the  permanent  Constitution  by 
Conventions  of  the  states  concerned,  and  expressed  his 
belief  that  at  no  distant  day  the  other  Slave  States  would 
join  the  Confederacy. 

It  was  not,  however,  for  the  purpose  of  mating  this  an- 
nouncement that  he  had  summoned  the  mem- 
unifed'stltes\ave  bcrs  togcthcr,  but  bccausc  the  Presidei^fc  of 
the  United  States  had  made  a  declaration 
of  war  against  the  Confederacy,  and  thereby  had  render- 
ed it  necessary  to  devise  measures  for  the  defense  of  the 
country.  That  mankind  might  pass  an  impartial  judg- 
ment on  the  motives  and  objects  of  the  Confederates,  he 


152  ABSTRACT  OF  MK.  DAVIS'S  MESSAGK         [Sect.  VIII. 

briefly  reviewed  tlie  relations  between  the  contending 
parties. 

He  stated  that,  during  the  war  between  the  colonies 
and  England,  the  former  entered  into  a  con- 

and  describes  the         «    -,  . .  . , ,  -,        , ,         r»       i  i      • 

origin  of  state  sov-  lederation  with  each  other  tor  their  common 
defense ;  and,  that  there  might  be  no  mis- 
construction of  their  compact,  they,  in  a  distinct  article, 
made  an  explicit  declaration  that  each  state  retained  its 
sovereignty,  and  every  power  and  right  not  expressly  del- 
egated to  the  United  States  by  this  contract. 

He  added  that  in  the  treaty  of  peace  in  1783,  the  sev- 
eral states  wxre  by  name  recognized  to' be  independent. 

He  then  drew  attention  strongly  to  the  marked  caution 
with  which  the  states  endeavored,  in  every  possible  man- 
ner, to  exclude  the  idea  that  the  separate  and  independ- 
ent sovereignty  of  each  was  merged  in  one  common  gov- 
ernment or  nation.  The  states,  when  invited  to  ratify 
the  Constitution,  refused  to  be  satisfied  until  amendments 
were  added  to  it  placing  beyond  doubt  their  reservation 
of  their  sovereign  rights  not  expressly  delegated  to  the 
United  States  in  that  instrument. 

In  spite  of  all  this  care,  a  political  school  had  arisen  in 
The  centralizing  the  North  claiming  that  the  government  is 
ideas  of  the  North.  ^^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^^^^  Gxaltlug  the  crcaturc  above 

its  creator,  and  making  the  principals  subordinate  to  the 
agent  appointed  by  themselves. 

The  people  of  the  Southern  States^  devoted  to  agricul- 
ture, early  perceived  a  tendency  in  the  Northern  States 
to  render  a  common  government  subservient  to  their  pur- 
pose by  imposing  burdens  on  commerce  as  protection  to 
their  manufacturing  and  shipping  interests.  Controver- 
sies grew  out  of  those  attempts  to  benefit  one  section  at 
the  expense  of  the  other,  and  the  dangers  of  disruption 
were  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  the  population  of  the 
North  was  increasing  more  rapidly  than  that  of  the 


Chap.  XLIL]       ABSTRACT  OF  ME.  DAVIS'S  MESSAGE.  ^53 

Soutli.     By  degrees,  as  the  Northern  States  gained  pre- 
ponderance in  Congress,  self-interest  taught  their  people 
to  assert  their  right  as  a  majority  to  govern 
ernmSby  m|oV-  tho   minorltv.     President  Lincoln  had  de- 

ities. 

clared,  at  length,  that  the  theory  of  the  Con- 
stitution requires  that  in  all  cases  the  majority  shall  gov- 
ern. He  likens  the  relations  between  states  and  the 
United  States  to  those  between  a  county  and  the  state  in 
which  it  is  situated.  On  this  lamentable  error  rests  the 
policy  which  has  culminated  in  his  declaration  of  war 
against  the  Confederate  States. 

Mr.  Davis  pointed  out  that,  in  addition  to  the  deep- 
The  obnoxious  char-  scatcd  rescntmeut  felt  by  the  South  at  the 
acteroftariffiaws.  ^j^rfching  of  thc  North  through  thc  tariff 
laws,  there  was  another  subject  of  discord,  involving  in- 
terests of  such  transcendent  magnitude  as  to  create  an 
apprehension  that  the  permanence  of  the  Union  was  im- 
possible. 

He  then  gave  a  brief  history  of  American  negro  slav- 
The  story  of  Amer-  ^ry,  affirming  that  originally  it  existed  in 

icau  slavery.  ^^^j^^  ^^^  ^^  ^^^^^^  ^^^^^  ^^^^^^  .    ^^^  ^j^^^ 

of  property  in  slaves  was  protected  by  law,  recognized  in 
the  Constitution,  and  provision  made  against  loss  by  the 
escape  of  the  slave ;  that,  to  secure  a  due  slave  supply, 
Congress  was  forbidden  to  prohibit  the  African  slave- 
trade  before  a  certain  date,  and  no  power  was  given  to  it 
to  legislate  disadvantageously  against  that  species  of 
property. 

The  climate  of  the  Northern  States  being  unpropi- 
Anti-siavery  con-  tlous  to  slavc  labor,  they  sold  their  slaves 
duct  of  the  North.   ^^  ^^^  g^^^^j^^  ^^^  ^-^^^^  prohibited  skvcry  in 

their  own  limits.  The  South  purchased  this  property 
willingly,  not  suspecting  that  quiet  possession  of  it  was 
to  be  disturbed  by  those  who  not  only  were  in  want  of 
constitutional  authority,  but  prevented  by  good  faith  as 


154  ABSTRACT  OF  MR.  DAVIS'S  MESSAGE.        [Sect.  VIII. 

vendors  from  disquieting  a  title  emanating  from  them- 
selves. 

This  done,  as  soon  as  the  Northern  States  had  gained 
a  control  in  Congress,  they  commenced  an  organized  sys- 
tem of  hostile  measures  against  the  institution.  They  de- 
vised plans  for  making  slave  property  insecure ;  they  sup- 
plied fanatical  organizations  with  money  to  excite  the 
slaves  to  discontent  and  revolt ;  they  enticed  them  to  ab- 
scond ;  they  neutralized  and  denounced  the  fugitive  slave 
law ;  they  mobbed  and  murdered  slave-owners  in  pursuit 
of  their  fugitive  slaves ;  they  passed  laws  punishing  by 
fine  and  imprisonment  Southern  citizens  seeking  the  re- 
covery of  their  property;  they  sent  senators  and  repre- 
sentatives to  Congress  whose  chief  title  to  that  distinc- 
tion was  their  ultra-fanaticism,  and  whose  business  was 
to  awaken  the  bitterest  hatred  against  the  South  by  vio- 
lent denunciations  of  its  institutions. 

A  great  party  was  then  organized  for  obtaining  the 
Organization  of  the  admiuistratiou  of  the  government,  its  object 

Anti-slavery  party.     ^^^^^  ^^    CXCludc  thc  SlaVC  StatCS  from  thc 

public  domain,  to  surround  them  by  states  in  which  slav- 
ery should  be  prohibited,  and  thereby  annihilate  slave 
property  worth  thousands  of  millions  of  dollars.  This 
party  succeeded,  in  November  last,  in  the  election  of  its 
candidate  for  the  presidency  of  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Davis  then  proceeded  to  show  that,  on  the  other 

hand,  under  the  genial  climate  of  the  South- 
gaveryiuthe       em  Statcs,  and  owing  to  the  care  for  their 

well-being,  w^hich  had  been  dictated  alike  by 
interest  and  humanity,  the  slaves  had  augmented  from 
six  hundred  thousand  at  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution 
to  upward  of  four  millions ;  that,  by  careful  religious  in- 
struction, they  had  been  elevated  from  brutahsavages  into 
docile,  intelligent,  civilized  laborers,  whose  toil  had  been 
directed  to  the  conversion  of  a  vast  wilderness  into  culti- 


Chap.  XLII.]       ABSTRACT  OF  MR.  DAVIS'S  MESSAGE.  I55 

vated  lands  covered  with  a  prosperous  people.  During 
the  same  period  the  white  slaveholding  population  had 
increased  from  one  million  and  a  quarter  to  more  than 
eight  millions  and  a  half;  and  the  productions  of  the 
South,  to  which  slave  labor  v^a's  and  is  indispensable, 
formed  three  fourths  of  the  exports  of  the  whole  United 
States,  and  had  become  absolutely  necessary  to  the  wants 
of  civilized  man. 

With  interests  of  such  overwhelming  magnitude  im- 
perii arisingt.  the  perllcd, thc  South  had  been  driven  to  protect 
slave  institution,  '^.g^i^  Convcutions  had  been  held  to  deter- 
mine how  best  it  might  meet  such  an  alarming  crisis  in 
its  history. 

Ever  since  1798  there  had  existed  a  party,  almost  un- 
interruptedly in  the  maiority,  based  upon 

The  Slave  states       ,,  i    ,i      ,  i        ;     ,       •       •       x i        i      x 

determine  to  se-  thc  crccd  that  cacu  statc  IS  lu  the  last  re- 
sort the  sole  judge,  as  well  of  its  wrongs  as 
of  the  mode  and  measures  of  redress.  The  Democratic 
party  of  the  United  States  had  again  and  again  affirmed 
its  adhesion  to  those  principles.  In  the  exercise  of  that 
right,  the  people  of  the  Confederate  States,  in  their  Con- 
ventions, determined  that  it  was  necessary  for  them  to  re- 
voke their  delegation  of  powers  to  the  federal  govern- 
ment. They  therefore  passed  ordinances  resuming  their 
sovereign  rights,  and  dissolving  their  connection  with  the 
Union.  They  then  entered  into  a  new  compact,  by  new 
articles  of  confederation  with  each  other,  and  organized  a 
new  government,  complete  in  all  its  parts. 

Mr.  Davis  continued — that  one  of  his  first  desires  and 
acts  had  been  to  endeavor  to  obtain  a  just 
peaTeabil'^Sm-^     aud  cqultablc  Settlement  between  the  Con- 
federacy and  the  United  States,  and  that  he 
had  therefore  selected  three  distinguished  citizens,  who 
repaired  to  Washington.     He  affirmed  that  the  crooked 
paths  of  diplomacy  can  scarcely  furnish  an  example  so 


156  ABSTRACT  OF  MR.  DAVIS'S  MESSAGE.         [Sect.  VIII. 

wanting  in  courtesy,  in  candor,  and  directness  as  was  the 
It  is  perfidiously  ^^^^^^e  of  the  United  States  government 
repelled.  toward  thcse  commissioners.     While  they 

were  assured,  through  an  intermediary  of  high  position, 
of  the  peaceful  intentions  of  that  government,  it  was  in 
secrecy  preparing  an  expedition  for  hostile  operations 
against  South  Carolina;  that  at  length  they  were  in- 
formed that  the  President  of  the  United  States  had  de- 
termined to  hold  no  interview  with  them  whatever — to 
refuse  even  to  listen  to  any  proposals  they  had  to  make. 
Mr.  Davis  then  related  the  circumstances  under  which 
South  Carolina  cap-  ^^^^  Sumtcr  had  bceu  reduced,  describing  in 
tures  Fort  Sumter,    ^^^^j^  ^-^^  trcachcrous  maucBuvre  of  which 

he  declared  the  United  States  government  had  been 
guilty.  He  paid  a  tribute  of  respect  to  that  noble  state 
— South  Carolina — the  eminent  soldierly  qualities  of 
whose  people  had  been  conspicuously  displayed.  He 
showed  how  that,  for  months,  they  had  refrained  from 
capturing  the  fortress,  and  how  they  had  evinced  a  chiv- 
alrous regard  for  the  brave  but  unfortunate  officer  who 
had  been  compelled  by  them  to  lower  his  flag. 

Scarcely  had  the  President  of  the  United  States  learned 
and  war  is  declared  ^^  ^^^  failurc  of  his  schcmcs  iu  rclatiou  to 
against  them.  p^^^  Sumtcr,  wheu  hc  issued  a  declaration 
of  war  against  the  Confederacy.  This  it  was  which  had 
prompted  Mr.  Davis  to  convoke  the  Congress.  Not  with- 
out a  sentiment  of  contempt  he  proceeded  to  analyze  that 
"  extraordinary  production,"  that  "  singular  document,"  se- 
lecting from  it  such  expressions  as  were  likely  to  wound 
the  pride  of  the  South,  and  particularly  drawing  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that  Lincoln  had  called  "  for  an  army  of 
75,000  men,  whose  first  service  was  to  capture  our  forts;" 
that,  though  this  was  a  usurpation  of  a  power  exclusive- 
ly granted  to  the  Congress  of  that  country  by  its  Consti- 
tution, it  was  not  for  the  executive  of  the  Confederacy 


Chap.  XLII.]      ABSTRACT  OF  MR.  DAVIS'S  MESSAGE.  157 

The  south  obliged  ^^  qnestioH  that  point,  but  to  prepare  for  de- 
to  defend  itself.  f^nse.  He  therefore  had  called  on  the  Con- 
federated States  for  volunteers,  and  had  issued  a  procla- 
mation inviting  applications  for  letters  of  marque  and  re- 
prisal;  and  though  the  authority  of  Congress  was  neces- 
sary to  these  measures,  he  entertained  no  doubt  that  that 
body  would  concur  in  his  opinion  of  their  advantage. 

Referring  to  the  proclamation  of  the  President  of  the 
Its  ports  are  block-  United  States  announcing  the  blockade  of 
^^^^'  the  Southern  ports,  he  almost  doubted  its 

authenticity,  and  inferred  that,  if  it  had  been  issued  at  all, 
it  could  only  have  been  under  the  sudden  influence  of 
passion.  He  denounced  it  as  a  mere  paper  blockade,  so 
manifestly  a  violation  of  the  law  of  nations  that  it  would 
seem  incredible  that  it  could  have  been  issued  by  author- 
ity. Its  threat  to  punish  as  pirates  all  persons  who  should 
molest  a  vessel  of  the  United  States  under  letters  of 
marque  issued  by  the  Confederate  government,  he  be- 
lieved, would  not  be  sanctioned  by  the  people  of  the  Uni- 
ted States. 

He  then  informed  the  Congress  that  commissioners  had 
It  seeks  foreign  rec-  ^^^u  scut  to  various  Europcau  govcrnmeuts 
ogm  ion,  asking  for  recognition.     He  offered  congrat- 

ulations on  the  fact  that  Virginia  had  at  length  joined 
the  Confederacy.  He  could  not  doubt  that "  ere  you  shall 
have  been  many  weeks  in  session,  the  slaveholding  states 
of  the  late  Union  will  respond  to  the  call  of  honor  and 
affection,  and, by  uniting  their  fortunes  with  ours,  promote 
our  common  interests,  and  secure  our  common  safety." 

Directing  attention  then  to  the  reports  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  and  of  the  Navy,  and  coligratulating  the  Confed- 
eracy on  the  patriotic  devotion  of  its  people,  assuring 
them  of  the  smiles  of  Providence  on  their  efforts,  Mr. 
Davis  concludes  with  these  remarks : 

"  All  we  ask  is  to  be  let  alone — that  those  who  never 


158  TREATMENT  OF  THE  SLAVERY  QUESTION.     [Sect.  VIII. 

and  desires  to  be  let  ^leM  powcr  over  US  shall  not  now  attempt 
^'°''^*  our  subjugation  by  arms.     This  we  will — 

we  must  resist  to  the  direst  extremity.  The  moment  that 
this  pretension  is  abandoned,  the  sword  will  drop  from 
our  grasp,  and  we  shall  be  ready  to  enter  into  treaties  of 
amity  and  commerce  that  can  not  but  be  mutually  bene- 
ficial. So  long  as  this  pretension  is  maintained,  with  a 
firm  reliance  on  that  Divine  Power  which  covers  with  its 
protection  the  just  cause,  we  will  continue  to  struggle  for 
our  inherent  right  to  freedom,  independence,  and  self-gov- 
ernment." 

Such  is  the  purport  of  this  long  and  very  able  state 
Davis's  shorter  ex-  p^per.  Davls,  howcver,  on  a  subsequent  oc- 
position.  casion,  and  with  much  more  brevity,  forcibly 

declared,  in  a  dozen  words,  the  motives  of  the  Confeder- 
ates :  "  We  left  the  Union  simply  to  get  rid  of  the  rule 
of  majorities." 

It  has  been  mentioned  (vol.  i.,  p.  533)  that,  in  his  inau- 
gural address,  Davis  made  no  allusion  to 

He  is  obliged  to  deal      ^  -,         .  i,i,  ••  ,        r>      t    n 

vvitii  the  slave  ques-  slavcTy,  hopmg  by  that  omission  to  nnd  la- 
vor  in  the  eyes  of  Europe ;  and,  in  truth,  he 
succeeded  in  that.  But  the  Southern  people,  who  had 
been  taught  by  their  clergy  to  regard  the  institution  of 
slavery  as  "just  and  holy,"  thought  that  such  silence  im- 
plied shame.  They  looked  upon  his  precaution  as  need- 
less, and  were  far  from  being  satisfied  with  his  course. 
On  this  occasion  he  therefore  brought  the  slave  question 
into  its  proper  and  prominent  position. 

But  the  commissioners,  or  other  diplomatic  agents  who 
were  sent  to  Europe,  were  careful  not  to  provoke  the 
religious  or  political  disfavor  of  the  governments  from 
whom  they  sought  recognition.  Thus  Messrs.  Yancey, 
Mann,  and  Eost,  in  communications  had 
coZnission'Jrfdeai  wlth  Lord  Johu  RusscU  (Ausrust,  1861),  as- 

with  that  question.  -,   -,  .  •,  -,  i  U  • 

sured  him  that  the  real  cause  oi  secession 


Chap.  XLII.]  TREATMENT  OF  STATE  RIGHTS.  159 

was  not  Slavery,  but  the  Tariff,  wLicli  kept  out  Englisli 
goods.  He  stated  this  in  a  dispatch  to  Lord  Lyons,  the 
English  minister  at  Washington.  In  other  communica- 
tions they  threw  the  odium  of  the  protection  of  slavery 
on  the  United  States  government.  They  declared  that 
"  the  object  of  the  war  (on  the  part  of  the  North),  as  of- 
ficially announced,  was,  not  to  free  the  slave,  but  to  keep 
him  in  subjection  to  his  owner,  and  to  control  his  labor, 
through  the  legislative  channels  which  the  Lincoln  gov- 
ernment designed  to  force  upon  the  master."  The  obvi- 
They  fail  to  impose  ous  iusinccrity  of  such  declarations  doubt- 
on  England.  jggg  incited  Lord  Eussell  to  express  his  ap- 
prehensions that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Confederacy 
to  reopen  the  African  slave-trade ;  and  the  offense  which 
these  audacious  misrepresentations  offered  to  his  under- 
standings perhaps,  led  him  eventually  to  reply, "Lord  Rus- 
sell presents  his  compliments  to  Mr.  Yancey,  Mr.  Rost,  and 
Mr.  Mann.  He  had  the  honor  to  receive  their  letters  and 
inclosures  of  the  27th  and  30th  of  November,  but  in  the 
present  state  of  affairs  he  must  decline  to  enter  into  any 
official  communication  with  them." 

Davis,  in  his  message,  thus  found  a  justification  for  se- 
cession and  civil  war  in  the  principle  of 

Treatment  of  state  •    i   i  -xt  •   t  •       • 

rights  in  the  Con-  statc  rio;hts.     JNot  without  curiosity  may 

federacy.  cd  ^  .  .       .      *^ 

we  examine  how  that  anarchical  principle 
was  dealt  with  by  him  in  his  subsequent  acts  of  govern- 
ment. It  is  the  testimony  of  a  member  of  the  Confeder- 
ate Congress,  Mr.  Foote,  that  "  Posterity  will  hardly  be- 
lieve the  statement,  and  yet  it  is  absolutely  true,  that  the 
ultra-secessionists,  who  professed  to  have  brought  on  the 
war  chiefly  to  maintain  the  right  of  separate  state  seces- 
sion, were  the  first  to  deny  the  existence  of  any  such  right 
when  certain  movements  were  understood  to  be  in  prog- 
ress in  North  Carolina  looking  to  peaceful  secession  from 
the  Confederate  States  themselves;  and  these  persons 


IQQ  TREATMENT  OF  STATE  RIGHTS.  [Sect.  VIII. 

urged  most  veliemently  tlie  putting  of  the  whole  country 
under  military  law,  in  order  to  counteract  all  such  at- 
tempts at  withdrawal."  The  same  authority  says  "  that 
state  rights  and  state  sovereignty  no  longer  exist  south 
of  the  Potomac  Eiver ;  that  in  that  once  happy  but  now 
forlorn  region,  freedom  of  speech,  freedom  of  the  press,  the 
right  of  jury  trial,  and,  in  fact,  all  the  muniments  of  civil 
liberty  most  highly  prized  in  countries  actually  free,  are 
completely  prostrated;  that  corruption  and  imbecility 
sit  grimly  enthroned  where  it  was  once  hoped  that  vir- 
tue and  ability  would  exercise  supreme  sway ;  and  that 
a  selfish,  hypocritical,  and  tyrannical  executive  chief,  un- 
blushingly  sanctioned  and  sustained  by  a  servile  and  in- 
competent Congress,  has  well-nigh  deprived  a  high-spirit- 
ed and  eminently  chivalrous  people  of  all  ground  of  hope 
as  to  their  own  future  safety  and  happiness." 

In  theory  the  Confederacy  was  founded  upon  state  sov- 
ereignty, and  its  consequence  state  rights; 

Necessity  of  a  cen-     i      ,  t      t       ^   ,-,  •  ,i 

trai  power  in  the    but  scarcclv  had  the  secession  movement  be- 

Confederacy.  / 

gun  when  it  was  discovered,  as  had  been  dis- 
covered eighty-five  years  before,  in  the  war  of  the  colonies 
with  England,  that  the  object  in  view  could  never  be 
gained  by  a  feebly-joined  league  of  quarrelsome  states. 
It  demanded  a  central  —  a  national  power.  Even  "  in 
Richmond  itself,  as  soon  as  the  ordinance  of  secession  was 
passed,  many  persons  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it 
was  best  to  obliterate  state  lines,  and  merge  all  the  South 
into  one  indivisible  nation  or  empire.  They  thought  the 
old,  cumbrous,  complicated  machinery  could  not  be  main- 
tained. It  was  said,  state  rights  gave  us  the  right  to  se- 
cede ;  but  what  is  in  a  name  ?" 

It  was  not  possible  that  the  government  should  be  any 
thing  else  than  a  military  despotism,  and  accordingly  that 
it  forthwith  became.  The  plea  of  state  necessity  over- 
rode every  thing,  and  justified  every  thing. 


Chap.xlil]     the  confederate  extea  session.  151 

This  session  of  tlie  Cojifederate  Congress  lasted  from 
Acts  of  the  extra  the  29th  of  April  to  the  22d  of  May,  much 
session.  ^^  -^^  business  being  transacted  in  secret. 

Among  its  more  important  public  acts  may  be  mentioned 
a  recognition  that  war  with  the  United  States  was  ex- 
isting, and  an  authorization  of  the  issue  of  letters  of 
marque.  A  patent-office  was  established,  and  a  bill  pass- 
ed for  the  issue  of  fifty  millions  of  dollars  in  bonds.  Cit- 
izens of  the  Confederate  States  were  prohibited  paying  to 
citizens  of  the  United  States  any  debt  due.  Those  owing 
such  debts  were  directed  to  pay  them  into  the  Confeder- 
ate treasury.  When  the  Congress  adjourned, it  adjourned 
to  meet  in  Richmond  on  the  20th  of  July. 

But  this  transfer  did  not  meet  with  unanimous  ap- 
proval in  the  South.     Davis  himself,  in  the 

Opposition  to  the      />,•,  t'iTi*,  i 

transfer  to  Eich-  iirst  mstaucc,  oDiected  to  it,  and  vetoed  the 
bill  authorizing  it.  A  strong  opposition  to 
it  existed  in  the  Gulf  States,  founded  on  an  apprehension 
that  it  would  enable  the  Virginians  to  do  as  they  had 
done  in  the  Union,  and  engross  too  much  of  office  and  pa- 
tronage. However,  like  the  provision  in  the  Constitu- 
tion against  the  reopening  of  the  slave-trade,  it  was  one 
of  the  stipulated  conditions  on  whicb  the  secession  of  Vir- 
ginia was  obtained,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that,  by 
many  who  were  not  completely  informed  of  the  intentions 
of  the  master-minds  who  were  projecting  a  great  slave- 
emi)ire,  the  establishment  of  the  Confederate  government 
at  Richmond  was  regarded  as  a  temporary  affair. 

The  Congress  assembled  at  Richmond  transacted  much 
Acts  of  the  Con-      of  Its  buslucss  lYi  sccrct  scssiou.     Rccoguiz- 

gress  at  Richmond.    ^^^^  ^^  ^-^  ^|^^^  ^^  ^-^^  ^^.^^^  g^^^^^^  ^^^^   .^ 

had  a  great  war  on  its  hands,  it,  immediately  after  the 
battle  of  Bull  Run,  authorized  the  raising  of  400,000  men. 
It  provided  for  the  issue  of  one  hundred  millions  of  dol- 
lars in  treasury  notes,  payable  six  months  after  the  ratifi- 
II.— L 


1^2  THE  CONGRESS  AT  RICHMOND.  .     [Sect.  Vlll. 

cation  of  peace ;  and  the  same  amount  in  bonds,  bearing 
eight  per  cent,  interest,  and  payable  in  twenty  years; 
the  imposition  of  a  war  tax  of  half  of  one  per  cent,  on  all 
real  and  personal  property,  including  slaves,  but  except- 
ing persons  whose  property  was  less  than  four  hundred 
dollars.  It  authorized  the  seizure  of  all  telegraphic  lines ; 
the  appointment  by  the  President  of  agents  to  supervise 
all  communications  passing  over  them;  the  forbidding 
of  communications  in  cipher,  or  such  as  were  of  an  enig- 
matical character ;  the  banishment  of  all  alien  enemies ; 
the  confiscation  of  their  property,  with  the  exception  of 
debts  due  to  th^m  from  the  Confederacy  or  a  confeder- 
ated state.  Every  male  thus  liable  to  banishment,  if 
above  fourteen  years  of  age,  was  required  to  leave  the 
Confederacy  within  forty  days;  if  he  lingered  beyond 
that  time  he  was  to  be  imprisoned,  and  then  removed ; 
if  he  returned,  he  was  to  be  dealt  with  as  a  spy  or  pris- 
oner of  war.  In  retaliation  for  the  Confiscation  Act  of  the 
United  States,  measures  of  the  strictest  kind  for  the  dis- 
covery of  property  of  alien  enemies  were  enacted.  Every 
citizen  in  the  Confederacy  was  required  to  tell  all  he 
knew  about  such  matters,  and  that  voluntarily,  and  with- 
out being  specially  interrogated.  Should  he  fail  of  this, 
he  was  to  be  held  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  to  be  fined 
not  more  than  $5000,  imprisoned  not  more  than  six 
months,  and  be  liable  to  pay  double  the  value  of  the  prop- 
erty in  question.  It  was  anticipated  that  these  measures 
would  bring  three  hundred  millions  of  dollars  into  the 
Confederate  treasury.  That  result,  however,  was  not  at- 
tained. The  Sequestration  Bill  was  passed  on  August 
6th,  1861,  and  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
reported  that,  up  to  September  30th,  1863,  the  treasury 
had  received  from  sequestration  less  than  two  millions 
of  dollars  ($1,862,650). 
■    In  this,  its  first  session  at  Richmond,  an  act  was  also 


I 


Chap.XLIL]  ,  THE  PERMANEISfT  CONGRESS.  1^3 

passed  directing  tlie  form  under  whicli  evidence  should 
be  taken  respecting  abducted  slaves,  witli  a  viev^  to  tlie 
exaction  of  indemnity  subsequently  from  tlie  United 
States ;  and  an  act  to  aid  the  State  of  Missouri  in  repel- 
ling invasion.  The  adjournment  was  to  the  18th  of  Nor 
vember. 
From  the  beginning  the  Confederate  government  had 
constituted  itself  a  Committee   of  Public 

onhJcoi^federate  Safctv.  No  commlttce  in  the  French  Revo- 
government.  1     ,.  .     T    ..  ,        •!  1      • 

lution  was  more  vindictive,  more  terrible  m 
its  acts.  In  its  eyes  neutrality  was  the  highest  crime. 
Nothing  was  sacred ;  nothing  was  spared  that  stood  be- 
tween it  and  its  purposes.  * 

The  session  commencing  on  the  18th  of  November*  pro- 
c    •     f.T,  icfi,   videdfor  the  increase  of  the  naval  force  and 

Session  of  the  IStn 

of  November.  ^j^^  eulistmeut  of  2000  seamen.  It  made  ap- 
propriations of  sixty  millions  for  the  army  and  four  mill- 
ions for  the  navy;  but  all  its  important  measures  were 
transacted  in  secret. 

The  permanent  Congress  succeeded  the  provisional  on 
The  permanent  *^^  ^^^^  of  February,  1862.  Mr.  Davis  was 
Congress.  iuauguratcd  as  permanent  President  four 

days  subsequently.  The  day  was  very  rainy,  and  the  fes- 
tivities, as  described  by  an  eye-witness, lugubrious.  "The 
permanent  government  had  its  birth  in  a  storm." 

The  state  of  the  army  was  the  first  object  of  the  atten- 
Legisiation  respect-  ^ou  of  Cougrcss.  The  scsslous  wcre  for  the 
ing  the  army  ^^^^^  ^^^^^  sccrct.  lu  hls  mcssagc  the  Pres- 
ident had  said, "  Events  have  demonstrated  that  the  gov- 
ernment has  attempted  more  than  it  had  the  power  suc- 
cessfully to  achieve.  Hence,  in  the  effort  to  protect  by 
our  arms  the  whole  territory  of  the  Confederate  States, 
sea-board  and  inland,  we  have  been  so  exposed  as  recent- 
ly to  suffer  great  disasters."  But,  in  truth,  it  was  not  the 
diffusion  of  the  military  force  that  gave  disquiet ;  it  was 


104  WAR  LEGISLATION.  [Sect.  VIIL 

the  too  plainly  recognized  decline  of  tlie  military  spirit 
tliat  caused  the  alarm.  The  term  of  those  soldiers  who 
had  enlisted  for  a  year  was  about  to  expire.  They. had 
found,  by  fearful  experience,  that  each  Southerner  was  not 
equal  to  five  Yankees.  The  first  enthusiasm  had  alto- 
gether died  out.  The  delusion  that  there  would  be  no 
war  had  passed  away.  Every  one  now  knew  that  there 
would  be  a  long  and  dreadful  war,  and  that  instead  of 
pageantry  and  pomp  there  would  be  hardships,  mutila- 
tion, and  death. 

The  want  of  military  success  to  which  Davis  alluded 
and  the  conduct  of  ^as  attributed  by  many  to  the  faulty  man- 
the  war.  ^^j.  -^  which  the  war  was  carried  on.    There 

was  a  clamor  that  the  Confederacy,  instead  of  remaining 
on  the  defensive,  should  throw  its  armies  into  the  ene- 
my's country.  Scarcely  had  the  session  oj)ened  when  a 
resolution  (February  20th)  was  offered  to  that  effect,  and 
complaint  made  that  some  one  was  imposing  defensive 
war  on  the  country.  A  bill  was  reported  to  indemnify 
owners  of  cotton,  tobacco,  and  other  produce  destroyed  to 
prevent  its  capture  by  the  enemy.  The  Senate  adopted 
a  resolution  (February  27th)  to  the  effect  that  no  peace 
propositions  should  be  entertained  which  surrendered  any 
portion  of  the  Confederate  States,  and  that  war  must  be 
continued  until  the  enemy  was  expelled  from  Confederate 
territory.  In  the  House  a  resolution  was  passed  advising 
the  non-cultivation  of  cotton  and  tobacco,  and  the  raising 
of  provisions  in  their  stead.  After  the  disaster  of  Fort 
Donelson,  a  message  was  received  from  the  President  to 
the  effect  that  he  had  suspended  Generals  Floyd  and  Pil- 
low ;  the  former  officer  was,  however,  subsequently  rein- 
stated at  the  request  of  the  Legislature  of  Virginia.  A  re- 
The  Conscription  Hiorselcss  couscriptiou  law  was  now  (April 
^''^'  16th)  passed.     It  annulled  all  previous  con- 

tracts with  volunteers;  it  took  every  man  between  the 


Chap.xlil]  war  legislation.  105 

ages  of  eigliteen  and  thirty-five,  not  legally  exempt,  from 
state  control,  and  placed  him  absolutely  under  the  orders 
of  the  Confederate  President  during  the  war.  Was  it  to 
this  that  state  rights  had  come  ?  Not  a  little  was  added 
to  the  bitterness  now  felt  when  it  was  found  that  many 
of  the  states  thus  stripped  of  their  able-bodied  men  were 
to  be  left  to  the  mercy  of  the  invader.  "Arkansas,"  said 
her  governor  in  his  address, "  severed  her  connection  with 
the  United  States  upon  the  doctrine  of  state  sovereignty. 
She  has  lavished  her  blood  in  support  of  the  Confeder- 
acy: she  did  this  because  she  believed  that  when  the 
Disappointment  of  ^vil  hour  Came  upou  hcr  the  Confederate 
the  states.  ^^^  w^ould  bc  fouud  floating  upon  her  bat- 

tlements, defying  the  invader,  and  giving  succor  to  her 
people.  Arkansas — lost,  abandoned,  subjugated — is  not 
that  Arkansas  who  entered  the  Confederacy,  nor  will  she 
remain  Arkansas — a  Confederate  state,  as  desolate  as  a 
wilderness.  It  was  for  liberty  she  struck,  and  not  for 
subordination  to  any  created  secondary  power  North  or 
South." 

Hard  as  it  was,  this  conscription  law  was  thoroughly 
executed.  It  accomplished  its  purpose.  For  the  time  it 
was  the  salvation  of  the  Confederacy.  The  reluctant  con- 
scripts were  hurried  into  Virginia  to  confront  McClellan, 
and,  raw  as  they  were,  they  hurled  him  out  of  the  Penin- 
sula. They  saved  Richmond,  put  Washington  in  immi- 
nent peril,  invaded  Maryland,  and  watered  their  horses 
in  the  rivers  of  Pennsylvania. 

But  this  was  not  enough.  Conscription  had  again  to 
Renewed  conscrip-  ^^  prcssed  uutil  tlic  vcry  briilk  of  social  ex- 
^^''"^"  haustion  was  reached.     The  first  body  of 

100,000  volunteers  had  been  exhausted;  a  second  body 
of  400,000  volunteers  had  proved  to  be  insufficient.  At 
this  period  there  were  not  fewer  than  210,000  men  in  the 
Confederate  service.    Volunteering  was  at  an  end.    Pro- 


IQ^  THE  CONSCEIPT  SOLDIERS.  [Sect.  VIII. 

crastinated  independence  and  disappointment  were  break- 
ing tlie  spirit  of  the  South.  Compulsion  must  take  what 
enthusiasm  could  no  longer  give.  The  product  of  the  first 
conscription  bill  was  being  fast  devoured  by  cannon,  or 
melting  away  with  fearful  rapidity  in  the  hospitals.  An- 
other conscription  was  actually  enacted  in  the  following 
year.  It  demanded  all  men  between  eighteen  and  forty- 
five  years  of  age,  except  those  legally  exempted.  They 
were  ordered  by  proclamation  to  repair  voluntarily  to 
the  conscript  camps.  They  were  to  be  punished  as  de- 
serters if  they  did  not  comply.  Troops  from  the  same 
state  were  brigaded  together — a  last,  a  grim  recognition 
of  state  rights. 

Torn  from  their  firesides,  deported  from  their  native 
The  conscript  sol-  statcs,  thcsc  couscrlpts  fo'rmcd  that  incom- 
parable infantry  which  the  South  will  never 
remember  without  affectionate  emotion,  and  whose  mili- 
tary deeds  the  North  will  never  recall  without  a  secret 
pride.  A  lady: — an  eye-witness  —  writing  to  a  friend 
about  the  prisoners  who  were  taken  at  Shiloh,  and  brought 
to  Camp  Douglas  at  Chicago,  says :  "  But  I  have  not 
told  you  how  awfully  they  were  dressed.  They  had  old 
carpets,  new  carpets,  rag  carpets,  old  bed-quilts,  new  bed- 
quilts,  and  ladies'  quilts  for  blankets.  They  had  slouch 
hats,  children's  hats,  little  girls'  hats,  but  not  one  soldier 
had  a  soldier's  cap  on  his  head.  One  man  had  two  old 
hats  tied  to  his  feet  instead  of  shoes.  They  were  the 
most  ragged,  torn,  and  worn,  and  weary-looking  set  I  ever 
saw.  Every  one  felt  sorry  for  them,  and  no  one  was  dis- 
posed to  speak  unkindly  to  them."  Yet  this  was  that 
infantry  ^ — that  magnificent  infantry,  which  had  nearly 
wrenched  victory  from  Grant  on  the  blood-stained  field  of 
Shiloh.  It  had  faced,  without  flinching,  famine,  naked- 
ness, the  hospital,  and  the  sword.  Would  to  God  that  it 
had  had  a  different  enemy  and  a  different  cause ! 


Its  various  war 
measures. 


chap.xlil]  the  august  session.  1^7 

On  the  21st  of  April  Congress  adjourned  to  the  third 
The  August  session  Monday  in  August.  When  it  met  (August 
of  Congress.  j^Sth),  the  couditiou  of  the  army  was  a  sub- 

ject  of  deep  concern.  This  was  manifested  by  the  fact 
that  hardly  had  Congress  entered  on  its  duties  when  a 
resolution  was  offered  inquiring  into  the  expediency  of 
compelling  the  Commissary  Department  to  furnish  more 
and  better  food  to  the  soldiers.  Much  of  the  public  leg- 
islation had  immediate  reference  to  questions  arising  from 
the  war.  Among  war  measures,  bills  were  submitted  for 
the  treatment  of  captives ;  one  to  retaliate  for 
the  seizure  of  citizens ;  and  one  for  the  pun- 
ishment of  negroes  in  arms :  it  provided  that  Federal  ar- 
mies, incongruously  composed  of  whites  and  blacks,  should 
not  be  entitled  to  the  privileges  of  war,  or  to  be  taken 
prisoners;  the  negroes,  if  captured,  to  be  returned  to  their 
masters,  or  publicly  sold ;  their  commanders  to  be  hanged 
or  shot,  as  might  be  most  convenient.  Another  bill  was 
introduced  declaring  that  Federal  soldiers  taken  with 
counterfeit  Confederate  notes  in  their  possession  should 
be  put  to  death.  When  Lincoln's  proclamation  of  Sep- 
tember 2 2d  respecting  slavery  was  received,  retaliatory 
measures  were  at  once  contemplated.  '  It  was  proposed 
that  every  man  taken  in  arms  against  the  Confederacy, 
upon  its  soil,  should  be  put  to  death,  and  that  the  black 
flag  should  be  hoisted.  These  motions  were  disposed 
of  on  the  last  day  of  the  session  by  a  resolution  declar- 
ing that  Congress  would  sustain  any  retaliatory  meas- 
ures which  the  President  might  adopt. 

There  was  a  growing,  an  irrepressible  dissatisfaction 

Dissatisfaction  ^vitlx  ^^i^^  ^^^^  management  of  the  armies,  an  in- 
the  state  of  affairs,  ccssaut  dcmaud  to  Carry  the  war  into  the 
enemy's  country.  "  If,"  said  a  member  from  South  Caro- 
lina, "you  will  give  Stonewall  Jackson  half  our  armies, 
he  will  drive  the  whole  600,000  of  the  enemy  into  the 
I^orthern  States." 


108  THE  OPPOSITION.  [Sect.  VII. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  Davis,  and  those  who  act- 
opposition  to  the  ^^  ^Ith  him,  Carried  their  measures  without 
President.  seiious  oppositiou  ill  their  Congress.    The 

member  of  that  body  whose  testimony  I  have  quoted  (p. 
159)  remarks  that  even  in  the  provisional  Congress  a 
tendency  to  centralization  was  apparent,  and  that  "  Mr. 
Davis  vetoed  more  bills  during  that  provisional  regime 
than  all  the  presidents  of  the  United  States,  from  Wash- 
ington to  Lincoln  inclusive." 

In  vain  a  few  independent  members  attempted  to  pre- 
Avbitrary  course  of  ^^^^  ^^^  passage  of  laws  suspcudiug  the 
the  government.  ^^^^  ^£  habcas  corpus ,'  coufiscating  the  es- 
tates of  all  who  could  not  conscientiously  range  them- 
selves in  opposition  to  the  flag  of  their  fathers ;  putting 
under  conscription  all  male  citizens  capable  of  bearing 
arms,  whether  they  were  friendly  or  hostile  to  the  Con- 
federate cause ;  forcibly  impressing  private  property, 
wheresoever  situated,  at  the  discretion  of  men  endowed 
temporarily  with  military  authority;  declaring  and  enforc- 
ing martial  law.  In  spite  of  them,  inefficient  and  mis- 
chievous officials  were  appointed,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
capable  and  virtuous;  able  military  commanders  were 
displaced  to  make  way  for  others  despised  by  the  army, 
and  hated  and  distrusted  by  the  citizens. 

These,  measures,  and  others  of  a  like  character,  were 
carried  against  all  opposition.  A  single  member,  by  mov- 
ing it,  could  force  the  House  to  sit  with  closed  doors, 
and  thus  in  secret  session,  and  under  what  was  known  as 
the  ten  minutes'  rule,  measures  the  most  dangerous  and 
doubtful  might  be  passed.  It  was  thus  with  the  Erlanger 
loan,  a  shameless  speculation  introduced  under  the  auspi- 
ces of  Messrs.  Slidell  and  Benjamin ;  thus,  too,  with  the 
Confiscation  Act. 

As  it  became  more  and  more  apparent  that  the  prom- 
ises Davis  had  made  of  a  short  and  successful  war  were 


Chap.XLIL]   decline  OF  THE  INFLUENCE  OF  DAVIS.  I59 

Decline  of  the  infiu-  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^  ^^  realized,  his  popukrity  de- 
ence  of  Davis.  clined.  All  influential  newspaper  declared 
that  he  had  been  "  hastily  and  unfortunately  inflicted  on 
the  Confederacy  at  Montgomery,  and,  when  fixed  in  posi- 
tion, banished  from  his  presence  the  head  and  brain  of  the 
South,  denying  all  participation  in  the  affairs  of  the  gov- 
ernment to  the  great  men  who  were  the  authors  of  seces- 
sion." Elsewhere  it  was  affirmed  that  "  the  great  men  of 
the  pa&t  and  their  families  are  proscribed  as  if  this  gov- 
ernment was  the  property  of  a  few  who  haj)pen  to  wield 
power   at  present."     It  was  declared  that 

Neglect  of  the  lead-    ,,  ,-,  -,  i  ,  ,       ii 

ers  of  the  move-  "  the  pcoplc  cau  uo  longer  get  access  to  tne 
President ;  he  is  surrounded  by  officers  like 
an  imperial  court."  Nor  were  these  accusations  ground- 
less ;  the  ablest  writers  of  the  South — such  as  Fitzhugh, 
De  Bow,  Fisher — whose  Avorks  had  in  reality  formed  pub- 
lic opinion,  and  who  were  entitled  to  the  most  prominent 
positions,  were  treated  with  contumely ;  one  was  offered 
a  low  clerkship,  which  he  spurned  with  contempt ;  an- 
other died  of  a  broken  heart. 

"  He  has  notions  of  imperial  greatness ;"  "  his  head  is 
Accnsations  against  Completely  tumcd  by  his  sudden  elevation ;" 
the  President,  a  ^^  'g  ^^^  victiui  of  the  wcakest  weakness, 
vanity  ;"  "  he  is  the  dupe  of  the  intriguing  machinations 
of  cunning  and  unscrupulous  managers,  whose  true  char- 
acter he  has  never  penetrated"— such  were  the  bitter  ob- 
jurgations of  those  who  had  recently  been  Davis's  friends. 
One  pointed  out  in  detail  that  all  the  military  reverses 
of  the  Confederacy  might  be  directly  traced  to  his  unhap- 
py interventions  ;  another  sneeringly  recalled  that  when 
McClellan  was  in  sight  of  Eichmond,  the  President  was 
being  baptized  at  home,  and  then  privately  confirmed  in 
St.  Paul's  Church  ;  that,  during  the  battle  of  June  28th, 
"he  was  in  the  lanes  and  orchards,  near  the  field  of  ac- 
tion praying  for  abundant  success." 


170  ^  EEIGN  OF  TERROR.  [Sect.  VIII. 

These  bitter  animosities  were  not  restricted  to  tlie  Pres- 
and  against  his  ideiit ;  his  Cabinet  bore  their  share.  The 
,  chief  officers.  ignorance  of  one;  the  incompetence  of  an- 
other; the  want  of  ordinary  honesty  in  a  third,  were 
openly  proclaimed.  It  was  affirmed  that  a  person  who 
had  pursued  the  empirical  practice  of  a  vegetarian  quack- 
doctor  was  intrusted  with  one  of  the  most  important  mil- 
itary offices.  "  His  manners  were  coarse,  overbearing,  and 
insulting;  he  was  utterly  ignorant  of  the  duties  of  the 
post  assigned  to  him,  and  was  not  at  all  solicitous  to  make 
himself  acquainted  with  them.  He  exhibited  a  brutal 
indifference  to  the  sufferings  of  the  Confederate  soldiery, 
by  all  of  whonf  he  was  most  cordially  detested." 

Mr.  Foote  declares :  "  As  chairman  of  a  special  com- 
imprisonment  of    Hiittce  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  OTgan- 

suspectedper^ns.    -^^^   ^^  ^^   ^^^^  ^^^.^^^  ^^^  ^^^  pUrpOSe   of 

inquiring  into  cases  of  illegal  imprisonment,  I  obtained 
from  the  superintendent  of  the  prison-house  in  Eichmond, 
under  the  official  sanction  of  the  Department  of  War  it- 
self, a  grim  and  shocking  catalogue  of  several  hundred 
persons  then  in  confinement  therein,  not  one  of  whom 
was  charged  with  any  thing  but  suspected  political  infi- 
delity, and  this,  too,  not  upon  oath  in  a  single  instance. 
Before  I  could  take  proper  steps  to  procure  the  discharge 
of  these  unhappy  men,  the  second  suspension  of  the  writ 
of  liberty  occurred,  and  I  presume  that  such  of  them  as 
did  not  die  in  jail  remained  there  until  the  fall  of  Eich- 
mond into  the  bands  of  the  Federal  forces." 

These  imprisonments  were  very  far  from  being  restrict- 
Barbaiities  prac-    ^d  to  pcrsous  little  kuowu  or  lu  the  humbler 

ticed  upon  them.      ^^^j^^  ^^  j  •  ^^^      rj.^^^^  ^^  g^^^^^  ^^^^^  ^^^,  ^^^^ 

years  had  been  one  of  the  most  prominent  men  in  polit- 
ical life  in  Virginia,  says  that  he  was  arrested  in  March, 
1862,  sent  to  a  filthy  negro  jail,  and  kept  there  in  solitary 
confinement  for  eight  weeks ;  not  even  a  chair  or  table 


Chap.  XLIL]  A  REIGN.  OF  TERROR.  171 

was  furnislied  him;  no  one  was  permitted  to  speak  to 
him.  He  adds  "  that  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty 
persons  were  in  like  manner  confined.  Many  of  them 
were  subsequently  sent  to  Salisbury,  in  North  Carolina, 
where  some  went  crazy,  and  many  died.  In  the  Rich- 
mond Prison  they  had  the  naked  floor  for  a  pallet,  a  log 
of  wood  for  a  pillow,  the  ceiling  for  a  blanket.  At  Salis- 
bury it  was  still  worse.  They  were  exposed  to  all  the 
weather — cold  rains  and  burning  suns  alternately."  "  But 
the  object  was  effected  by  my  arrest  and  imprisonment 
and  that  of  others.  It  effectually  sealed  every  man's  lips. 
All  were  afraid  to  express  their  opinions  under  the  reign 
of  terror  and  despotism  that  had  been  established  in  Rich- 
mond. Every  man  felt  that  his  personal  liberty  and  safe- 
ty required  silent  submission  to  the  tyranny  of  the  Con- 
federacy." 

It  was  this  Mr.  Botts  who  first  uttered  th^t  sentiment, 
which  became  eventually  so  current  among  the  brave  and 
much-enduring,  the  shoeless,  ragged,  famished,  noble  con- 
scripts— "  It's  the  rich  man's  war^  and  the  poor  man's 
fight." 

,,Things  were  fast  going  from  bad  to  worse  in  domestic 
life  in  the  Confederacy.     A  clerk  in  the  War 

Deplorable  condi-     ^^-^         .  -,.  Pi'i?        m  /a»*         in 

tiou  of  domestic  af-  Omce,  lu  a  diary  oi  his  lamily  airairs,  tells 
us :  "  The  shadow  of  gaunt  Famine  is  upon 
us.  All  the  patriotism  is  in  the  army ;  out  of  it  the  de- 
mon Avarice  rages  supreme.  Every  one  is  mad  with 
speculation."  By  the  middle  of  November,  1862,  salt  was 
selling  in  Richmond  at  more  than  a  dollar  a  pound ;  boots 
at  fifty  dollars  a  pair ;  clothing  was  almost  unattainable. 
The  city  was  full  of  accusations,  of  speculations,  extortion, 
cheating  the  government.  It  was  found,  from  an  exam- 
ination of  the  accounts  of  disbursing  agents,  that  nearly 
seventy  millions  of  dollars  were  not  accounted  for.  Th^ 
remorseless  pressure  of  the  blockade  had  reached  the  re- 


]^^2  EFFECTS  ON  DOMESTIC  LIFE.  [Sect.  VIII. 

cesses  of  private  life.  "Pins  are  now  so  rare  tliat  we 
pick  them  up  with  avidity  in  the  streets."  Enthusiasm 
had  died  out.  Blank  despair  was  settling  on  multitudes 
to  whom  pride  had  been  a  temporary  support.  The  la- 
dies were  no  longer  seen  sewing  uniforms  in  the  churches 
as  in  the  first  days  of  secession,  and  boasting  that  they 
had  postponed  all  engagements  until  their  lovers  had 
fouo^ht  with  the  Yankees.  But,  faithful  to  the  end,  as 
they  will  always  be,  they  were  watching  by  their  wound- 
ed in  the  hospitals,  or  decorating  with  flowers  the  graves 
of  their  dead. 


CHAPTER  XLHI. 

THE  EXTRA  SESSION  OF  THE  NATIONAL  CONGRESS. 

The  Republican  party  had  a  majority  in  Congress,  and  was  sustained  by  the  mass 
of  the  Democratic  party  in  all  measures  needful  for  the  support  of  the  govern- 
ment. 

President  Lincoln,  in  his  message,  gave  an  exposition  of  the  state  of- affairs,  and  of 
the  causes  which  had  led  to  the  existing  crisis. 

Congress  in  its  acts  exceeded  his  recommendations,  pledging  itself  to  bring  into  op- 
eration the  whole  power  of  the  nation  for  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion. 

The  Thirty-seventli  Congress  met  on  the  4tli  of  July, 
1861,  in  extra  session,  in  accordance  with 
the  President's  proclamation  of  the  15th  of 
April. 

The  Republican  party  had  a  majority  in  both  houses. 
Party  composition  ^^  ^^^  Senate  it  had  thirty-one  votes  out  of 
of  the  houses,  forty-eight ;  in  the  House  of  Representatives, 
one  hundred  and  six  out  of  one  hundred  and  seventy- 
eight. 

Of  the  House  of  Representatives,  a  large  number  of  the 
compared  with  the  members  were  new  men  who  had  never  been 
preceding  session.  -^  Qougress  beforc.  Though  the  Republic- 
an  party  had  in  this  three  representatives  less  than  in  the 
last  session,  it  had,  through  the  non-representation  of  the 
seceding  states,  the  above-mentioned  majority. 

The  last  Senate  had  consisted  of  sixty-six  members ;  in 
this  there  were  but  forty-eight.  In  the  former  case  the 
Democratic  party  had  a  majority  over  the  Republican  in 
the  proportion  of  three  to  two.  This  gave  to  the  South 
a  control  of  the  Senate,  and  through  it  a  control  of  the 
government. 


174  THE  EXTEA  SESSION.  [Sect.  VIII.. 

The  control  tlius  maintained  "by  the  slave  power  is  in- 
dicated by  the  distribution  of  the  chairmanships  of  the 
standing  committees.  The  important  ones  were  held  by 
the  South.  Thus  Mississippi  had  that  of  Military  Affairs ; 
Florida,  Naval  Affairs  and  the  Post-office ;  Delaware,  the 
Justiciary;  Virginia,  Foreign  Eelations,  and  also  Finance ; 
Alabama,  Commerce;  Arkansas,  Public  Lands;  Louisiana, 
Public  Land  Claims.  Of  twenty-two  such  committees, 
the  slave  power  controlled  sixteen.  These  chairmanships 
were  in  the  hands  of  persons  soon  to  be  found  in  open 
opposition  to  the  government.  To  the  North  had  been 
assigned  the  more  insignificant,  such  as  Printing,  Patents, 
Public  Buildings. 

As  in  the  House,  so  in  the  Senate,  the  non-representa- 
tion of  the  seceding  states  threw  the  power 

Effect  of  the  with-     •,,ii  i  n   ,1        -n>  it  t» 

drawai  of  South-     mto  tuo  uauds  01  the  Kepublicans,  and,  m 

em  members.  t  t    •  n 

addition,  many  senators,  as  well  as  many  rep- 
resentatives who  had  heretofore  acted  with  the  Democrat- 
ic party,  joined  cordially  in  support  of  the  administration 
as  soon  as  they  plainly  perceived  that  the  life  of  the  na- 
tion was  in  peril. 

The  sentiments  animating  a  very  large  portion  of  the 

Democratic  party  were  well  expressed  by 

eSSent  by  the^°^'  Mr.  Dousflas,  who  had  been  its   candidate 

Democratic  party.        ^        ,^  -i  •  •,•  j.t'  t 

for  the  presidency  m  opposition  to  Lincoln. 
They  occur  in  a  letter  to  the  chairman  of  the  Democratic 
Committee  of  his  state,  written  but  a  short  time  before 
his  death : 

"  I  am  neither  the  supporter  of  the  partisan  policy,  nor 

Views  expressed  by    ^^^  apologist  of  thc  ClTOrS   of  this   admiuis- 

Mr.  Douglas.  tratiou.    My  prcvious  rclatlous  to  it  remain 

unchanged.  But  I  trust  the  time  will  never  come  when 
I  shall  not  be  willing  to  mak^  any  needful  sacrifice  of 
personal  feeling  and  party  policy  for  the  honor  and  in- 
tegrity of  my  country.     I  know  of  no  mode  by  which  a 


Chap.  XLIII.]  MR.  DOUGLAS'S  LETTER.  175 

loyal  citizen  may  so  well  demonstrate  his  devotion  to  his 
country  as  by  sustaining  the  flag,  the  Constitution,  and 
the  Union  against  all  assailants,  at  home  and  abroad." 
"The  hope  (of  a  compromise)  was  cherished  by  Union  men 
North  and  South,  and  was  never  abandoned  until  actual 
war  was  levied  at  Charleston,  and  the  authoritative  an- 
nouncement made  by  the  revolutionary  government  at 
Monto-omery  that  the.  secession  flag  should  be  planted  on 
the  walls  of  the  Capitol  at  Washington,  and  a  proclama- 
tion issued  inviting  the  pirates  of  the  world  to  prey  upon 
the  commerce  of  the  United  States."  "  There  was  then 
but  one  path  of  duty  left  open  to  patriotic  men.  It  was 
not  a  party  question,  nor  a  question  involving  partisan 
policy.  It  w^as  a  question  of  government  or  no  govern- 
ment— country  or  no  country ;  and  hence  it  became  the 
duty  of  every  friend  of  constitutional  liberty  to  rally  to 
the  support  of  our  common  country,  its  government  and 
flag,  as  the  only  means  of  checking  the  progress  of  revo- 
lution, and  of  preserving  the  union  of  the  states." 
.  On  the  day  after  the  organization  of  Congress,  the  Pres- 
ident transmitted  to  it  his  message. 

He  stated  that,  since  the  beginning  of  his  term,  the  func- 
tions of  the  government,  with  the  exception 
of  those  of  the  Post-office  Department,  had 
been  suspended  in  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Mis- 
sissippi, Louisiana,  and  Florida ;  that  forts,  arsenals,  dock- 
yards, and  other  property  had  been  seized,  strengthened, 
and  armed,  and  were  held  in  open  hostility  to  the  govern- 
ment ;  that  a  disproportionate  quantity  of  national  mus- 

specifying  the  acts  ^^^^  ^^^  riflcs  had  lu  somc  mauucr  found 
of  the  insurgents,    ^^g  ^^y  ^^  thosc  statcs,  aud  was  about  to 

be  used  against  the  government ;  that  accumulations  of 
revenue,  had  in  like  manner  been  taken ;  that  the  navy 
had  been  scattered  to  distant  seas ;  that  officers  both  of 
the  army  and  navy  had  resigned  in  great  numbers,  and 


The  President's 
message, 


176  ABSTRACT  OF  LINCOLN'S  MESSAGE.  [Sect.VIIL 

many  of  them  were  in  arms  against  the  government ;  that 
ordinances  of  secession  had  been  passed  by  each  of  the 
states  designated,  and  an  illegal  organization  established 
which,  in  the  character  of  a  confederation,  was  seeking 
the  intervention  of  foreign  powers. 

That,  recognizing  it  to  be  his  imperative  duty  to  arrest 

this  attempt  at  the  destruction  of  the  Union, 

capture  of  Fort       hc  had  at  first  resorted  to  peaceful  meas- 

Sumter.  iiii  it 

ures,  seekmg  only  to  hold  the  public  prop- 
erty, collect  the  revenue,  and  continue,  at  the  government 
expense,  the  mails  to  the  very  people  who  were  resisting; 
that  he  had  notified  the  Governor  of  South  Carolina  of 
an  attem]3t  about  to  be  made  to  provision  Fort  Sumter, 
and  had  also  informed  him  that,  unless  this  were  resist- 
ed, there  would  be  no  effort  to  send  re-enforcements. 
Thereupon  the  fort  was  bombarded  and  captured,  with- 
out even  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  provisioning  expe- 
dition. 

From  this  it  might  be  seen  that  the  assault  on  Fort 

Sumter  was  in  no  sense  a  matter  of  self  de- 

That  they  had  made    ^  ,  ,        ty  ,i  m        j       'j    i      • 

war  on  the  govern-  feuse  ou  tho  part  01  thc  assailauts,  it  bemo^ 
impossible  that  the  garrison  could  commit 
any  aggression  upon  them ;  that  their  object  was  to  drive 
out  the  visible  authority  of  the  Union ;  that  there  were 
no  guns  in  the  fort  save  those  sent  to  that  harbor  many 
years  before  for  the  protection  of  the  assailants  them- 
selves. In  doing  this  they  had  forced  upon  the  country 
the  distinct  issue — "  immediate  dissolution  of  the  Union 
or  blood." 

This  issue  presents  the  question  whether  discontented 
individuals,  too  few  in  numbers  to  control  the  adminis- 
tration according  to  law,  may,  upon  pretenses  made  arbi- 
trarily or  not  at  all,  break  up  the  government.  It  forces 
us  to  ask,  "  Is  there  in  all  republics  an  inherent  and  fatal 
weakness  ?"     "  Must  a  government,  of  necessity,  be  too 


Chap.  XLIIL]      ABSTRACT  OF  LINCOLN'S  MESSAGE.  l^^ 

strong  for  the  liberties  of  its  own  people,  or  too  weak  to 
maintain  its  own  existence  ?" 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  government  was  com- 
pelled to  resist  the  force  employed  for  its 

The  government  ij.x'T.i»  1  1    n         '  i^ 

had  been  compelled  dcstruction  Dj  lorco  employed  for  its  pres- 

to  r6sist«  ^ 

ervation. 
The  President  then  proceeded  to  say  that  the  response 
The  course  that  vir-  of  thc  country  had  bcen  most  gratifying,  yet 

ginia  had  taken.  ^|^^^   ^^^^    ^^  ^^^   gj^^^    g^^^^^   ^^^^^^   jy^^^ 

ware  had  furnished  a  reo;iment.  He  drew  attention  to 
the  course  that  Virginia  had  taken.  A  Convention,  of 
whom  a  large  majority  were  professed  Unionists,  had 
been  elected  by  the  people  of  that  state  for  the  purpose 
of  considering  secession ;  on  the  fall  of  Sumter,  many  of 
them  went  over  to  the  secession  party,  and  undertook 
to  withdraw  the  state  from  the  Union,  but,  though  they 
submitted  their  ordinance  for  ratification  to  a  vote  of  the 
people,  to  be  taken  a  month  subsequently,  they,  without 
any  delay,  commenced  warlike  operations  against  the 
Union.  They  seized  the  government  armory  at  Harper's 
Ferry  and  the  Norfolk  navy  yard ;  they  received,  per- 
haps invited,  large  bodies  of  troops  from  the  other  seced- 
ing states;  they  madd  a  treaty  with  the  Confederate 
States,  and  sent  representatives  to  their  Congress;  they 
permitted  the  installation  of  the  insurrectionary  govern- 
ment at  Richmond. 

In  the  other  Border  Slave  States  there  had  been  an  at- 
tempt to  assume  a  position  which  they  called 

and  the  armed  neu-  -.  ;       t  ,  rm  it  • 

iraiity  of  the  Border  armed  neutrality,  ihey  would  permit  nei- 
ther the  insurgents  nor  the  government  to 
cross  their  soil.  -Under  this  guise  of  neutrality  they  gave 
protection  to  and  screened  the  insurgents,  securing  dis- 
union without  a  struggle. 

He  then  stated  the  circumstances  under  which  the  gov- 
ernment had  called  out  seventy-five  thousand  militia,  and 
H.— M 


178  ABSTRACT  OF  LINCOLN'S  MESSAGE.  [Sect.  VIII. 

instituted  a  blockade  of  the  insurrection- 

ssre- 
the  ad- 
ministration. 


War  measures  re-  t    i    •    i       ,  i        •  j  •       •    j      i 

sorted  to  by  the  ad-  arv  Qistricts,  tuc  lusurrectionists  havinp;  an- 


nounced  their  purpose  of  entering  on  the 
practice  of  privateering.  Other  calls  had  been  made  for 
volunteers,  and  also  for  large  additions  to  the  regular 
army  and  navy.  These  measures  had  been  ventured 
upon  under  what  appeared  to  be  a  public  necessity,  and 
in  the  trust  that  Congress  would  readily  ratify  them.  He 
had  also  authorized  the  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus,  so  that  dangerous  persons  might  be  arrested  or 
detained.  He  presented  the  considerations  which  had 
led  him  to  regard  this  step  not  only  as  justifiable,  but 
obligatory. 

In  view  of  the  existing  condition  of  things,  he  then 
m  recommenda-  callcd  upou  Cougrcss  to  glvc  thc  legal  means 
tions  to  congress.  ^^^  making  this  coutcst  short  aud  decisive. 
He  asked  for  400,000  men,  and  $400,000,000. 

The  President  also  pointed  out  the  manner  in  which 

the  people  of  the  Slave  States  had  been  be- 
specting  state  sov-  gullcd  luto  trcasou.     Thc  Icadcrs   of  the 

movement  had  for  more  than  thirty  years 
been  laboring  to  persuade  them  that  any  state  of  the 
Union,  by  virtue  of  its  supremacy  or  sovereignty  as  a 
state,  might  constitutionally,  and  therefore  peacefully  and 
legally,  withdraw  at  its  pleasure  from  the  Union.  But, 
with  the  exception  of  Texas,  not  one  of  them  had  ever 
been  a  state  out  of  the  Union.  The  original  ones  passed 
into  the  Union  before  they  had  cast  off  British  colonial 
dependence.  Not  one  of  the  states,  save  Texas,  had  ever 
been  sovereign.  The  Union  gave  each  of  them  whatever 
independence  and  liberty  it  had.  It  is*  older  than  any 
of  them,  and  created  them  as  states.  Not  one  of  them 
ever  had  a  state  Constitution  independent  of  the  Union. 
Even  if  they  had  reserved  powers,  they  certainly  had  not 
a  power  to  destroy  the  government.     Kecalling  the  fact 


Chap.  XLIII.]      ABSTRACT  OF  LINCOLN'S  MESSAGE.  179 

that  the  nation  had  purchased  with  its  money  several  of 
the  seceding  states,  he  asked,  Is  it  just  that  they  should 
separate  without  its  permission  ?  Florida,  for  instance, 
had  cost  $100,000,000.  The  nation  is  actually  now  in 
debt  for  moneys  it  has  thus  paid.  A  part  of  the  existing 
national  debt  was  contracted  to  pay  the  debts  of  Texas. 
Is  it  just  that  she  should  secede,  and  pay  no  portion  of 
it  herself? 

After  showing  the  constitutional  absurdities  of  seces- 
sion, and  questioning  whether  in  any  state,  with  perhaps 
the  exception  of  South  Carolina,  a  majority  of  the  voters 
was  in  favor  of  secession,  he  referred  to  the 
the  seutimentTof  great  blcssiugs  that  the  nation  had  derived 
from  free  institutions,  affirming  his  belief 
that  the  "  plain  people"  understood  that  this  was  essen- 
tially a  people's  contest.  He  drew  attention  to  the  fact 
that,  while  so  many  of  the  officers  of  the  army  and  navy 
had  proved  false,  not  one  common  soldier  or  common  sail- 
or was  known  to  have  deserted  his  flag.  "  This  is  the 
patriotic  instinct  of  plain  people.  They  understand,  with- 
out any  argument,  that  the  destruction  of  the  government 
made  by  Washington  means  no  good  to  them." 

Alluding  to  his  purposes  in  the  event  of  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  rebellion,  and  expressing  his  deep  concern  that 
he  had  been  compelled  to  resort  to  the  war  power,  he  felt 
that  he  had  done  what  he  believed  to  be  his  duty,  know- 
ing that  he  had  no  moral  right  to  shrink,  or  even  to  count 
the  chances  of  his  own  life  in  what  might  follow.  Coin- 
mending,  therefore,  to  Congress  wjiat  he  had  done  under 
a  deep  sense  of  his  great  responsibilities,  he  sincerely 
He  invokes  the  sup-  hopcd  that  Its  vicws  aud  actions  might  so 

port  of  congress.        ^^^^^^  ^^-^^  j^.^  ^^  ^^   ^^^^^^  ^jj  faithful  <iiti. 

zens  who  have  been  disturbed  in  their  rights  a  speedy 
restoration  of  them  under  the  Constitution  and  the  laws. 
The  points  brought  iifto  relief  in  this  message  are  the 


130  THE  PKESIDENT'S  WAR  ACTS.  [Sect.  VIIL 

The  chief  points  of  aggressivG  character  of  the  insurrection,  its 
the  message.  leaders  having  determined  to  make  good 
their  secession  by  force  of  arms ;  the  unpatriotic  and  un- 
fair position  in  which  the  Border  States  were  endeavor- 
ing to  stand,  and  the  war  measures  to  which  the  govern- 
ment had  been  compelled  to  resort. 

These  war  measures,  more  explicitly  stated,  are  as  fol- 
officiaiwaractsof  lows :  Ist.  Ou  the  15th  of  April,  Lincoln 
the  President.        ^^||^^  ^^^^  ^-^^  scvcral  statcs  for  75,000 

men.  2d.  On  the  19th  of  April  he  set  on  foot  a  block- 
ade of  the  ports  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama, 
Florida,  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  and  Texas.  3d.  On  the 
27th  of  April  he  did  the  same  as  respects  the  states  of 
Virginia  and  North  Carolina.  4th.  On  the  27th  of  April 
he  authorized  the  commanding  general  of  the  army  of  the 
United  States  to  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  at 
any  point  on  or  in  the  vicinity  of  any  military  line  be- 
tween the  city  of  Philadelphia  and  the  city  of  Washing- 
ton. 5th.  On  the  3d  of  May  he  called  into  the  service 
ofthe  United  States  42,034  volunteers,  increased  the  reg- 
ular army  by  22,714  men,  and  the  navy  by  18,000  sea- 
men. 6th.  On  the  10th  of  May  he  authorized  the  com- 
mander of  the  Uilited  States  forces  on  the  coast  of  Flor- 
ida to  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  if  necessary. 

The  silence  with  which  the  message  treated  slavery 
Silence  respecting  showcd  clcarly  that,  iu  thc  President's  judg- 
slavery.  meut,  the  preservation  ofthe  Union  was  the 

first  thing — the  relations  of  the  government  to  slavery  a 
secondary  affair.  He  understood  thoroughly  that  the 
real  point  at  issue  with  the  leaders  of  secession  was  the 
possession  of  national  power,  but  that  with  the  people 
whom  they  were  forcing  into  their  measures  it  w^as  the 
retention  of  their  slaves.  They  had  been  brought  to  a 
unanimity  of  action  by  the  belief  that  their  domestic  in- 
stitution was  in  peril. 


Chap.XLIIL]  reports  OF  THE  SECRETARIES.  181 

The  Secretary  of  War  reported  that  after  the  term  of 
.  Report  of  the  secre-  the  three-iiioiiths'  volunteers  had  expired, 
taryofwar.  ^^^^^  ^^^^l^  remain  230,000  men.     Volun- 

teering had  exceeded  the  demands.  He  recommended 
that  the  regular  army  should  be  increased;  that  appro- 
priations should  be  made  for  the  establishment  of  gov- 
ernment railroads  and  telegraphs,  and  provision  for  a 
supply  of  improved  arms. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  complained  of  the  neglected 
Report  of  the  secre-  couditlou  iu  which  he  had  found  his  depart- 
taryoftheNavy.  j-q^j^^^  lustcad  of  niucty  vcsscls.  Carrying 
2415  guns,  it  had  dwindled  down  to  forty-two  vessels, 
with  555  guns.  The  fleet  seemed  to  have  been  posted 
with  the  express  design  of  rendering  it  useless  in  the 
present  emergency.  Between  the  4th  of  March  and  the 
1st  of  July,  not  less  than  259  officers  had  resigned  their 
commissions  or  had  been  dismissed.  Vessels,  however, 
having  been  purchased  or  chartered  to  meet  the  public 
exigency,  the  government  had  now  in  commission  eighty- 
two  ships,  carrying  1100  guns. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  asked  for  $320,000,000, 
of  which  240,000,000  were  for  w^ar  purposes, 
taryoftheTreas-  aud  80,000,000  for  Ordinary  demands  for 
the  ensuing  year.  He  proposed  to  raise 
$146,000,000,  consisting  of  the  above  80,000,000  and 
66,000,000  already  appropriated,  by  increased  duties  on 
specified  articles,  by  certain  internal  imposts,  and  by  di- 
rect taxation  on  real  and  personal  property.  To  meet  the 
amount  for  war  purposes,  he  proposed  a  national  loan  of 
not  less  than  $100,000,000  in  the  form  of  treasury  notes, 
bearing  an  annual  interest  of  seven  and  three  tenths  per 
cent.  Should  this  loan  prove  insufficient,  he  proposed  to 
issue  bonds  to  an  amount  not  exceeding  $100,000,000,  re- 
deemable at  the  option  of  the  government  after  a  period 
not  exceeding  thirty  years,  the  interest  not  to  exceed  sev- 


132  ACTION  OF  THE  HOUSE.  [Sect.  VIII. 

en  per  cent.  He  also  recommended  the  issue  of  other 
treasury  notes,  not  exceeding  $50,000,000,  bearing  inter- 
est of  3^%%  per  cent.,  exchangeable  for  the  first -named 
notes  at  the  will  of  the  holder. 

The  House  of  Representatives,  with  a  view  to  the  ex- 
Action  of  the  House  pediting  of  business,  and  limiting  its  action 

ofRepresentatives.     ^^  ^^^  purpOSCS  for  which  thc  CXtra  SeSSioU 

had  been  called,  passed  a  resolution  that  it  would  consid- 
er only  bills  relating  to  the  military,  naval,  and  financial 
affairs  of  the  government,  referring  all  other  matters  to 
the  appropriate  committees,  without  debate,  for  action  at 
the  next  regular  session  of  Congress. 

The  temper  of  the  House  of  Representatives  was  man- 
ifested by  the  adoption  of  a  resolution  of- 

the^suppTession  of  fcred  bv  Mr.  McClernand,  a  Democrat  of  li- 
the rebellion.  ,       •^  .  '  •        i  r» 

Imois :  "  This  house  hereby  pledges  itself  to 
vote  for  any  amount  of  money  and  any  number  of  men 
which  may  be  necessary  to  insure  a  speedy  and  effectual 
suppression  of  the  rebellion,  and  the  permanent  restora- 
tion of  the  Federal  authority  every  where  within  the  lim- 
its and  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States."  It  passed  by 
a  vote  of  121  to  5. 

In  the  discussions  arising  on  the  various  measures  be- 

Resistanceofthe     ^^^^    ^^^     ^^O    hoUSCS,    CVCry    CXCrtioU    WaS 

slave  interest.  made  by  tho  rcmuaut  of  the  slave  interest 
and  its  party  allies  to  embarrass  and  procrastinate  legis- 
lation, or  divert  it  in  favor  of  the  insurrection.  It  was, 
however,  one  of  the  benefits  that  accrued  to  the  nation 
from  its  great  disaster  at  Bull  Run,  M^hich  happened  while 
these  discussions  were  in  progress,  that  a  powerful  public 
sentiment  was  aroused  which  greatly  restrained  these 
proceedings — a  determination  to  tolerate  nothing  that 
stood  in  opposition  to  the  safety  of  the  republic. 

Lincoln  was  spared  the  difficulty  which  so  often  ob- 


Action  in  the 
ate. 


chap.xliii.]  action  of  the  house.  183 

structs  representative  governments,  that  for 

Congress  thorough-  -t        ,     t  •  p  ^ 

ly  sustains  the  gov-  everv  measure  adopted  an  opposmer  lormula 

ernment.  Y  ^  ^  ^  •-* 

can  be  produced.  Congress  at  once  rose  to 
the  height  of  the  occasion,  and,  recognizing  that  the  safe- 
ty of  the  republic  is  the  supreme  law,  with  Eoman  firm- 
ness legalized  whatever  was  needful  for  that  end.  It  ac- 
cepted, in  all  its  subsequent  action,  the  idea  expressed  by 
one  of  its  members,  "  Tax,  fight,  emancipate." 

Senator  Baker,  who  a  few  weeks  later  fell  at  the  dis- 
sen-  aster  of  Ball's  Bluff,  thoroughly  represented 
the  roused  spirit  of  the  nation  when  he  de- 
clared in  the  Senate,  "  I  propose  to  put  the  whole  power 
of  this  country,  arms,  men,  money,  into  the  hands  of  the 
President.  He  has  asked  for  four  hundred  millions  of 
dollars — we  will  give  him  ^ve  hundred  millions;  he  has 
asked  for  four  hundred  thousand  men — we  will  give  him 
Rve  hundred  thousand." 

After  a  session  of  thirty-three  days  Congress  had  ac- 
Re^nmeoftheacts  complished  Its  work.  It  had  approved  and 
oftheextrasession.  igg^^^ed  the  acts  aud  ordcrs  of  the  Presi- 
dent ;  it  had  authorized  him  to  accept  half  a  million  of 
volunteers ;  it  had  added  eleven  regiments  to  the  regular 
army ;  it  had  raised  the  pay  of  the  soldier  to  thirteen 
dollars  a  month,  with  a  bounty,  of  one  hundred  acres  of 
land  at  the  close  of  the  war ;  it  had  authorized  the  pur- 
chase or  building  and  arming  of  as  many  ships  as  niight 
be  found  requisite ;  it  had  appointed  a  committee  to  take 
charge  of  the  construction  of  irOn-clads  and  floating  bat- 
teries; it  had  facilitated  the  importing  of  arms  from 
abroad  by  the  loyal  states,  voted  ten  millions  of  dollars 
for  the  purchase  of  arms,  and  undertaken  to  indemnify 
the  states  for  all  expenses  they  might  incur  in  raising, 
paying,  subsisting,  and  transporting  troops.  It  had  au- 
thorized the  President  to  close  the  ports  of  entry  at  his 
discretion,  to  declare  any  community  to  be  in  a  state  of 


184:  OPPOSITION  TO  THAT  ACTION.  [Sect.  VIII. 

insurrection,  and  to  prohibit  commercial  intercourse  with 
it.  It  had  provided  that,  after  proclamation  by  him,  all 
property  used  or  intended  to  be  used  in  aid  of  the  insur- 
surrection  should  be  seized  and  confiscated;  and  specially 
that  if  the  owner  of  any  slave  should  require  or  permit 
such  slave  to  be  in  any  way  employed  in  military  or  na- 
val service  against  the  United  States,  all  claim  to  him  or 
his  services  should  be  forfeited  by  such  owner.  It  had 
appropriated  two  hundred  and  twenty-eight  millions  of 
dollars  ($227,938,000)  for  the  army,  and  forty-three  mill- 
ions ($42,938,000)  for  the  navy.  It  had  made  provision 
for  these  appropriations  by  imposts  and  taxation,  and 
authorized  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  borrow  two 
hundred  and  fifty  millions  ($250,000,000). 

But  these  and  other  important  measures  were  not  car- 
ried without  encountering  a  most  strenuous 

Character  of  the  op-  ...  ^tM  i        n     ^ 

position  they  had     oppositiou.     ihc  rcar-sTuard  oi  slavery  m 

eucouatered.  ■^  ^  *' 

Congress  fought  the  battle  to  the  last.  The 
House  resolution,  "That,  in.  the  judgment  of  this  house, 
it  is  no  part  of  the  duty  of  the  soldiers  of  the  United 
States  to  capture  and  return  fugitive  slaves,"  was  carried 
by  a  vote  in  which  all  the  afiirmatives  were  Republicans. 
The  resolution  in  the  Senate  expelling  from  that  body 
Messrs.  Mason,  Clingman,  Wigfall,  and  others,  who  were 
openly  attempting  the  overthrow  of  the  government,  was 
in  like  manner  resisted.  An  attempt  was  made  to  attach 
to  the  army  appropriation  bill  the  proviso  "  that  no  part 
of  the  money  hereby  appropriated  shall  be  employed  in 
subjugating  or  holding  as  a  conquered  province  any  sov- 
ereign state  now  or  lately  one  of  the  United  States,  nor 
in  abolishing  or  interfering  with  African  slavery  in  any 
of  the  states."  Resolutions  were  offered  condemning  as 
unconstitutional  the  increase  of  the  army,  the  blockade 
of  the  Southern  ports,  the  seizure  of  telegraphic  dispatches, 
the  arrest  of  persons  suspected  of  treason.     As  had  been 


Chap.  XLIIL]  THE  PLEDGE  OF  CONGRESS.  135 

the  case  in  the  House  in  the  instance  just  referred  to,  so 
in  the  Senate  on  the  occasion  -of  the  l^ill  for  reorganizing 
the  army,  an  amendment  was  proposed  "  that  the  army 
and  navy  shall  not  be  employed  for  the  purpose  of  sub- 
jugating any  state,  or  reducing  it  to  the  condition  of  a 
territory  or  province,  or  to  abolish  slavery  therein."  This 
was  by  Mr.  Breckinridge,  recently  Vice-President  of  the 
United  States,  and  shortly  to  be  a  general  in  the  Confed- 
erate service.  When  the  bill  freeing  slaves  who  had  been 
used  in  aid  of  the  insurrection  was  before  the  Senate,  it 
met  with  earnest  opposition  because  "  it  will  inflame  sus- 
picions which  have  had  much  to  do  with  producing  our 
present  evils;  it  will  disturb  those  who  are  now  calm 
and  quiet,  inflame  those  who  are  restless,  irritate  numbers 
who  would  not  be  exasperated  by  any  thing  else,  and  will, 
in  all  probability,  produce  no  other  effect  than  these.  It 
is  therefore  useless,  unnecessary,  irritating,  unwise." 
With  a  firmness  which  recalls  the  action  of  the  Ro- 
man Senate,  on  the  day  after  the  disastrous 
gres8  to  suppress     battle  of  Bull  Ruu,  whllc  the  demoralized 

the  rebellion.  .    ' 

wreck  of  the  national  army  was  filling  the 
streets  of  Washington,  and  the  victorious  Confederate 
troops  were  momentarily  expected,  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives resolved  "  that  the  maintenance  of  the  Consti- 
tution, the  preservation  of  the  Union,  and  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  laws  are  sacred  trusts  which  must  be  exe- 
cuted ;  that  no  disaster  shall  discourage  us  from  the  most 
ample  performance  of  this  high  duty ;  and  that  we  pledge 
to  the  country  and  the  world  the  employment  of  every 
resource,  national  and  individual,  for  the  suppression, 
overthrow,  and  punishment  of  rebels  in  arms." 

A  few  days  later  (July  29th)  the  Senate  passed  a  res- 
olution to  the  same  eftect. 


CHAPTER  XLIV. 

CREATION  OF  THE  NATIONAL  ARMY. 

The  national  government,  after  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  commenced  the  organiza- 
tion of  those  great  armies  which  eventually  attained  a  strength  of  more  than  a 
million  of  men. 

The  process  of  collecting,  officering,  and  arming  the  troops. 

Organization  and  development  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  General  McCIel- 
lan.     For  this  army  the  most  abundant  provision  was  made. 

The  Western  armies  were  less  perfectly  supplied. 

Remarks  on  the  ostensible  and  working  strength  of  the  armies  during  the  Civil 
War. 

To  create,  command,  and  disband  a  great  army  are 
among  the  most  difficult  acts  of  a  free  government. 

At  the  period  of  the  inauguration  of  Lincoln,  the 
^^     ;.    ,    .,.    United  States  were  really  without  an  army. 

The  natioual  mih-  •^  •^ 

ifegJZgofthe  The  insignificant  force  which  had  formerly 
^^"^  passed  under  that  name  had  been  dissipated 

by  the  perfidy  of  Floyd,  the  Secretary  of  War;  the  most 
important  portion  of  it  had  been  disarmed  and  destroyed 
in  Texas  by  the  treason  of  General  Twiggs. 

At  the  close  of  the  war  the  army  numbered  about 
1,050,000  men.    Such  was  its  strength  when 

and  at  its  close.       ,  t   i  t     i 

it  was  disbanded. 
Enthusiasm  furnished  in  the  beginning  what  seemed 
to  be   an  adequate   supply  of  volunteers. 

Modes  by  which       -r»     ,  1 1         •  i    i  T     i 

troops  were  ob-     i3ut  ciitnusiasm  can  not  be  relied  upon  as  a 

tained.  .       .     t  ^  •  i  •  t       • 

steady  principle  of  national  action.  It  is 
quickly  excited,  and,  under  the  influence  of  adversity,  as 
quickly  subsides.  Men  were  next  obtained  by  the  allure- 
ment of  bounties,  and  that  eventually  failing  of  its  pur^- 
pose,  they  were  taken  by  draft. 


Chap.  XLIV.]  THE  NATIONAL  ARMY.  Ig7 

The  quality  of  the  force  thus  arising  changed  with  the 
changes  of  its  origin.     To  the  experienced 

Gradual  change  in  .-,.,  ii        ■  •       ,i  ,•  i 

the  morale  of  the  military  cyc,  the  troops  m  the  national  serv- 
ice up  to  the  epoch  of  the  battle  of  Bull 
Eun  constituted  an  armed  multitude,  but  not  an  army. 
Then  it  became  evident  that  something  more  effective 
was  necessary.  Many  months  were  consumed,  and  the 
skill  of  a  trained  officer,  General  McClellan,  was  exhaust- 
ed ;  unstinted  supplies  were  lavished ;  but,  though  a  great 
improvement  was  accomplished,  perfection  was  very  far 
from  being  reached.  Not  without  the  utmost  difficulty, 
and  after  many  disasters,  were  the  political  aspirations  of 
officers  and  men  extinguished.  It  was  in  the  West  that 
the  army  first  became  what  an  army  ought  to  be— a  mere 
What  an  army  ^cutre  of  humau  foi'ce.  Capable  of  being  di- 
oughttobe.  rected  with  mathematical  precision  along 
any  given  line,  and  brought  to  bear  irresistibly  on  any 
given  point.  In  the  judgment  of  a  very  high  military 
authority,  this  degree  of  perfection  w^as  first  manifested 
in  General  Grant's  campaign  from  Grand  Gulf  to  Vicks- 
burg. 

To  attain'  to  this,  an  army  must  have  lost  all  outward 
political  thought ;  it  must  have  implicit  reliance  on  the 
mind  which  is  guiding  it.  It  must  have  complete  cohe- 
sion in  all  its  parts — from  that  tenacity  results.  Each 
soldier  must  thoroughly  feel  that,  no  matter  how  insig- 
nificant he  as  a  single  individual  may  be,  he  is  absolutely 
sustained  in  what  he  is  about  to  do  by  the  unswerving 
and  unfailing  power  of  the  whole  force.  The  highest  ex- 
cellence is  reached  when  the  converse  of  this  conception 
is  attained,  and  the  individual  soldier  considers  that  on 
him  personally  the  safety  and  honor  of  the  whole  army 
may  be  depending.  In  the  wars  of  Napoleon  the  Impe- 
rial Guard  had  been  brought  to  this  state.  It  is  not  by 
the  pageantry  of  reviews  that  this  grand  ideal  is  reached; 


188  PKOGKESS  OF  ENLISTMENTS.  [Sect.  VIII. 

the  perfect  soldier,  like  his  own  weapon,  must  have  passed 
through  the  ordeal  of  fire. 

Congress  at  its  extra  session  more  than  complied  with 
Army  legislation  of  the  Call  of  the  President.  He  asked  for 
Congress.  400,000  meu — he  was.  authorized  to  accept 

500,000. 

In  a  report  to  the  President  (December  1st,  1861),  the 
Report  on  the  prog-  Sccrctarj  of  War,  Mr.  Cameron,  states  that, 
ress  of  enlistments,  ^^  ^-^^  commencemQut  of  this  rebellion,  in- 
augurated by  the  attack  upon  Fort  Sumter,  the  active 
military  force  at  the  disposal  of  the  government  was 
16,006  regulars,  principally  employed  in  the  West  to  hold 
in  check  marauding  Indians.  In  April  75,000  volunteers 
were  called  upon  to  enlist  for  three  months'  service.^  The 
people  responded  with  such  alacrity  that  77,875  were  im- 
mediately obtained.  Under  the  authority  of  the  act  of 
Congress  of  July  22d,  1861,  the  states  were  asked  to  fur- 
nish 500,000  volunteers  to  serve  for  three  years  or  during 
the  war,  and  by  the  act  approved  on  the  29th  of  the 
same  month,  the  addition  of  25,000  men  to  the  regular 
army  was  authorized,  the  result  being  an  army  of  600,000 
men.  If  to  this  be  added  the  number  of  discharged  three- 
months'  volunteers,  the  aggregate  force  furnished  to  the 
government  between  April  and  December  exceeded 
700,000  men. 

At  first  the  government  found  itself  deficient  in  arms 
and  on  the  provi-  ^^^  muuitious  of  War  through  the  bad  faith 
sion  of  arms.  ^^  ^^^^^  intrustcd  wlth  their  control  during 
the  preceding  administration.  The  armory  at  Harper's 
Ferry  had  been  destroyed.  The  only  reliance  was  on  the 
single  armory  at  Springfield  and  upon  private  establish- 
ments. Measures  had  promptly  been  taken  to  increase 
the  capacity  of  the  Springfield  establishment  until  it  was 
expected  to  produce  in  the  ensuing  year  200,000  rifles. 
A  special  agent  had  been  sent  to  Europe,  with  two  mill- 


Chap.  XLIV.]     REGULARS  AND  VOLUNTEERS.  189 

ions  of  dollars,  to  obtain  an  immediate  supply,  part  of 
whicli  had  been  already  received. 

By  a  very  important  provision  of  the  law  enacted  in 
July  (1861),  it  was  permitted  to  detach  resr- 

Eegnlar  officers  may       i  /v»  .  •       ii  i        ,  /. 

serve  ia  the  voiun-  ular  omcers  to  serve  m  the  volunteer  force. 
Special  provision  was  also  made  permitting 
the  appointment  of  general  officers  from  any  grade  in  the 
regular  army,  the  officers  not  forfeiting  their  positions  in 
the  old  army.  This  proved  to  be  one  of  the  most  judi- 
cious laws  in  reference  to  the  army  passed  by  Congress 
at  the  inception  of  the  war.  In  a  great  measure  it  broke 
down  all  distinction  between  regulars  and  volunteers; 
Regulars  were  commanding  volunteers,  and  volunteers 
quickly  became  as  well  disciplined  as  regulars. 

The  bounties  by  states,  and  counties,  and  cities  were 
given  to  volunteer  troops,  and  not  enjoyed  by  regular 
troops.  It  therefore  became  difficult  to  fill  the  regular 
regiments.  In  actual  operations,  all  distinctions  between 
them  practically  disappeared.  If  jealousy  did  exist,  it 
was  little  more  than  in  name — not  more,  perhaps,  than 
occasioned  wholesome  rivalry. 

In  the  early  period  of  the  war,  it  was  supposed  by 
The  Academy  at  ^^^7  poMcal  demagogues  that  service  in 
West  Point.  ^^Q  army  would  prove,  to  be  the  quickest 
and  most  eifectual  method  of  creating  political  capital  for 
themselves.  The  battle  of  Bull  Run,  to  some  extent,  dis- 
pelled that  illusion.  *  However,  while  it  lasted,  they,  and 
the  newspapers  acting  in  their  interest,  spared  no  pains 
to  de]3reciate  those  officers  who  had  been  professionally 
educated  at  West  Point,  and  whom  they  considered  as 
standing  in  their  way.  They  not  only  derided  all  pre- 
paratory military  study,  but  openly  accused  that  nation- 
al institution  of  inculcating  aristocratic  sentiments,  and, 
what  is  worse,  of  a  tendency  to  disloyalty.    They  pointed 


190  LOYALTY  OF  THE  WEST  POINT  ACADEMY.    [Sect.  VIII. 

to  the  more  prominent  Confederate  officers  who  had  grad- 
uated there. 

But,  from  a  critical  inquiry  into  the  subject,  General 
Loyalty  of  its  grad-  Cullum  has  showu  that,  at  the  commence- 
^'*^'  ment  of  the  war,  out  of  1249  graduates  of 

the  Academy  then  supposed  to  be  living,  821  were  in  the 
army,  and  428  in  civil  life.  Of  the  821,  only  184,  or  a 
little  more  than  one  fifth,  went  over  to  the  South;  627, 
or  nearly  four  fifths,  remained  loyal ;  10  took  neither  side. 
Of  the  428  in  civil  life,  only  99,  or  less  than  one  fourth, 
were  known  to  have  favored  the-  Confederates;  292,  or 
nearly  three  times  that  number,  remained  loyal.  The  ca- 
reer of  37  is  unknown.  It  thus  appears  that,  out  of  1249, 
more  than  three  fourths  remained  true. 

Of  the  loyal  graduates  in  civil  life,  115  re-entered  the 
national  service.  Among  these,  54  were  over  the  age  of 
45  years.  Of  those  who,  from  disability  or  other  causes, 
did  not  take  an  active  part  in  the  war^  many  performed 
useful  services  in  civil  capacities  requiring  military  knowl- 
edge ;  others,  who  had  tendered  their  services,  were  una- 
ble to  procure  commissions.  The  graduates  of  the  Acad- 
emy were  in  command  at  nearly  all  the  great  victories  of 
the  national  arms ;  they  were  the  chief  organizers  and  di- 
recting agents  of  the  various  staff  branches  of  the  serv- 
ice. They  planned  defenses,  conducted  sieges,  bridged  the 
boldest  streams.  They  silently  executed  an  incalculable 
amount  of  work  in  keeping  in  active  motion  the  compli- 
cated machinery  of  war. 

Of  the  graduates  of  the  Academy  thus  serving  in  the 
national  army,  one  fifth  were  killed  in  battle,  and  more 
than  one  third — ^probably  one  half — were  wounded. 

Those  officers  in  the  Confederate  service  who  had  re- 
ceived their  military  education  at  the  national  expense 
had  taken  the  following  oath  on  entering  the  army  as 
commissioned  officers.   It  is  from  the  tenth  Article  of  War, 


Oath 

uates 

entering  the  army, 


Chap.  XLIV.]  •  McCLELLAN'S  KEPORT.  191 

act  of  Congress  1806.  It  still  remains  for  tliem  to  justify 
their  conduct. 

"  I,  A.  B.,  do  solemnly  swear  (or  affirm,  as  the  case  may 

be)  that  I  will  bear  true  allegiance  to  the 
duTsef  (fi^ '  United  States  of  America,  and  that  I  will 

serve  them  honestly  and  faithfully  against 
all  their  enemies  and  opposers  whatsoever;  and  observe 
and  obey  the  orders  of  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
and  the  orders  of  the  officers  appointed  over  me  accord- 
ing to  the  Kules  and  Articles  for  the  government  of  the 
armies  of  the  United  States." 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Bull  Kun,  Major  Gen- 
General  Mccieiian  ^^^1  McCldlan  was  assigucd  to  thc  com- 
maifd"a?wasSg.  ^laud  of  the  Military  Department  of  Wash- 
^''°*  ington  and  Northeastern  Virginia.    Lieuten- 

ant General  Scott  retained  his  command  as  general  in 
chief  of  the  American  army  until  the  end  of  October. 

"  I  found,"  says  General  McClellan  in  his  report, "  no 
state  pfthe  army  at  army  to  commaud— a  mcre  collection  of  reg- 
thattime.  iments  cowering  on  the  banks  of  the  Poto. 

mac,  some  perfectly  raw,  others  dispirited  by  the  recent 
defeat.     •  • 

"Nothing  of  any  consequence  had  been  done  to  secure 
the  southern  approaches  to  the  capital  by  means  of  de- 
fensive works ;  nothing  whatever  had  been  undertaken 
to  defend  the  avenues  to  the  city  on  the  northern  side  of 
the  Potomac. 

"  The  number  of  troops  in  and  around  the  city  was 
about  50,000  infantry,  less  than  1000  cavalry,  650  artil- 
lerymen, with  nine  imperfect  field  batteries  of  thirty 
pieces. 

"  In  no  quarter  were  the  dispositions  for  defense  such 
as  to  offer  a  vigorous  resistance  to  a  respectable  body  of 
the  enemy,  either  in  the  position  or  number  of  the  troops. 


J 92  McGLELLAN'S  REPORT. .  [Sect.  VIII. 

'condition  of  the    ^^  ^^^  number  and  character  of  the  defen- 
fortifications.       ^-^.^  woYks.     Earthworks  in  the  nature  of 

tetes  depont  looked  upon  the  approaches  to  the  George- 
town Aqueduct  and  Ferry,  the  Long  Bridge  and  Alexan- 
dria, and  some  simple  defensive  arrangements  were  made 
at  the  Chain  Bridge.  With  the  latter  exception,  not  a 
single  defensive  work  had  been  constructed  on  the  Mary- 
land side. 

"  There  was  nothing  to  prevent  the  enemy  shelling  the 
city  frora  heights  within  easy  range,  which  could  be  oc- 
cupied by  a  hostile  column  almost  without  resistance. 
Many  soldiers  had  deserted,  and  the  streets  of  Washing- 
ton* were  crowded  with  straggling  officers  and  men  absent 
from  their  stations  without  authority,  whose  behavior  in- 
dicated the  general  want  of  discipline  and  organization." 

In  a  memorandum  addressed  to  the  President  a  few 
days  subsequently  (August  4th,  1861),  Gen- 

McClellan's  views  t  nr   r^T    -\i  •      t       i      t  i  •         •  i       ,i 

on  the  conduct  of    ei'ai  McUlellan  mdicated  his  views  as  to  the 

the  war. 

objects  and  conduct  of  the  war ;  "  that  it  had 
become  necessary  to  crush  a  population  sufficiently  numer- 
ous, intelligent,  and  warlike  to  constitute  a  nation,  and 
not  only  to  defeat  their  armed  and  organized  forces  in  the 
field,  but  to  display  such  an  overwhelming  strength  as  to 
convince  all  our  antagonists,  especially  those  of  the  gov- 
erning aristocratic  class,  of  the  utter  impossibility  of  re- 
sistance." "  Their  success  in  the  battle  of  Bull  Eun  would 
enable  the  political  leaders  of  the  rebels  to  convince  the 
mass  of  their  people  that  we  are  inferior  to  them  in  force 
and  courage,  and  to  command  all  their  resources.  The 
contest  had  beguri  with  a  class,  now  it  is  with  a  people ; 
our  military  success  alone  can  restore  the  former  issue." 

General  McClellan  then  stated  that,  as  the  rebels  have 
The  form  he  thinks  choscu  Virginia  as  their  battle-field,  it  seems 
it  should  have.  proper  for  us  to  make  the  first  great  strug- 
gle there.    With  that  he  would  also  advise  another  move- 


Chap.  XLIV.]   PROPOSED  COMPOSITION  OF  THE  ARMY.  193 

ment,  to  be  made  sinmltaneously  on  the  Mississippi,  the 
expulsion  of  the  insurgents  from  Missouri,  and  a  move- 
ment through  Kentucky  into  Eastern  Tennessee,  for  the 
purpose  of  assisting  the  Union  men  of  that  region,  and  of 
seizing  the  railroad  leading  from  Memphis  to  the  east. 
He  supposed  that  the  possession  of  the  road  and  the 
movement  on  the  Mississippi  would  go  far  toward  deter- 
mining the  evacuation  of  Virginia.  He  advised  the  occu- 
pation of  Baltimore  and  Fortress  Monroe  by  garrisons 
sufficiently  strong,  but  believed  that  the  importance  of 
Harper's  Ferry  and  the  line  of  the  Potomac  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Leesburg  would  be  very  materially  diminished  as 
soon  as  the  army  at  Washington  became  organized,  strong, 
and  efficient,  averring  that  no  capable  general  would  cross 
the  river  north  of  that  city  if  there  were  an  army  ready 
to  cut  off  his  retreat. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  therefore  considered  as 
being  charged  with  the  main  duty ;  all  other  forces  were 
of  a  secondary  and  subordinate  character. 

The  main  army  was  to  have  the  following  composi- 
tion : 


250  regiments  of  infantry 225,000  men. 

100  field  batteries— 600  guns   ....  15,000     " 

28  regiments  of  cavalry .  25,500     " 

5  regiments  of  engineer  troops  .  .  7,500     " 

Total 273,000      " 


This  force  was  to  be  supplied  with  engineer 

Composition  pro-  -^  ,  ,.  ^  ,  ,.  .,i., 

posed  for  the  main  aud  poutoou  traius,  aud  lu  couuection  with  it 

army.  ^ 

a  powerful  naval  force,  to  protect  the  move- 
ment of  a  fleet  of  transports  intended  to  convey  troops 
from  point  to  point  of  the  enemy's  sea-coast.  The  naval 
force  was  also  to  co-operate  with  the  army  in  its  efforts 
to  seize  the  important  sea-board  towns. 
The  movement  down  the  Mississippi,  and  the  progress 

n.— N 


294  CONDITION  OF  THE  AKMY.  [Sect.  VIII. 

of  the  main  army  in  the  East,  it  was  expected,  would  mu- 
tually assist  each  other  by  diminishing  the  resistance  to 
be  encountered  by  each. 

General  McClellan  also  advised  a  movement  from  Kan- 
^ ,    ,.  ,       ^    sas  and  Nebraska,  throug-h  the  Indian  Ter- 

Subordmate  move-  '  o 

ments  suggested,  ritory,  upou  Kcd  Eiver  and  Western  Texas, 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  and  developing  the  Union 
sentiment  known  to  exist  in  those  regions.  He  likewise 
suggested  that  permission  should  be  obtained  from  the 
Mexican  government  for  the  use  of  certain  of  their  roads, 
and  hinted  that  it  perhaps  might  be  desirable  to  take 
into  service,  and  employ  in  these  operations,  Mexican  sol- 
diers. 

He  proposed  with  his  main  force  not  only  to  drive  the 
enemy  out  of  Virginia  and  occupy  Eichmond,  but  also 
Charleston,  Savannah,  Montgomery,  Pensacola,  Mobile, 
and  New  Orleans. 

Toward  the  latter  part  of  October,  in  consequence  of 
condition  of  the  ^^^  auxicty  of  the  President  for  the  speedy 
army  in  October,  employment  of  the  army.  General  McClellan 
reported  to  the ,  Secretary  of  "War  its  condition  at  that 
time.  "  While  I  regret  that  it  has  not  been  thought  ex- 
pedient, or  perhaps  possible,  to  concentrate  the  forces  of 
the  nation  near  Washington  (remaining  on  the  defensive 
elsewhere),  keeping  the  attention  and  efforts  of  the  gov- 
ernment fixed  upon  that  as  the  vital  point  where  the  issue 
of  the  great  contest  is  to  be  decided,  it  may  still  be  that, 
by  introducing  unity  of  action  and  design  among  the  va- 
rious armies  of  the  land,  by  determining  the  courses  to  be 
pursued  by  the  various  commanders  under  one  general 
plan,  transferring  from  the  other  armies  their  superfluous 
strength,  and  thus  re-enforcing  this  main  army,  whose  des- 
tiny it  is  to  decide  the  controversy,  we  may  yet  be  able 
to  move  with  a  reasonable  prospect  of  success  before  the 
winter  is  fairly  upon  us."     "  The  advance  should  not  be 


Chap.  XLIV.]  STRENGTH  OF  THE  ARMY.  .^95 

postponed  beyond  tlie  25tli  of  November,  if  possible  to 
avoid  it." 

The  strength  of  the  Potomac  Army,  on  the  morning  of 
October  27th,  had  risen  to  168,318  officers  and  men  of  all 
grades  and  all  arms.  This  included  the  sick,  the  absent, 
troops  at  Baltimore,  Annapolis,  and  on  the  Upper  and 
Lower  Potomac.  The  force  present  for  duty  was  147,695, 
but  of  these  13,410  were  unarmed  or  unequipped.  The 
infantry  regiments,  to  a  considerable  extent,  were  armed 
with  unserviceable  weapons.  The  general  farther  stated 
that  quite  a  large  number  of  good  arms,  which  had  been 
intended  for  this  army,  had  been  ordered  elsewhere,  leav- 
ing the  Army  of  the  Potomac  insufficiently,  and,  in  some 
instances,  badly  armed.  On  September  30th  there  were 
with  the  army  228  field  guns. 

The  strength  of  the  army  increased  until  the  follow- 
its  subsequent     i^g  February,  as  shown  in  the  subjoined 

strength.  ^^-^^^, 


December  1,  1861 198,213 

January  1,  1862 219,707 

February  1,    "     222,196 

March  1,         "     221,987 


These  numbers  represent  the  total,  present  and  absent. 
The  troops  in  Maryland  and  Delaware  are  included. 

In  consolidating  this  army  and  preparing  it  for  the 
Organization  of  tiie  field,  thc  first  stcp  takcu  was  to  organize  the 
infantry,  infantry  into  brigades  of  four  regiments  each, 

retaining  the  newly-arrived  regiments  on  the  Maryland 
side  until  their  armament  and  equipments  were  issued, 
and  they  had  obtained  some  little  elementary  instruction, 
before  assigning  them  permanently  to  brigades.  When 
the  organization  of  the  brigades  was  well  established,  and 
the  troops  somewhat  disciplined  and  instructed,  divisions 
of  three  brigades  each  were  gradually  formed.     It  was 


196  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY.  [Sect.  VIII. 

intended  eventually  to  introduce  a  iiglier  unit — tlie  army 
corps. 

When  new  batteries  of  artillery  arrived,  they  also  were 
retained  in  Washington  until  their  armament  and  equip- 
ment were  completed;  and  their  instruction  sufficiently 
advanced  to  justify  their  being  assigned  to  divisions.    The 
same  course  was  pursued  with  regard  to  the 

and  of  the  cavalry,  -,  »  'n  •  i 

cavalry.  As  rapidly  as  circumstances  per- 
mitted, every  cavalry  soldier  was  armed  with  a  sabre  and 
revolver,  and  at  least  two  squadrons  in  every  regiment 
with  carbines.  It  was  intended  to  assign  at  least  one 
regiment  of  cavalry  to  each  division  of  the  active  army, 
besides  forming  a  cavalry  reserve  of  the  regular  regiments 
and  some  picked  regiments  of  volunteer  cavalry.  It  was 
determined  to  collect  the  regular  infantry  to  form  the 
nucleus  of  a  reserve. 

With  respect  to  the  artillery,  the  following  principles 
were  observed  in  its  organization : 

The  artillery  should  be  in  the  proportion 
*  of  2  J  pieces  to  1000  men,  to  be  expanded, 
if  possible,  to  3  pieces.  Each  field  battery  was  to  have, 
if  possible,  six  guns,  none  less  than  four,  and  in  all  cases 
the  guns  to  be  of  uniform  calibre.  The  field  batteries 
were  to  be  assigned  to  divisions,  not  to  brigades,  four  to 
each  division.  In  the  event  of  several  divisions  consti- 
tuting an  army  corps,  at  least  one  half  of  the  divisional 
artillery  was  to  constitute  the  reserve  artillery  of  the 
corps.  The  reserve  artillery  of  the  whole  army  was  to 
be  one  hundred  guns.  The  ammunition  to  accompany 
field  batteries  was  not  to  be  less  than  four  hundred  rounds 
per  gun.  The  siege  train  to  be  of  fifty  pieces.  This  was 
subsequently  expanded  at  the  siege  of  Yorktown  to  very 
nearly  one  hundred  pieces,  and  comprised  the  unusual 
calibres  and  heavy  weight  of  metal  of  two  200-pounders, 
&ve  100-pounders,  and  ten  13-inch  sea-coast  mortars. 


Chap.xliv.]        organization  of  the  army.  197 

In  March,  1862,  the  artillery  of  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
immense  increase   tomac  had  riseii  from  the  30  guns,  650  men, 

in  the  artillery.  ^^^   ^^^    ^^^^^^    ^^^^^^   ^^^   COmpOSed   it    in 

the  preceding  July,  to  520  guns,  12,500  men,  and  11,000 
horses,  fully  equipped,  and  in  readiness  for  active  field 
service.  During  the  short  period  of  seven  months  all 
this  immense  amount  of  material  had  been  issued  by  the 
Ordnance  Department,  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  ar- 
tillery troops  after  their  arrival  in  Washington. 

On  the  8th  of  March,  1862,  the  President  directed  the 
Formation  of  corps  orgauizatiou  ofthc  actlve  portion  ofthe  Ar- 
darmee.  ^^  ^^  ^-j^^  Potomac  luto  four  army  corps, 

and  the  formation  of  a  fifth  from  the  divisions  of  Banks 
and  Shields. 

The  entire  system  of  defenses  for  the  protection  of 
Organization  of  oth-  Washlugtou  was  Carried  into  execution,  en- 
er  departments.  ginecr  aud  bridge  trains  were  organized,  the 
latter  upon  the  French  model,  the  topographical,  medical, 
quartermaster's,  subsistence,  ordnance,  provost  -  marshal's 
departments  were  established,  signal  and  telegraphic  corps 
were  instituted ;  the  latter  of  which  had  constructed  up- 
ward of  1200  miles  of  telegraphic  line  before  the  close 
of  1862.  The  air-balloon  was  not  infrequently  used,  and 
often  furnished  very  valuable  information. 

Considering  the  military  condition  of  the  nation  when 
General  McClellan  undertook  the  formation 

The  time  consumed  -^  •,•  p.t  ia  /»,i 

in  these  prepara-  aud  orsianizatiou  01  thc  firreat  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  the  time  consumed  m  brmgmg 
that  force  into  a  satisfactory  condition  was  far  from  be- 
ing too  long.  The  preceding  paragraphs  show  how  much 
was  necessary  to  be  done  and  how  much  was  actually  ac- 
complished. From  the  resources  furnished  without  stint 
by  Congress  McClellan  created  that  army.  Events  show- 
ed that  his  mental  constitution  was  such  that  he  could 
not  use  it  on  the  battle-field. 


198  THE  POTOMAC  AND  WESTERN  ARMIES.        [Sect.  VIII. 

Events  also  showed  that  McClellan's  solution  of  tlie 
Problem  of  the  Form  of  tlie  War  was  incor- 

McClellan's  ideas  ,         tt       t  t  i  •         ,  t        • 

as  to  the  Form  of  rect.  He  dicL  not  recognize  the  importance 
of  the  Mississippi  Valley,  and  looked  upon 
military  operations  there  as  of  secondary  importance. 
Though  the  force  he  had  accumulated  was  already  un- 
manageable in  his  hands,  he  unceasingly  importuned  the 
government  to  strip  the  Western  armies  of  whatever  they 
could  for  th^  sake  of  adding  to  his  already  unwieldy 
Lavish  provision  for  ^ass.     Thcro  probably  never  was  an  army 

the  Potomac  army.     -^  ^^^  ^^^^^^  ^^  kvishly  SUpplicd  aS  that  of 

the  Potomac  before  the  Peninsular  expedition.  General 
McDowell,  who  knew  the  state  of  things  well,  declared, 
in  his  testimony  before  the  Congressional  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  "  There  never  was  an  army  in 
the  world  supplied  as  well  as  ours.  I  believe  a  French 
army  of  half  the  size  could  be  supplied  with  what  we 
waste." 

While  these  things  were  lavished  on  the  Army  of  the 
East,  no   superfluities  were   given   to   the 

Imperfect  provision      .  f%  ,-,       ^-ry      ,  x      i  •  •        i  •  -i 

for  the  Western  Armv  01  the  West.  In  his  examination  be- 
fore  the  same  Congressional  Committee, 
General  Pope  testified  that  the  Western  army  had  labored 
under  a  great  many  disadvantages,  but  it  had  always  pur- 
sued an  aggressive  policy  from  the  beginning.  So  far  as 
material  was  concerned,  it  was  indifferently  supjDlied  com- 
pared with  the  Army  of  the  East :  he  added,  "  We  had 
nothing,  you  might  say ;  I  have  seen  men  go  into  action 
there  with  the  locks  of  their  muskets  tied  on  with  strings. 
I  have  seen  them  wearing  overcoats  to  hide  their  naked- 
ness, as  they  had  no  pantaloons.  When  I  left  there  there 
were  some  troops-  that  had  been  there  over  a  year,  and 
yet  had  but  two  or  three  ambulances  to  a  regiment  of  a 
thousand  men."  To  the  question, "  Was  it  all  appropri- 
ated for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  ?"  he  replied, "  I  do  not 


Chap.  XLIV.]       ACTUAL  STRENGTH  OF  THE  ARMY.  199 

say  what  became  of  it.  I  do  not  know  that  it  had  an  ex- 
istence ;  at  least  we  never  saw  it.  Our  troops  suffered 
very  much,  and  I  must  say  that  it  was  understood  by 
them  to  have  been  from  neglect  on  the  part  of  the  gov- 
ernment." 

It  was  the  man  in  the  overcoat,  with  the  lock  of  his 
rifle  tied  on  with  a  string,  who  won  victories — ^not  the 
pampered,  neatly-uniformed  soldier. 

I  shall  close  this  chapter  by  quoting  some  instructive 
,  ,  ,     , .       remarks  on  the  national  armies  of  the  Civil 

Actual  working 

Sef  dudig^      War.   They  occur  in  a  communication  made 
the  war.  ^^  ^^  ^^  ^^^  ^£  ^"j^^  grcatcst  aud  most  suc- 

cessful of  the  generals.  "  Our  paper  armies  were  very 
large,  while  the  officers  and  men  for  actual  duty  were 
small  in  comparison.  As  a  rule,  in  a  well-ordered  army, 
if  sixty-six  per  cent,  of  the  men  ^  present'  can  be  brought 
into  battle,  it  is  a  good  average ;  the  other  thirty-three 
per  cent,  are  employed  as  cooks,  teamsters,  nurses,  serv- 
ants, etc.,  etc. — are  sick,  on  furlough,  detached.  Then  the 
men  .reported*  as  ^  absent'  to  guard  rivers,  depots,  prisons, 
railroad  stations,  escorts,  etc.,  etc.,  make  fearful  blanks  in 
every  regiment  and  subdivision  of  the  army.  ,  During 
our  war,  at  no  time  do  I  think  one  half  of  the  men  receiv- 
ing pay  were  engaged  with  the  fighting  armies  at  the 
front,  and  this  half  was  subjected  to  the  farther  diminu- 
tion of  the  thirty-three  per  cent,  before  mentioned,  so  that 
in  an  army  whose  muster-rolls  would  give  100,000  men 
^  present'  and  ^  absent'  for  pay,  no  general  could  expect  to 
bring  into  battle,  at  any  distance  from  his  base  of  sup- 
plies, more  than  35,000  men.  By  way  of  illustration,  I 
take  the  case  at  the  close  of  the  war,  when  for  the  first 
time  we  got  at  the  real  facts  and  figures.  1,050,000  men 
were  then  on  the  muster-rolls  to  be  paid  off  and  dis- 
charged. 


200  ACTUAL  STRENGTH  OF  THE  ARMY.  [Sect.  VIII. 

"  The  active  fighting  armies  then  were : 


Grant  at  Kichmond 80,000 

Sherman  at  Raleigh 65,000 

Schofield  in  North  Carolina 15,000 

Canby  at  Mobile  and  in  the  Southwest 30,000 

Wilson's  cavalry  at  Macon,  Georgia 12,000 

Stoneman  in  East  Tennessee 5,000 

Thomas  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee 40,000 

West  of  Mississippi  (Missouri  and  Arkansas)  .  .  15,000 

262,000 


Where  were  all  the  rest  ? 

"  Guarding  thousands  of  miles  of  sea-coast,  rivers,  and 
roads,  guarding  prisoners,  and  acting  as  provost  guards,  or 
loafing  about  the  country.  I  do  not  mention  this  in  crit- 
icism, but  to  show  how  in  war  such  vast  expenses  do 
arise,  and  how  often  the  country  overestimates  the  exact 
strength  of  armies  from  the  ofiicial  returns. 

^^At  no  single  time  during  the.  late  Civil  War — not  even 
in  1864,  the  time  of  the  greatest  pressure,  do  I  believe 
that  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  men  drawing  pay  as  soldiers 
were  actually  within  striking  distance  of  the  enemy.  To 
this  cause  may  be  traced  some  of  the  worst  failures,  when 
the  government  and  people  behind  pushed  their  officers 
^on,'  supposing  that  figures  could  handle  muskets  and 
fight  battles." 


CHAPTER  XLV. 

CREATION  OF  THE  NATIONAL  NAVY. 

Immediately  after  the  proclamation  of  the  blockade,  the  National  Government  com- 
menced the  building  of  war-ships  suitable  for  that  purpose,  and  for  defense  against 
Confederate  and  foreign  attack. 

It  found  that  the  navy,  consisting  of  about  forty  ships,  had  been  purposely  dispersed, 
the  dock-yards  shamefully  neglected,  and  that  many  of  the  oiiicers  had  been  un- 
faithful. 

It  built  many  different  classes  of  sea-ships,  both  wooden  and  armored,  and  especial- 
ly developed  Ericsson's  invention,  the  Monitor. 

It  constructed,  with  great  energy,  a  fleet  of  river-ships,  armored  and  unarmored, 
for  duty  in  the  West. 

Peculiarities  of  American  naval  artillery.  Guns  in  service  and  reserve  at  the  be- 
ginning and  the  end  of  the  war. 

The  navy  eventually  numbered  nearly  seven  hundred  ships. 

Foe  the  overthrow  of  the  Confederate  power,  it  was  ab- 
Dnties  of  the  Navy  solutelj  iiecessary,  as  we  have  seen  (Chapter 
Department.  ^^1,  p.  137),  that  the  forelgn  commerce  of 
the  South  should  be  prohibited.  To  accomplish  this,  it 
had  been  determined  to  establish  a  blockade. 

But  providing  for  an  effective  blockade  was  by  no 
means  the  only  duty  of  the  Navy  Department ;  it  had  to 
protect  the  sea-board  also,  to  recover  the  forts  that  had 
been  seized,  to  prepare  expeditions  against  strategic  points 
on  the  coast,  to  pursue  Confederate  cruisers  on  the  sea,  to 
force  open  and  patrol  the  rivers,  to  be  in  readiness  for  a 
contingency  apparently  at  one  time  imminent — a  foreign 
war — and  to  meet  the  vast  demands  of  the  army  for 
transportation  of  troops  and  supplies. 

To  accomplish  these  objects,  it  must  have  ships  of  many 
Various  kinds  of  different  kinds  —  some  powerful  and  swift 
ships  required.      ^^^  ^^^^^  scrvicc,  some  of  light  draught  to 

penetrate  through  shallow  waters,  some  iron-clad  to  en- 


202  THE  NAVY  REPORT.  [Sect.  VIII. 

counter  batteries  and  riflemen  on  river  banks.  The  sat- 
isfaction of  these  requirements  demanded  not  merely  the 
invention  of  new  models,  but  the  introduction  of  new 
principles  in  naval  construction,  and  radical  changes  in 
armaments. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Welles,  has  thus  stated 
the  first  duties  of  his  department :  "  To  make  available 
every  naval  vessel ;  to  recall  our  foreign  squadrons ;  to  in- 
crease our  force  by  building  new  vessels,  and  by  procur- 
ing for  naval  purposes  from  the  merchant  service  every 
steamer  which  could  be  made  a  fighting  vessel;  to  enlarge 
at  once  the  capacity  of  the  navy  yards ;  to  put  in  requi- 
sition the  founderies  and  work-shops  of  the  country  for 
supplies  of  ordnance  and  steam  machinery ;  to  augment 
the  number  of  seamen;  and  to  supply  the  deficiency  of 
officers  by  selecting  experienced  and  able  shipmasters 
and  others  from  the  merchant  marine." 

At  the  opening  of  the  war,  the  force  possessed  by  the 
Navy  Department  consisted  of  42  vessels  of 

Weakness  of  the  .  -,  ,  t         .,.  ,  . 

navyattheopeniDg  various  classcs — stcamcrs  and  sailmsr  ships, 

of  the  war.  .  t       t  w 

carrymg  555  guns   and  about  7600  men. 
They  were  dispersed  on  different  stations — the  Mediter- 
ranean, the  African  coast,  the  coast  of  Brazil,  the  East  In- 
dies, the  Pacific  coast,  etc.     So  effectually  had  the  disper- 
^.    _,.       ,   sion  and  neutralization  of  the  national  fleet 

The  ships  dispersed. 

been  accomplished,  that  there  was  actually 
but  one  efficient  war  vessel  on  the  Northern  coast  when 
the  conflict  began.  The  conspirators  had  therefore  ample 
time  to  seize  the  foists,  and  establish  themselves  in  the 
strong-holds  of  the  coast  unmolested. 

In  addition  to  this  scattering  of  the  ships,  measures  had 


The  dock-yards  pur-  ^^^^  takcu  to  iucapacitatc  ihe  dock-yards, 
poseiy  neglected:  j^g^ead  of  thcrc  bciug  au  accumulation  of 
timber  suitable  for  ship-building,  the  stock  had  been  per- 
mitted to  diminish  until  very  little  remained.  The  cus- 
tomary purchases  had  not  been  made. 


Chap.xlv.]  the  navy  report.  203 

Still  more, "  demoralization  prevailed  among  the  naval 
The  officers  unfaith-  officers,  many  of  whom,  occupying  the  most 
^"^'  responsible  positions,  betrayed  symptoms  of 

that  infidelity  which  has  dishonored  the  service.  But, 
while  so  many  officers  were  unfaithful,  the  crews,  to  their 
honor  be  it  recorded,  were  true  and  reliable,  and  have 
maintained,  through  every  trial  and  under  all  circumstan- 
ces, their  devotion  to  the  Union  and  the  flag."  "  From 
the  4th  of  March  to  the  4th  of  July,  1861,  two  hundred 
and  fifty -nine  officers  of  the  navy  either  resigned  or  were 
dismissed  from  the  service." 

Events  showed  that,  to  complete  the  blockade,  nearly 
Requirements  for  slx  huudrcd  vcsscls,  most  of  them  steamcrs, 
the  blockade.  y^Q^e  rcquircd.  This  vast  fleet  was  demand- 
ed by  the  peculiarities  of  the  coast.  Its  outer  line  is 
more  than  three  thousand  miles  in  length,  and, "  had  it 
been  merely  necessary  to  guard  the  ports  of  the  principal 
cities  of  the  South,  the  task  would  have  been  compara- 
tively easy.  But  this  external  coast-line  is  merely  the 
outer  edge  of  what  may  almost  be  called  a  series  of  isl- 
lutricate  character  ^uds,  some  loug,  somo  short,  some  wide,  and 
of  the  coast.  othcrs  vcry  narrow,  stretching   along   the 

whole  Atlantic,  behind  which  are  sounds  and  connecting 
channels  forming  an  almost  continuous  line  of  water,  nav- 
igable for  small  vessels  from  Norfolk  to  Florida."  Navi- 
gable inlets  give  passage  from  the  ocean  to  these  interior 
channels,  affording  many  secure  and  secret  entrances  to 
blockade  runners.  These  inlets,  moreover,  are  subject  to 
incessant  changes,  new  ones  continually  opening,  and  old 
ones  closing  up,  especially  in  stormy  weather. 

The  rapid  increase  of  the  navy  is  shown 

strength  of  the  navy    '.TPn         •  i    i  ^  n     i.  i         •! 

at  the  close  of  the  m  the  loilowms:  table  or  steamers  and  sail- 
war.  .        ,  .      .        °    .    . 

mg  ships  m  commission  : 


204  THE  SEA  NAVY.  [Sect.  VIII. 


March  4,  1861 42 

July  4,  1861 .  82 

December  1,  1861 264 

December  1,  1862 427 

December  7,  1863 588 

December  1,  1864 671 


The  completeness  and  stringency  of  tlie  blockade  is 
Completeness  of  the  proved  by  the  general  destitution  of  the 
blockade.  South  at  the  close  of  the  war,  and  by  the 

fact  that  there  still  remained  in  those  states  cotton  of  the 
value  of  three  hundred  millions  in  gold,  which  it  had 
been  impossible  to  ship. 

In  giving  the  details  of  the  creation  of  this  navy,  it 
may  be  conveniently  classed  under  two  heads:  (1.)  The 
Sea  Navy ;  (2.)  The  River  Navy. 

(1.)  Of  the  Sea  Navy: 

The  first  measures  taken  by  the  Navy  Department  to 
meet  the  requirement  were  directed  to  the 

First  measures  for  ,  pi,  •       j  i  •    i 

increasing  the  navy  purcuasc  01  such  stcamcrs  m  the  commercial 

by  purchase.  -^         , 

marine  as  could  be  adapted  to  the  service. 
Orders  were  issued  (April  21)  to  the  officers  in  command 
of  the  navy  yards  at  Boston,  New  York,  and  Philadelphia, 
to  charter  twenty  steam-ships,  each  capable  of  carrying  a 
nine-inch  pivot-gun,  the  charter  to  be  for  three  months, 
and  the  government  to  have  the  privilege  of  purchasing 
at  a  stipulated  price.  Orders  for  vessels  of  other  classes 
were  speedily  given,  and  the  government  became  possess- 
ed of  some  of  the  best  and  fastest  steamers. 

In  building  new  ships,  a  work  which  was  entered  upon 

with  great  energy,  the  principles  already  ac- 

Peculiarities  of  ,     t    •       .i         a  •  'i? 

American  naval     ccptcd  lu  thc  AmcHcau  uavv  were  uniiorm- 

construction.  ■•■  ,,.  ^  ktm  i  jj' 

ly  carried  into  effect.  These  are,  to  attain 
the  highest  speed  possible  under  the  circumstances;  to 


Chap.  XLV.]        CONSTRUCTION  OF  WOODEN  SHIPS.  205 

concentrate  the  projectile  power;  and,  in  armored  ships, 
to  reduce  the  exposed  surface  to  a  minimum.  The  attain- 
ment of  high  speed  implies  an  increase  in  the  length  of 
the  ship  and  a  diminution  of  her  breadth ;  the  concentra- 
tion of  projectile  power  implies  diminution  of  the  num- 
ber of  guns  and  increase  in  the  weight  of  the  shot. 

At  the  epoch  of  the  last  Anglo-American  war  (1812), 
^  , ,.  ,     the  principle  of  concentration  of  power  had 

Relative  concentra-  r  r  i  ^ 

guSi^'aSd  AmSi?an  ^^^^  SO  far  Carried  out  that  an  American 
^^'P^'  forty -four  gun  frigate  was  very  nearly  as 

powerful  a  machine  as  an  English  line-of-battle  ship.  Un- 
der an  equality  of  rate  there  was  therefore  a  very  great 
disparity  of  force.  Thus  the  English  forty-four  gun  frig- 
ate Guerriere,  brought  into  action  with  the  American 
frigate  Constitution,  also  rated  as  a  forty-four,  was  con- 
quered in  fifteen  minutes,  the  weight  of  the  broadside 
she  threw  being  517  pounds,  that  of  her  antagonist  768 
pounds. 

To  aid  in  enforcing  the  blockade,  twenty-three  small 
The  fleet  of  small  guu-boats  wcrc  forthwith  constructed.  They 
gun-  oa  s.  were  for  service  in  the  shallow  waters,  each 

being  of  about  five  hundred  tons  burden,  their  speed 
nine  knots,  their  armament  one  eleven-inch  pivot-gun,  two 
twenty-four-pound  howitzers,  and  one  twenty-pound  how- 
itzer. Their  length  was  as  great  as  that  of  the  frigates 
of  1812,  their  breadth  only  half  as  much,  their  tonnage 
only  one  third.  A  large  portion  of  this  fleet  w^as  built 
and  put  in  commission  before  December,  1861.  These 
ships,  together  with  those  that  had  been  purchased,  es- 
tablished a  blockade  acknowledged  in  Europe  as  being 
valid. 

With  a  view  to  the  pursuit  and  capture  of  the  armed 

The  Kearsarge     cruiscrs  built  iu  England,  a  class  of  steamers 

^^^''*  was  constructed  of  which  the  Kearsarge  may 

be  taken  as  the  type.    They  w^ere  of  about  1000  tons  bur- 


206  CONSTRUCTION  OF  WOODEN  SHIPS.  [Sect.  VIII. 

den ;  tlieir  length  200  feet,  tlieir  breadtli  33 ;  their  arma- 
ment two  eleven-inch  guns,  one  thirty-pound  rifle,  and  four 
thirty-two-pounders,  smooth  bore.  They  were  therefore 
longer  than  the  old  seventy-four-gun  ship,  and  twenty  feet 
narrower.  It  was  one  of  this  class,  the  Kearsarge,  which 
sunk  the  Alabama. 

It  haying  been  found  that  screw  steamers  were  some- 
times inefficient  in  narrow  channels,  because  they  can  not 
retire  without  turning  round,  an  operation  sometimes  very 
difficult  in  such  confined  places,  and  exposing  the  broad- 
side to  the  enemy's  fire,  twelve  side- wheel  steamers,  of  850 
tons  each,  w^ere  built.  These  were  followed  by  the  con- 
The  doubie-euder  structiou  of  auothcr  class,  twenty-seven  in 
number,  of  about  974  tons  burden,  with  a 
maximum  speed  of  144  knots  per  hour.  They  received 
the  name  of  double-enders  from  the  fact  that  the  ends 
were  built  alike,  and  they  could  move  backward  or  for- 
ward with  equal  facility.  Seven  additional  ones  of  the 
same  type  were  added;  they  w^ere  of  heavier  burden  and 
greater  speed. 

A  third  class,  still  more  powerful,  was  provided,  their 
The  Lackawanna  length  237  fcct,  their  breadth  38,  their  bur- 
''^''''*  den  1530  tons.    The  armament  of  these  ships 

was  very  powerful,  though  not  the  same  in  all.  That  of 
the  Lackawanna  was  one  150-pounder  rifle,  pivot;  one 
50-pounder  ditto;  two  eleven-inch  rifles,  166-pounders; 
four  nine-inch  broadside  guns.  Comparing  this  ship  with 
the  old  frigate  Constitution,  both  were  of  about  the  same 
burden,  1500  tons;  the  broadside  of  the  former  712,  of 
the  latter  768 ;  but  the  Lackawanna  was  ^ve  feet  nar- 
rower and  sixty-two  feet  longer  than  the  Constitution. 
The  concentration  of  power  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  the 
former  has  only  eight  guns,  the  latter  had  fifty.  More- 
over, these  heavy  modern  guns  were  also  shell  guns. 
In  view  of  the  contingency  of  war  with  England  or 


Chap.  XLV.]  THE  ARMOEED  SHIPS.  207 

The  wampanoa<r    Fi'aiice,  and  of  the  fact  that  the  republic 
^^^'^'  possessed  no  foreign  coaling  stations,  still 

another  class  of  ships  was  built,  of  which  the  Wampanoag 
is  the  type.  This  vessel  is  3200  tons  burden,  335  feet 
long,  45  feet  in  breadth.  With  the  same  breadth  they 
have  twice  the  length  of  the  frigates  of  1812.  They  are 
full  ship -rigged,  with  an  enormous  spread  of  canvas. 
They  carry  the  most  powerful  engines  that  their  hulls 
can  bear.  Their  armament  consists  of  a  few  very  heavy 
guns.  The  sails  of  these  sea-racers  are  to  be  used  to 
spare  their  coal  until  they  reach  their  hunting-ground, 
for  they  are  intended  to  act  against  the  merchant  marine 
of  the  enemy,  and  clear  it  from  the  sea.  Their  speed, 
either  under  sail  or  steam,  is  to  be  fifteen  knots  per  hour. 
The  Confederate  government  at  an^'early  period  turned 
its  attention  to  the  construction  of  iron-clad 

The  armored  ships.  a  ,     .i  •  n     t       ~kt      n  -n 

ships.     At  the  seizure  oi  the  JNoriolk  navy 
yard,  the  Merrimack,  one  of  the  largest  frigates  in  the 
service,  had  been  sunk  (p.  84),  but  under  such  circum- 
stances that  she  was  raised  without  difficulty. 
There  was  thus  supplied  extemporaneously  to  the  Con- 
federates the  hull  of  a  very  powerful  ship. 

The  Confederate      j^,  i     i     ,  .      .  .       ^ 

iron-clad  Merri-     inev  procecded  to  convert  it  into  an  iron- 
mack.  "^  ■"■ 

clad  on  the  plan  of  the  shot-proof  raft  that 
had  been  used  in  Charleston  Harbor,  covering  her,  when 
properly  cut  down,  with  an  iron  roof  projecting  into  the 
water.  At  or  below  the  water-line  the  mail  extended  in 
the  opposite  way,  so  that  a  shot  striking  in  the  air  would 
glance  upward,  and  in  the  water  would  glance  down- 
ward. She  was,  therefore,  a  broadside  iron -clad  with 
sloping  armor,  and  carrying  a  very  formidable  battery. 
The  national  Congress  had  appointed  a  special  board 

to  examine  and  report  on  the  subject  of 

Congressional  ap-.  •,-,  titt  .. 

Kdadr  ^""'^       iron-clads,  and  had  made  an  appropriation 
-     of  $1,500,000  for  the  experimental  construe- 


208  •      ^HE  MONITORS.  [Sect.  VIII. 

Hon  of  one  or  more  armored  ships.     Contracts  were  ac- 
cordingly made  for  three  such  vessels,  one  a  small  cor- 
vette, the  Galena,  plated  with  iron  three  inches  thick :  she 
^The  three  experi-   P^oved  to  be  a  failurc,  being  easily  perfo- 
mentai  ships.        ratcd  with  hcavy  shot.     The  second  was  a 
frigate,  the  New  Ironsides :   she  was   constructed  as   a 
broadside  iron-clad,  and  with  her  powerful  battery  of 
eleven-inch  guns  did  good  service.     The  third  was  the 
Monitor,  invented  and  constructed  by  John  Ericsson. 
The  Monitor  is  essentially  a  shot-proof  revolving  tur- 
ret, containinsr  a  battery,  and  carried  on  a 

The  first  Monitor.  ^^  i      n  i  i  t 

rait  or  null  so  much  submerged  as  to  pre- 
sent the  smallest  possible  surface  to  an  enemy's  fire. 

The  guns  of  a  monitor  can  be  trained  to  any  point  of 
Advantages  of  the  ^^^  horizou,  cvcu  though  the  sHp  hcrsclf 
monitor  type.  should  be  agrouud.  They  are  mounted  over 
the  centre  or  axis  of  the  vessel,  and  hence  those  of  the 
heaviest  weight  may  be  used ;  the  principle  of  condensing 
the  weight  of  the  broadside  into  a  few  heavy  shot  may 
be  perfectly  carried  into  effect.  A  monitor,  in  compar- 
ison with  a  broadside  armored  ship,  requires  a  small 
number  of  men.  Its  fire  is  more  effective  because  of  the 
greater  steadiness  of  the  vessel,  which  exposes  but  little 
surface  to.  the  waves. 

The  first  monitor  was  built  chiefly  for-  the  purpose  of 

neutralizing  the  Confederate  iron-clad  Mer- 

Ericsson's  success-       .  -,  -n r       t^    •  » ,^ 

fui  completion  of    rimacK.     Mr.  JLricsson,  with  s:reat  enersrv, 

his  contract  '  ~  ^"^ ' 

commenced  her  construction  before  the  con- 
tract for  her  was  signed.  He  bound  himself  to  finish  her 
within  100  days.  She  reached  Fortress  Monroe  at  a  most 
critical  moment,  when  her  antagonist  had  begun  her  work 
of  unresisted  destruction.  By  a  crew  inexperienced  in 
her  management,  and  worn  out  with  a  stormy  voyage,  she 
was  carried  without  hesitation  into  action  against  her  en- 
emy, fought  the  battle  for  which  she  had  been  built,  and 
won  it. 


chap.xlv.]  the  monitor  frigates.  209 

'   The  length  of  the  Monitor  was  173  feet,  her  breadth 
42 J  feet;  her  side  armor  at  the  water-line 

Dimensions  and      ^  •       i,  xi  •    1         1,  x  x       •    I,  i.    i.1. '    1 

armament  of  his  five  inciies  thicK ;  her  turret  eight  tnick- 
nesses  of  one-inch  ii^on ;  its  inside  diameter 
was  20  feet,  its  height  nine  feet.  Her  armament  was 
two  eleven-inch  guns  mounted  side  by  side. 

The  government  at  once  ordered  nine  monitors,  of 
other  monitors  at  somewhat  larger  size,  and  having  such  im- 
once  built..  provements   as   experience  had  suggested. 

The  armor  was  of  greater- thickness,  that  of  the  turret 
being  eleven  inches.  They  carried  one  fifteen-inch  and 
one  eleven-inch  gun.  ■ 

This  class  of  monitors  was  followed  by  another  of  light 
Failure  of  the  li-ht-  draught.  Thesc  proved  to  be  failures,  not 
draught  monitors,  j^^^^^g  sufficieut  flotatiou.  Still  another  class 
was  ordered,  larger  than  any  of  the  preceding,  their  length 
being  225  feet,  their  turrets  and  side-armor  eleven  inches 
thick.  They  were  considered  more  formidable  than  any 
broadside  ship  afloat. 

To  the  foregoing  two  monitor  frigates  were  added. 
There  was  significance  to  the  Confederates 

The  monitor  frig-      .  ,  ,  ..         ,  ,         -r»« 

ates  Puritan  and    m  the  uamcs  thcv  reccived— thc  Puritan 

Dictator,  . .  */  , 

and  the  Dictator.  The  former  is  double- 
turreted,  the  latter  single — she  is  the  smaller  ship  of  the 
two.'  Her  length  is,  however,  314  feet;  she  is  built  alto- 
gether of  iron ;  her  side- armor  is  eleven  inches  thick,  her 
turret  fifteen  inches ;  she  has  a  ram  of  solid  oak  and  iron ; 
her  engines  of  5000  horse-power,  her  armament  two  fif- 
teen-inch guns: 

Still  larger  and  more  powerful,  the  ram  frigate  Dunder- 
The  ram  frigate     ^^^g  ^^  378"  fcct  loug  aud  68  fcet  in  breadth'. 
Dundcrberg.        gj^^  ^^^  intended  to  combine  the  advan- 
tages of  a  ram,  a  casemated  broadside,  and  a  monitor,  car- 
rying twenty-inch  guns.     This  vessel,  probably  the  most 
powerful  war-ship  ever  built,  was  not  finished  until  the 
H.— O 


210  THE  KIVER  NAVY.  [Sect.  VIII. 

close  of  the  war,  and  was  then  sold  to  the  Emperor  of  the 
French. 

With  a  view  of  carrying  out  the  monitor  type  in  ocean 
The  Miantonomoh  cruiscrs,  a  class  of  vcsscls  of  which  the  Mian- 
^^^^^'  tonomoh  is  an  example  was  built.    These 

have  a  sea-speed  of  eleven  knots ;  their  side-armor  is  elev- 
en inches  thick,  their  turrets  twelve,  their  armament  four 
fifteen-inch  guns,  and  the  weight  of  their  discharge  1800 
pounds.  Their  sea-going  qualities  have  been  found  to 
answer  expectation.  They  cross  the  Atlantic  without  dif 
Acuity. 

FJbally,  there  was  nearly  completed,  at  the  end  of  the 

The  Kalamazoo     War,  a  class  of  mouitors  of  which  the  Kala- 

^^^^^'  mazoo  is  an  example,  their  length  342  feet, 

their  breadth  56f  feet,  their  deck  solid  to  the  water-line, 

their  turrets  fifteen  inches  thick,  their  intended  armament 

twenty-inch  guns. 

(2.)  OftheEiverNavy: 

If  the  republic  had  only  a  single  available  war-ship 
nivernavyofthe  ou  the  North  Atlantic  coast  at  the  break- 
west,  -j^g  ^^^  of  the  insurrection,  it  was  actually 
still  worse  prepared  on  the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries, 
on  which  there  was  not  so  much  as  a  single  gun.  The 
reopening  of  those  streams,  seized  by  the  Confederates 
without  resistance,  and  the  conduct  of  warlike  operations 
upon  them,  implied  the  creation  of  a  powerful  navy,  the 
guns  of  which  might  sweep  the  level  shores  for  miles. 

Gun-boats  on  the  "Western  rivers  must  be  mainly  plan- 
Reqmrements  for  ^^^  ^^^  rcsistaucc  aud  offeusivc  uiovemcnts 
river  gun-boats,  ^g^inst  battcrlcs  OU  thc  bauks,  and  engage- 
ments with  other  ships  like  themselves.  Since  they  are 
to  operate  in  smooth  water,  principles  of  construction  may 
be  adopted  in  them  which  would  be  inadmissible  in  ships 
exposed  to  the  Atlantic. 


Chap.  XL  v.]  THE  RIVER  NAVY.  211 

The  Confederates  had  strongly  and  without  molesta- 
tion fortified  the  most  important  strategic  points  upon  the 
Mississippi — Columbus,  Island  No.  10,  Fort  Pillow,  Mem- 
phis, Vicksburg,  Grand  Gulf,  Port  Hudson,  Baton  Kouge, 
New  Orleans.  On  the  Tennessee  they  had  Fort  Henry, 
on  the  Cumberland  Fort  Donelson,  on  the  Arkansas  Fort 
Hindman,  etc. 

At  first  the  government  directed  the  purchase  of  such 
stout  and  swift  steam-boats  as  might  answer 

Their  dimensions     , ,  rr^i  1 1  t  i      i 

and  plan  of  con-    thc  purposc.    1  hcv  wcrc  altcrcd  so  as  to  have 

Btruction.  i  •  (*  i      • 

better  protection  for  their  machinery,  but 
were  not  plated  with  iron.  The  Conestoga,  Tyler,  and 
Lexington  were  of  this  class.  They  were  side- wheel  steam- 
ers. In  July,  1861,  the  government  advertised  for  the 
construction  of  iron-clad  gun-boats.  "  It  was  decided  to 
construct  seven  vessels,  each  of  about  six  hundred  tons,  to 
draw  six  feet,  to  carry  thirteen  guns,  to  be  plated  with 
iron  two  and  a  "half  inches  thick,  and  to  steam  nine  miles 
an  hour.  They  were  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  feet 
long,  and  fifty-one  and  a  half  wide ;  the  hulls  of  wood." 
The  principles  adopted  by  the  Confederates  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  Merrimack  were  here  reproduced.  "  Their 
sides  were  placed  out  from  the  bottom  of  the  boat  to  the 
water-line  at  an  angle  of  about  thirty-four  degrees,  and 
from  the  water-line  they  fell  back  at  about  the  same  angle, 
to  form  a  slanting  casemate,  the  gun-deck  being  but  a  foot 
above  water.  This  slanting  casemate  extended  across  the 
hull,  near  the  bow  and  stern,  forming  a  quadrilateral  gun- 
deck.  Three  nine  or  ten  inch  guns  were  placed  on  the 
bow,  four  similar  ones  on  each  side,  and  two  smaller  ones 
astern.  The  casemate,  inclosed  the  wheel,  which  was 
placed  in  a  recess  at  the  stern  of  the  vessel.  The  plating 
was  two  and  a  half  inches  thick." 

Mr.  Eads,  of  St.  Louis,  undertook  to  construct  these 
seven  vessels  in  sixty-five  days.    Mr.  Boynton,  from  whose 


212  THE  RIVER  NAVY.  [Sect.  VIII. 

Energy dispiayedin  Historj  of  the  United  States  Navy  I  am 
buiidmg  them.  quoting,  says :  "  It  was  at  this  time  that  the 
contractor  returned  to  St.  Louis  with  an  obligation  to  per- 
form what,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  would  have  been 
deemed  by  most  men  an  impossibility.  Rolling-mills, 
machine*  shops,  founderies,  forges,  and  saw-mills  were  all 
idle.  The  engines  that  were  to  drive  this,  our  first  iron- 
clad fleet,  were  yet  to  be  built.  The  timber  to  form  the 
hulls  was  uncut  in  the  forest ;  the  huge  rollers  and  ma- 
chinery for  making  their  iron  armor  were  not  yet  con- 
structed. The  rapidity  with  which  all  these  various  parts 
were  to  be  supplied  forbade  depending  on  any  two  or 
three  establishments  in  the  country,  no  matter  how  great 
were  their  resources. 

"  The  signatures  were  scarcely  dry  upon  this  important 
contract  before  the  work  was  actively  begun  through  tel- 
egraphic orders  issued  from  Washington.  Special  agents 
were  dispatched  in  every  direction,  and  saw-mills  were 
simultaneously  occupied  in  sawing  the  timber  required 
in  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio,  Minnesota, 
and  Missouri,  and  railroads,  steam-boats,  and  barges  en- 
gaged for  its  immediate  transportation.  Nearly  all  the 
largest  machine  shops  and  founderies  in  St.  Louis,  and 
many  small  ones,  were  at  once  set  at  work  day  and  night, 
and  the  telegraph  lines  between  St.  Louis,  and  Pittsburg, 
and  Cincinnati  were  occupied  frequently  for  hours  in 
transmitting  instructions  to  similar  establishments  in 
those  cities  for  the  construction  of  the  twenty-one  steam- 
engines,  and  five-and-thirty  steam  boilers  that  were  to  pro- 
pel the  fleet.  Within  two  weeks  not  less  than  four  thou- 
sand men  were  engaged  in  the  various  details  of  their 
construction.  Neither  the  sanctity  of  the  Sabbath  nor 
the  darkness  of  the  night  were  permitted  to  interrupt  it. 
On  the  12th  of  October,  1861,  the  first  United  States  iron- 
clad, with  her  boilers  and  engines  on  board,  was  launched 


Chap.  XLV.]    MONITORS— TIN-CLADS—MORTAK-BOATS. 


213 


in  Missouri  in  forty-five  days  from  the  laying  of  her  keel. 
In  ten  days  after  the  Carondelet  was  launch- 
pieted  in  one  hun-  ed,  and  tho  Cincinnati,  Louisville,  Mound 
City,  Cairo,  and  Pittsburg  followed  in  rapid 
succession.  An  eighth  vessel,  larger,  more  powerful,  and 
superior  in  every  respect,  was  also  undertaken  before  the 
hulls  of  the  first  seven  had  fairly  assumed  shape.  In  less 
than  one  hundred  days  one  individual  put  in  construc- 
tion and  completed  a  powerful  squadron  of  eight  steam- 
ers, in  the  aggregate  of  five  thousand  tons  burden,  capa- 
ble of  steaming  nine  knots  an  hour,  each  heavily  armored, 
fully  equipped,  and  all  ready  for  their  armament  of  one 
hundred  and  seven  large  guns." 

In  the  following  year  the  Navy  Department  caused  to 
The  river  monitor  ^^  coustructed  vcsscls  of  light  draught  with 
''^'''''  rotating  turrets.    Of  two  of  these,  the  Osage 

and  Neosho,  the  turrets  were  six  inches  thick  and  only 
seven  feet  high,  the  floor-beams  being  so  bent  as  to  al- 
low the  guns  to  be  worked  at  a  lower  level,  and  permit- 
ting less  height  of  turret.  They  drew  less  than  four  feet. 
Immediately  afterward  four  double -turreted  propellers 
were  built ;  each  carried  four  eleven-inch  guns,  and  drew 
only  six  feet  of  water. 

Besides  the  above,  a  number  of  vessels  of  less  resisting 

The  tin-clad  class  P^^^^  ^^^^  providcd ;  they  were  musket- 
proof  gun-boats,  and  passed  under  the  title 
of  tin-clads.  In  addition,  mortar-boats  were  construct- 
ed which  endured  without  injury  the  severe  service  to 
which  they  were  subjected.  "  The  number  of  discharges 
from  these  heavy  mortars  averacred  fifteen 

The  mortar-boats.     -,-,-,  -,  \  -^ 

hundred  to  each  vessel,  and  yet  they  were 
none  of  them  shaken  so  as  to  leak,  and  at  the  close  of 
the  war  they  were  sold  for  nearly  as  much  as  they  had 
originally  cost." 

The  navy  on  the  Western  rivers  steadily  increased  dur- 


214  AMERICAN  ORDNANCE.  [Sect.  VIII. 

Final  strength  of    '^^g  tliG  coiitest.     It  leaclied  at  last  more 
the  river  navy.      ^-^^^  ^  huiidred  steamers,  all  of  tliem  fully, 
and  many  of  them  ppwerfully  armed. 

The  account  of  tie  creation  of  the  Navy  and  Army 
contained  in  this  and  the  preceding  chapter 

Peculiarities  of  «  -,  ',1111 

American  naval     may  pcrhaps   be   appropriately   closed  by 
some  statements  in  relation  to  the  changes 
which  took  place  in  cannon. 

American  naval   artillerists  have  preferred  a  heavy 
smashing  shot  to  a  smaller  and  swifter  one. 

Up  to  1860  the  eight-inch  gun  was  regarded  in  the 
English  navy  as  the  heaviest  and  most  pow- 

Armament  ofEn-  t*   t    ii      ,  ^  t    1  /»i  t  i  t 

giish  and  Ameri-  ertul  that  could  be  saiely  used  on  board  a 
ship.  It  has  been  already  remarked  (p. 
205)  that,  in  the  war  of  1812,  American  ships  were  much 
more  powerfully  armed  than  English  ones  of  nominally 
the  same  rate.  This  principle  was  steadily  kept  in  view, 
and  experiments  continually  made  under  the  direction  of 
the  government,  until,  in  1856,  frigates  were  armed  with 
nine,  ten,  and  eleven  inch  shell  guns.  Some  of  these  were 
of  the  form  known  as  Columbiads;  they 

Columbiad,  Dahl-  -,  -i        ^^        ^^       t  iiii 

gren,  and  Parrott  wcrc,  howcvcr,  gradually  displaced  by  those 
invented  by  Dahlgren.  During  the  war, 
both  in  the  land  and  sea  services,  the  Parrott  gun  was 
largely  used.  It  consists  of  a  casting  bored  out  and  ri- 
fled, and  then  strengthened  by  a  band  of  wrought  iron 
shrunk  on  the  breech.  These  rifles  have  been  made  up 
to  the  size  of  a  300-pounder. 

The  Rodman  gun,  which  has  successfully  attained  a 
bore  of  twenty  inches,  is  cast  upon  peculiar 

The  Rodman  gun.  .       .     ,  ri^,  .  n  -  -       ii 

principles.  Ihere  is  a  core  ot  iron  m  the 
centre  of  the  mould,  and  a  stream  of  water  is  introduced 
from  a  hydrant  into,  that  core.  The  metal,  being  poured 
into  the  mould,  is  thus  ceoled  from  the  interior  to  the 
exterior.     The  water  is  introduced  to  the  bottom  of  the 


Chap.  XLV.]  AMERICAN  ORDNANCE.  215 

core  through  a  pipe  going  down  its  centre,  and  flows  off 
at  the  top.  The  process  goes  on  during  the  pouring  in 
and  cooling  of  the  metal.  The  guns  made  by  this  meth- 
od are  much  stronger  than  if  made  by  the  method  of 
solid  casting. 

The  twenty-inch  gun  is  fired  with  a  charge  of  200 
pounds  of  powder;  its  shot  weighs  1100  pounds.  Its 
range,  at  25  degrees  of  elevation,  is  more  than  four  and  a 
half  miles. 

The  Navy  Department  possessed,  in  March,  1861,  2468 
heavy  guns.  Of  these  many  were  seized  at 
Sneginifiirof^*  the  Norfolk  navy  yard,  and  most  of  the  re- 
mainder were  on  board  ships  scattered  in 
distant  seas.  Mr.  Boynton,  to  whose  work  already  quo- 
ted I  am  indebted  for  many  of  these  facts,  affirms  that 
the  Navy  Department  had  at-  its  disposal  little  more  than 
fifty  really  efficient  guns  when  the  conflict  began. 

In  November,  1863,  the  number  was  2811,  of  the  most 
Number  at  the  end  approvcd  modcm  pattcms.  About  800  of 
of  1863.  them  were  nine-inch  and  eleven-inch  Dahl- 

grens,  700  were  heavy  rifles,  and  36  were  of  fifteen  inches. 


SECTION  IX. 

PRELUDE  TO  THE  GREAT  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTEE  XLVL 

TRANSACTIONS,  CIVIL  AND  MILITARY,  IN  KENTUCKY. 

Introductory  remarks  to  this  section. 

The  Confederates  intended  to  use  the  Border  States  as  a  barrier  to  screen  them- 
selves from  the  attacks  of  the  government.  Their  partisans  in  those  states  en- 
deavored to  assume  a  position  of  ostensible  neutrality. 

The  Governor  of  Kentucky,  in  opposition  to  its  Legislature,  attempted  to  carry  the 
state  over  to  the  Confederacy. 

It  was  found  impossible  to  maintain  neutrality.  Kentucky  was  invaded  both  by 
Confederate  and  national  troops ;  by  the  former  a  blockade  of  the  Mississippi  was 
established  at  Columbus. 

Several  events  took  place  in  the  year  1861  whicL, 
Minor  military  af-  though  tliej  Can  not  bc  regarded  in  a  mili- 
fair8ofis6i.  ^^Yj  point  of  view  as  important,  or  as  influ- 
encing, except  indirectly,  the  course  of  the  war,  demand, 
nevertheless,  a  passing  notice.  They  occurred  at  a  period 
of  great  public  depression  in  the  North,  and  of  excitement 
in  the  South,  and  hence  assumed  a  prominence  which  did 
not  truly  belong  to  them.  Among  them  may  be  men- 
tioned the  operations  in  Missouri,  those  in  Northwestern 
Virginia,  the  affair  at  Bethel,  the  tragedy  at  Ball's  Bluff. 

Doubtless  they  were  all  illustrated  with  many  signal 
instances   of  military  skill  and  daring  on 

Their  correct  and  i«t  iiii  ii  t     i 

subordinate  char-    eacu  siQc,  auQ  yct  they  must  be  regardea 

as  unessential  parts  of  the  grand  and  bloody 

drama  about  to  be  enacted.     They  were  incidents,  or 

merely  personal  encounters.     In  the  brilliancy  of  the 


Chap.  XLVI.] 


MINOR  WAR  MOVEMENTS. 


217 


great  events  by  wliicli  they  were  followed,  these  little 
ones  become  almost  invisible. 

During  1861  the  government  had  not  a  just  conception 
„  , ,.     ,   ,.,.  ,  of  the  form  which  the  war  must  necessarily 

Eelation  of  political  ^  ... 

and  military  ideas,  assuuio  iu  ordcr  to  obtaiu  dccislvo  results. 
Political  considerations  completely  outweighed  the  mili- 
tary. This  was  no  more  than  might  have  been  expected. 
The  cabinet  had  been  drawn  from  civil  life.  It  had  not 
yet  rejected  the  fallacy  that  the  military  must  always  be 
subordinate  to  the  political  idea.  Appalling  disasters 
occurred  before  it  fully  perceived  how  frequently  that 
m^m  has  to  be  reversed. 

If  it  became  necessary  to  assure  the  Unionists  of  Mis- 

Eariy  war  move-  ^^^^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^^  ^^  Northwcstcm  Virginia,  or 
m'ents  iucorrect.  ^^  protcct  thc  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Kailroad, 
or  to  threaten  Norfolk,  expeditions  were  arranged  for 
each  purpose,  and  a  great  army  frittered  away.  The  bat- 
tle of  Bull  Eun  was  fought  with  less  than  30,000  men, 
when  there  would  have  been  no  difficulty  in  bringing 
into  action  60,000.  The  cabinet  had  yet  to  learn  that 
a  great  victory  woa  at  a  decisive  point  satisfies  a  thou- 
sand distant  political  demands — it  had  yet  to  see  the 
Mississippi  opened  by  operations,  not  in  its  stream,  but 
far  in  its  rear — it  had  yet  to  see  Charleston,  after  re- 
sisting the  most  powerful  direct  attacks,  fall  helplessly 
by  the  march  of  an  army  a  hundred  miles  distant  in  the 
interior. 

By  degrees  the  correct  ideas  of  professional  military 
men  forced  their  way,  and  affairs  which,  to  the  eye  of  in- 
experience, seemed  of  signal  moment,  dwarfed  to  their 
true  proportions,  and  stood  in  their  proper  attitude  of  in- 
significance. 

In  the  three  chapters  of  this  section,  I  shall  briefly  re- 
Groupin- of  these   ^^tc  tho  more  interesting  of  these  military 
affairs  and  the  political  movements  connect- 


minor  aflfairs. 


218 


THE  BORDEK  STATES. 


[Sect.  IX. 


The  Border  States. 


ed  witli  them,  considering  tliem  under  tlie  titles  of  trans- 
actions in  Kentucky,  Missouri,  and  Virginia  respectively. 
Their  disconnected  character  and  their  subordinate  rela- 
tion to  the  great  and  decisive  campaigns  will  be  recog- 
nized without  difficulty.  They  form,  in  reality,  only  a 
prelude  to  the  true  war. 

The  Border  States  consist  of  the  most  northerly  tier  of 
slave  states.  They  are  Missouri,  Kentucky, 
Virginia,  Maryland,  Delaware.  Thpugh  per- 
haps not  correctly,  Tennessee  is  often  numbered  among 
them.  "^ 

The  agricultural  products  of  these  states  are  such  as 
Their  agricultural  ^eloug  to  a  temperate  climate.  The  easter- 
products.  Yj  ones  produce  breadstuffs  and  tobacco; 

the  westerly  have,  in  addition,  hemp  and  live-stock.  The 
value  of  slave  labor  is  by  no  means  so  great  in  them  as 
in  the  Gulf  States,  but  in  most  of  them  negroes  could  be 
raised  for  sale  very  profitably.  This  gave  them  an  iden- 
tity of  interest  with  the  cotton-growing  regions  at  the 
South. 

and  their  popuia-        From  the  ccusus  of  1860  it  appears  that 
^'""^  the  population  of  the  Border  States  was  as 

follows : 


Missouri  .... 

Whites. 

Free  Colored, 

Slaves. 

1,064,369 

2,983 

114,965 

Kenkicky.  .  .  . 

920,077 

10,146 

225,490 

Virgmia  .... 

1,047,613 

57,579 

490,888 

Maryland.  .  .  . 

516,128 

83,718 

87,188 

Delaware .... 

90,697 

19,723 

1,798 

They  stretch  from  beyond  the  Mississippi  to  the  At- 
Their  geographical  l^utlc,  formlug  a  great  bulwark,  protecting 


position. 


the  cotton  region  from  the  contact  of  the 
North,  and  are  nearly  divided  asunder  by  the  Free  State 
Illinois,  which,  toward  the  south,  being  bounded  by  the 


Chap.  XLYL] 


THE  BORDER  STATES. 


219 


KENTUCKY   AND   TENNESSEE. 


Mississippi  oa  the  west  and  the  Ohio  on  the  east,  projects 
deeply  into  them.  At  the  point  of  confluence  of  those 
streams  is  the  important  position  Cairo. 

It  was,  as  we  have  seen  (p.  95),  the  intention  of  the 
Their  political  posi-  Original  seceding  states  to  intrench  them- 
selves behind  this  great  natural  barrier,  ex- 
pecting that  it  would  bear  the  burden  of  the  war  if 
any  should  take  place,  and  be.  the  scene  of  whatever 
devastation  might  ensue.  In  that  favorable  seclusion,  it 
was  thought  that  the  cotton  crop  might  be  raised  with- 
out molestation.  To  obtain  access  to  this  staple,  it  was 
expected  that  England  would  not  hesitate  to  break  any 
blockade  that  the  national  government  might  establish, 
and  ttet  a  recognition  of  independence,  and  perhaps  mil- 
itary aid  from  Western  Europe,  might  follow. 


220  THE  BORDER  STATES.  [Sect.  IX. 

It  was  therefore  important  to  the  leaders  of  the  secession 
and  importance  to  movement  that  the  alliance  of  the  Border 
the  Confederacy.  g^^|.^g  should  be  sccurcd.  To  accomplish 
this,  it  was  necessary,  in  accordance  with  the  theory  of 
the  American  political  system,  to  obtain  the  direct  con- 
sent of  the  people  of  those  states  through  a  Convention 
expressly  called  in  each.  The  Legislatures  and  executive 
officers  had  no  direct  or  lawful  power  in  the  matter  be- 
yond that  of  calling  such  a  Convention.  They  could 
only  act  in  obedience  to  the  existing  Constitution  whose 
agents  they  were.  The  transference  of  allegiance  was 
not  in  their  control. 

The  inhabitants  of  the  Border  States  clearly  foresaw 
that  their  geographical  position  placed  them  in  the  front 
of  the  conflict.  In  addition  to  the  fact  that  they  were 
by  nature  (vol.  i.,  p.  102)  more  predisposed  than  their 
Southern  neighbors  to  look  to  the  consequences  of  their 
acts,  their  vicinity  to  the  Free  States  caused  them  to  be 
brought  under  influences  antagonistic  to  the  slave  system. 
Under  such  circumstances,  it  could  not  be 

Division  in  their  -      _  ^  i  t  i  •!  • 

opj^iiious  and  inter-  cxpcctcd  that  they  would  exhibit  unanim- 
ity ;  on  the  contrary,  they  must  necessarily 
be  divided  by  clashing  opinions  and  interests.  Though 
the  slaveowner  might  view  a  coalescence  with  the  South- 
ern Confederacy  with  satisfaction,  the  slaveless  white 
might  perhaps  resist  any  attempt  to  detach  him  from  the 
Union. 

The  problem  for  the  secessionist  leaders  to  solve  was 
Mode  hy  which  it  thcrcfore  how  to  deal  with  these  divided 
rureCrto\hr^"  border  populations.  At  an  early  period, 
while  the  secession  movement  was  a  mere 
conspiracy,  it  was  seen  that  the  election  of  trustworthy 
governors  must  be  secured.  Through  the  governor  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  control  over  the  Legislature  could  be  ob- 
tained, and  the  vote  of  the  Legislature  was  need?d  for 


Chap.  XL VI.]  THE  BORDER  STATES.  221 

calling  a  Convention  of  the  people.  Moreover,  by  mak- 
ing sure  of  these  influences,  it  was  not  impossible,  though 
such  actions  might  be  arbitrary,  to  obtain  possession  of 
the  military  resources  of  each  of  those  states. 

No  pains  were  spared  to  excite  the  slave  interest  by 
Their  slave  interests  representing  that  the  Free  States  had  at  last 
^^"^^"^^  entered  upon  an  abolition  crusade,  and  that 

the  Republican  party  inaugurated  in  Washington  had 
determined  on  tyrannical  measures  toward  the  South. 

On  the  other  hand,  all  through  the  summer  of  1861 
^  ,^  .         ,    the  national  2:overnment  used  every  exertion 

On  their  account  o  J 

avoiSSon  on  ^o  rctalu  thcse  Border  States  in  their  loyal- 
siavery.  ^^^     j^.  ^^^  mainly  on  their  account  that  no 

hostile  measures  were  taken  against  slavery.  That  om- 
inous subject  could  not*  fail,  however,  to  intrude,  and  ac- 
cordingly it  had  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  military  com- 
manders both  at  Fortress  Monroe  and  in  Northwestern 
Virginia.  General  McClellan,  then  in  command  in  the 
latter,  declared  that  he  should  not  only  abstain  from  in- 
terference with  the  slaves,  but  with  an  iron  hand  crush 
any  attempts  at  insurrection  on  their  part.  Almost  on 
the  sflme  day.  General  Butler,  at  Fortress  Monroe,  deter- 
mined to  regard  them  as  "  contraband"  of  war,  and  to 
employ  them  at  a  fair  compensation. 

In  his  message  to  Congress  at  its  extra  session  in  July, 
The  effect  of  their  President  Lincoln  pointed  out  clearly  what 
neutrality.  ^|j^  ^^^^i^  ^£  ^j^^  attltudc  of  neutrality  must 

necessarily  be.  "  In  the  Border  States  so  called,  in  fact 
the  Middle  States,  there  are  those  who  favor  a  policy 
which  they  call '  armed  neutrality;'  that  is,  an  arming  of 
these  states  to  prevent  the  Union  forces  passing  one  way, 
or  the  disunion  the  other,  over  their  soil.  This  would  be 
disunion  completed.  Figuratively  speaking,  it  w^ould  be 
building  an  impassable  wall  along  the  line  of  separation 
—  and  yet  not  quite  <in  impassable  one,  for  under  the 

'■  •   ,     ^' 


222  IMPORTANCE  OF  KENTUCKY.  [Sect.  IX. 

guise  of  neutrality  it  would  tie  the  lands  of  the  Union 
men,  and  freely  pass  supplies  from  among  them  to  the  in- 
surrectionists, which  could  not  be  done  if  they  were  open 
enemies.  At  a  stroke  it  would  take  all  trouble  off  the 
hands  of  secession  except  only  what  proceeds  from  the 
external  blockade.  It  would  do  for  the  Disunionists  that 
which  of  all  things  they  most  desire — feed  them  well,  and 
give  them  disunion  without  a  struggle  of  their  own.  It 
recognizes  no  fidelity  to  the  Constitution,  no  obligation 
to  maintain  the  Union." 

Armed  neutrality  found  advocates  among  both^e  se- 
cessionists and  the  loyal.    The  fM?ner  feared 

Neutrality  advoca-      .t../.  tit  ;i«t 

ted  by  secessionists  that  it  opeu  War  shouid  ensue,  their  slaves, 

and  loyalists.  r»  i  •  n      ^  i  -it 

for  the  retention  of  whom  they  were  willing 
to  sacrifice  the  Union,  would  escape.  The  latter,  still  re- 
taining a  deep  attachment  to  the  national  government, 
were  willing  to  adopt  a  course  which  they  hoped  would 
avoid  any  fatal  collision  with  it. 

Kentucky,  both  in  a  political  and  military  point  of 
Importance  of  ^lew,  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the 
Kentucky.  Coufedcracy.  Its  slave  interests  were  large, 
and  must  be  protected.  Columbus,  a  little  below  the 
junction  of  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi,  might  be  made  to 
command  the  latter  river  and>  blockade  it  completely. 
From  that  point  to  Bowling  Green  there  was  railroad 
connection.  Here,  in  the  oj)inion  of  the  Confederate  en- 
gineers, must  be  established  their  outer  line  of  defense. 
The  occupation  of  Kentucky  was  correctly  viewed  by 
them  as  a  military  necessity. 

The  Governor  of  Kentucky  had  been  elected  as  a  Dem- 

poiicyofit-sgov-    ^^^^^  ^^  1^^^5  te  was  thoroughly  devoted 
^^°^-  to  the  secession  cause.     He  denounced  the 

policy  of  President  Lincoln,  and  refused  the  state's  quota 

of  troops  (p.  27). 


Chap.  XLVI.]   POLITICAL  MOVEMENTS  IN  KENTUCKY.  223 

All  extra  session  of  the  Legislature  had  been  sumnion- 
Hisraessa  e  to  the  ^^  (January  18th,  1861)  for  the  purpose  of 
Legislature,  calHug  a  State  Convention.     In  his  message 

to  it  the  governor  declared  that  the  people  of  the  Unit- 
ed States  are  already  effectively  sundered,  and  that  the 
Union  exists  only  as  an  abstraction ;  that,  in  fact,  it  was 
dissolving  into  its  original  integral  elements;  that  a 
bloody  revolution,  already  commencing  in  South  Caro- 
lina, was  inevitable.  He  directed  attention  to  the  suc- 
cessful establishment  of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  and 
inquired  in  what  attitude  Kentucky  should  stand,  and  by 
what  authority  her  external  relations  should  be  regu- 
,. ,   ,     ,    ,,  lated.     But  the  Leo-islature  refused  to  call 

which  refuses  to  call  O 

aconventiou.  ^  Statc  Convcution,  preferring  that  there 
should  be  a  National  or  Peace  Conference  at  Washington. 

The  intentions  of  the  Unionists  of  Kentucky  were  ex- 
Quaimedioyaityof  P^^s^ed  at  a  mcctiug  hcld  in  Louisville 
the  Unionists.  (April  18th)  immediately  after  the  capture 
of  Fort  Sumter.  It  was  resolved  that  the  sympathies  of 
Kentucky  are  with  those  who  have  an  interest  in  the  pro- 
tection of  slavery,  but  that  she  acknowledges  her  fealty 
to  the  United  States  until  its  government  becomes  re- 
gardless of  her  rights  in  slave  property.  The  use  of  co- 
ercive measures  to  bring  back  the  seceded  states  was  con- 
demned, and  the  Kentucky  State  Guard  was  admonished 
to  remember  that  its  fidelity  was  pledged  equally  to  the 
Union  and  the  state.  ^         . 

The  governor  ^gain  summoned  an  extra  session  of  the 
Legislature  (April  28th).     It  refused  once 

Second  extra  ses-  ,  ^^         /-i      ,  i'  i  •    t  • 

sion  oftheLegis-    luorc  to  Call  a  Cotfveution,  or  to  errant  him 

lature.  • 

•  three  millions  of  dollars  which  he  had  re- 
quired for  arming  the  state. ,  It  even  amended  the  militia 
law  so  as  to  require  the  State  Guard  to  take  an  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  Union.  He  then  issued  a  proclamation 
of  neutrality  (May  20th),  denouncing  the  war  as  horrid, 


224  POLITICAL  MOVEMENTS  IN  KENTUCKY.  [Sect.  IX. 

and  forbidding  tlie  United  States  and  the  Confederate 
States  invading  Kentucky.  This  the  Legislature  refused 
to  indorse.  The  intention  of  the  people  was  doubtless 
truly  expressed  by  a  resolution  of  their  Senate,  that  the 
state  "  should  not  sever  its  connection  with  the  national 
It  inclines  toward  govemment,  uor  take  up  arms  for  either 
the  Union.  belligerent'  party,  but  arm  herself  for  the 

preservation  of  peace  on  her  borders."  Her  attitude  was 
that  of  conditional  Unionism.  The  loyalty  of  her  people 
was  shown  at  the  election  for  delegates  to  the  Peace  Con- 
vention (May  4th).  They  gave  a  Union  majority  of  fifty 
thousand  votes,  and  the  insincerity  of  those  who  would 
have  forced  her  out  of  the  Union  was  manifested  by  the 
fact  that,  though  they  had  declared  that  allegiance  and 
loyalty  compelled  them  to  go  with  their  state,  they  did 
not  consider  themselves  under  any  obligation  to  remain 
with  their  state. 

Kentucky  had  thus,  by  very  large  majorities,  refused 
to  join  in  the  secession  movement;  but  her  governor, 
like  those  of  Virginia  and  Missouri,  was  not  unwilling  to 
make  her  a  screen  behind  which  the  purposes  of  the  in- 
surgents in  the  Cotton  States  could  be  carried  on.  In  a 
letter  to  President  Lincoln  (August  19),  he 
ernof  to  theVrel-    dcclarcd  that  her  people  earnestly  desire  to 

ident. 

avoid  being  involved  in  the  war ;  that  they 
have  rebelled  against  no  authority,  engaged  in  no  revolu- 
tion, and  have  done  nothing  to  provoke  the  presence  of 
a  military  force.  He  therefore  urged  that  the  national 
troops  be  removed. 

In  his  reply,  setting  forth  the  reasons  which  compelled 
The  President's  ^im  to  dcclinc  gratifying  the  governor  in 
reply.  "^-g  rcqucst,  siucc  the  troops  in  question  con- 

sisted entirely  of  Kentuckians,  Lincoln,  in  a  very  charac- 
teristic manner,  remarks, "  I  most  cordially  sympathize 
with  your  excellency  in  the  wish  to  preserve  the  peace 
of  my  own  native  state,  Kentucky ;  but  it  is  with  regret 


Chap.XLVI.]   the  confederates  invade  KENTUCKY.  225 

I  searcL.  for  and  can  not  find  in  your  not  very  short  letter 
any  declaration  or  intimation  that  you  entertain  any  de- 
sire for  the  preservation  of  the  Federal  Union." 
.  In  a  message  to  the  Legislature  which  shortly  after- 
ward convened  (September  3d),  the  2:0V- 

Message  of  the  gov-  .  i    •         i       r»  i  i        •     ,  • 

ernor  to  the  Legis-  emor  agaiu  complaiued  01  the  mtrusive  ag- 
gression of  the  North,  and  declared  his  opin- 
ion that  Kentucky  would  never  renounce  her  sympathy 
with  her  aggrieved  sister  Southern  States ;  but  that  body 
resolved  that  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky  had  been  vio- 
The  Legislature  ^^^^^  ^J  ^^^  Confederate  forces,  requested 
coSliS'fnva.^^  the  governor  to  call  out  the  militia  to  expel 
^'''°'  them,  and  invoked  the  United  States  to  give 

aid  and  assistance.  The  governor  vetoed  these  resolu- 
tions. The  Legislature  at  once  passed  them  over  his  veto 
by  very  large  majorities. 

The  Confederate  authorities  perceived  that  it  was  ab- 
solutely necessary  for  them  to  take  military  possession  of 
Kentucky,  no  matter  what  the  wishes  of  its  people  might 
be.  If  it  could  not  be  used  as  a  bulwark,  it  must  be  used 
The  Confederate  ^s  a  battle-field.  They  therefore  assigned 
General  Polk.  (j^ncral  Polk  to  the  commaud  of  a  depart- 
ment extending  from  the  mouth  of  the  Arkansas  north- 
ward on  both  sides  of  the  Mississippi.  He  had  been  the 
bishop  of  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church  of  the  Diocese 
of  Louisiana,  but  now,  as  far  as  it  was  possible  for  him  to 
do  so,  had  exchanged  ecclesiastical  for  military  life.  Like 
some  of  the  bishop-generals  of  the  Middle  Ages,  he  drew 
forth  well-tried  weapons  from  the  spiritual  armory,  as  well 
as  those  of  a  carnal  kind,  in  his  first  general  order,  declar- 
ing that  "  the  invasion  of  the  South  by  the  Federal  armies 
had  brought  with  it  a  contempt  for  constitutional  liberty,  ** 
and  the  withering  influences  of  the  infidelity  of  New  En- 
gland and  of  Germany  combined."  • 
IL— P 


226  THE  MISSISSIPPI  BLOCKADED— BELMONT.        [Sect.  IX. 

General  Polk  at  once  occupied  Columbus  and  fortified 
it.     Hereupon  General  Grant,  who  was  in 

The  Confederate  j      nil  >•  ii?  j.  r\    •        xn 

troops  occupy  command  oi  the  national  forces  at  Cairo,  took 
possession  of  Paducah  (September  16tli),at 
the  junction  of  the  Tennessee  and  Ohio.  It  was  about 
this  time  and  in  reference  to  these  Confederate  forces  that 
the  Legislature  passed  the  resolution  above  referred  to 
requiring  their  removal  from  the  state. 

Simultaneously  with  the  invasion  of  Kentucky  by  Gen- 
eral Polk  on  the  west,  General  ZoUikoffer 

The  Confederates  ,  i     •  i  1 1  j.     i      i       •  x i      j     xi  • 

invade  East  Ken-    entcrcd  it  ou  the  cast,  aeclaring:  that  this 

tacky.  /  o 

step  was  necessary  for  the  safety  of  Tennes- 
see; and  to  meet  his  forces,  national  troops  were  intro- 
duced from  Indiana,  Ohio,  etc. 

The  seizure  and  fortifying  of  Columbus  by  Polk  block- 
BiockadeoftheMis-  ^dcd  thc  Misslssippi.  The  position  was 
sissippiestabiished.  eventually  made  very  strong,  being  defend- 
ed by  more  than  120  heavy  guns. 

Opposite  Columbus,  on  the  Missouri  side  of  the  river, 
is  Belmont,  a  steam-boat  landing,  at  which  a  small  Con- 
federate force  was  encamped.  On  the  7th  of  November, 
Grant  attacks  Bel-  Gcucr al  Grant,  wlth  3114  men ,  attacked  this 
mont.  force.     He   succeeded  in   destroying  their 

camp  and  driving  them  down  to  the  brink  of  the  river. 
But,  the  place  being  commanded  by  Columbus,  General 
Polk  was  able  to  bring  several  of  his  guns  to  bear  on  the 
national  troops,  and  dispatched  as  quickly  as  he  could  a 
re-enforcement  of  5000  men  across  the  river.  Discipline 
in  the  armies  was  at  that  time  very  lax.  The  national 
soldiers  indulged  themselves  in  plundering,  the  officers 
in  making  stump  speeches  glorifying  the  Union  and 
magnifying  themselves.  While  this  was  going  on  Polk's 
troops  appeared.  Grant,  however,  successfully  cut  his 
way  through  them,  bringing  off  his  own  guns  and  some 
of  those  of  the  enemy.  He  lost  480  men  in  killed,  wound- 
ed, and  missing.     Polk's  loss  was  642. 


CHAPTER  XLVII. 

TRANSACTIONS  CIVIL  AND  MILITARY  IN  MISSOURI. 

In  Missouri  the  governor  and  Legislature  were  in  favor  of  secession ;  the  State  Con- 
vention averse  to  it. 

The  governor  inaugurated  hostilities  by  seizing  a  national  arsenal.  In  his  subse- 
quent movements  he  was  defeated  at  the  battle  of  Booneville.  He  then  pro- 
claimed the  secession  of  the  state. 

Battle  of  Wilson's  Creek,  and  death  of  General  Lyon. 

General  Fremont  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  district.  Causes  of  his  sudden 
removal. 

Battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  and  march  of  General  Curtis  to  Helena. 

In  Missouri  the  separation  of  tlie  people  into  two  par- 
internai  dissensions  ties  at  oHce  occupred.  The  slaveholders 
in  Missouri.  ^^^^  numerically  in  the  minority,  but  their 

inferiority  in  Jhat  respect  was  compensated  for  by  their 
social  influence  and  w^ealth.  They  were  mostly  settled 
in  the  rich  river  valleys,  and  had  no  intention  of  yielding 
to  the  New  Englanders  and  German  immigrants  with 
whom  the  chief  towns  were  thronged.  The  governor  was 
a  supporter  of  the  secession  party,  and  the  Legislature  had 
similar  inclinations. 

A  State  Convention  was  called  by  the  Legislature.  It 
The  state  conven-  ^ict  February  28th.  A  commissioner  from 
^'''"'  Georgia  was  permitted  to  address  it.     He 

was,  however,  respectfully  dismis-sed  with  the  informa- 
tion that  his  views  were  not  considered  acceptable,  and 
that  it  was  to  be  regretted  that  he  had  no  plan  of  recon- 
ciliation to  offer.  The  Committee  of  the  Convention  on 
Federal  Relations  presented  its  report  on  March  9th.  It 
offered  resolutions  declaring  that  there  was  no  adequate 
cause  for  Missouri  to  leave  the  Union;  that  she  would 


228  POLITICAL  MOVEMENTS  IN  MISSOURI.  [Sect.  IX. 

It  desires  an  ami-  la"bor  foi  Its  perpetuatloii ;  tliat  the  people 
cable  adjustment,  ^f  ^i^^t  state  earnestly  desired  an  amicable 
adjustment  of  all  difficulties;  it  suggested  the  Crittenden 
Compromise  as  a  satisfactory  basis,  and  a  Convention  of 
the  states  for  the  purpose  of  suitably  amending  the  Con- 
stitution ;  it  equally  denounced  coercion  of  the  seceding 
states  by  the  government,  and  assaults  by  those  states  on 
the  government,  and  entreated  both  not  to  bring  on  the 
nation  the  horrors  of  civil  war.  An  amendment  was  add- 
ed to  this  report,  before  its  adoption  by  the  Convention, 
recommending  the  national  government  to  withdraw  its 
troops  from  the  forts  in  the  seceded  states,  where  there 
might  be  danger  of  a  collision  with  state  troops.  The 
Convention  then  adjourned  to  the  following  December. 

Though  the  Convention  had  thus  determined  against 
The  governor  de-   secesslon,  the  govcmor  at  once  proceeded  to 
Sate^ovSo^the    render  its  action  abortive.     To  President 
Confederacy.        Llucolu's  rcquisltiou  for  troops  he  returned 
a  refusal,  and  called  an  extra  session  of  the  Legislature 
(May  2d)  to  authorize  the  military  organization  of  the 
state.     In  his  message  on  that  occasion,  he  declared  that 
the  sympathies  of  Missouri  were  with  the  Slave  States, 
and  that  it  was  necessary  for  her  interests  to  unite  her 
destiny  with  theirs:    In  his  views  the  Legislature  con- 
curred. 

The  governor  had  already  (April  20th)  seized  the 
He  seizes  the  arse-  Uultcd  Statcs  Arscual  at  Liberty,  and  had 
nai  at  Liberty.  (Jistributcd  amoug  his  friends  the  arms  it 
contained ;  he  had  attempted  to  obtain  control  of  the  city 
of  St.  Louis  by  establishing  in  it  an  armed  force  under  the 
guise  of  a  metropolitan  police ;  he  had  ordefed  the  mili- 
tia to  go  into  encampment  under  pretense  of  drilling,  but, 
in  reality,  to  be  ready  to  secure  the  state.  His  intention 
was  to  seize  the  national  arsenal  at  St.  Louis,  at  that  time 
in  charge  of  Captain  Lyon,  who  had  a  garrison  of  about 


Chap.  XLVII.]    MILITARY  MOVEMENTS  IN  MISSOURI.  229 

The  arms  at  St.  500  legulars.  That  officer,  wLile  the  gov- 
Louis  removed,  qyhoy  was  maturing  his  plans,  had  the  arms 
secretly  transferred  to  Springfield,  in  the  adjoining  Free 
State  Illinois.  Meantime  permission  had  been  received 
from  Washington  to  raise  troops,  and,  notwithstanding 
the  refusal  of  the  governor  to  comply  with  the  President's 
requisition,  several  regiments  had  been  raised  by  Colonel 
P.P.Blair. 

Captain  Lyon,  finding  that  the  state  troops  encamped 
.    ,^    in  the  vicinity  of  St.  Louis  were  receivinor 

Lyon  surprises  the  «/  O 

secession  camp.  canuou,  shot,  aud  shcU  taken  from  the  na- 
tional arsenal  at  Baton  Rouge,  in  Louisiana,  and  sent  up 
the  Mississippi  in  boxes  marked  "  marble,"  resolved  not 
to  wait  for  their  assault  on  the  arsenal  in  his  charge. 
With  6000  troops,  he  suddenly  surrounded  their  camp 
and  compelled  them  to  surrender.  He  took  fr(5m  them 
,    ,  20  cannon,  1200  new  rifles,  several  chests 

and  captures  many  7  ' 

munitions.  ^£  small-arms,  and  large  quantities  of  ammu- 

nition. As  the  last  of  the  prisoners  were  leaving  their 
camp,  some  persons  from  the  city  fired  on  his  German 
combats  between  regimcuts,  who,  retumiug  the  fire,  killed  and 
the  opponents.  wouudcd  more  than  twenty  of  their  assail- 
ants. As  might  have  been  expected,  the  city  was  a  scene 
of  conflict  between  the  two  parties  for  several  days  sub- 
sequently. 

General  Harney,  now  arriving  in  St.  Louis,  took  com- 
mand of  the  national  forces,'  and  entered  into 

Harney  makes  a  j         • ,  i     ,  i  •  j  i      j 

compact  with  the    a  compact  with  the  s-overnor,  a2:reein2:  thai; 

governor.  ;^  i         i  i    i  -t 

no  military  movements  should  be  made  so 
long  as  the  state  authorities  would  preserve  order.     The 
national  government,  however,  disapproved  of  this  com- 
Lyon  assigned  to    P^ct,  rclievcd  Hamcy  of  his  command,  and 
the  command.       coufcrred  it  ou  Captain  Lyon,  who  was  com- 
missioned a  brigadier  general. 

But  the  governor  did  not  d^st  from  his  attempt  to 


230  POLITICAL  MOVEMENTS  IN  MISSOUEI.  [Sect.  IX. 


force  the  state  into  the  Confederacy.     The 

The  governor  de-  J 

S^fThfnauraT   Leglskture  had  placed  the  whole  military 
troops.  power  in  his  hands ;  it  had  made  every  able- 

bodied  man  subject  to  military  duty,  and. had  provided 
money  for  war  purposes.  He  demanded  of  General  Lyon, 
as  a  preliminary  to  pacification,  that  no  national  troops 
should  be  permitted  to  remain  in  Missouri,  and  that  his 
volunteers  should  be  disbanded.  This  being  refused,  he 
Heissuesaprocia-  i^^ued  a  proclamation  calling  into  service 
mation,  50,000  militia  for  the  purpose  of  repelling 

invasion,  declaring  to  the  people  that  their  first  allegiance 
was  due  ^o  their  own  state ;  that  they  were  under  no  ob- 
ligation whatever  to  obey  the  unconstitutional  edicts 
of  the  military  despotism  that  had  enthroned  itself  at 
Washington,  nor  to  submit  to  the  infamous  and  degrad- 
ing sway  of  its  minions.     He  had  railroad 

and  commences       t«t  i  t  t/t  -t         *  ,  ■^ 

warlike  opera-      bridsfes  Dumed  and  tele2:raph  wires  cut,  and 

commenced  a  civil  strife  for  the  purpose  of 

forcing  Missouri  into  the  Confederacy,  though  so  large  a 

majority  of  the  people  were  avowedly  averse  to  that 

course. 

By  the  Kansas  conflicts  (vol.  i.,  p.  416),  Missouri  had 
been  prepared  for  fierce  civil  dissensions. 

The  Leprislatare         .  ,  ,,  ''iitt  t, 

places  funds  at     As  uot  a  smsflc  secessiouist  had  been  elect- 

his  disposal.  i        r^ 

ed  to  the  Convention,  the  governor  gave  up 
all  hope  of  attaching  the  state  to  the  Confederacy  through 
an  action,  real  or  ostensible,  of  the  people,  and,  thoroughly 
committed  to  the  slave  interest,  he  carried  on  his  opera- 
tions through  the  Legislature.  This  body  had  placed  at 
his  disposal  more  than  $3,000,000,  derived  from  funds 
intended  for  purposes  altogether  different,  such  as  the 
school  fund,  the  interest  on  the  state  debt,  etc.  With 
these  means  he  proceeded  to  attempt  the  military  organi- 
zation of  the  state,  and  concentrated  his  militia  at  Boone- 
ville  and  Lexington.      -, 


chap.xlvil]  political  movements  in  MISSOUEI.  231 

He  endeavored  at  first  to  renew  the  agreement  pre- 
He  expects  troops  viouslj  made  with  General  Harney,  and  to 
from  the  South,  gecure  the  removal  of  the  national  troops. 
In  whatever  promises  he  gave  of  neutrality,  he  was,  how- 
ever, insincere,  for  he  knew  that  a  body  of  Texan  troops 
were  coming  across  the  Southern  frontier  to  his  aid. 

General  Lyon  at  once  determined  to  attack  the  troops 
Lyon  attacks  him  at  ^^  Booncville  before  they  were  re-enforeed. 
Booneviiie.  jj^  movcd  with  such  celcrity  that  he  came 

upon  theni  (June  17th)  unprepared.  In  an  affair  of  twen- 
ty minutes  he  totally  routed  them.  The  governor  fled 
to  the  Southwest,  to  meet  re-enforcements  which  were  hur- 
rying to  him  from  other  parts  of  the  state,  and  the  ex- 
pected Texan  troops.  To  prevent  this  junction.  Colonel 
Sigel  had  been  sent  with  a  national  force  from  St.  Louis. 
He  advanced  from  Eolla  to  beyond  Carthage,  but  was 
too  late  to  accomplish  his  purpose.  After  some  severe 
fighting  he  was  forced  back  to  Springfield,  where  he  was 
joined  by  Lyon. 

While  things  were  in  this  condition  the  State  Conven- 
tion reassembled  at  Jefferson  City  (July 
points  uew  state  of-  20th).  It  dcclarcd  thc  offices  of  srovernor, 
lieutenant  governor,  etc.,  vacant,  and  pro- 
nounced all  the  anti-national  legislation  that  had  taken 
place  null  and  void.  It  apj^^ointed  a  new  governor  until, 
on  a  subsequent  day  of  election,  the  people  should  ex- 
press their  choice. 

On  his  part,  the  governor,  in  retaliation,  issued  a  dec- 
laration that,  by  the  act  of  the  people  and 
ciaferthluhe  state  govcmment  of  the  Northern  States  of  the 
late  Union,  the  political  connection  of  Mis- 
souri with  the  United  States  was  dissolved.  In  conformi- 
ty with  the  plan  elsewhere  followed,  he  proceeded  to  con- 
tract an  alliance  with  the. Confederacy,  turning  over  to  it 
the  military  means  of  the  state.    The  formal  secession  of 


232 


MILITAEY  MOVEMENTS  IN  MISSOURI. 


[Sect.  IX. 


Missouri  was  tlius  the  act  of  one  man,  and  herein  is  seen 
the  wisdom  of  the  original  movers  of  secession,  in  hav- 
ing persons  who  could  be  relied  upon  for  their  purposes 
as  governors  in  all  the  Border  States. 


MISSOURI   AND   ARKANSAS. 


The  month  of  August  came,  and  found  General  Lyon 
at  Springfield,  hoping  to  receive  re-enforcements ;  but  the 
battle  of  Bull  Run  had  occurred,  and  rendered  it  impos- 
Fremont  takes  com-  slblc  to  scud  him  aid.  Major  General  Fre- 
mandofthedistrict.  ^^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  appointed  to  thc  commaud 

of  the  Western  Department,  and  had  reached  St.  Louis 
(July  25).  Meantime  Confederate  troops  were  pouring 
over  the  southern  frontier  of  Missouri,  and  Lyon,  finding 
that  they  were  advancing  upon  him  in  two  columns,  de- 
termined to  strike  before  he  should  be  overwhelmed  by 
the  combined  Louisiana,  Missouri,  Arkansas,  and  Texas 
troops.  His  force  did  not  exceed  5500,  his  antagonist  had 
Lyon's  skirmish  at  niorc  tliau  12,000.  A  skirmish  occurred  at 
Dug  Spring.         p^^  Spring  (August  1st),  in  which  he  had 


Chap.  XLVII.]  BATTLE  OF  WILSON'S  CREEK.  233 

the  advantage ;  but  lie  could  not  prevent  the  junction  of 
the  two  columns.  Hereupon  he  fell  back  to  Springfield: 
His  position  had  now  become  one  of  great  difficulty.  Po- 
litical as  well  as  military  considerations  rendered  it  al- 
most impossible  for  him  to  retreat  farther.  He  therefore 
determined  to  resume  the  offensive,  and  compensate  for 
his  weakness  by  audacity.  Moving  out  of  Springfield  on 
a  very  dark  night  (xlugust  9, 10),  and  having  ordered 
Sigel,  with  1200  men  and  six  guns,  to  gain  the  enemy's 
rear  by  their  right,  he  was  ready,  as  soon  as  day  broke, 
to  make  an  attack  on  their  front. 

But  the  disparity  of  force  was  too  great.  Sigel  was 
Battle  of  Wilson's  Overwhelmed.  He  lost  &ve  out  of  his  six 
^^''^^'  guns,  and  more  than  half  his  men.     The  at- 

tack in  front  was  conducted  by  Lyon  in  person  with  very 
great  energy.  His  horse  was  shot  under  him;  he  was 
twice  wounded,  the  second  time  in  the  head.  In  a  final 
charge  he  called  to  the  Second  Kansas  Regiment,  whose 

colonel  was  at  that  moment  severely  wound- 
Death  of  Lyon.  ,  *', 

ed, "  Come  on,  I  will  lead  you,"  and  in  so  do- 
ing was  shot  through  the  heart. 

After  the  death  of  Lyon  the  battle  was  still  continued, 
their  artillery  preserving  the  national  troops  from  total 
defeat.  News  then  coming  of  Sigel's  disaster,  a  retreat 
to  Springfield,  distant  about  nine  miles,  was  resolved  on; 
It  was  executed  without  difficulty. 

In  this  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek  there  were  223  killed. 
Results  of  the  bat-   ^^1  wouudcd,  292  mlsslug,  ou  the  national 

side ;  and,  as  may  be  inferred  from  the  de- 
termined character  of  the  assault,  the  loss  of  the  Confed- 
erates was  very  great.  They  had  been  so  severely  han- 
dled that  they  made  no  attempt  at  pursuit,  and  the  re- 
treat was  continued  by  the  national  troops,  who,  on  the 
19th,  had  fallen  back  to  Rolla. 
-After  this  action,  the  Confederate  commanders  McCul- 


234  CAPTURE  OF  LEXINGTON.  [Sect.  IX. 

Quarrel  of  the  Con-  l<^cli  and  PHce  quarreling  with  each  other 
federate  generals.  ^^^  nusihle  to  agree  upon  a  plan  for  their 
campaign,  the  former  returned  to  Arkansas,  the  latter  ad- 
vanced from  Springfield  toward  Lexington.  Here  he 
found  a  national  force  of  about  three  thousand  (2780) 
under  Colonel  Mulligan. 

Attempts  were  made  by  General  Fremont  to  re-enforce 
Mulligan,  but  they  did  not  succeed.  Meantime  the  assail- 
ing forces  were  steadily  increasing  in  number,  until  they 
eventually  reached  28,000,  with  13  pieces  of  artillery. 
They  surrounded  the  position,  and  cut  off  the  beleaguer- 
ed troops  from  water.  They  made  repeated  assaults  with- 
out success  until  August  20th,  when  they  contrived  a 
movable  breastwork  of  hemp-bales,  which  they  rolled  be- 
captureofLexing-  f^re  them  as  they  advanced,  and  compelled 
^'*"'  Mulligan,  who  had  been  twice  wounded,  to 

surrender  unconditionally. 

On  receiving  the  news  of  this  disaster,  Fremont  at  once 
left  St.  Louis  with  the  intention  of  attacking 

Fremont  marches        t^.         i,,i,  i«i         it  i  .t 

against  the  confed-  Trice,  but  that  gcueral  instantly  retreated, 
making  his  way  back  to  the  southwest  cor- 
ner of  the  state,  where  he  rejoined  McCulloch  and  his 
Confederate  troops.     Fremont  continued  the  pursuit,  his 
army  amounting  to  30,000  men,  of  whom  5000  were  cav- 
alry;  he  had  86  guns.     But,  on  reaching  Tipton,  he  was 
overtaken  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  had  come  from 
Washington  for  the  purpose  of  having  an  interview  with 
He  is  suddenly  re-   t™.     Ou  Novcmbcr  2d  au  order  was  re- 
lieved.  ceived    at    Springfield   removing  Fremont 

from  his  command.  He  was  directed  to  turn  it  over  to 
General  Hunter,  who  was  soon  after  superseded  by  Gen- 
eral Halleck. 

Among  the  avowed  reasons  for  the  removal  of  Fremont, 
Causes  of  his  re-    thus  chcckcd  iu  thc  outsct  of  his  career,  were 
his  permitting  the  disaster  that  had  befallen 


moval. 


Chap.XLVII.]   FREMONT  REMOVED  FROM  COMMAND.  235 

Colonel  Mulligan,  and  the  extravagance  of  Hs  military 
preparations  at  St.  Louis ;  but  from  his  correspondence 
Causes  of  his  re-    witli  President  Lincoln  it  may  be  seen  that 
movai.  the  true  reason  lay  in  the  view  he  took  of 

the  general  policy  on  which  the  war  should  be  conduct- 
ed. At  that  time  the  administration  was  extremely  so- 
licitous to  do  nothing  that  might  alienate  the  Border 
Slave  States ;  the  President,  as  he  himself  has  told  us, 
was  not  unwilling  to  spare  slavery,  if  by  that  means  the 
Union  could  be  saved ;  and  McClellan,  who  had  now  the 
chief  military  command,  was  perhaps  ready  to  go  even 
farther  than  that.  Such  being  the  intention  of  the  au- 
thorities at  Washington,  it  was  plain  that  the  general  or- 
der issued  by  Fremont  immediately  on  taking  command 
of  the  Western  Department  was  incompatible  therewith. 
In  this  he  had  declared  that  "  the  property,  real  and  per- 
sonal, of  all  persons  in  the  State  of  Missouri  who  shall 
take  up  arms  against  the  United  States,  or  shall  be  di- 
rectly proven  to  have  taken  active  part  with  their  ene- 
mies in  the  field,  is  declared  to  be  confiscated  to  the  pub- 
lic use,  and  their  slaves,  if  any  they  have,  are  hereby  de- 
clared to  be  free  men." 

After  the  removal  of  Fremont  the  national  army  was 
Retreat  of  the  na:  ordcrcd  to  retire  upon  Kolla.  There  had, 
tionai  army.  thercforc,  bceu  two  military  advances  from 
St.  Louis  across  the  state  toward  its  southwest  corner,  the 
first  under  Lyon,  the  second  under  Fremont.  In  each 
case  the  subsequent  retreat  was  followed  by  unhappy 
consequences,  in  exposing  those  individuals  and  families 
who  had  ventured  to  sustain  the  national  cause  to  the 
vengeance  of  their  opponents. 

On  the  18th  of  November  General  Halleck  arrived  at 
St.  Louis,  and  took  command  of  the  West- 

Halleck  takes  com-  -|->.  .  ,  a  i    ii  •      i'  ii        r^        n    t 

mand  of  the  depart-  cm  Department.     At  this  time  the  Confed- 
erates under  Price  were  intending  to  aj)- 


^gg  HALLECK  TAKES  COMMAND.  [Sect.  IX. 

proach  Kansas  and  destroy  the  Northern  Eailroad.  But 
before  Christmas  Halleck  had  compelled  him  to  retreat 
into  Arkansas,  and  for  a  short  time  military  operations 
closed  during  the  severity  of  the  winter.  Price  had  dis- 
played no  small  skill  in  his  movements,  and  it  was  be- 
lieved in  Eichmond  that  if  he  had  been  properly  sup- 
ported he  would  have  secured  Missouri  to  the  Confed- 
eracy. 

Price  himself  attributed  his  want  of  success  to  the  fail- 
ure of  McCulloch  to  sustain  him.    These 

Van  Dom  takes  /v,  i     i       t    j  '  it  i 

command  of  the     omcers  wcrc  on  such  bad  terms  with  each 

Confederates.  i  •     t 

other  that  it  became  necessary  to  put  a  su- 
perior over  them.  Accordingly  (January  29th,  1862), 
General  Van  Dorn  was  ordered  to  take  command  of  the 
Mississippi  District.  He  had  his  headquarters  at  Little 
Rock. 

Three  days  after  General  Halleck  had  taken  command 
General  Haiieck's  ^^  ^^^  Wcstcm  Department,  he  issued  an 
slave  order.  ^^dev  (Novcmbcr   21st)  that   no   fugitive 

slaves  should  be  permitted  to  enter  the  lines  of  any  camp, 
nor  of  any  forces  on  the  march.  The  reason  assigned  for 
this  measure  was  that  such  persons  had  conveyed  to  the 
enemy  important  information  respecting  the  numbers  and 
condition  of  his  forces.  He  thus  brought  the  slave  policy 
of  his  department  more  nearly  into  correspondence  with 
the  slave  policy  of  the  administration,  and  corrected  the 
error  into  which  it  was  assumed  that  General  Fremont 
had  fallen. 

The  national  forces  were  now  combined  under  General 
Curtis,  who  (February  11th)  moved  forward 
from  Lebanon  with  the  intention  of  operat- 
ing: ao^ainst  Price.  As  he  advanced  the  Confederates  re- 
tired  into  Arkansas,  falling  back  fifty  miles  beyond  the 
Boston  Mountain.  This  retreat,  if  such  it  could  be  call- 
ed, was  a  falling  back  on  re-enforcements,  which  were 


Curtis's  advance. 


Chap.  XLVII.] 


BATTLE  OF  PEA  EIDGE. 


237 


daily  increased  in  strength ;  the  national  advance  was  at- 
tended by  a  continual  enfeeblement. 

Under  these  circumstances,  Curtis,  foreseeing  that  he 

would  soon  be  attacked  at  a  disadvantage, 

took  post  on  Sugar  Creek.     His  first  and 

second  divisons,  under  General  Sigel,  were  four  miles 


PEA  RIDGE. 


southwest  of  Bentonville ;  his  third,  under  Colonel  J.  C, 
Davis,  was  on  Pea  Kidge,  north  of  Sugar  Creek;  his 
fourth,  under  Colonel  Carr,  was  at  Cross  Hollows.  The 
entire  force  was  10,500,  with  49  guns.  The  encHiy,  under 
General  Van  Dorn,  now  advancing  upon  him,  numbered 
more  than  20,000  men. 

On  March  5th,  a  cold,  snowy  day,  Curtis  received  no- 
tice that  the  Confederates  were  approaching.  He  there- 
upon sent  orders  to  Sigel  and  Carr  to  fall  back  at  once 
on  Sugar  Creek ;  the  former  accomplished  that  movement 
with  considerable  difficulty,  but  with  very  great  skill,  in- 
cessantly fighting  and  repelling  the  enemy;  but,  in  spite 
of  the  weather  and.  the  dreadful  condition  of  the  roads, 


238  BATf  LE  OF  PEA  RID^E.  [Sect.  IX. 

he  made  good  his  junction  with  Curtis  on  the  west  end 
of  Pea  Eidge. 

Meantime  General  Curtis  had  made  preparations  for 
receiving  the  enemy  on  the  southwest,  along  the  Fayette- 
ville  Road.  They,  however,  passed  round  to  the  north  of 
Pea  Ridge,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  Curtis  found 
them  prepared  to  attack  him  from  that  quarter ;  he  was 
thus  compelled  to  make  a  corresponding  change  of  front, 
his  position  being  perilous;  for,  if  he  were  defeated,  the  en- 
emy would  occupy  his  line  of  retreat.  Sigel  held  his  left, 
Davis  his  centre,  Carr  his  right.  The  attack  commenced 
on  the  7th,  and  was  chiefly  directed  by  the  Confederates 
against  Carr's  division,  which  was  forced  back  in  the 
course  of  the  day  nearly  h  mile,  though  not  disorganized. 

McCulloch,  who  confronted  Sigel  on  Curtis's  left,  at- 
tempted, by  a  movement  of  his  force  to  the  east,  to  join 
Van  Dorn  and  Price  in  their  attack  on  Curtis's  right. 
To  arrest  this,  Sigel  sent  forward  three  pieces  of  artillery, 
with  a  supporting  force  of  cavalry,  but  they  were  speed- 
ily overwhelmed  and  the  guns  captured.  Sigel,  however, 
being  re-enforced  by  Davis,  a  desperate  struggle  ensued, 
which  ended  in  a  complete  rout  of  the  Confederate  right, 
its  generals,  McCulloch  and  Mcintosh,  being  killed. 

At  the  close  of  the  day  Price  was  on  the  Fayetteville 
Road,  in  Curtis's  rear.  Elkhorn  Tavern  was  Van  Dorn's 
head-quarters.  The  national  army  had  been  defeated  on 
the  right ;  its  line  of  communication  had  been  taken ;  it 
was  nearly  without  food.  The  Confederates  had  been 
defeated  on  their  right.  During  the  night  the  Confeder- 
ate forces  formed  a  junction  on  the  ground  held. by. their 
left  wing.  The  national  line  had  also  changed ;  Davis 
was  on  the  right,  Carr  at  the  centre,  Sigel  on  the  left. 
The  battle  was  renewed  at  sunrise,  Sigel  opening  a  heavy 
dannonade  and  advancing  round  the  enemy's  right,  Davis 
turning  their  left  as  Sigel  advanced.     The  Confederates 


Chap.xlvil]  battle  of  pea  ridge.  239 

Defeat  of  the  Con-  could  Hot  staiid  the  CIO ss  fire  to  which  they 
federates.  were  exposed,  and  were  compelled  in  two 

hours  to  retreat  through  the  defiles  of  Cross  Timber  Hol- 
low. The  national  loss  was  1351.  The  Confederate  loss 
was  heavier.  After  the  battle  General  Curtis  fell  back 
into  Missouri,  and  Van  Dorn  into  Arkansas. 

In  this  battle  there  appeared  on  the  side  of  the  Confed- 
indian  allies  of  the  erates  four  or  ^ve  thousand  Indians.  Some 
Confederates.  ^£  them  asslsted  lu  taking  a  battery,  but, 
for  the  most  part,  they  were  so  amazed  at  the  evolutions 
and  noise  of  the  artillery  that  General  Van  Dorn,  in  his 
report,  does  not  mention  that  they  had  been  of  service  to 
him.  These  Indians  had  been  brought  over  to  the  Con- 
federacy by  emissaries  who  had  been  sent  among  them, 
representing  that  the  Union  had  been  destroyed,  and  that, 
if  they  desired  to  retain  their  slaves  —  for  many  slaves 
were  held  by  them — it  was  best  for  them  to  join  the  Con- 
federate side,  with  which,  in  that  particular,  they  had  an 
interest  in  common.  The  Creeks  and  Cherokees  had  long 
been-disafi*ected  to  the  Union  on  account  of  their  removal 
to  this  region  from  the  East ;  and  the  vacillating  military 
movements  that  had  been  taking  place  in  Missouri  for  the 
establishment  of  the  national  authority,  the  death  of  Gen- 
eral Lyon,  and  other  facts  which  they  had  learned,  and 
the  bearing  of  which  they  could  comprehend,  were  used 
with  success  to  draw  many  of  them  over  to  the  Confeder- 
ate side.  A  minority,  however,  still  remained  attached  to 
the  Union. 

The  expedition  into  Arkansas  was  shortly  afterward 
The  march  of  Curtis  Tcsumcd  by  Gcucral  Curtis.  He  reached 
to  Helena.  Batcsville  (scc  map,  p.  232),  on  the  White 

River  (May  6th),  where  he  expected  to  meet  supplies  and 
the  co-operation  of  gun-boats  coming  up  the  river.  In 
this  he  was  disappointed,  partly  owing  to  the  lowness  of 
the  river,  and  partly  to  the  difficulty  of  passing  the  ob- 


240  MAKCH  OE  CUKTIS  TO  HELENA.  [Sect.  IX. 

structing  batteries  of  tlie  enemy.  In  making  such  an  at- 
tempt, one  of  tlie  boats  —  the  Mound  City  —  had  been 
blown  lip.  It  was  Curtis's  intention  to  march  to  Little 
Kock,  the  capital  of  Arkansas ;  but  ten  regiments  were 
taken  from  him  and  sent  to  Corinth,  thus  occasioning  the 
abandonment  of  the  Little  Eock  campaign.  The  Confed- 
erates were  in  like  manner  weakened,  their  Arkansas 
troops  being  sent  into  Tennessee.  Curtis  remained  at 
Batesville  until  June  26th,  when  he  resumed  his  march, 
passing  down  between  the  White  and  the  Cache  Eivers 
until  he  reached  Clarendon  (July  9th).  Two  days  pre- 
viously his  advance  had  been  attacked  by  some  Texan 
cavalry,  1500  strong,  who  had  been  repulsed  with  heavy 
loss. 

On  reaching  Clarendon,  Curtis  found  that  the  gun- 
boats and  transports  had  returned  down  the  river  the 
day  before.  He  was  therefore  compelled  to  cross  over  to 
Helena,  on  the  Mississippi.  At  the  close  of  September 
he  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Department  of 
Missouri,  with  his  head-quarters  at  St.  Louis. 

The  subsequent  military  operations  in  Arkansas  were 
Minor  military  op-  ^^^  of  much  momeut.  Thcrc  wcre  affairs  at 
erations.  ^^^^^  HoUows  aud  Cauc  Hill,  which  ended 

adversely  to  the  Confederates.  A  more  important  en- 
gagement took  place  at  Prairie  Grove  (December  7th), 
by  which  the  farther  advance  of  the  Confederate  troops 
into  Missouri  was  checked. 


CHAPTEE  XLVm. 

TRANSACTIONS,  CIVIL  AND  MILITAEY,  IN  VIRGINIA. 

Western  Virginia  disapproved  of  the  secession  of  the  state  and  adhered  to  the 

Union. 
General  McClellan  crossed  the  Ohio,  and  conducted  operations  so  successfully 

against  the  secession  generals  who  were  occupying  Western  Virginia  that  the 

Confederate  government  was  eventually  constrained  to  abandon  the  campaign  in 

that  region. 
General  Butler,  in  command  at  Fortress  Monroe,  sent  an  expedition  against  the 

Confederate  posts  at  Bethel.     Failure  of  that  expedition. 
An  expedition  sent  toward  Leesburg  was  enveloped  by  the  Confederates  on  Ball's 

Bluff.     The  national  troops  were  forced  into  the  Potomac  with  very  severe  loss. 

The  macliinations  of  the  secession  conspirators  in  Vir- 
ginia were  very  far  from  commanding  ap- 
adheiTtotoe'"'^  proval  throughout  the  state.  Especially 
was  this  the  case  with  the  inhabitants  of 
the  northwestern  counties,  who  had  but  few  slaves.  At 
a  Convention  held  at  Wheeling,  in  which  delegates  from 
about  forty  counties  were  present,  the  action  of  the  cabal 
at  Kichmond  was  repudiated,  and  it  was  determined  that 
West  Virginia  should  adhere  to  the  Union.  A  governor 
and  lieutenant  governor  were  appointed.  A  Legislature, 
clainjing  to  be  that  of  loyal  Virginia,  assembled ;  the 
western  part  of  the  state  was  separated  from  the  eastern. 
Eventually  Congress  assented  to  and  ratified  this  action. 

The  view  taken  of  these  proceedings  by  the  inhabit- 
ants of  Western  Virginia  was  that  their  relations  with 
the  Union  simply  remained  intact;  but  in  the  eastern 
portions  of  the  state,  which  were  under  the  control  of 
the  secessionists  of  Eichmond,  they  were  regarded  in  the 
light  of  a  secession  from  the  state  itself.  Partly  for  the 
II.-Q 


242 


CAJMPAIGNS  OF  WESTERN  VIRGINIA. 


[Sect.  IX. 


sake  of  repressing  tHs,  and  partly  from  tlie  military  con- 
sideration that  Northwestern  Virginia,  advancing  with- 
in a  short  distance  of  Lake  Erie,  almost  bisects  the  Free 
States,  troops  were  without  delay  dispatch- 
other  parts  of  the     ed  into  it  to  enforce  its  adhesion  to  the  Con- 

state. 

federacy. 
The  Eichmond  authorities  had  seized  Harper's  Ferry 
immediately  upon  the  passage  of  the  ordinance  of  seces- 
sion (p.  83).  Occupying  it  as  strongly  as  they  could, 
they  cut  off  all  communication  between  Western  Virginia 
•and  Washington  along  the  line  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad. 


CAMPAIGNS   OF   WESTERN  VIRGINIA. 


No  movement  was  made  by  the  national  government 
until  after  the  day  (May  23d)  appointed  for  the  election 
to  ratify  or  reject  the  ordinance  of  secession,  it  being 
thought  expedient  to  do  nothing  that  might  be  inter- 
Mccieiian  ordered  prctcd  as  au  interference  with  the  Border 
to  cross  theohio.  g^^^^^^  ^^^^^  ^^^^  elcctiou,  howcvcr,  Gen- 
eral George  B.  McClellan,  who  had  been  assigned  to  the 


Chap.  XLVIIL]       McCLELLAN  CEOSSES  THE  OHIO.  243 

command  of  the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  including  West- 
ern Virginia,  received  orders  to  cross  the  Ohio  and  ad- 
vance along  the  line  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Eailroad 
to  Harper's  Ferry.  He  issued  addresses  to  the  people 
and  to  his  soldiers,  in  the  former  denouncing  the  "  infa- 
mous attempt  of  the  traitorous  conspiracy  dignified  by 
the  name  of  the  Southern  Confederacy."  He  then  pro- 
ceeded to  occupy  Parkersburg,  the  terminus  of  the  rail- 
road on  the  Ohio  River.  A  secession  force  lying  at  Graf- 
ton, the  place  of  junction  of  the  two  branches  of  the  road 

to  Parkersburg  and  to  Wheeling  respective- 
He  forces  the  seces-    -,  i»irv»Ji  t  ji  Tj 

eionists  from  the  ly,  was  lorced  Oil  the  road  southward  to 
Philippi.  Here  its  commander.  Colonel  Por- 
terfield,  issued  an  address  to  the  people  urging  them  not 
to  allow  the  people  of  other  states  to  govern  them. 
McClellan,  however,  ordering  an  advance  to  Philippi, 
Porterfield  had  to  retreat,  first  to  Beverley,  and  then  to 
Huttonsville,  where  he  was  joined  by  re-enforcements  un- 
der Governor  Wise,  who  assumed  command. 

An  Indiana  regiment,  under  Colonel  Lewis  Wallace, 
had  been  directed  to  join  General  Robert 

Affair  at  Romney.     -p.    ,,  ^  .  J       i?  xT,      T^ 

Patterson,  who  was  m  command  oi  the  JJe- 
partment  of  Pennsylvania,  and  who  was  preparing  to  at- 
tack Maryland  Heights,  which  command  Harper's  Ferry. 
On  approaching  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  in  the 
direction  of  Cumberland  (June  9th),Wallace  learned  that 
there  was  a  force  of  1200  Confederates  at  Romney.  Mak- 
ing a  march  of  eighty -four  miles,  of  which  forty-six  were 
on  foot,  in  twenty-four  hours,  he  drove  the  Confederates 
from  their  post,  and  so  alarmed  General  Joseph  E.  John- 
ston, who  was  holding  Harper's  Ferry,  that  he  evacuated 

that  place  (June  15th),  after  having  burned 

Evacuation  of  Har-    ,■,  .^  i  t     *  i  j_i       t>    j  m       t 

per's  Ferry  by        the  railroad  bridge  over  the  Potomac,  spiked 

the  guns  he  could  not  carry  away,  and  blown 

down  rocks  so  as  to  obstruct  the  railroad  and  canal.   Pat- 


244  EICH  MOUNTAIN.  [Sect.  IX. 

terson  at  once  crossed  the  river  in  pursuit  of  liim,  but  was 
speedily  compelled  to  return,  General  Scott  having  or- 
dered him  to  send  all  his  regulars  and  Burnside's  regi- 
ment to  Washington. 

Patterson,  however,  renewed  his  attempt  under  instruc- 
who  is  pursued  by  ^ous  from  Scott  (Julj  2d),  and  at  Falling 
Patterson.  Watcrs,  encountcring  Johnston's   advance 

under  Stonewall  Jackson,  forced  it  back  to  Bunker  Hill. 
On  the  15th  of  July  Patterson  moved  forward  on  that 
place,  occupying  it  without  resistance.  On  the  17th  he 
suddenly  turned  to  the  left,  and  moved  away  from  his  en- 
emy toward  Charlestown ;  Johnston  at  once  gave  him  the 
slip,  and,  joining  Beauregard  at  Manassas, 
BeauJeg^daT     wou  the  battle  of  Bull  Kun  (p.  126).    Little 

Bull  Run.  .  y. 

suspecting  the   consequences   of  his  negli- 
gence, Patterson  remained  at  Charlestown  until  the  22d. 
A  few  days  after  he  was  superseded  by  General  Banks. 
While  these  events  were  taking  place  on  the  Potomac, 
the  Confederate  troops  were  operating  on 
tJ'checkMccfil^ ^   the  south  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Kail- 
road,  in  Northwestern  Virginia,  their  inten- 
tion being  to  prevent  McClellan  from  coming  through 
any  of  the  mountain  gaps  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
and  joining  Patterson.     Porteriield  had  been  succeeded 
in  his   command  by  General  Garnett,  who  had  distin- 
guished himself  in  the  Mexican  War. 

The  forces  of  General  McClellan,  who  still  remained  at 
Affair  at  Rich  Graftou,  had  increased,  by  the  4th  of  July, 
Mountain.  ^^  20,000  mcu.  As  his  antagonists  could 
scarcely  muster  one  third  of  that  strength,  he  directed  an 
advance  upon  them.  Their  main  force  under  Garnett 
was  at  Laurel  Hill,  near  Beverley,  having  a  detachment 
under  Colonel  Pegram  at  Rich  Mountain.  Colonel  Rose- 
crans,  with  1800  men,  attacked  this  detachment,  which 
was  about  900  strong,  on  the  11th  of  July.     His  march 


Chap.  XLVIIL]  CARRICK'S  FORD.  245 

had  been  through  mountain  paths  and  trackless  forests, 
in  a  heavy  rain.  Pegram  was  put  to  flight,  and  lost  nearly 
half  his  men.  McClellan  now  coming  up  with  his  main 
army,  Garnett,  who  had  been  joined  by  some  remnants 
of  Pegram's  force,  and  whose  rear  was  exposed  to  Eose- 
crans,  was  compelled  to  abandon  his  camp  and  cannon, 
and  move  toward  Beverley.  McClellan  had,  however,  en- 
tered that  place  before  him,  and  drove  him  into  a  precip- 
itate flight  northwardly.  Pegram,  cut  off  from  support, 
Surrender  of  Pe-  ^^^  wlthout  food  for  two  days,  was  obliged, 
gram.  ^^j^]^  QQQ  ^^j^^  j.^  surreudcr,  and  Garnett,  after 

throwing  away  every  thing  that  could  impede  his  flight, 
was  overtaken  by  General  Morris,  who  was  conducting 
the  pursuit,  at  Carrick's  Ford.     Here  the  Confederates, 
Affair  at  carrick's   ^^^ir  ammuuitiou  exhausted,  were  finally 
^""'^  dispersed.    Their  General  Garnett,  attempt- 

ing in  vain  to  rally  them,  was  killed.     The  fugitives 
wandered  over  the  Alleghany  Mountains,  and  eventually 
joined  Stonewall  Jackson  at  Monterey. 
In  a  dispatch  to  the  government.  General  McClellan 
says,  "  We  have  completely  annihilated  the 

McClellan's  dis-  .       -^^7-      ,  ~^j.       ,     *  ^^  -, 

patch  to  the  gov-  encmv  m  Western  Vir^rmia.  Our  loss  is 
about  13  killed,  and  not  more  than  40 
wounded,  while  the  enemy's  loss  is  not  far  from  200 
killed,  and  the  number  of  prisoners  we  have  taken  will 
amount  to  at  least  1000.  We  have  captured  seven  of 
the  enemy's  guns  in  all." 

Another  national  force  was  meantime  advancing  from 
Operations  on  the  Guyaudottc  up  thc  KauawhaVallcy.  It  met 
Kanawha.  somc  rcslstauce  at  Scarytown,  but  pressed 

forward  with  a  view  of  attacking  General  Wise.  He, 
however,  having  learned  of  the  disaster  that  had  befallen 
Garnett,  retreated,  burning  the  bridge  over  the  Gauley 
Kiver  to  delay  pursuit,  and  made  his  way  successfully  to 
Lewisburg.    At  this  place  he  was  joined  by  General 


246  CARNIPEX  FERRY.  ^  [Sect.  IX. 

Junction  ofwise   Flojd,  the  former  Secretary  of  War,  who,  out- 
and  Floyd.         ranking  him,  took  the  command,  and  at  once 
assumed  the  offensive.    He  surprised  and  routed  an  Ohio 
regiment  at  Cross  Lanes,  and,  moving  southwardly,  en- 
deavored  to  gain  the  rear  of  the  national  general  Cox; 
but,  while  attempting  this,  was  suddenly  attacked  by  Eose- 
crans,  who  had  come  down  from  Clarksbur^r, 
Lanes  and  carnifex  at  Camifcx  Fcrry  (August  10th).     The  at- 
tack began  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 
Floyd,  outnumbered,  acted  on  the  defensive.     He  had 
ordered  Wise  to  come  up  to  his  support,  but  that  officer 
failing  him,  he  was  compelled  to  abandon  his  position 
during  the  night,  retreating  to  Big  Sewell  Mountain. 

Floyd  now  complained  to  the  Confederate  government 
Arrival  of  General  of  what  he  regarded  as  Wise's  neglect  in  the 
R.E.Lee.  affair  of  Carnifex  Ferry,  and  General  Eobert 

E.  Lee,  destined  to  future  celebrity,  who,  upon  the  retreat 
of  Gamett  from  Kich  Mountain,  had  been  appointed  to 
succeed  him,  arriving  with  large  re-enforcements,  and  out- 
ranking both  of  the  disputants,  took  the  command. 
Previously  to  this  junction  being  effected.  General  Lee 
had  attempted  unsuccessfully  to   dislodge 
er?t?on?atTiieSt    Rosecraus's  forces,  under  command  of  Gen- 

Mountaiu. 

eral  Reynolds,  from  Cheat  Mountain.  The 
attack  miscarried  through  the  failure  of  an  expected  com- 
bination. This  want  of  success  brought  upon  Lee  the 
Dissatisfaction  with  disapprobation  of  the  Confederate  govern- 

him  at  Richmond.       ^^^^^       j^    ^^^    ^^.^   -^    RichmOud  that  "  hc 

might  have  achieved  a  glorious  success,  opening  the  whole 
Northwestern  country,  and  enabling  Floyd  and  Wise  to 
drive  Cox  with  ease  out  of  the  Kanawha  Valley.  Re- 
grets, however,  are  unavailing  now.  General  Lee's  plan, 
finished  drawings  of  which  were  sent  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment at  Richmond,  was  said  to  have  been  one  of  the  best- 
laid  plans  that  ever  illustrated  the  rules  of  strategy,  or 


Chap.  XL VIII.]        OPERATIONS  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  247 

ever  went  awry  on  account  of  practical  failures  in  its  ex- 
ecution." 

Having  failed  in  this  plan  for  dislodging  his  enemy 
from  Cheat  Mountain  and  relieving  Northwestern  Vir- 
ginia, Lee  determined  to  go  into  the  Kanawha  region,  and 
help  Floyd  and  Wise.  He  ordered  back  Floyd's  troops 
to  a  position  that  had  been  fortified  by  Wise,  and  named 
Camp  Defiance,  strengthening  the  works  by  a  breastwork 
four  miles  long.  He  had  now  under  his  command  nearly 
20,000  men.  Here  he  lay  making  preparations  to  attack 
Eosecrans,  who  was  in  front  of  him.  Eosecrans,  however, 
suddenly  retired  by  night,  and  was  not  pursued;  and 
again  a  clamor  rose  in  Eichmond  that  "  a  second  oppor- 
tunity for  a  decisive  battle  in  Virginia  had  been  lost." 

Some  unimportant  operations  now  took  place  at  New 
Eiver,  Eomney,  Alleghany  Summit,  Hunt- 

The  Confederates  .^i         ii'j  n     i  i» 

abandon  the  cam-  ersvillc ;  Dut  wiutcr  was  last  approachiug, 
and  the  Confederate  government,  greatly  dis- 
appointed at  the  course  of  events,  determined  to  abandon 
the  campaign.  Lee  was  recalled,  and  sent  to  take  charge 
of  the  coast  defenses  of  South  Carolina.  Wise  was  or- 
dered to  report  at  Eichmond.  Floyd  was  sent  to  the 
West. 

On  the  Confederate  side,  the  failure  of  this  campaign 
was  attributed  to  the  incapacity  of  General 

Lee  andMcClellan.  .-*•*' 

Lee;  on  the  national  side, the  success  was 
ascribed  to  the  talents  of  General  McClellan.  The  for- 
mer officer  was  greatly  blamed  by  the  government  at 
Eichmond ;  the  latter  still  more  greatly  rewarded  by  that 
at  Washington.  How  different  the  judgment  passed  upon 
these  soldiers  a  few  months  subsequently,  at  the  close  of 
the  Peninsular  campaign ! 

In  view  of  the  scale  on  which  it  was  soon  found  that 
Insignificance  of  Warlike  operatious  must  be  carried  on  for 
these  affairs.        ^-^^  ovcrthrow  of  the  Coufcdcracy,  we  may 


248  BUTLER  AT  FORTRESS  MONROE.  [Sect.  IX. 

see  how  insignificant  were  tlie  combats  of  this  campaign, 
and  how  unimportant  the  result.  Yet,  coming  at  a  time 
when  the  nation  was  deeply  depressed,  the  moral  effect 
was  great.  Though  McClellan  had  not  in  person  com- 
manded on  any  of  these  battle-fields,  he  gathered  the  en- 
tire honor. 

In  consequence  of  his  services  at  Bull  Eun,  Stonewall 
Jackson  had  been  made  a  major  general  in  the  Confed- 
erate service  and  assigned  command  at  Winchester.  On 
the  1st  of  January,  1862,  he  marched  westward,  capturing 
Bath  and  Komney,  but  was  obliged  to  return.  The^weath- 
er  was  so  severe  and  the  roads  so  dreadful  that  General 
Lander,  in  command  of  the  national  troops,  could  not 
move  more  than  a  mile  and  a  quarter  an  hour ;  he  him- 
self suffered  so  much  from  hardship  and  anxiety  that 
shortly  afterward  he  died.  Nevertheless,  he  had  succeed- 
ed in  clearing  his  department  of  the  Confederates. 

Fortress  Monroe,  commanding  Chesapeake  Bay  and 
-      ^     ,,  James  River,  is  the  lar^iest  and  most  power- 

Fortrees  Monroe,      ^t-t  .Y  it  t 

lul  military  work  in  the  republic.  It  was 
built  at  a  cost  of  two  and  a  half  millions  of  dollars.  It 
covers  an  area  of  nearly  seventy  acres. 

General  Butler,  whose  successful  restoration  of  order  in 
General  Butler  in  Baltimore  had  not  met  with  the  approval 
command.  ^£  Gcucral  Scott,  had  been  ordered  to  the 

command  of  this  work.  Soon  after  his  arrival  (May  2 2d), 
he  found  himself,  at  the  head  of  12,000  troops,  confronted 
by  8000  Confederates  under  General  Magruder.  He  at 
once  caused  a  reconnoissance  to  be  made  in  the  direction 
of  Hampton,  and  drove  the  Confederates  out  of  that  town. 
On  the  return  of  the  expedition  some  negroes  joined  it, 
and  having  informed  Butler  that  they  had  been  engaged 
in  the  building  of  fortifications,  he  declared  them  "  con- 


Chap.  XL VIII.]       EXPEDITION  AGAINST  BETHEL. 


249 


Origin  of  tlie  term 
"contrabands." 


Magruder's  force  at 
Yorktown. 


BETHEL  AND  FORTRESS  MONROE. 


traband  of  war."  The  government  subse- 
quently approving  of  his  course,  fugitive 
slaves  thereafter  passed  in  the  army  under  the  designa- 
tion of  contrabands. 

The  main  body  of  the  Con- 
federates under 
Magruderlay  at 
Yorktown,  but  they  had  out- 
posts at  Big  Bethel  and  Little 
Bethel.  With  a  view  of  ex- 
pelling them  from  these  po- 
sitions and  rendering  secure 
some  works  which  he  had 
constructed  at  Hampton  and 
Newport  I^ews,  Butler  direct- 
ed (June  10th)  Duryea's  Zou- 
His  outposts  at  ^v^s  and  Townsend's  Third  New  York  to 
Bethel.  g^-^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^£  Little  Bethel,  while  a  Ver- 

mont battalion  and  Bendix's  New  York  regiment  were 
to  attack  it  in  front.  The  expedition  was  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Pierce,  and  had  with  it  only  three  guns. 
Townsend's  troops  moved  along  the  road  from  Hampton, 
Bendix's  along  that  from  Newport  News.  They  simulta- 
neously reached  the  junction  of  the  roads  before  day- 
break, when  Bendix,  mistaking  Townsend  for  the  enemy, 
opened  fire  upon  him,  which  was  instantly  returned  by 
Townsend,  who  supposed  he  had  fallen  into  an  ambush. 
Expedition  against  That  portlou  of  the  cxpeditiou  which  had 
^^^°'*  already  passed  beyond  the  junction  of  the 

roads  toward  Little  Bethel,  hearing  the  firing,  supposed 
that  an  attack  was  being  made  on  its  rear.  Every  thing 
was  for  the  moment  in  confusion,  and  the  Confederates  in 
Little  Bethel,  taking  alarm,  at  once  fell  back  on  Big  Beth- 
el, where  Magruder,  with  1800  men,  was  posted. 

Thither,  after  destroying  the  abandoned  camp,  Pierce 


250  DEFEAT  OF  THE  NATIONAL  TEOOPS.  [Sect.  IX. 

advanced.  ,  The  position  occupied  by  the  Confederates 
They  fall  back  to  was  strong.  It  had  in  front  a  branch  of  the 
Big  Bethel.  Back  Eivcr,  crossed  by  a  bridge,  the  stream 

above  and  below  the  place  of  crossing  widening,  so  as  to 
forni-a  difficult  morass.  On  each  side  of  the  road  from 
the  bridge  was  an  earthwork,  and  on  their  right,  facing 
the  stream,  the  Confederates  had  a  line  of  intrenchments. 
Their  works  were  defended  by  twenty  guns. 

The  national  troops  advanced  at  once  under,  a  heavy 

Attack  by  the  na-  ^^^y  intending  to  rush  across  the  stream  and 
tionaitroops.        ^^^^^  ^|^^  ^^^^^^^     j^  ^-^^^^  howcvcr,  they 

were;  checked.    After  a  pause  of  two  hours  the  attempt 

was  renewed,  the  troops  on  the  left  crossed  the  morass, 

the  enemy  was  driven  out  of  the  battery 

Its  failure.    Death  ijii'i  i       i     ii         n         i  i 

ofwinthrop  and  ueai'cst  the  bridge,  but  the  nre  became  too 
hot,  and  the  assailants  were  again  repulsed. 
In  this  affair  the  loss  of  the  Confederates  was  insignifi- 
cant ;  that  of  the  national  troops  was  fifty-five,  of  whom 
sixteen  were  killed.  Among  the  latter,  deeply  regretted, 
was  Major  Theodore  Winthrop.  He  had  already  distin- 
guished himself  in  literary  life,  and  when  leading  his  men 
to  the  attack,  within  thirty  or  forty  yards  of  one  of  the 
batteries,  was  shot  through  the  head  by  a  North  Caro- 
lina drummer -boy.  Lieutenant  Greble,  who  had  been 
in  command  of  the  three  guns,  was  killed  in  attempting 
to  withdraw  them.  He  was  the  first  officer  of  the  regu- 
lar army  who  fell  in  the  Civil  War. 

"  This  is  an  ill  advised  and  badly  arranged  movement. 
I  am  afraid  no  good  will  come  of  it ;  and  as  for  myself,  I 
do  not  think  I  shall  come  off  the  field  alive" — so  Greble 
had  said  to  one  of  his  friends  before  starting.  In  this 
condemnation  of  the  expedition  the  nation  universally 
Joined. 

The  national  and  Confederate  forces  were  confronting 


CHAP.XLvm.]  BALL'S  bluff:  '  "251 

The  tragedy  at  ^^^  otlier  Oil  oppo&ite  sides  of  the  Potomac, 
Ball's  Bluff.  between  Washiiigtoii  and  Harper's  Ferry. 
General  McGlellan,  about  tlie  middle  of  October,  con- 
sidered it  desirable  to  ascertain  the  strength  of  his  an- 
tagonists in  the  vicinity  of  Dranesville,  and  accordingly 
caused  a  reconnoissance  to  be  made  by  General  McCall, 
on  the  19th  of  that  month.  He  likewise  desired  General 
Stone,  who  was  at  Poolesville,  to  keep  a  look-out  upon 
Leesburg,  and  suggested  that  a  "  slight  demonstration"  on 
his  part  might  have  the  effect  of  moving  the  enemy.  He 
did  not,  however,  contemplate  making  an  attack  upon 
them,  or  the  crossing  of  the  river  in  force  by  any  portion 
of  Stone's  command. 

Hereupon.  Colonel  Devins  was  ordered  by  Stone  to 
Devins's  reconnois-  "^ring  two  flat-boats  froiu  the  Chesapeake 
sauce.  ^^^  Ohio  Caual  into  the  river  opposite  Har- 

rison's Island,  and  ferry  some  troops  over  to  it.  This 
done,  Devins  sent  a  detachment  to  the  Virginia  shore  to 
make  an  exploration  toward  Leesburg,  which  had  been 
reported  to  be  evacuated.  They  discovered,  as  they  sup- 
posed, a  small  camp  about  a  mile  from  the  town.  Stone 
thereupon  ordered  Devins  to  land  on  Ball's  Bluff,  oppo- 
site the  island.  It  is  an  eminence  from  50  to  150  feet 
high.  He  was  to  surprise  the  discovered  camp,  destroy 
it,  examine  the  country,  and  return,  unless  he  should  find 
a  good  place  on  which  to  establish  himself,  in  which  case 
An  expedition  sets  rc-enforcemeuts  would  be  sent  him.  He  set 
°''*'  out  about  midnight;  the  clayey  bluff  was 

very  wet  and  slippery ;  he  reached  the  top  of  it  by  day- 
light (October  22d).  Advancing  within  a  mile  of  Lees- 
burg, he  could  find  no  enemy ;  the  reported  camp  proved 
to  be  an  illusion  due  to  openings  among  the  trees.  He 
therefore  halted  and  sent  to  Stone  for  further  orders.  At 
seven  o'clock,  perceiving  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  were 
gathering  around  him,  he  fell  back  toward  the  bluff,  and 


252  BALL'S  BLLTFF.  [Sect.  IX. 

stood  in  an  open  field  surrounded  by  woods.     Here  lie 
itis  enveloped  by   ^ecelved  orders  to  remain.     He  liad  about 
the  Confederates.    Q^Q  mejij  aud  a  re-euforcement  was  prom- 
ised.   About  noon,  the  Confederates,  having  occupied  the 
woods  on  three  sides  of  him,  began  to  attack  him,  com- 
pelling him  to  fall  back  toward  the  edge  of  the  bluff. 
At  length  re-enforcements  under  Colonel  Baker  arrived. 
They  had  orders  either  to  support  Devins  or  to  with- 
draw, as  Baker,  who  outranked  Devins,  might  judge  best. 
But  at  once  it  was  plain  that  there  was  no  option.    Dev- 
ins was  in  the  act  of  being  assaulted,  and  there  was  noth- 
ing to  do  but  to  support  him.     Baker  accordingly  took 
that  course.     The  entire  national  force  was  now  about 
1900  men.    They  were  in  an  open  field;  their  assailants  in 
the  surrounding  woods ;  the  bluff  down  which  they  must 
retreat  was  steep  and  slippery,  and  only  two  wretched 
scows  were  there  to  carry  them  across  to  Harrison's  Island. 
coioneiBakeris    Coloncl  Bakcr,  whilc  bravcly  holding  his 
kuied.  ground  at  the  head  of  his  troops,  was  killed. 

The  fire  was  becoming  momentarily  more  and  more  severe, 
and  the  enemy  receiving  re-enforcements.     The  national 
troops  were  forced  over  the  edge  of  the  bluff, 

The  national  troops  t    ,i        r^        r-    i         i  i.±*  •  /y 

forced  over  the       aud  the  Confederates  siettms:  possession  of 

bluff.  .  1  ,1  ,  T 

it,  a  massacre  ensued  among  the  struggling 
men  below.  Of  the  boats,  one  had  disappeared ;  the  oth- 
er was  quickly  swamped.  Some  tried  to  reach  the  isl- 
and by  swimming,  some  by  floating  on  logs;  they  were  de- 
An^assacreoftheru  H^erately  shot  by  their  antagonists  above. 
ensues.  Coloucl  Coggswcll,  who  had  succeeded  to 

the  command,  tried  to  force  his  way  to  Edwards's  Ferry, 
but  was  driven  back  by  a  Mississippi  regiment.  The  loss 
was  in  killed,  either  by  shooting  or  drowning,  300 ;  in 
wounded  and  prisoners,  more  than  700. 

Stone  had  thrown  a  small  force  across  the  river  at  Ed- 
wards's  Ferry.    They  advanced  about  three  miles  toward 


Chap.XLVIII.]  BALL'S  bluff.  253 

Leesburg  and  returned.  He  then  threw  over  General 
Gorman's  entire  brigade.  Had  this  been  done  earlier, 
the  movements  of  the  Confederates  would  have  been 
arrested,  and  the  tragedy  at  Ball's  Bluff  would  not  have 
occurred. 


SECTION  X. 

CAMPAIGNS  FOR  OPENING  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  AND  PIER- 
CING THE  GREAT  EAST  AND  WEST  LINE  OF  THE 
CONFEDERACY. 


CHAPTEE  XLIX. 


FORCING  OF  THE  FIRST  CONFEDERATE  LINE.  CAPTURE  OF  FORTS 
HENRY  AND  DONELSON,  AND  OPENING  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI  TO 
MEMPHIS. 

The  President  issued  a  general  War  Order,  directing  all  the  armies  to  advance  on 
the  22d  of  February,  1862. 

The  Tennessee  Rivei'  was  selected  by  General  Halleck  as  the  correct  line  of  opera- 
tion for  the  armies  of  the  central  region.  Under  his  orders,  Fort  Henry  was. 
captured  by  Foote,  and  Fort  Donelson  by  Grant. 

The  Confederate  line  being  thus  broken  at  its  centre,  Nashville  was  evacuated  on 
its  right,  and  Columbus  on  its  left.  Island  No.  10  and  Fort  Pillow  were  sur- 
rendered, and  the  Mississippi  opened  to  Memphis,  the  Confederate  fleet  at  that 
place  being  destroyed. 

The  battle  of  Bull  Eun  manifested  to  the  Nortliern 

Effect  of  the  battle  people  tko  real  nature  of  the  struggle  in 

of  Bull  Run.,        ^Hch  they  were  engaged — that  they  must 

accept  a  wasting  war,  or  consent  to  the  destruction  of  rejD- 

resentative  government  in  the  land. 

They  did  not  delay  in  making  their  choice.  It  was 
evident  that  more  vigor  must  be  infused  into  their  move- 
ments. Lieutenant  General  Scott,  who  was  at  the  head 
of  the  army,  and  who  thus  far  had  directed  all  the  mili- 
tary operations,  was,  in  consideration  of  his  age  and  great 
bodily  infirmities,  relieved  (July  loth)  from  the  more  act- 
ive portion  of  his  duties.     A  new  military  department, 


CSAP.XLIX.J      McCLELLAN  COMMA]J^DEIl-IN-CHIEF.  255 

to  be  known  as  that  of  Washington  and 


McClellan  in  com 


mand  at  Washing-  jN  ortheastem  Virginia,  was  lormed,  and  (ren- 
eral  McClellan  was  placed  in  command  of  it. 
As  has  been  already  related  in  detail  (Chapter  XLIV.), 
ArmyofthePoto-  Grcneral  McClellan  at  once  commenced  the 
mac  organized.  organization  of  the  great  army  authorized 
by  Congress.  His  views  of  the  military  position  and  ap- 
propriate military  conduct  were,  for  the  most  part,  ac- 
cepted, and  such  was  the  patriotism  of  the  people,  the 
resolution  of  Congress,  the  energy  of  the  executive,  that 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  reached  (p.  195),  on  Oc- 
tober 27th,  a  strength  of  nearly  one  hundred  and  seventy 
thousand  men  (168,318).  It  was  the  general's  opinion 
that  the  advance  upon  the  enemy  at  Manassas  should  not 
be  postponed  beyond  the  25th  of  November.  It  was  his 
desire  that  all  the  other  armies  should  be  stripped  of  their 
superfluous  strength,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  every  thing 
concentrated  in  the  force  under  his  command. 

On  the  31st  of  October,  General  Scott,  having  found  his 
bodily  infirmities  increasing,  addressed  a  let- 
tires  from  com-     ter  to  the  Secretary  of  War  requesting:  to  be 

mand.  ,*'  ,  \  ^  ^ 

placed  on  the  retired  list.  With  every  cir- 
cumstance that  could  indicate  an  appreciation  of  the  bril- 
liant services  which  the  aged  chief  had  rendered  the  re- 
public, his  desire  was  granted.  An  order  was  simultane- 
ously issued  appointing  General  McClellan  commander- 
in-chief  under  the  President. 

This  change  in  his  position  at  once  produced  a  change 
chan-e  in  General  ^^  Gcucral  McClellau's  vicws.  Hithcrto  he 
Mccieiian's  views.  -^^^  undervalued  the  importance   of  what 

was  to  be  done  in  the  West.  He  had  desired  the  West- 
ern armies  to  act  on  the  defensive.  Now  he  wished  to  in- 
stitute an  advance  on  East  Tennessee,  and  capture  Nash- 
ville contemporaneously  with  Eichmond.  This,  in  his 
military  administration,  implied  another  long  delay  to 


256        '  STANTON  SECRETARY  OF  WAR.  [Sect.  X. 

bring  up  the  organization  of  the  armies  of  the  West  to  an 
equality  with  that  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

In  preparation  for  this,  the  Department  of  the  West 
was   reorganized.     On  the   day  foUowins: 

Comniand  of  the       ,  oiiir   r^i    n       i  •  -r^ 

departmmits  re-  that  01  McClellan  s  promotion,  i^remont  was 
removed  from  his  command  (p.  234).  His 
department  was  subdivided  into  three:  (1.)  New  Mex- 
ico, which  was  assigned  to  Colonel  Canby ;  (2.)  Kansas, 
to  General  Hunter;  (3.)  Missouri,  to  General  Halleck. 
To  General  Buell  was  assigned  the  Department  of  the 
Ohio,  and  to  General  Kosecrans  that  of  West  Virginia. 

The  end  of  November  approached,  and  still  the  Army 
Immobility  6f  the  of  the  Potomac  had  not  moved.  The  weath- 
Potomac  army.  ^^  ^^^  magnificeut,  the  roads  excellent.  One 
excuse  after  another  was  alleged.  The  Confederate  army 
in  front  was  magnified  to  thrice  its  actual  strength.  Ex- 
penses were  accumulating  frightfully.  Winter  at  last 
came,  and  nothing  had  been  done. 

So  wore  away  day  after  day  and  month  after  month. 

The  clicking  telegraph  in  the  War  Ojffice 

eatSSSnwith'    had  nothinQT  to  say  but  "all  quiet  on  the 

McClellan.  _^  °  ^  ^ 

Potomac."  Not  alone  among  ttie  people, 
who  had  only  imperfect  information,  but  even  among 
officials  in  prominent  positions,  the  inquiry  became  more 
and  more  urgent,  "  When  will  McClellan  move  ?  What 
is  he  going  to  do  ?"  "  Sir,"  said  an  eminent  statesman,  to 
whom  Lincoln  addressed  that  now  painful  interrogatory, 
"  I  declare  to  you  my  firm  belief  that  to  this  day  he  has 
no  plan."  It  seemed  as  if  the  army  he  had  organized  was 
a  coat  of  mail  he  could  not  carry.  The  sword  he  had 
caused  to  be  forged  was  too  heavy  for  him  to  lift. 

Mr.  Stanton  had  succeeded  Mr.  Cameron  as  Secretary 
Stanton  made  sec-  of  War  (Jauuary  1 3th,  1862).  He  had  been 
retaryofwar.  attomcy  general  in  the  latter  part  of  Bu- 
chanan's administration,  and  had  acted  with  conspicuous 


Chap.  XLIX.]  THE  GENERAL  WAR  ORDER.  257 

energy  in  preserving  Washington  from  seizure  by  the 
conspirators  (p.  47).  To  him  Lincoln  spontaneously 
turned,  satisfied  that  by  him  the  great  duties  of  the  War 
Department  would  be  energetically  and  faithfully  dis- 
charged. Others,  who  had  aspired  to  the  position  thus 
unexpectedly  imposed  upon  Stanton,  declared  that  he  was 
unsuited  to  the  office;  that  he  was  a  man  of  only  one 
idea.  "  It  is  true,"  WTote  a  very  observant  foreigner  at 
that  time  residing  in  Washington,  "  he  is  a  man  of  one 
idea,  but  his  enemies  abstain  from  saying  that  his  one 
idea  is  the  grandeur  and  immortality  of  the  Republic." 

At  Stanton's  suggestion,  the  President,  whose  patience 
He  infnses  energv   ^as  Completely  wom  out  by  McClellan's  in- 
in  the  department,  activity,  Issucd  au  ordcr  that  on  the  2 2d  day 
of  February  a  general  movement  of  the  land  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States  against  the  insurgent  states 
should  take  place ;  that  "  especially  the  army  at  or  about 
Fortress  Monroe,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  Army  of 
Western  Virginia,  the   army  near  Mumfordsville,  Ken- 
^  tucky,  the  army  and  flotilla  near  Cairo,  and 

genera^^waror-^  thc  uaval  force  lu  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  be 
ready  to  move  on  that  day.  That  all  other 
forces,  both  land  and  naval,  with  their  respective  com- 
manders, obey  existing  orders  for  the  time,  and  be  ready 
to  obey  additional  orders  when  duly  given.  That  the 
heads  of  departments,  and  especially  the  Secretaries  of 
War  and  the  Navy,  with  all  their  subordinates,  and  the 
generals  in  chief,  with  all  other  commanders  and  subor- 
dinates of  land  and  naval  forces,  will  severally  be  held  to 
their  strict  and  full  responsibilities  for  the  prompt  execu- 
tion of  this  order." 

A  special  war  order  was  issued  January  31st, "  that  all 
Special  order  as  to  ^hc  disposablc  forcc  of  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
the  Potomac  Army.  ^^^^^^  ^^^^^  providlng  safcly  for  the  defense 

of  Washington,  be  formed  into  an  expedition  for  the  im- 
II.— R 


258  CONFEDERATE  LINE  OF  DEFENSE.  [Sect.  X. 

mediate  object  of  seizing  upon  tlie  railroad  soutliwest- 
ward  of  wliat  is  known  as  Manassas  Junction ;  all  details 
to  be  in  the  discretion  of  the  commander-in-chief,  and  the 
expedition  to  move  before  or  on  the  2 2d  day  of  Febru- 
ary next."  This  order  was,  however,  subsequently  modi- 
fied. 

These  orders  carried  upon  their  face  the  distrust  which 
the  administration  had  conceived  of  General  McClellan, 
a  distrust  fast  spreading  all  over  the  country.  It  was 
felt  not  alone  in  the  council  chamber  of  the  cabinet,  but 
among  all  grades  of  society. 

With  the  President's  order  of  January  27th  the  war 
may  be  said  to  have  begun  systematically. 

The  rivers  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  show  by  their 
Commencement  of  course  that  thoso  statcs  prcscut  a  topograph- 
"'®^*''*  ical  incline  to  the  northwest,  the  Cumber- 

land Mountains  being  its  culminating  ridge.  Down  the 
gentle  slope  thus  afforded,  the  Tennessee  and  its  affluent 
the  Duck,  the  Cumberland,  the  Green,  the  Kentucky,  the 
Big  Sandy,  empty  into  the  Ohio.  Beyond  the  ridge  the 
rivers  flow  southward  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

Political  as  well  as  military  considerations,  already  de- 
Thefirstiineofcon-  scrlbcd  (p.  219),  had  led  the  Confederate 
federate  defense,  (jg^^ers  to  cstablish  upou  this  iucliue  their 
first  line  of  defense.  Commencing  at  Columbus,  a  little 
below  the  junction  of  the  Mississippi  and  Ohio  Kivers  at 
Cairo,  it  crossed  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland,  having 
on  the '.former  Fort  Henry,  on  the  latter  Fort  Donelson. 
Eastward  of  the  latter  post  there  was  an  intrenched  camp 
at  Bowling  Green.  The  Confederate  left,  therefore,  rest- 
ed on  the  Mississippi,  their  right  on  the  intrenched  camp 
at  Bowling  Green,  which  was  at  the  junction  of  the  Mem- 
phis and  Ohio  with  the  Louisville  and  N"ashville  Kailroad. 
A  railroad  connection  between  the  ends  of  the  line  gave 


Chap.  XLIX.] 


HALLECK'S  WAR-PLAN. 


259 


facilities  for  military  movements.  The  intrenched  camp 
covered  the  city  of  Nashville. 

In  November,  1861,  General  Halleck  was  directed  to 
General  Haiieck  in  ^^^^  command  of  the  Department  of  Mis- 
command.  g^^^'^     j^  includcd  Mlssourl,  lowa,  Minne- 

sota, Wisconsin,  Illinois,  Arkansas,  and  Kentucky  west  of 
the  Cumberland  Mountains.  He  divided  it  into  districts, 
assigning  to  General  U.  S.  Grant  the  District  of  Cairo, 
which  also  included  Paducah,  in  Kentucky.  Cairo,  at  the 
junction  of  the  Ohio  and  the  Mississippi,  is  a  place  of 
great  strategic  importance. 


I 


THE   CAMPAIGN   OP  THE   TENNESSEE. 


Halleck  saw  at  once  that  the  military  operations  which 
His  views  on  the    l^^d  bccu  cariicd  on  in  Missouri  by  Gener- 

correct  war-plan.     ^^^     j^^^^^    ^^^^.^^    ^^^    FrCmOUt     (Chapter 

XL VII.)  were  in  reality  without  significance,  so  far  as 


260  OPERATIONS  ON  THE  TENNESSEE.       [Sect.X. 

the  overthrow  of  the  Confederacy  was  concerned,  and 
that  the  proper  movement  was  the  forcing  of  the  Confed- 
erate line  just  described  as  reaching  from  the  Mississippi 
to  Bowling  Green.  He  therefore,  on  the  removal  of  Fre- 
He  withdraws  from  Hiont,  causcd  the  army  in  Missouri  to  retire 

to  RoUa  (p.  235),  his  course  in  this  respect 
meeting  with  much  condemnation  among  those  who  only 
looked  at  the  consequences  it  brought  on  the  inhabitants 
of  that  country,  and  did  not  comprehend  the  character  of 
the  movement  about  to  be  put  into  execution. 

One  evening  late  in  December  (1861),  Generals  Hal- 

leck,  Sherman,  and  CuUum  were  conversing 
sionastothetrue    to^cther  at  thc  Plautcrs'  Hotel,  in  St.  Louis, 

Ime  of  operation.  ^  ,  ,  '  ^ 

on  the  proper  Ime  of  invasion.  They  saw^ 
clearly  that  the  Confederates  meant  to  stand  on  the  de- 
fensive, and  Halleck  asked, "  Where  is  their  line  ?"  Sher- 
man replied, "  Why,  from  Bowling  Green  to  Columbus." 
"Well,  then,  where  is  the  true  point  of  attack?"  "Nat- 
urally the  centre."  "Then  let  us  see  what  is  the  direc- 
tion in  which  it  should  be  made." 

A  map  lay  on  the  table,  and,  with  a  blue  pencil,  Hal- 
leck drew  a  line  from  Bowling  Green  to  Columbus,  past 
Donelson  and  Henry,  and  another  perpendicular  to  its 
centre,  which  happened  to  coincide  nearly  with  the  Ten- 
nessee River.  "  There,"  said  he, "  that  is  the  true  line  of 
attack." 

This  forcing  of  the  Confederate  line  would  bring  the 
important  states  Kentucky  and  Tennessee 

Effect  of  operations  -,  ,.  -,  .       •,       •,*         tiji* 

on  the  line  of  the     uudcr  uatioual  control ;  it  would  take  m  re- 

Tgdugssgg 

verse  the  strong  works  on  the  Mississippi, 
which  could  not  be  reduced  by  a  mere  naval  attack ;  it 
would  open  that  great  river ;  it  would  permit  the  pas- 
sage of  a  national  army  into  the  recesses  of  the  Cotton 
States,  and  expose  Georgia,  South  Carolina,  North  Caro- 
lina, and  even  Virginia,  to  attack  on  an  unj^rotected  flank. 


chap.xlix.]  the  opposing  armies.  261 

In  determining  the  mode  in  whicli  this  movement 
Conditions  of  that  should  be  camed  into  execution,  it  was  evi- 
movement.  ^^^^  ^-^^^  ^j^^  essential  point  was  the  seiz- 

ure of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  Eivers.  This  im- 
plied the  reduction  of  the  two  forts  Henry  and  Donelson, 
on  which  the  Confederates  were  relying  for  the  protection 
of  those  rivers. 

The  Confederate  line  of  defense  had  been  intrusted  to 
The  Confederate  Greueral  Albert  Sydney  Johnston.  He  was 
post  at  Columbus.  ^^  Bowliug  Grceu,  confronting  General  Buell. 
The  fortified  post  at  Columbus,  on  which  the  left  flank 
of  the  Confederates  rested,  was  considered  by  them  to  be 
the  Gibraltar  of  America.  They  believed  that  it  would 
close  the  Mississippi  until  their  independence  w^as  ac- 
knowledged. It  was  in  charge  of  General  Polk  (p.  226). 
The  .  strength  of  the  entire  force  holding  the  line  was 
about  60,000  men. 
To  execute  the  proposed  operation  two  national  armies 
were  available.     One  lay  at  Cairo,  under 

The  national  armies    ^-^  i    r^  i         rm  •,!     'i  t 

at  Cairo  and  Louis-  {xeueYSii  Graut.     Incrc  was  with  it  a  naval 

ville.  ,  . 

force,  having  some  iron-clad  gun-boats  un- 
der Commodore  Foote.  The  second  army  was  at  Louis- 
ville. It  was  under  command  of  General  Buell,  and  was 
40,000  strong. 

It  had  been  intended  originally  that  Grant's  force 
should  operate  directly  on  the  Mississippi  River,  forcing 
it  open,  and  that  Buell's  army  should  strike  at  the  in- 
trenched camp  at  Bowling  Green.  If  the  force  there 
were  disposed  of,  Nashville,  in  its  rear,  must  necessarily 
be  abandoned. 

In  Halleck's  view,  the  operation  on  the  line  of  the 
Tennessee  River  would  accomplish  all  these  results.  If 
the  army  and  the  gun-boats  could  force  their  way  up  that 
stream,  Columbus  and  Bowling  Green,  no  matter  how 
strong  they  might  be,  must  both  at  once  fall,  and  Nash- 
ville must  share  their  fate. 


262 


OPEEATIONS  AGAINST  FORT  HENRY. 


[Sect.  X. 


Fort  Henry,  on  tlie  east  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  and 
Fort  Donelson,  on  the  west  bank   of  the 

Operations  com-       r^         t        -i         ^  ii*  t  .i  ■^ 

menced  against     (Jumberland,  were    bastioned    earthworks. 

Fort  Henry.  '  t     n  t 

twelve  miles  apart,  connected  by  a  road. 
Immediately  after  the  issue  of  the  President's  war  order 
(January  27th,  1862)  commanding  a  general  movement, 
operations  were  undertaken  against  Fort  Henry.     Of  the 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 


fleet  of  gun-boats  employed,  four  were  iron-clad  and  three 
wooden.  They  were  under  Commodore  Foote.  The  land 
force  was  under  General  Grant.  The  garrison  of  the  fort, 
commanded  by  General  Tilghman,  was  2734  strong;  the 
armament  was  seventeen  guns. 

Halleck  gave  the  necessary  orders  for  the  expedition 
Condition  of  that  ^^  ^^^  30th  of  Jauuary,  and  Grant  left  Cairo 
^"^^-  with  17,000  men.     The  Confederates  had 

works  on  both  sides  of  the  river.  Fort  Henry  being  on 
the  east  bank  and  Fort  Heiman  on  the  west,  the  latter 
commanding  the  former.  The  country  was  all  under 
water,  the  river  overflowing,  the  rain  still  falling  in  tor- 
rents. Though  Tilghman  was  receiving  re-enforcements 
and  hastening  the  completion  of  his  works,  he  found  that 
he  must  withdraw  from  Fort  Heiman  and  defend  Fort 
Henry  alone. 


Chap.  XLIX.]  CAPTURE  OE  FORT  HENRY.  263 

It  was  understood  between  Foote  and  Grant  that  the 
Bombardment  of  ^^^^^  ^as  to  reduce  the  fort,  the  latter  to 
the  fort.  Q^^  ^^  ^]^Q  retreat  of  the  garrison.     The  at- 

tack was  to  begin  at  twelve  o'clock  (February  6th). 
Foote  thought  he  could  reduce  the  work  in  an  hour,  and 
Grant,  whose  forces  were  three  miles  below,  allowed  him- 
self two  hours  to  accomplish  his  march.  The  gun-boats 
commenced  their  fire  at  a  thousand  yards,  approaching 
gradually  within  six  hundred. 

Tilghman  returned  the  fire  at  first  very  vigorously,  but 
Intentions  of  Gen-  ^  serfcs  of  accldeuts  lu  succcsslou  befell  him 
erai Tilghman.  _^  ^.'^^^  24-pounder  burst,  killing  and 
wounding  a  number  of  his  men ;  a  premature  discharge 
of  a  42-pounder  killed  three  of  its  gunners.  From  the 
beginning  he  had  foreseen  that  he  could  not  hold  the 
place.  In  his  report  he  says, "  My  object  was  to  save  the 
main  body  by  delaying  matters  as  long  as  possible.  I 
therefore  ordered  Colonel  Ileiman  to  join  his  command 
and  keep  up  the  retreat  in  good  order,  while  I  would 
fight  the  guns  as  long  as  one  was  left,  and  sacrifice  my- 
self to  save  the  main  body  of  my  troops."  He  had  given 
orders  for  the  garrison  to  retire  to  Fort  Donelson  before 
the  firing  began.  He  worked  one  of  the  guns  himself 
At  the  end  of  little  more  than  an  hour,  he,  with  his  staif 
and  sixty  men,  surrendered  unconditionally  to  Foote.  His 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  twenty-one. 

As  the  land  forces  under  Grant  had  been  delayed  by 
He  withdraws  the  *^^  ^^^^^  ^^  ^^^  roads  lougcr  than  had  been 
garrison,  anticipated,  the  Confederate  garrison  under 

Heiman  made  their  escape  safely.  On  the  national  side, 
the  chief  casualty  occurred  on  board  the  iron-clad  Essex, 
which  received  a  shot  in  her  boiler,  in  consequence  of 
which  twenty-nine  ofiicers  and  men  were  scalded. 

The  conduct  of  General  Tilghman  in  this  affair  stands 
in  very  striking  contrast  with  that  of  Floyd  and  Pillow 


264  •     ^ORT  DONELSON.  [Sect.  X. 


and  then  surrenders 
the  work. 


Position  of  Donel- 
son. 


at  Donelson.     For  the  sake  of  giving  time 
for  his  garrison  to  make  good  its  escape,  lie 
continued  his  hopeless  resistance,  and  surrendered  him- 
self prisoner  along  with  his  artillerists. 
Fort  Henry  thus  secured,  General  Halleck  next  turned 
his  attention  to  Fort  Donelson.     Re-enforce- 
tacking  Fort  Donei-  mcuts  wcre  therefore  rapidly  brousrht  from 
Buell's  army,  and  also  from  St.  Louis,  Cairo, 
Cincinnati,  and  Kansas. 

The  Tennessee  and  Cumberland,  as  they  approach  the 
Ohio,  run  northward  and  nearly  parallel  to 
each  other.  Fort  Donelson  was  about  forty 
miles  above  the  mouth  of  the  Cumberland,  and  on  its 
west  bank.  It  was  a  large  field-work  of  a  hundred  acres, 
near  the  town  of  Dover,  on  a  bluff  rising  by  a  gentle 
slope  from  the  river,  at  the  point  where  the  stream  turns 
from  its  westerly  course.  The  height  of  the  bluff  is  about 
100  feet.  The  strength  of  the  work  was  directed  toward 
the  river,  which  it  effectually  commanded ;  on  the  land 
side  it  was  comparatively  weak.  The  entire  artillery,  in- 
cluding light  batteries,  was  65  pieces.  The 
strength  oflhe  evcutual  Strength  of  the  garrison  was  2 1 ,000. 
The  surrounding  country  was  rugged,  hilly, 
and  heavily  wooded.  Round  the  works  timber  had  been 
felled,  and  small,  trees  half  chopped  off  formed  an  aba- 
tis. Two  creeks,  flooded  by  the  rains,  formed  defenses  on 
the  right  and  left. 

As  soon  as  it  became  clear  that  the  fort  was  about  to 
be  attacked  from  the  land  side,  the  Confederate  com- 
manders exerted  themselves  to  strengthen  it.  A  fortified 
line  two  miles  and  a  half  in  length,  inclosing  the  town  of 
Dover,  was  drawn  along  the  commanding  high  grounds. 
Re-enforcements  were  sent  from  Bowling  Green  by  the 
railroad,  and  the  work  pushed  on  day  and  night.  The 
gaiTison  of  Fort  Henry  came  in  on  the  7th,  the  command 


Chap.xlix.]  operations  against  fort  DONELSON.  265 

of  Pillow  arrived  on  the  lOth,  that  of  Buckner  on  the 
11th,  that  of  Floyd  on  the  13th.  Floyd,  as  the  senior 
officer,  was  in  command. 

Grant  moved  from  Fort  Henry  upon  Donelsoh,  with 
„  -  •       about  15,000  men,  on  Wednesday,  the  12th. 

Grant  prepares  to  ^  '  •^  ' 

attack  it.  jjg  ]^a(j  'h^^n  obliged  to  submit  to  this  de- 

lay to  give  time  for  preparing  the  gun -boats,  though 
every  hour  of  it  was  strengthening  the  enemy.  His  fore- 
most brigade  went  by  the  telegraph  road ;  the  others  by 
the  Dover  Eoad.  He  was  before  the  fort  in  the  after- 
noon of  that  day,  and  spent  the  remaining  daylight  in 
bringing  his  troops  into  position.  Batteries  were  posted 
and  the  movement  completed  in  the  night.  It  was  his 
intention,  if  the  gun-boats  should  arrive,  to  make  an  at- 
tack next  morning.  His  force  consisted  of  the  division 
of  McClernand,  containing  the  four  brigades  of  Oglesby, 
W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  McArthur,  Morrison ;  the  division  of 
C.  F.  Smith,  containing  the  three  brigades  of  Cook,  Lau- 
man,  and  M.  L.  Smith.  The  division  of  Lewis  Wallace 
did  not  arrive  until  the  14th.  Smith's  division  was  to 
be  on  the  left,  Lewis  Wallace's  at  the  centre,  McClernand's 
on  the  right.  He  formed  his  first  line  opposite  the  ene- 
my's centre,  his  left  resting  on  Hickman  Creek,  his  right 
reaching  not  quite  round  to  Dover.  The  advance  was 
very  difficult  on  account  of  a  growth  of  dwarf  oaks. 

Though  the  gun-boats  had  not  arrived,  a  cannonade 
McClernand's  pre-  ^^^^  opcued.  McClcmand  made  an  attack 
mature  assault.  ^^  ^  battcTy  Commanding  the  ridge  road 
on  which  Grant  moved.  He  met  with  a  repulse  in  his 
attempt  to  carry  it.  There  was  a  bitter  storm  of  hail 
and  snow  after  dark,  yet  the  troops  bivouacked  in  line 
of  battle.  They  had  no  tents  and  no  fires ;  many  of  them 
were  without  blankets.  The  cries  of  the  wounded  call- 
ing for  water  were  heard  all  that  night. 

At  midnight  six  gun-boats  and  fourteen  transports  had 


250  DEFEAT  OF  THE  GUN-BOATS.  [Sect.  X. 

Arrival  of  the  gun-  amved,  the  latter  bringing  Lewis  Wallace's 
•^''**^'  division,  and  giving  Grant  a  superiority  of 

force.  Up  to  this  time  he  had  not  been  as  strong  as  the 
Confederates.  It  took  longer  than  had  been  anticipated 
to  get  these  troops  into  position,  and  the  consequence 
was  that  the  attack  on  Friday  had  to  be  mainly  carried 
on  by  the  boats. 

Of  the  gun-boats  four  were  iron-clad,  the  remaining  two 
wooden.  The  former  opened  their  fire  and  advanced  un- 
til they  were  within  three  hundred  yards  of  the  Confed- 
erate batteries,  which,  up  to  this  time  silent,  were  now 
vigorously  worked.  Their  plunging  fire,  for  they  were 
elevated  about  thirty  feet,  soon  told  heavily  on  the  boats. 
For  an  hour  and  a  half  the  contest  was  maintained,  when 
the  steering  apparatus  of  two  was  disabled,  and  they 
drifted  down  the  stream.  The  others  were  compelled  to 
withdraw.     They  had  a  loss  of  54  killed 

They  are  defeated.  "^  ^^ 

and  wounded;  among  the  latter  was  Com- 
modore Foote.  In  the  Confederate  batteries  no  one  was 
killed,  and  the  works  were  uninjured. 

Thus  the  attack  from  the  river,  as  well  as  McClernand's 
partial  attempt  from  the  land  side,  had  failed,  and  appar- 
ently it  had  become  necessary  for  the  national  command- 
ers to  have  re-enforcements. 

But  Floyd  had  taken  alarm.  He  had  seen  that  heavy 
Floyd  becomes  rc  -  cnforccments,  Lewis  Wallace's  division, 
alarmed.  ^^^  ^|^^^  ^^^  arrlvcd ;  he  considered  that, 

notwithstanding  his  success  in  beating  off  the  gun-boats, 
there  was  no  place  within  his  intrenchments  that  could 
not  be  reached  by  the  enemies'  artillery  fire  from  their 
boats  or  their  batteries,  and  that  there  was  nothing  to 
prevent  them  from  passing  a  column  above  him  on  the 
river,  and  thus  cutting  off  his  only  remaining  communica- 
iie  summons  a  tlou — that  by  watcr— aud  preventing  the 
council.  possibility  of  egress.    He  therefore  summon- 


Chap.  XLIX.]  SORTIE  OF  THE  GARRISON.  267 

ed  a  council  that  evening,  at  wliicli  it  was  determined  to 
abandon  the  fort,  force  a  way  past  Grant's  right,  and  es- 
cape to  Nashville. 

At  that  time,  owing  to  the  high  water  of  the  river, 
there  was  but  one  practicable  road — Wynn's  Ferry  Eoad. 
Between  it  and  the  river  lay  the  division  of  McClernand, 
the  national  right  wing.  The  Confederate  operation. 
It  determines  to  therefore,  was  to  throw  their  left,  Pillow's 
make  a  sortie.  ^ivisiou,  agalust  tho  uatloual  right  flank, 
McClernand' s,  and,  with  Buckner's  division  drawn  from 
their  right,  and  leaving  there  only  a  weak  force,  to  attack 
the  right  of  the  national  centre,  which  was  upon  the 
Wynn's  Ferry  Eoad.  If  Pillow  could  force  back  the  na- 
tional right  upon  the  centre,  and  Buckner  take  the  disor- 
dered mass  in  flank,  it  was  expected  that  the  whole  would 
be  rolled  back  on  the  left — McClernand  upon  Wallace, 
and  both  upon  Smith — and  that  the  Wynn's  Ferry  Eoad 
would  be  opened. 

f  On  Wednesday  night  the  air  had  been  warm  and  ge- 
nial ;  the  sky  was  cloudless,  the  moon  at  full.  On  the 
night  of  Thursday  the  weather  changed ;  there  was  a 
storm  of  sleet  and  snow.  On  Friday  night  it  was  in- 
tensely cold ;  the  thermometer  had  fallen  to  10°  Fahr- 
enheit. Nevertheless,  the  Confederates  got  ready  to  ex- 
ecute their  desperate  undertaking  on  Saturday  morning 
at  five  o'clock,  an  hour  before  day. 

At  first  fortune  favored  the  boldly  conceived  and  brave- 
it  is  at  first  sue-  ty  exccutcd  attciupt.  The  Confederates'  left 
cessfui.  forced  from  their  position  the  two  national 

right  brigades.  Meantime  Buckner,  who  had  brought 
his  troops  over  from  the  Confederate  right,  assaulted  the 
third  right  national  brigade,  at  first  ineffectually,  but  at 
length,  stimulated  by  Pillow's  results,  successfully.  Nev- 
The  national  right  Grthclcss,  McClcmand's  troops  did  not  re- 
wmg  forced  back.    ^j.q^j.  ^ntil  their  ammunition  was  exhausted. 


268  SUCCESS  OF  THE  SORTIE.  [Sect.  X. 

At  nine  o'clock  Grant's  riglit  wing  Lad  been  completely 
pressed  from  its  ground  and  the  Wynn's  Ferry  Road 
opened.     The  Confederates  might  now  have  escaped. 

All  this  occurred  during  the  absence  of  Grant.  He 
had  gone  on  board  a  gun-boat  at  2  A.M.  to  consult  with 
Commodore  Foote,  who  had  been  wounded,  and  had  asked 
for  this  consultation.  Already  Lewis  Wallace,  who  was 
holding  Grant's  centre,  had  sent  one  of  his  brigades  to 
the  assistance  of  the  defeated  right  wing,  but  with  no 
other  result  than  to  participate  in  their  disaster.  With 
his  remaining  brigade,  however,  he  presented  a  firm  front 
at  right  angles  to  his  former  one,  and  behind  this  the  de- 
feated troops  of  the  right  wing  rallied  and  reformed. 

Against  this  the  Confederates,  flushed  with  success,  but 
not  altogether  without  confusion,  advanced.  They  were 
received  with  such  a  fire  that  they  instantly  broke,  and, 
on  making  a  second  attempt,  broke  again.  This  time 
they  could  not  be  rallied. 

Grant  had  now  come  on  the  field.  It  was  about  nine 
^  . .     ,^    ,    o'clock.     Thousrh  the  battle  had  lulled,  ev- 

Decision  of  Grant  ^  ^  ,  ^ 

ery  thing  was  in  confusion.  The  troops 
were  scattered  in  knots.  At  a  glance  he  appreciated  the 
disaster  and  took  his  resolve.  "  On  riding  upon  the  field, 
I  saw  that  either  side  was  ready  to  give  way  if  the  other 
showed  a  bold  front.  I  took  the  opportunity,  and  order- 
ed an  advance  of  the  whole  line."  Smith,  with  the  left 
wing,  was  to  storm  the  enemy's  works  in  his  front,  Wal- 
lace to  recover  the  ground  that  had  been  lost  on  the 
right.  A  request  was  sent  to  the  gun-boats  to  make  a 
vigorous  demonstration. 

The  removal  of  Buckner  from  Smith's  front  for  the 
early  attack  in  the  morning  had  greatly  weakened  the 
right  of  the  Confederate  line.  Buckner,  therefore,  was 
now  ordered  back.  But  it  was  too  late.  The  storming 
column,  with  Smith  at  its  head,  was  steadily  and  irresist- 


Chap.  XLIX.]      THE  CONFEDERATES  FORCED  BACK.  2^C^ 

Successful  assault   iblj  advancing.     It  forced  its  way  np  the 
of  Smith.  g^^^p  l^-|l^     ^g  Buckner's  troops  came  on, 

they  encountered  such  a  fire  as  hurled  them  out  of  the 
way.  The  abatis  was  torn  aside,  the  key-point  of  the  fort 
was  seized ;  the  Confederates  fled  into  the  work.  Smith 
had  gained  possession  of  the  high  ground  from  which  the 
entire  right  of  the  defenses  of  Donelson  might  be  enfi- 
laded. 

Buckner's  withdrawal  from  the  ground  that  had  been 
conquered  in  the  morning  now  weakened 
forced'backhfto^  aud  demoralized  the  Confederate  left.  At 
this  instant  Wallace  made  his  attack  on  that 
front.  It  was  impossible  to  resist  him.  The  Confeder- 
ates here  also  recoiled  to  their  own  works.  The  oppor- 
tunity they  had  won  at  one  moment  was  lost.  Not  only 
was  the  line  of  investment  renewed,  but  the  fort  had  be- 
come imtenable:  had  daylight  lasted  half  an  hour  longer 
it  would  have  been  taken.  The  losses  on  each  side  amount- 
ed to  about  two  thousand  killed  and  wounded. 

Darkness  fell  upon  Donelson.  The  cold  was  more  than 
twenty  degrees  below  the  freezing  point.  The  woods 
were  covered  with  a  sleety  incrustation  of  ice ;  they  sway- 
ed and  crackled  in  the  night  air.  Grant  fell  asleep  in  a 
negro  hut.  Smith  on  the  hard -frozen  ground.  On  the 
battle-field  there  lay  four  thousand  Americans,  many  of 
them  dead,  many  freezing  to  death.  Wallace,  whose 
troops  were  nearest  the  scene  of  agony,  employed  his 
men  until  "  far  in  the  morning  in  ministering  to  our  own 
wounded,  but  we  did  not  forget  those  of  the  enemy."  A 
piteous  wail  for  water  was  heard  in  all  directions,  for  the 
cannon  were  now  silent.  It  smote  on  the  ears  of  Floyd. 
The  arms  that  he  had  scattered  all  over  the  South  had 
been  used! 

He  called  a  council  of  war  at  Pillow's  head-quarters. 
It  was  concluded  that  any  attempt  to  renew  the  sortie 


270-  ESCAPE  OF  FLOYD  AND  PILLOW.  [Sect.  X. 

They  hold  a  night  would  be  absolutelj  disastrous.  Buckner 
council.  declared  that  lie  could  not  liold  the  position 

for  half  an  hour  after  daylight.  In  his  opinion  there  was 
no  escape  from  a  surrender. 

"  There  is  nothing  for  us  but  to  capitulate  "  exclaimed 
Floyd  determines  to  Floyd ;  "  yct  I  cau  uot  surreudcr— I  can  not 
escape.  surrcudcr.    You  know  the  position  in  which 

I  stand."  He  asked  advice  of  his  subordinates,  some  of 
whom  did  not  hesitate  to  express  very  plainly  disappro- 
bation of  his  intention  of  escaping  from  the  fort.  -Buck- 
ner, thinking  it  dishonorable  not  to  share  the  fate  of  the 
men,  said, "You  must  judge  for  yourself"  "General," 
said  Floyd  to  him, "if  we  put  you  in  command,  will  you 
let  me  take  away  my  brigade  V 

Floyd  now  turned  the  command  over  to  Pillow,  who 

•He  carries  off  the   tumcd  it  ovcr  to  Buckucr.     Pillow  then 

Virginia  troops.     ^^^^^^^  ^^^  ^iver  iu  a  SCOW.     Floyd  escaped 

with  his  Virginia  brigade.  By  the  light  of  lanterns  they 
went  on  board  a  steam-boat  at  the  wharf,  many  of  the 
men  half  tipsily  staggering  under  their  knapsacks,  all 
shivering  with  the  cold.  A  crowd  was  cursing  and  hissing 
at  the  fugitives.  But  in  this  her  hour  of  dire  humiliation 
Virginia  was  not  without  soldiers  who  vindicated  her 
honor.  There  were  those  who  disdained  to  follow  such 
a  shameful  example,  who  chose  to  remain  and  share  the 
fate  of  Buckner  and  his  men. 

At  daylight  Grant  was  ready  to  make  the  assault.    He 

Grant  ready  for  the    ^^^    ^OW   27,000    UieU,  but    OUly   eight  light 

assault.  batteries  of  artillery.    A  white  flag  was  seen 

on  Donelson,  and  a  note  was  received  from  Buckner,  to 
which  Grant  at  once  replied : 

"  Sir, — Yours  of  this  date,  proposing  an  armistice  and  appoint- 
ment of  commissioners  to  settle  terms  of  capitulation,  is  just  re- 
ceived. No  terms  other  than  an  unconditional  and  immediate  sur- 
render can  be  accepted.  I  propose  to  move  immediately  on  your 
works.     I  am,  sir,  very  respectfullv,  your  obedient  servant, 

"U.S.Grant." 


Chap.  XLIX.]  THE  SURRENDER  OF  DONELSON.  271 

To  this  Buckner  replied : 

"  SiE, — The  distribution  of  the  forces  under  my  command,  inci- 
Surrender  of  the  ^^^^  t^  an  unexpected  change  of  commanders,  and 
^^^^'  the  overwhelming  force  under  your  command,  com- 

pel me,  notwithstanding  the  brilliant  success  of  the  Confederate 
arms  yesterday,  to  accept  the  ungenerous  and  unchivalrous  terms 
which  you  propose.     I  am,  sir,  your  very  obedient  servant, 

"S.B.BUCKNEK." 

Hereupon  Grant  rode  over  to  Buckner's  head-quarters, 

Generous  terms     ^^^^  spontaueouslj  couseuted  that  the  offi- 

giveu  by  Grant.     ^^^^  should  keep  their  side-arms,  and  both 

officers  and  men  their  personal  baggage.     He  desired  to 

do  nothing  that  might  have  the  appearance  of  inflicting 

humiliation. 

Nearly  15,000  prisoners,  17,600  small-arms,  and  65  guns 

The  spoils  of  the    wcre  takcu.     That  such  was  the  number  of 

victory.  prisoners  was  shown  by  the  fact  that  rations 

were  issued  at  Cairo  to  14,623.    Grant's  losses  were  2041, 

of  whom  425  were  killed. 

In  his  congratulatory  order  to  his  troops,  Grant  tells 
them  that  "  for  four  successive  ni^rhts,  with- 

Grant's  cougratula-  iiiii*  i  ., 

tory  order  to  his     out  sncltcr  durinp;  the  most  inclement  weath- 

troops.  c5 

er  known  in  this  latitude,  they  had  faced 
an  enemy  in  large  force,  and  in  a  position  chosen  by  him- 
self, and  had.  compelled  him  to  surrender  without  con- 
ditions, the  victory  achieved  being  not  only  great  in  the 
effect  it  must  have  in  breaking  down  the  rebellion,  but 
also  in  this,  that  it  had  secured  the  greatest  number  of 
prisoners  of  war  ever  taken  in  any  battle  on  this  con- 
tinent." 

The  inauguration  of  Davis  as  permanent  President  of 

the  Confederate  States  occurred  simultane- 

^^^^'H^^'^^y^'"''    ously  with- the  reception  of  the  news  of  the 

and  riUow.  n  -^t       n-t-\  -t  '  ■  -r 

fall  of  Donelson.  In  a  special  message  which 
he  was  constrained  to  send  to  the  Confederate  ConQ:ress, 


27-2  FALL  OF  NASHVILLE.  [Sect.  X. 

Davis. characterizes  the  report  lie  had  received  as  incom- 
plete and  unsatisfactory.  "It  is  not  stated  that  re-en- 
forcements were  at  any  time  asked  for ;  nor  is  it  demon- 
strated to  have  been  impossible  to  have  saved  the  army 
by  evacuating  the  position;  nor  is  it  known  by  what 
means  it  was  found  practicable  to  withdraw  a  part  of  the 
garrison,  leaving  the  remainder  to  surrender ;  nor  upon 
what  authority  or  principles  of  action  the  senior  generals 
abandoned  responsibility  by  transferring  the  command  to 
a  junior  officer."  The  delinquent  generals  were  required 
to  give  information  on  the  point  "  why  they  abandoned 
the  command  to  their  inferior  officer  instead  of  executing 
themselves  whatever  measure  was  deemed  proper  for  the 
entire  army,  and  also  what  were  the  precise  means  by 
which  each  had  effected  his  escape  from  the  fort,  and 
what  dangers  were  encountered  in  the  retreat,  and  upon 
what  principle  a  selection  was  made  of  particular  troops, 
being  certain  regiments  of  General  Floyd's  brigade." 

Notwithstanding  the  great  obligations  the  Confederate 
They  are  relieved  govemmeut  was  uudcr  to  Floyd,  he  and 
from  command,      pi^o^  ^q^q  rclicved  of  their  commands. 

The  investment  of  Donelson  was  followed  by  the  im- 
mediate evacuation  of  Bowling  Green ;  its 
render'of  dobIk'''   fall  by  thc  abandonment  of  Nashville,  which 

eon.  *'  ,  ' 

was  at  once  occupied  by  Buell. 
Nashville  was  so  central  and  so  important  to  the  South 
The  fall  of  Nash-    that  at  oue  time  it  was  a  competitor  with 
Richmond .  for .  the  honor  of  becoming  the 
metropolis  of  the  Confederacy.     A  dispatch  had  been  re- 
ceived on  Saturday  night  by  Johnston  from  Pillow,  con- 
gratulating him  on  a  great  Confederate  victory  won  by 
the  garrison  of  Fort  Donelson.     The  city  was  in  a  deliri- 
um of  delight.     But  on  Sunday  morning,  while  the  peo- 
ple were  at  church  engaged  in  returning  thanks,  news 
came  that  the  fort  had  fallen.     The  surrender  of  Nash- 


Chap.  XLIX.]  MILL  SPKING.  273 

ville  was  inevitable.  A  scene  of  hideous  confusion  at 
once  ensued.  The  congregations  rushed  into  the  streets. 
Every  conveyance  at  hand  was  seized  for  the  purpose  of 
escaping  from  the  place.  Trunks  and  valuables  were 
thrown  from  upper  windows ;  women  in  mortal,  but  very 
needless  terror,  fled  away,  and  a  mob  hastened  to  plunder 
the  abandoned  Confederate  stores. 

But  the  disaster  did  not  end  here.  The  Confederate 
and  evacuation  of  General  Polk  had  at  once  to  evacuate  Co- 
coiumbus.  lumbus  and  fall  back  to  Island  No.  10.     Co- 

lumbus— the  so  styled  Gibraltar  of  the  West — was  occu- 
pied by  national  troops.  , 

It  was  not  only  on  the  west,  but  also  on  the  east  of 
Nashville  that  misfortunes  befell  the  Con- 
federate cause.  General  Zollicoffer,  with  a 
force  of  about  5000  men,  was  encamped  on  the  south  side 
of  the  Cumberland,  at  Mill  Spring,  in  Wayne  County.  In 
front  of  him  lay  General  Schoepf,  inactive,  with  a  force 
of  about  8000,  at  Somerset.  General  Thomas  had  been 
ordered  to  take  command  of  this  force  (January  I7th, 
1862),  and  had  scarcely  done  so,  when  four  regiments 
that  he  had  near  Somerset  were  attacked  by  General  Crit- 
tenden, who  had  superseded  Zollicoffer.  The  attack  M^as 
made  at  night,  and  intended  to  be  a  surprise.  In  this, 
however,  it  proved  a  failure,  Thomas  having  strongly 
picketed  the  roads  between  himself  and  the  enemy. 

The  pickets  having  been  driven  in,  the  Confederates 
made  a  desperate  charge,  and  the  battle  was  continued  for 
two  hours ;  a  bayonet  charge  by  an  Ohio  regiment  decided 
it,  the  Confederates  escaping  to  an  intrenched  camp  they 
had  near  the  river,  Zollicoffer  being  killed.  The  loss  on 
the  Confederate  side  was  300  killed  and  wounded,  and 
50  prisoners ;' on  the  national,  39  killed,  and  207  wound- 
ed. Pursued  to  their  camp,  the  Confederates  were  shelled 
IL— S 


2^4:  NEW  MADRID.  [Sect.  X. 

until  nigM.  Sclioepf  s  brigade  coming  up,  it  was  hoped 
that  their  entire  force  would  have  been  captured.  Dur- 
ing the  darkness,  however,  it  escaped,  leaving  ten  guns, 
1200  horses  and  mules,  and  a  large  quantity  of  clothing. 

At  the  time  of  the .  evacuation  of  Columbus,  prepara- 
tions had  been  made  to  capture  it  by  an  attack  from  the 
river,  under  Commodore  Foote  and  General  W.  T.  Sher- 
man. On  this  expedition  appearing  before  the  works,  it 
was  ascertained  that  they  had  been  abandoned,  and  that 
in  very  great  haste.  The  cannon  had  been  spiked  and 
pushed  over  the  bluff  into  the  river.  The  garrison  had 
retreated  to  New  Madrid  and  Island  No.  10. 

The  Mississippi,  approaching  that  island,  leaves  its 
southerly  course,  and,  making  a  bend  to  the  northwest, 
reaches  New  Madrid,  which  is  on  the  Missouri  bank. 
Following  the  course  of  the  river.  New  Madrid  is  there- 
fore below  the  island. 

Strong  works  had  been  established  at  New  Madrid. 
The  position  at  It.was  also  defended  by  six  gun-boats,  the 
New  Madrid.  cauuou  of  wMch  commanded  the  adjacent 
country ;  for  the  river  at  the  time  was  very  high. 

Halleck  dispatched  General  Pope  from  St.  Louis  to 
make  an  attack  on  New  Madrid.  The  troops  were  land- 
ed on  the  Missouri  bank  from  transports  on  February 
24th,  and  found  great  difficulty  in  approaching  the  town 
March  of  General  ^^  accouut  of  thc  swampy  statc  of  thc  COUU- 
pope  to  that  place.  ^^^^     rpj^^  ^^^^  dcckrcd  that  they  "waded 

in  mud,  slept  in  mud,  ate  in  mud,  and  were  as  completely 
surrounded  by  mud  as  St.  Helena  is  by  the  ocean."  They 
reached  their  destination,  however,  on  the  3d  of  March. 
Finding  the  place  stronger  than  he  expected.  Pope  was 
obliged  to  send  to  Cairo  for  siege  guns.  To  prevent  the 
Confederates  being  re-enforced  from  below,  he  established 
a  sunken  battery  at  Point  Pleasant.    The  siege  gims  were 


Chap.  XLIX.] 


EVACUATION  OF  NEW  MADRID. 


275 


THE   MISSISSIPPI   FROM   CAIRO   TO   MEMPHIS. 

placed  in  position  before  the  town  immediately  on  their 
arrival.  Three  of  the  Confederate  gun-boats  were  speed- 
ily disabled,  and  it  was  soon  apparent  that  the  place  must 
The  Confederates  ^^  evacuated.  The  garrison  fled  at  mid- 
.  eyacuateit.  ^^^^^  ^^  Msnid  No.  10,  Icaviug  their  supper 

untouched  and  candles  burning  in  their  tents.  They  aban- 
doned thirty-three  cannon,  several  thousand  stand  of  small- 
arms,  hundreds  of  boxes  of  musket  cartridges,  and  tents 
for  an  army  of  10,000  men. 


276  CANAL  OF  ISLAND  No.  10.  [Sect.  X. 

'  On  the  15tli  of  March,  Commodore  Foote,  who  had 
brought  down  from  Cairo  seven  armored  gun-boats,  one 
not  armored,  and  ten  mortar-boats  capable  of  throwing 
13-inch  shell,  appeared  before  Island  No.  10,  and  at  once 
'  Bombardment  of  commcuccd  its  sicgc.  Though  the  bombard- 
ment was  vigorously  maintained  and  con- 
tinued for  nearly  three  weeks,  ifc  proved  to  be  very  inef- 
fective. Beauregard  reported  that  the  enemy's  guns  had 
thrown  into  the  works  three  thousand  shells  and  burned 
fifty  tons  of  gunpowder  without  doing  any  damage  to  the 
batteries,  and  only  killing  one  of  the  men.  On  the  other 
hand.  Commodore  Poote  reported  to  his  government  that 
"Island  No.  10  is  harder  to  conquer  than  Columbus,  its 
shores  being  lined  with  forts,  each  fort  commanding  the 
one  above  it." 

Pope,  who  was  on  the  Missouri  side  of  the  river,  could 
give  but  little  assistance  unless  he  should  cross  over  to  the 
Tennessee  side  and  come  upon  the  rear  of  the  island.  It 
was  impossible  for  him  to  do  this  unless  some  of  the  gun- 
boats could  be  brought  down  to  New  Madrid,  as  the  op- 
posite shore  was  crowned  with  batteries.  To  accomplish 
this,  General  Schuyler  Hamilton  proposed 

Cutting  of  a  canal.       _       '  t      i         i  i    i  ,  ta  t  t 

that  a  canal  should  be  cut  across  Donald- 
son's Point,  between  Island  No.  8  and  New  Madrid.  This 
work  was  actually  accomplished  in  nineteen  days.  The 
canal  was  twelve  miles  long ;  for  a  part  of  the  distance, 
however,  it  passed  through  two  ponds.  The  width  was 
about  fifty  feet.  To  make  the  cut,  it  was  necessary  to  re- 
move about  a  thousand  trees  varying  from  six  inches  to 
three  feet  in  diameter.  They  had  to. be  sawn  off  by  liand 
in  many  places  four  feet  under  water.  When  the  rivei^ 
was  admitted  into  the  canal  it  flowed  through  with  great 
force. 

By  the  aid  of  this  canal,  transports  could  be  passed  be- 
low the  island,  and  Pope's  troops  taken  across  the  Missis- 


Flight  of  the  Con^ 
federates. 


Ghap.XLIX.]    POPE'S  passage  of  the  MISSISSIPPI.  277 

Thegun-hoatsrun  sippi  to  the  Teniiessee  side.  To  cover  the 
the  batteries.  passage  wheii  it  should  be  made,  the  gun- 
boat Carondelet  ran  down  the  river,  past  the  island,  dur- 
ing a  thunder-storm  on  the  night  of  the  4th  of  April : 
she  was  protected  on  her  exposed  side  by  a  barge  laden 
with  hay.  Though  the  soot  in  her  chimney  caught  fire  as 
she  approached  the  batteries,  and,  revealing  her,  brought 
on  her  a  hail  of  cannon-shot,  she  escaped  safely.  On  the 
6th,  another  gun -boat  in  like  manner  ran  past.  The 
bombardment  was  now  vigorously  kept  up;  the  trans- 
ports were  brought  out  of  their  concealment  through  the 
canal ;  the  Carondelet  and  her  consort  silenced  the  bat- 
teries at  the  proposed  place  of  landing,  and  in  a  furious 
rain  -  storm  Pope's  troops  accomplished  the  brilliant  op- 
eration of  a  forced  passage  across  the  Mississippi.  The 
defenders  of  the  batteries  fled  in  confusion. 
They  were  pursued  so  vigorously  by  Pope 
that  during  the  following  night  they  were  driven  back 
on  the  swamps,  and  compelled  to  surrender  before  day- 
light* (April  8th).  The  garrison  in  the  island,  learning 
what  had  taken  place,  sent  a  flag  of  truce  to  Commodore 
surrender  of  the  ^^^^^^  offcriug  to  surrcudcr.  Nearly  seven 
island.  thousand  prisoners  (6700),  including  three 

generals,  273  field  and  company  officers,  were  taken.  The 
spoils  were  a  floating  battery,  100  heavy  siege-guns,  24 
pieces  of  field  artillery,  an  immense  quantity  of  ammuni^ 
tion  and  supplies,  several  thousand  stand  of  small-armsj 
and  a  great  number  of  tents,  horses,  and  wagons.  The 
surrender  was  conducted  with  so  much  confusion  that 
many  important  papers  and  documents  were  left;  among 
others,  drawings  of  the  works  of  Fort  Pillow.  On  the 
national  side  not  a  single  life  was  lost.  . 

The  fall  of  the  island  was  like  a  thunderbolt  in  Eich- 
■'Moral effectonthe  ^^^^'    " ^6  have  saved  uouc  of  our  cau- 
confederacy.         j^^^  qj.  muuitions ;  wc  havc  lost  our  boats ; 


278  SUKRENDER  OF  ISLAND  No.  10.  [Sect.  X. 

our  sick  tave  been  abandoned ;  there  can  be  no  excuse 
for  the  wretched  mismanagement  and  infamous  scenes 
that  attended  the  evacuation ;  our  transports  have  been 
scattered  ;  the  floating  battery,  formerly  the  Pelican  dock 
at  New  Orleans,  with  sixteen  heavy  guns,  has  been  sent 
adrift.  In  one  or  the  hospital  boats  were  a  hundred 
poor  wretches,  half  dead  with  disease  and  neglect.  On 
the  shore  are  crowds  of  our  men  wandering  about,  some 
trying  to  construct  rafts  with  which  to  float  down  the 
river ;  some  lost  in  the  cane-brakes,  and  without  food. 
No  single  battle-field  has  yet  afforded  to  the  North  such 
visible  fruits  of  victory  as  have  been  gathered  at  Island 
No.  10." 

The  capture  of  Island  No.  10  opened  the  river  as  far  as 
Fort  Pillow-its  Fort  Pillow.  This  work  was  a  short  dis- 
strength.  taucc  abovc  Memphis ;  it  had  40  heavy  guns 

in  position,  nine  gun-boats,  and  about  6000  troops.  Gen- 
eral Pope's  army  of  20,000  reached  its  vicinity  on  April 
13th,  and  preparations  were  immediately  made  for  an 
attack.  Unexpectedly,  however  (April  17th),  Pope's 
troops  were  withdrawn,  and  ordered  to  join  Halleck's 
army,  then  advancing  on  Corinth. 

The  Confederates,  having  a  fleet,  of  which  eight  vessels 
Destruction  of  the   wcrc  irou-clads,  Came  out  from  under  the 

confederate  fleet.      ^^^^  ^^  j.^^^  p- jj^^^  ^^  ^^^  ^^^^^  -^  ^^^  ^^^^ 

of  surprising  some  of  the  national  mortar-boats  which  lay 
above.  In  less  than  an  hour  half  the  Confederate  flotilla 
had  been  disabled  or  destroyed.  Some  had  their  boilers 
shot  through ;  others  had  been  butted  and  sunk.  None 
of  them,  however,  were  captured.  The  steam  power  of 
the  national  gun-boats  was  too  small  to  stem  the  stream 
of  the  river.  It  was  feared  that  if  they  grappled  the 
disabled  vessels,  they-  might  be  dragged  under  the  guns 
of  the  batteries.  Their  victory  was  due  to  the  suj^eri- 
ority  of  their  construction-^-for  they  were  more  heavily 


I 


•  Chap.  XLIX.]  FORT  PILLOW  AND  MEMPHIS.  279 

mailed  than  their  antagonists — and  the  heavier  weight 

of  their  fire. 

Fort  Pillow  was,  however,  soon  after  abandoned,  in 
Abandonment  of  consequence  of  the  operations  on  the  line 
the  fort.  ^£^^^  Tennessee  Kiver.     The  troops  were 

*  Avith drawn  to  Corinth,  and  the  remnant  of  the  Confeder- 
ate fleet  went  down  to  Memphis. 

From  its  railroad  connections  Memphis  is  the  most  im- 
strategicai  import-  portant  citj  on  thc  Mlssisslppi  between  'New 
ance  of  Memphis.    Qrlcans  and  St.  Louis.     It  is  the  western 

• 
terminus  of  the  great  line  communicating  with  the  At- 
lantic cities.  By  its  branches  it  connects  with  the  Gulf 
on  the  south,  and  the  Cumberland  Valley  and  Ohio  on 
the  north.  Along  the  great  artery  of  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Road  the  Confederacy  brought  supplies  from 
regions  drained  by  the  affluents  of  the  Mississippi  River, 
and  from  Texas  and  Arkansas.  This  system  of  railroads 
enabled  them  to  distribute  troops  and  munitions  of  war 
in  all  directions. 

Considering  that  its  proper  protection  was  the  strong 
forts  on  the  river  above  and  below,  the  Confederates  had 
not  fortified  the  town.     Its  only  defense  was  its  flotilla. 
On  the  5th  of  June  Commodore  Davis  left  Fort  Pil- 
Navai  attack  on    l^w  with  hls  guu-boats  aud  came  down  to 
Memphis.  Memphis.    The  Confederate  fleet  was  at  the 

levee.  It  consisted  of  eight  vessels.  Four  ram -boats, 
under  Colonel  Ellet,  had  joined  the  national  squadron. 
Soon  after  daybreak  the  next  morning  the  action  began. 
In  many  particulars  it  recalled  the  naval  combats  of  an- 
cient times.  One  of  EUet's  rams,  the  Queen,  butted  a 
Confederate  ram,  sinking  her  immediately ;  the  Queen,  in 
her  turn,  was  struck  by  an  antagonist  and  disabled ;  that 
ram,  in  her  turn,  was  struck  by  the  Monarch,  and  instant- 
ly sunk.     But  among  these  reminiscences  of  old  warfare 


280  FALL  OF  MEMPHIS.  [Sect.  X. 

there  were  realities  of  a  more  modern  kind.  Hot  water 
was  scattered  on  boarders  ;  some  of  the  vessels  had  their 
boilers  shot  through,  and  their  crews  scalded  with  steam. 
One  Confederate  gun-boat  received  a  shell  that  set  her  on 
fire ;  she  burned  to  the  water's  edge,  and  then  blew  up. 
One  was  captured;  and  of  all  the  Confederate  flotilla, 
one  only,  the  Van  Dorn,  escaped. 

There  were  many  thousand  persons  on  the  river  banks 
Destruction  of  the  survcylug  the  battle  with  intense  interest. 
Confederate  fleet.  Qut  of  the  deuse  smoke  cnvelopiug  it  came 
the  roar  of  boilers  exploding,  the  crashing  of  the  rams, 
the  bursting  of  shells,  the  rattle  of  musketry,  the  inces- 
sant thunder  of  the  cannon.  In  half  an  hour  the  uproar 
ceased,  and  when  the  smoke  blew  aside,  it  was  found  that 
the  Confederate  flotilla  had  been  destroyed,  and  Mem- 
phis, left  defenseless. 


CHAPTER  L. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH.— FORCING  OF  THE  SECOND  CONFED- 
ERATE LINE. 

The  Confederates,  forced  back  from  their  first  line,  established  a  second  along  the 

Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  its  strong  point  being  at  Corinth,  where  they 

concentrated  their  armies. 
General  Halleck,  using  the  Tennessee  River  as  his  line  of  attack,  landed  his  army 

near  Shiloh,  and  placed  it  under  command  of  Grant.  .       -         .    .  • 

It  was  Halleck's  intention  to  join  the  army  of  Buell  to  that  of  Grant,  and  attack 

his  antagonists  at  Corinth.     It  was  their  intention  to  attack  Grant  before  he  was 

joined  by  Buell.     They  gained  the  initiative. 
Battle  of  Shiloh.     The  Confederates,  after  making  a  very,  brilliant  attack,  were 

compelled  to  retreat.     The  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  was  severed  by 

Sherman  and  by  Mitchell,  the  campaign  closing  successfully  on.  the  nationalpart 

by  the  capture  of  Corinth. 

After  Grant  had  captured  Donelson,  he  received  a 
message  from  Buell  asking  an  interview  with  him.  Ac- 
cordingly, on  the  27th  of  February,  he  went  for  that,  pur- 
pose to  Nashville.  In  the  mean  time  Hal- 
leck had  ordered  him  to  ascend  rapidly  the 
Tennessee,  then  in  full  water,  and  make  a  lodgment  on  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  Kailroad  about  Florence  or  Tus- 
cumbia,  or  perhaps  Corinth.  There  was  a  telegraph  from 
Paducah  to  Fort  Henry,  but  the  secessionists  were  daily 
breaking  the  wires,  and  communication  was  continually 
interrupted.  On  the  1st  of  March  Halleck  had  ordered 
Grant  to  fall  back  from  the  Cumberland  to  the  Tennes- 
see, with  the  view  of  carrying  his  intention  into  effect.  It 
was  at  this  moment  supposed  that  the  Confederates  had 
retreated  to  Chattanooga. 

Orders  were  likewise  transmitted  to  Sherman  to  seize 
all  steam-boats  passing  Paducah,  and  send  them  up  the 
Tennessee  for  the  transportation  of  Grant's  army.     As 


Grant's  visit  to 
Nashville 


282  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH.  .  [Sect.  X. 

soon  as  Halleck  heard  that  Grant  had  gone  up  the  Cum- 
land  instead  of  the  Tennessee,  he  was  very  much  displeas- 
disapproved  of  ^d,  and  telegraphed  to  him, "  Why  don't  you 
by  Halleck.  ^^^^  ^^^  orders  ?  "Why  don't  you  answer 
my  letters  ?  Turn  over  the  command  of  the  Tennessee 
expedition  to  General  C.  F.  Smith,  and  remain  yourself  at 
Fort  Henry." 

He  also  complained  to  McClellan  at  Washington  that 
he  could  get  no  reports  from  Grant,  whose  troops  were 
demoralized  by  their  victory.  To  Grant  he  wrote  that 
his  neglect  of  repeated  orders  to  report  his  strength  had 
created  great  dissatisfaction  and  seriously  interfered  with 
the  military  plans ;  that  his  going  to  Nashville  when  he 
should  have  beem  with  his  troops  had  been  a  matter  of 
so  much  complaint  at  Washington  that  it  had  been  con- 
sidered advisable  to  arrest  him  on  his  return. 

At  length  came  Grant's  answer  that  he  had  not  re- 
Grant's  expiana-  ccivcd  Hallcck's  ordcrs  in  time ;  that  he  had 
^'''''^*  not  gone  to  Nashville  to  gratify  any  desire 

of  his  own,  but  for  the  good  of  the  service ;  that  he  had 
reported  every  day,  and  had  written  on  an  average  more 
than  once  a  day,  and  had  done  his  best  to  obey  orders ; 
that,  instead  of  being  worthy  of  censure  for  permitting 
his  troops  to  maraud,  he  had  sent  the  marauders  to  St. 
Louis.  He  asked  to  be  relieved,  and  turned  over  the  com- 
Generai  Smith  put  Hiand  to  General  Smith,  who  at  once  com- 
ia  command.  nieuced  thc  cmbarkatlou  of  the  troops  to  the 
Upper  Tennessee. 

Halleck  was  so  far  satisfied  with  these  explanations 
that  he  requested  the  authorities  at  Washington  to  drop 
the  matter.  The  order  assigning  Smith  to  the  command 
was,  however,  not  recalled. 

Halleck,  in  this  perpendicular  movement  upon  the  Con- 
Advanta-es  of  the  federate  line,  derived  at  once  singular  advan- 
Tennessee  River.    ^^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^  Teuuessee  Kivcr.     It  gavc 


Chap.L.]  SHERMAN'S  expedition.  283 

him  ready  communication  by  his  transports  and  gun- 
boats ;  the  latter,  as  we  shall  see,  successfully  intervened 
at  the  very  moment  of  the  crisis  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh. 
Early  in  March,  Sherman  was  ordered  by  Halleck  to 
The  expedition  j^^^  ^^^  Teuuessee  expedition  and  report  to 
passes  up  it.  gmith.  The  whole  army  steamed  up  to 
Savannah,  where  the  depot  of  supplies  was  established. 
There  were  nearly  seventy  transports,  carrying  more  than 
thirty  thousand  troops.  The  bands  were  playing,  flags 
flying ;  it  was ,  a  splendid  pageant  of  war.  Lewis  Wal- 
lace's division  disembarked  on  the  west  bank  of  the  river 
and  took  post  on  the  road  to  Purdy.  He  was  ordered  to 
destroy  the  railroad  bridge  in  the  vicinity  of  that  place. 
A  train  with  Confederate  troops  narrowly  escaped  cap- 
ture ;  it  approached  while  the  bridge  was  burning.  An- 
other division  (C.  F.  Smith's)  occupied  the  town  and 
country  beyond ;  and  Sherman  was  ordered  by  Smith  to 
take  his  own  division,  and  the  two  gun-boats  Tyler  and 
Lexington,  to  proceed  farther  up  the  river,  and  break 
the  Memphis  and.  Charleston  Kailroad.  It 
vv^as  now  known  that  the  Confederate  army 
was  concentrating  at  Corinth,  and  that  it  had  a  battery 
at  Eastport,  and  another  just  above  the  mouth  of  Bear 
Creek.  On  passing  "  Pittsburg  Landing,"  Sherman  learn- 
ed that  there  was  a  road  thence  to  Corinth.  A  Confed- 
erate regiment  lying  there  had  fired  on  the  gun-boats. 
Hereupon  he  wrote  to  Smith  that  he  thought  it  impor- 
tant to  occupy  "  Pittsburg  Landing."  This  was  accord- 
ingly done,  and  the  place  became,  in  consequence,  immor- 
tal in  American  history. 

Meantime  Sherman  passed  forward  on  his  expedition 
for  cutting  the  railroad,  but  was  thwarted  by  a  deluge  of 
rain^  which  so  flooded  the  country  as  to  render  it  imprac- 
ticable, many  men  and  horses  being  drowned  in  the  swol- 
len streams.     With  great  difficulty  he  got  back  to  his 


Sherman's  recon- 
noissance. 


284  PITTSBURG  LANDING  AND  SHILOH.  [Sect.  X. 

boats., .  The  time  had  passed  to  make  a  lodgment  on  the 
railroad  by  a  dash :  whatever  was  to  be  done  now  must 
be  done  deliberately  and  systematically.  ; 

On  the  receipt  of  Sherman's  letter,  Smith  reconnoitred 
Occupation  6f  Pitts-  Pittsburg  Landing  in  pcrson,  and  found  that 
urg  an  :ng.  it  was  wcU  adapted  as  a  base  for  a  large 
army  operating  inland.  He  therefore  ordered  Hurlbut's 
division  to  occupy  it ;  and  then  directed  Sherman  to 
move  his  division  there,  and  take  a  position  out  from" 
the  river,  so  as  to  leave  room  for  a  large  army  behind- — 
room  enough, he  said, "for  a  hundred  thousand  men." 

I  am  particular  in  relating  these  details  of  the  manner 
in  which  Pittsburg  Landing  came  to  be  occupied,  because 
Grant  hias  not  only  been  criticised,  but  severely  blamed 
for  what  he  is  supposed  to  have  done  in  the  matter.  That 
great  soldier  has  made  no  reply,  justly  expecting  that  his- 
tory would  eventually  vindicate  him. 

The  bluff  at  Pittsburg  Landing  extended  about  half  a 
The  topograpiiy  Hiilc  aloug  thc  Hvcr :  the  road  to  the  top 
was  in  a  ravine,  at  the  foot  of  which  lay  four 
or  five  steam-boats  of  Hurlbut's  division.  As  this  road 
was  not  more  than  sufficient  for  their  accommodation, 
Sherman  caused  two  more  to  be  cut  up  through  the  bluff, 
which  was  a  high  plateau  inclining  from  the  west,  and  in- 
tersected with  ravines  right  and  left.  A  country  road  led 
from  the  landing  to  Corinth.  At  a  distance  upon  it  of 
about  two  and  a  (Quarter  miles  stood  a  little  log  building 
embowered  in  trees,  known  as  Shiloh  Church.  It  had  nei- 
ther doors  nor  windows,  and  was  only  half  floored.  When 
first  visited  there  was  a  pile  of  corn  in  the  husk  on  the 
floor.  It  was  simply  a  place  where  Methodist  camp-meet- 
ings were  occasionally  held,  and  had  of  late  been  used  as 
a  Confederate  picket  station.  The  greater  part  of  the  pla- 
teau, a  space  of  four  miles  by  two  and  a  half  or  three, 
was  covered  with  heavy  oaks,  and  an  underbrush  of  hick- 


Chap.l.]  posting  of  the  troops.  285 

cry  and  scrub ;  near  to  the  landing,  however,  it  Was  clear- 
ed. Sherman  carefully  reconnoitred  the  ground,  and  put 
two  of  his  brigades  on  the  Corinth  Road,  on  the  right  and 
left  of  the  meeting-house ;  another  brigade  he  put  more 
to  the  right  ♦and  somewhat  refused,  to  command  the  Pur- 
dy  Road  at  the  Owl  Creek  Grossing,  and  the  other  (Stew- 
postingofthe  art's)  to  cover  the  Lick  Creek  Ford.  Thus 
troops.  -^-g  ^[yJLgiQn^  8000  strong,  was  an  outlying 

force  to  cover  all  the  main  roads  leading  to  the  landing. 
There  was  a  short  gap  between  his  centre  and  right,  and 
a  wide  one,  of  nearly  tAVO  and  a  half  miles,  between  his 
centre  and  left  brigade  (Stewart's),  partially  covered  by 
Hurlbut.  V  .   w  .      .  . 

As  soon  as  these  camps  were  selected,  Sherman  and 
McPherson  examined  all  the  country  on  the  front  and 
flanks,  moving  out  ten  miles  toward  Corinth  as  far  as 
Monterey.  McPherson  had  been  sent,  by  order  of  Smith, 
to  post  the  army  as  it  arrived.  Hurlbut's  division  was 
put  in  line  to  the  left  of  the  main  Corinth  Road,  his 
right  where  the  Hamburg  Road  branches  to  the  left,  and 
Smith's  own  division  (then  commanded  by  General  W. 
H.  L.  Wallace)  was  on  Hurlbut's  right. 

McPherson  placed  McClernand's  division  about  a  mil6 
in  front  of  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  and  Prentiss's  to  his  left, 
Lewis  Wallace's  division  still  remaining  on  the  road  to 
Purdy.  It  communicated  with  the  main  army  by  an 
old  bridge  which  was  over  Snake  Creek.  These  dispo- 
sitions were  made  between  the  20th  of  March  and  the 
6th  of  April.- 

In  the  mean  time  General  Smith  had  fallen  seriously 
ill.  He  had  received  what  appeared' to  be 
an  insignificant  injury — a  mere  scratch  on 
his  leg,  in  stepping  into  a- boat;  Gangrene  came  on,  and 
he  died  on  the  25th  of  April.  His  health  had  been  ruined 
by  exposure  and  fatigue  at  Fort  Donelson. 


Death  of  General 
Smith. 


286  GRANT  RESTORED  TO  COMMAND.  [Sect.  X. 

It  is  to  be  remarked  that  most  of  the  arrangements 
thus  far  made  were  not  by  order  of  Grant, 
Grlnuo  com-  for  it  was  not  until  the  illness  of  Smith  that 
Halleck  restored  him  to  command.  At  this 
moment  the  Tennessee  River  was  separating  the  army. 
In  an  hour  after  taking  command  Grant  had  ordered  his 
forces  to  be  concentrated.  He  established  his  head-quar- 
ters at  Savannah  (March  17th),  where  he  could  commu- 
nicate with  Buell,  who  was  coming  from  Nashville,  and 
with  Lewis  Wallace,  who  was  at  Crump's  Landing.  It  is 
also  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  movements  were  un- 
der the  supreme  direction  of  Halleck,  who  was  at  St. 
Louis,  and  whose  intention  was  to  make  a  lodgment  on 
the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad.  All  the  landings 
except  the  bluffs  were  at  this  time  flooded.  The  first  ob- 
ject was  to  secure  positions  commanding  the  Tennessee 
and  bases  for  future  operations.  The  west  bank  of  the 
river  was  preferred,  because  it  rendered  unnecessary  pon- 
toons and  transports  for  crossing. 

The  first  line  of  Confederate  defense  having  been  swept 
Beauregard's  army  away  by  the  capturc  of  Fort  Donelson,  Beau- 
regard, who  had  been  sent  by  the  Richmond 
authorities  to  supervise  the  movements  in  the  Mississippi 
Valley,  established  a  second  along  the  line  of  the  Mem- 
phis and  Charleston  Railroad.  The  army  immediately 
under  his  command  was  at  Corinth,  about  30  miles  from 
Pittsburg  Landing.  His  views  of  the  measures  to  be  re- 
sorted to  for  the  defense  of  the  valley  were  far  more  cor- 
rect than  those  hitherto  adopted  by  the  Confederate  gov- 
ernment. His  intention  was  not  to  divide,  but  to  concen- 
trate all  the  available  Confederate  forces;  and  this  he 
would' have  done  previously  had  he  arrived  in  time  to 
prevent  the  disaster  at  Donelson. 

He  therefore,  as   rapidly  as  he  could,  withdrew  the 


Chap.  L.]  CONCENTRATION  OF  THE  ARMIES.  287 

forces  from  every  outlying  position.     He 

Concentration  of  ••tt-t*  t*  t»  it 

the  Confederate  was  jomeci  by  -Bragg,  irom  rensacola,  by 
Polk,  from  the  Mississippi,  and  Johnston's 
army  was  brought  from  Murfreesborough.  The  whole 
force  was  concentrated  at  Corinth,  where  the  two  great 
railroads  connecting  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Missis- 
sippi Eiver  with  the  Atlantic  Ocean  come  together.  That 
place  is  the  key  of  the  railroad  system  of  Mississippi  and 
Tennessee.  Beauregard  issued  the  customary  and  char- 
acteristic address  to  his  troops:  "Our  mothers  and  wives, 
our  sisters  and  children,  expect  us  to  do  our  duty.  Our 
cause  is  as  just  and  sacred  as  ever  animated  men  to  take 
up  arms." 

Corinth  was  thus  selected  not  only  because  of  its  rela- 
tion to  the  railroads,  but  also  because  it  was  necessary  to 
hold  it  for  the  protection  of  Memphis.  The  national 
army,  advancing  on  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  Eiver,  would 
strike  the  second  Confederate  line  perpendicularly.  It  had 
been  Halleck's  expectation  to  intervene  between  the  Ten- 
nessee army  under  Johnston  at  Murfreesborough,  and^the 
Mississippi  army  under  Beauregard  at  Corinth.  Through 
the  delay  that  had  occurred  after  the  fall  of  Donelson,  the 
junction  of  those  armies  had,  however,  taken  place. 

As  soon  as  it  was  discovered  that  Johnston  had  dis- 
concentration  of     appeared  from  Murfreesborough  at  Buell's 

the  national  armies.    ^^^^^^  ^^^  ^^^  ^^^^^  ^^  ^^^^^  a  jUUCtloU  wlth 

Beauregard,  Halleck,  whose  command  now  embraced  Bu- 
ell's, ordered  that  officer  to  join  Grant,  with  a  view  to 
counteract  the  Confederate  concentration  at  Corinth.  Bu- 
ell's force  was  about  40,000.  He  accordingly  at  once  set 
out  on  his  march,  and  reached  Columbia  on  the  20th ;  but, 
though  he  pushed  forward  as  quickly  as  he  could,  so  bad 
were  the  roads  and  so  dreadful  the  weather  that  it  took 
seventeen  days  to  accomplish  the  rest  of  the  distance  to 
Pittsburg  Landing — about  ninety  miles.     Nelson's  divis- 


288  BEAUREGARD'S  PLAN  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.         [Sect.X. 

ion  was  in  advance ;  it  was  followed  by  the  divisions  of 
Crittenden,  McCook,  Wood,  and  Thomas. 

The  concentration  of  the  Confederate  army,  which  had 
begun  early  in  March,  went  on  with  great  rapidity.  In 
three  weeks  its  strength  had  risen  from  11,000  to  45,000 
men.  Van  Dorn  and  Price  were  coming  from  Arkansas 
v^ith  30,000  more.  After  the  junction  with  Johnston* 
took  place,  that  general  had  assumed  the  chief  command, 
Beauregard's'pian  Bcaurcgard  bciug  secoud.  The  conception 
of  the  campaign.  ^£  ^-^^  eusuiug  mo vemcuts  was,  however,  due 
to  the  latter.  As  Halleck  had  intended  to  destroy  him 
before  Johnston  could  come  to  his  aid,  so  now  he  proposed 
to  destroy  Grant  before  Buell  could  arrive.  He  knew 
from  the  country  people  every  thing  about  Grant's  move- 
ments, but  it  was  little  that  Grant  could  find  out  from 
them  about  him.  The  question  for  him  to  decide  was, 
Should  he  wait  for  Van  Dorn  and  Price  to  come  up,  or 
strike  Grant  at  once?  At  this  time  Breckenridge  was 
on  his  right,  at  Burnsville  with  11,000  men  ;  Hardee  and 
Brigg,  with  more  than  20,000,  formed  his  centre  at  Cor- 
inth; Polk  and  Hindman  were  on  his  left  with  10,000 
north  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad.  Grant 
overthrown,  Buell  was  next  to  be  attacked,  the  victorious 
army  then  taking  up  its  line  of  march  to  the  north.  On 
Johnston's  assuming  the  chief  command,  he  issued  an  ad- 
dress, such  as  was  at  that  time  customary  in  the  Confed- 
erate armies :  "  You  are  expected  to  show  yourselves  wor- 
thy of  your  valor  and  courage,  worthy  of  the  women  of 
the  South,  whose  noble  devotion  in  this  war  has  never 
been  exceeded  in  any  time." 

Pittsburg  Landing  is  a  steam-boat  station  on  the  wegt 
bank  of  the  Tennessee  River,  219  miles  dis- 
tant from  its  mouth,  and  near  to  the  inter- 
section of  the  state  lines  of  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  Ten- 
nessee.    On  the  north  of  the  landing.  Snake  Creek,  and 


Chap.  L.] 


THE  FIELD  OP  SIIILOH. 


289 


on  the  south,  another  stream,  Lick  Creek,  fall  into  the 
Tennessee,  the  former  having  received  a  branch  known  as 
Owl  Creek.  '  These  rivulets  rise  near  each  other,  beyond 
Shiloh  Church,  and  inclose  between  them  a  plateau,  about 
eighty  feet  high,  on  which  took  place  the  great  battle 
now  to  be  described. 


THE   EATTLK   OF   SHiLOH. 


The  two  creeks  formed  the  right  and  left  defenses  of 
the  national  array,  obliging  the  enemy  to  make  a  front 
attack.  When  first  occupied  the  country  was  flooded, 
aiid  many  of  the  streams  impassable.  In  Snake  Creek 
the  water  was  so  high  that  a  horse  would  have  to  swim 
II.— T 


290  POSITION  OF  GRANT'S  AEMY.  [Sect.  X. 

to  reacli  the  bridge.  Lick  Creek,  ordinarily  fordable,  liad 
become  quite  a  river.  Grant  largely  depended  on  tbese 
overflows  for  protection.  They  were  among  the  reasons 
which  induced  him  to  throw  up  no  defenses. 

On  this  platiau  (Saturday,  April  5th)  ^ve  divisions 
Position  of  Grant's  of  Grant' s  army  were  encamped  in  the  order 
^^^^'  just  described  (p.  285).    Sherman  and  Pren- 

tiss were  therefore  in  front,  McClernand  on  the  left  and 
rear  of  Sherman.  Still  nearer  to  the  Landing  was  Hurl- 
but,  with  W.  H.  L.Wallace  on  his  right.  Lewis  Wallace's 
division  was  at  Crump's  Landing,  five  miles  below. 

Grant's  army  thus  lay  with  the  Tennessee  River  at  its 
back,  without  available  transportation  to  the  other  bank, 
and  no  defensive  preparations  on  its  front.  The  changes 
that  Halleck  had  made  in  its  command  operated  to  its 
disadvantage  in  unsettling  its  purposes  and  impairing  its 
unity  of  action.  It  was  not  understood  at  first  that  the 
Confederates  were  concentrating  so  rapidly  at  Corinth; 
on  the  contrary,  it  was  supposed  that  they  had  a  force 
of  only  about  10,000 ;  and  hence  there  was  at  that  time 
no  apprehension  of  being  attacked.  Even  after  it  was 
known  that  Johnston  had  withdrawn  from  Murfreesbor- 
ough,  it  was  expected  that  Buell's  re-enforcements  would 
join  Grant  in  time.  When  the  battle  began,  Buell's  lead- 
ing division,  Nelson's,  was  at  Savannah,  nine  miles  down 
the  river,-  and  on  its  other  bank,  but  the  rear  of  that 
army  stretched  off  for  thirty  miles  beyond. 

The  Confederate  generals  intended  to  fall  by  surprise 
Johnston  rnarches  on  Graut's  army,  encamped  thus  at  Pitts- 
from  Corinth.  burg  Landing,  bcforc  Buell  should  have 
joined  it.  Accordingly,  on  the  Sd  of  April,  their  avail- 
able strength  being  about  40,000,  they  commenced  their 
march.  The  dreadful  condition  of  the  roads,  and  a  rain^ 
storm  which  fell  on  the  afternoon  of  the  5th,  delayed  the 
proposed  attack.     That  night  they  had  advanced  within 


Chap.  L.]    THE  CONFEDERATE  ATTACK  EXPECTED.       291 

three  quarters  of  a  mile  of  the  national  pickets.  No 
fires  were  allowed,  though  the  air  was  cheerless  and  cold. 
Hardee's  corps  was  in  front ;  Bragg's  in  a  second  line  be- 
hind; Polk's  corps  formed  the  third,  with  Breckenridge's 
division  on  its  right  rear. 

On  Friday,  April  4th,  an  infantry  picket  belonging  to 
Colonel  Buckland's  brigade  having  been  captured,  Sher- 
man had  taken  that  brigade  and  some  cavalry,  and  driven 
back  the  Confederate  cavalry  six  miles  from  the  front  of 
the  camps.     On  the  evening  of  that  day  several  cannon 

Grant  expects     wcrc  fircd  aud  plainly  heard  by  the  whole 

au  attack.  army.    Grant  was  at  this  time  at  Sherman's 

lines.  On  coming  back,  his  horse  slipped  over  a  log  and 
lamed  him.  On  the  same  day,  Lewis  Wallace  reported 
eight  regiments  of  infantry  and  1200  cavalry  at  Purdy, 
and  an  equal  force  at  Bethel.  Grant  gave  the  necessary 
orders  to  Lewis  Wallace  in  case  they  should  attack  him. 

The  Confederate  attack  was  therefore  not  unexpected, 
and,  properly  speaking,  there  was  no  surprise.  Prentiss 
had  doubled  his  grand  guards  the  night  before,  and  had 
pickets  out  one  and  a  half  miles.  Sherman  ordered  his 
troops  to  breakfast  early,  and  got  them  at  once  into  line. 
Grant  was  perfectly  aware  of  what  had  been  going  on. 
He  was  in  doubt,  however,  from  what  directioli  the  blow 
would  be  delivered:  whether  the  Confederates  would 
attack  his  main  camp,  or  cross  over  Snake  Creek  to  the 
north  and  west  of  him,  falling  on  Lewis  Wallace's  division 
so  as  to  force  it  back,  and  make  a  lodgment  on  the  Ten- 
nessee below,  compelling  Grant  either  to  attack  them  and- 
drive  them  away,  or  to  cross  over  to  the  east  bank  of  the 
Tennessee  and  give  up  his  boats.  It  was  better  for  him 
to  risk  a  battle  on  the  ground  on  which  he  stood.  For 
the  Confederates,  the  attack  on  Wallace  would  have  been 
the  proper  movement. 
,   For  want  of  engineer  officers,  Beauregard  had  been  un- 


292  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH.  [Sect.  X. 

able  to  acquire  correct  information  of  the  terrain  of  tlie 
battle-field.  The  Richmond  authorities  had  become  alien- 
ated from  him.  On  this,  as  on  other  points,  tliey  either 
conceded  his  demands  reluctantly  or  were  indisposed  to 
adopt  his  recommendations. 

As  scon  as  it  was  dawn  on  Sunday,  April  6th,  Hardee's 
The  battle  of  corps  passcd  silently  across  the  ravine  of  the 
^^^^°''-  pebbly  Lick  Creek,  and  through  the  short 

distance  separating  it  from  the  outlying  divisions  of 
Grant.  The  fallen  leaves,  soaked  with  rain  and  deprived 
of  their  crispness,  emitted  no  rustling  sound  under  the 
footsteps  of  the  men.  Grant's  outposts  were  driven  in. 
Out  of  a  cloud  of  sulphury  smoke  with  which  the  woods 
were  instantly  filled  came  the  yell  of  charging  regiments, 
shells  crashing  against  the  trees,  and  the  whir  of  glan- 
cing bullets.  It  was  a  summons  to  the  battle  jpf  Shiloh. 
.  Grant  had  received  a  request  from  Buell  to  wait  for 
him  at  Savannah,  that  they  might  have  an  interview.  Ac- 
cordingly, he  was  at  that  place  at  breakfast  when  the  first 
guns  were  heard.  His  horse  was  standing  ready  saddled. 
He  perceived  at  once  that  a  serious  attack  was  being 
made.  Leaving  a  letter  for  Buell,  he  ordered  Nelson  to 
hurry  up,  and  took  a  steam-boat  for  Pittsburg.  On  his 
way  he  stopped  at  Crump's  Landing,  giving  directions  to 
Lewis  Wallace  to  follow  at  once — or,  if  the  cannonading 
they  heard  should  prove  to  be  a  feint,  and  the  real  attack 
was  about  to  be  made  on  him,  to  defend  himself  to  the 
utmost,  telling  him  that  he  should  have  re-enforcements 
as  quickly  as  possible. 

Grant  reached  the  field  of  Shiloh  at  eight  o'clock.  He 
saw  that  he  had  to  deal  with  the  combined  Confederate 
armies,  and  that  he  must  fight  without  Buell.  At  this 
moment  his  entire  available  force  was  33,000.  Lewis 
Wallace  had  5000  more.  Beauregard's  force  was  40,355. 
Hardee's  centre  and  left  had  fallen  upon  Sherman, 


Chap.  L.]  .  EESISTANCE  OF  SHERMAN,  293 

his  riglit  upon  Prentiss,  wlio  resisted  as  best  lie  could, 
Bragg's  corps,  which  had  been  stationed  immediately  be- 
hind Hardee's,  now  came  up,  re-enforcing  wherever  was 
necessary  the  thinned  attacking  line.  The  steadiness  of 
Sherman  threw  the  weight  on  Prentiss,  the  assailants 
Early  successes  of   wcdgiug  thclr  Way  bctwccn  the  two.     Be- 

the  confederates.      ^^^.^    ^^-^^     ^,^^^^^    ^^^^^    ^^^  forCCd  PreutisS 

from  his  ground  and  captured  and  plundered  his  camp. 
He  himself  was  separated  from  his  division.     It  fell  into 
confusion.     Of  his  defeated  troops   many  had  no   car- 
tridges.    They  had  been  organized  only  eleven  days. 
Sherman,  regarding  his  position  as  covering  the  roads, 
Resistance  of      chcckcd  tlic  cucmy  loug  cuough  to  enable 
Sherman,  ^-j^^  ^^^^  ^£  ^j^^  army  to  prepare  for  battle. 

McClernand,  who  was  in  his  rear,  had  sent  three  regi- 
ments and  three  batteries  to  strengthen  his  left.  To  the 
same  point  Hurlbut  had  sent  four  regiments.  If  deter- 
mination and  energy  could  have  saved  the  line,  Sherman 
would  have  held  his  ground :  he  personally  attended  to 
the  details  of  the  moment,  directed  the  fire  of  his  batter- 
ies, and  infused  his  own  spirit  into  his  men.  But  grad- 
ually the  Confederates  worked  their  way  through  the  in- 
terval between  him  and  Prentiss,  though  siiffering  dread- 
fully in  so  doing.  They  had  brought  up  re-enforcements 
from  their  third  or  Polk's  line,  and  at  length  were  turn-, 
ing  Sherman's  left.  A  part  of  his  division  at  that  point 
had  broken  and  fled  to  the  rear.  Hereupon  he  swung 
on  his  right  as  on  a  pivot,  and  came  round  at  a  right 
angle.  His  right  projected  forward,  holding  so  tenacious- 
ly that  the  Confederates  could  not  get  round  it.  It  was 
now  ten  o'clock.  They  had  seized  two  of  his  batteries 
and  had  captured  his  camp. 

Here  he  made  a  firm  resistance,  and  it  was  not  until 
between  two  and  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  that,  with 
McClernand,  who  had  also  been  forced  from  his  camp  and 


29^  GRANT'S  LINE  FORCED  BACK.  [Sect.  X.- 

lost  many  of  Lis  guns,  lie  moved  back  slowly  and  delib- 
erately to  a  better  position  in  front  of  and  covering  the 
bridge  across  Snake  Creek,  over  wbich  tbey  were  mo- 
mentarily expecting  tliat  Lewis  Wallace  would  come. 

It  was  in  reference  to  tbis  that  General  Grant  wrote 
to  the  War  Department :  "  Sherman  held  with  raw  troops 
the  key-point  of  the  Landing.  It  is  no  disparagement  to 
any  other  officer  to  say  that  I  do  not  believe  there  was 
another  division  commander  on  the  field  who  had  the 
skill  and  enterprise  to  have  done  it.  To  his  individual 
efforts  I  am  indebted  for  the  success  of  the  battle." 

At  ten  o'clock  the  battle  was  fiercest.  It  went  on, 
however,  with  little  intermission,  until  two.  At  the  for- 
mer hour  Grant  was  at  Sherman's  front.  Finding  that 
for  such  a  desperate  contest  the  supply  of  cartridges 
would  be  insufficient,  he  had  organized  a  train  of  ammu- 
nition wagons  from  the  Landing  to  that  point.  With  dif- 
ficulty it  forced  its  way  through  the  narrow  road  filled 
with  fugitives.  Meantime  Sherman,  though  wounded, 
was  holding  his  ground  tenaciously  on  the  right.  On 
the  left  Stewart's  brigade  was  in  the  utmost  danger,  until 
The  national  line  W.  H.  L.  Wallaco  dispatchcd  Mc Arthur  to 
forced  back.  -^-^  ^^^^  Stcwart  was  then  able  securely  to 
fall  back.  His  camp  was  taken.  The  Confederates  were 
now  ready  to  assail  Hurlbut,  and  push  him  into  the  river. 
He,  however,  retired  from  the  open  ground  on  which  he 
had  been  standing  to  the  woods  in  his  rear.  His  camp 
was  captured,  but  then  being  joined  by  W.  H.  L.  Wallace, 
they,  from  ten  o'clock  to  three,  resisted  a  succession  of 
desperate  charges.     In  one  of  these  Wallace  was  killed. 

Grant's  army  had  now  been  forced  into  a  space  of  not 
more  than  400  acres  on  the  very  verge  of 
ed to  the%?r^e^Sf '  thc  rivcr.  He  was  impatiently  expecting  to 
hear  Lewis  Wallace's  guns  on  the  Confed- 
erate flank.     He  dispatched  one  messenger  after  another 


Chap.L.]  death  of  JOHNSTON.  295 

to  hasten  that  general  up  to  the  critical  point,  but  still 
he  waited  in  vain.  It  subsequently  appeared  that  Wal- 
Lewis  Wallace  fails  l^ce  had  obcycd  the  first  orders  given  to 
to  come  up.  Mm"  to  jolu  the  right  of  the  army,  but  he 

had  not  been  told  that  it  had  fallen  back.  He  consumed 
in  a  fruitless  march  all  the  momentous  afternoon. 

In  Grant's  army  all  seemed  to  be  hopeless.    Five  camps 
had  been  carried,  many  prisoners  taken,  and 

Apparently  hope-  t       ,         t>       •    **       j.       i  i  ' 

less  state  of  Grant's  mauy  guus  lost.  Kegimcuts,  breaking  up 
into  individuals,  had  been  driven  in  confu- 
sion toward  the  Landing.  There  was  the  impassable 
river.  Thousands  of  fugitives  were  fleeing  through  the 
woods  down  the  bank.  It  was  a  rout  of  horses,  and 
wagons,  and  demoralized  men. 

But,  if  Grant's  army  was  in  confusion  through  its  de- 
feat, the  Confederate  army  was  scarcely  less  so  by  its  suc- 
cess. Its  organization  had  been  broken  up  by  the  wood- 
ed nature  of  the  ground,  and  by  the  course  that  had  been 
followed  of  detaching  re-enforcements  indiscriminately 
from  its  corps  or  divisions  wherever  they  were  required 
at  the  moment.  Nevertheless,  about  two  o'clock,  the 
Confederates  had  strong  hopes  that  they  would  be  able 
to  turn  the  national  left  and  seize  the  Landing.  Their 
general-in-chief,  Johnston,  was  vigorously  pushing  forward 
Death  of  General  ^^^^  opcratlou,  whcu  he  was  struck  by  a  rifle 
Johnston.  ^^12^  ^^^  quickly  bled  to  death— a  very  se- 

vere misfortune  to  them.  The  battle  at  once  lulled.  In 
the  confusion,  it  was  some  time  before  Beauregard  could 
be  found,  and  almost  two  hours  elapsed  before  he  could 
get  his  army  well  in  hand.  The  pressure  on  the  national 
left  then  increased.  There  was  no  time  to  lose,  for  night 
and  Buell  were  coming. 

Before  the  Confederates  could  reach  the  Landing  they 
must  cross  a  deep  ravine,  impassable  for  artillery  or  cav- 
alry, and  very  difficult  for  infantry.     Grant  had  thrown 


296  THE  FINAL  CONFEDERATE  CHARGE.  [Sect.X. 

up  hastily  some  slight  earthworks,  in  the  form  of  a  half 
moon,  on  the  brow  of  his  side  of  the  ravine;  and  General 
Grant  masses  his    Webster,  hls  chicf  of  staff,  by  adding  to  sev- 
artiiiery.  ^^^^  siege-guHS  which  were  parked  there  the 

fragments  of  many  light  batteries,  secured  a  semicircular 
defense  of  about  fifty  cannon.  It  reached  nearly  round 
to  the  Corinth  Road.  But  with  so  much  difficulty  were 
artillerists  obtained,  that  the  services  of  the  surgeon  of 
the  First  Missouri  Artillery  were  accepted,  and  he  aid- 
ed efficiently  in  working  the  guns.  The  Confederate  as- 
sault was  made  by  Chalmers,  Withers,  Cheatham,  Rug- 
gles,  Anderson,  Stuart,  Pond,  and  Stevens. 

Meantime  the  two  gun-boats,  Tyler  and  Lexington,  had 
The  gun-boats  come  couie  rouud  toward  the  mouth  of  the  ravine 
into  action.  -^  ^^^-^  ^  posltlou  as  to  bc  able  to  reach 

the  advancing  Confederates  with  their  eight-inch  shells. 
From  the  Confederate  bank  of  the  ravine,  the  view  ob- 
liquely across  the  Tennessee  River  is  very  beautiful.  The 
bank  gently  descends  as  a  grassy  lawn  dotted  with  fine 
old  red  oaks,  and  presenting  a  park-like  appearance — a 
tranquil  landscape  on  the  verge  of  a  stormy  battle-field. 

One  grand  effort  more,  and  the  Confederates  might  per- 
The  final  charges  of  haps  rcach  thc  Landing.  Down  the  ravine 
the  confederates.     ^^^^^  rushcd ;  its  bottom  .was  full  of  watcr. 

They  strove  to  get  across  and  force  their  way  up  the  op- 
posite slippery  side.  But  the  blaze  of  Webster's  guns 
was  in  their  front,  the  Lexington  and  Tyler  were  furi- 
ously shelling  their  flank,  and  national  troops,  fast  rally- 
ing, were  pouring  forth  from  their  rifles  into  the  battle- 
cloud  and  din  below  a  sheet  of  fire.  The  Confederates 
melted  away  under  the  roar  of  the  cannon  and  the  vol- 
leys of  musketry.  The  ravine  had  become  a  hell  of  hu- 
Grantsnccessfuiiy  ^lau  agouy  aud  passiou,  hlddcu  in  smoke, 

resists  them.  ^^^^   gj^-^^  ^.^|^   ^^^^^       J^   ^,^g    ^  ^^^lej  of 

the  shadow  of  death.     Few  gained  a  foothold  on  the  op- 


Chap.  L.]    PREPARATIONS  FOR  RENEWING  THE  BATTLE.  297 

posite  bank,  and  that  only  for  a  moment.  The  crisis  was 
soon  past ;  the  onset  of  the  Confederates  was  over.  They 
gave  up  the  struggle,  and  Grant  was  left  master  of  the 
ground. 

The  firing  had  hardly  ceased  when  Grant  went  across 
to  Sherman,  and  had  an  interview  with  him. 
rene"wiro?the  hat-  They  agrccd  in  opinion  that  the  Confeder- 
ate army  was  exhausted.  Grant  gave  Sher- 
man orders  to  be  ready  to  attack  it  early  in  the  morning, 
informing  him  that  Lewis  Wallace  was  near  at  hand,  and 
would  cross  the  bridge  and  take  post  on  his  right;  that 
Buell's  troops  were  arriving,  and  would  get  over  the  river 
during  the  night,  and  come  up  on  the  general  left.  Grant 
then  visited  every  division  commander,  giving  to  each 
special  directions.  He  slept  on  the  ground,  with  his 
head  against  the  stumj)  of  a  tree,  though  it  w^as  raining 
heavily. 

Buell,  who,  with  his  staff,  soon  afterward  came  on  the 
Exhausted  condi-  field,  aud  had  also  an  interview  with  Sher- 
tion  of  the  armies.  ^^^^^^  ^^^  heeii  uufavorably  impressed  by  the 

sight  of  the  broken  troops  near  the  Landing;  but  he 
found  that,  after  all  the  losses,  there  must  be  nearly  20,000 
still  left  for  battle,  and  that  the  Confederates  had  prob- 
ably not  more  than  25,000.  They  had,  in  fact,  suffered 
quite  as  much  as  Grant's  army.  Bragg  says  that  they 
were  very  much  shattered :  "  Li  a  dark,  stormy  night,  the 
commanders  found  it  impossible  to  find  and  assemble 
their  troops,  each  body  or  fragment  bivouacking  where 
the  night  overtook  them."  Buell  made  himself  acquaint- 
ed with  the  battle-ground  by  the  aid  of  a  manuscript 
map  lent  him  by  Sherman. 

Night  came,  and  brought  with  it  new  horrors.  The 
The  gun-boats  set   guu-boats  kept  up  au  iuccssaut  cannonad- 

the  woods  on  fire.      -^^ .  ^^^.^,  ^-^^-^^^  ^^^  ^^^  ^^.^^^^  ^^  g^^^      jj^^^ 

the  damp  leaves  were  smouldering;  there,  dried  by  the 


298  BEAUREGARD  REPORTS  HIS  SUCCESS.  [Sect.  X. 

heat,  they  and  the  underbrush  were  bursting  into  flame. 
The  fire  crept  up  the  bark  of  old  trees.  Wounded  men, 
both  those  in  blue  and  those  in  gray,  were  vainly  trying 
to  escape  a  common  torment.  Happily,  however,  the 
heavy  rain  that  fell  extinguished  the  flames. 

Beauregard  thus  reports  his  position  on  Sunday  night : 

Beanre-ard's  report    "  ^^  ^  o'clock  P.M.  WC  Were  lU- pOSSeSSloU  of 

of  his  successes.  ^^^  hls-  eucampmeuts  between  Owl  and  Lick 
Creeks  but  one.  Nearly  all  of  his  field  artillery,  about 
thirty  flags,  colors,  and  standards,  over  three  thousand 
prisoners,  including  a  division  commander  (General  Pren- 
tiss) and  several  brigade  commanders,  thousands  of  small- 
arms,  an  immense  supply  of  subsistence,  forage,  and  muni- 
tions of  war,  and  a  large  amount  of  means  of  transporta- 
tion^all  the  substantial  fruits  of  a  complete  victory — 
such,  indeed,  as  rarely  have  followed  the  most  successful 
battles;  for  never  was  an  army  so  well  provided  as  that 
of  our  enemy. 

"  The  remnant  of  his  army  had  been  driven  in  utter 
disorder  to  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Pittsburg,  under  the 
shelter  of  the  heavy  guns  of  his  iron-clad  gun-boats,  and 
we  remained  undisputed  masters  of  his  well-selected,  ad- 
mirably provided  cantonments,  after  over  twelve  hours  of 
obstinate  conflict  with  his  forces,  who  had  been  beaten 
from  them  and  the  contiguous  covert,  but  only  by  a  sus- 
tained onset  of  all  the  means  we  could  bring  into  ac- 
tion." 

It  has  been  sometimes  said  that  the  arrival  of  Buell 
Bueii  had  not  yet  savcd  Graut's  army.  But  it  was  not  so. 
arrived.  Grant,  though    severely  pressed,  was   not 

beaten.  General  Nelson,  with  Buell's  advance,  did  not 
reach  the  point  on  the  Tennessee  opposite  the  Landing 
until  5  P.M. ;  it  was  ^4  P.M.  before  Ammen's  brigade  was 
over.     The  Thirty-sixth  Indiana,  Colonel  Grose,  support- 


Chap.l.]  arrival  of  buell.  290 

ed  by  the  Sixth  Ohio,  was  the  first  to  touch  the  enemy .; 
The  resistance  it  met. with  shows,  however,  that  the  ac- 
tion had  really  ended.  Colonel  Grose  reported  only  one 
man  killed  in  the  firing,  and  one  after  he  had  got  np  two 
hundred  yards  in  the  rear  of  the  battery ;  he  had  also 
one  man  wounded.  -  Nelson  completed  the  crossing  of 
his  division  at  9  P.M.  Crittenden's  division  came  up 
Buell  comes  on  the  "^y  boat  from  Savauuah  after  that  hour; 
^^^'  McCook's  at  five  the  next  morning,  in  the 

boats  sent  back  by  Crittenden.  Lewis  Wallace  at  last 
also  arrived  on  the  extreme  right,  where  he  had  been  ex- 
pected for  so  many  hours.  These  re-enforcements  added 
to  Grant's  strength  about  27,000. men. 

The  morning  of  the  7th  came  in  with  a  drizzling  rain,- 
and  the  Confederates  showed  no  signs  of  advancing.* 
Beauregard  had  ascertained  that,  from  destruction,  ex- 
haustion, and  fatigue,  he  could,  not  bring  20,000  men  into 
battle  on  his  side.  It  was  only  now  that  he  learned  that 
Buell  had  come  on  the  field.  Lewis  Wallace,  who  was 
on  the  national  right,  was  in  action  soon  after  daylight. 
Eeuewaiofthebat-  Graut  ordcrcd  him  to  press  his  attack  on 
tie  next  xnorning.     ^^^  Confederate  Mt,  which  was  commanded 

by  Bragg.  Accordingly,  Wallace  and  McClernand  moved 
forward  and  recovered  the  ground'  lost  the  day  before, 
up  to  McClernand's  original  camp  on  the  right  of  the 
Corinth  Road.  There  they  waited  with  Sherman,  who 
sat  patiently  on  his  horse,  under  fire,  until  after  10  A.M., 
by  which  time  Buell's  troops  were  abreast  of  them. 

Buell's  forces. constituted  the  centre  and  left  of  Grant's 
Buell's  troops  come  newliuc.  Thc  divlslous  of  Nelson  and  Crit- 
into  action.  teudcu  ouly  wcrc  ready  at  dawn.     When 

they  heard  Wallace's  guns  on  the  extreme  right  they 
moved  forward.  Their  artillery  had  not  yet  got  up,  but 
Buell  sent  them  Mendenhall's  and  Terrill's,  of  the  regu- 
lar .  army.     Nelson  moved  half  a  mile  before  touching 


300  THE.  SECOND  DAY'S  BATTLE.  [Sect.  X. 

the  Confederates.  He  pushed  them  for  a  while  before 
him,  but  at  length  he  was  checked.  There  was  then  an 
artillery  conflict  for  two  hours,  the  Confederates  event- 
The  second  day's  ually  waveHng.  Crittenden  was  on  Nel- 
son's right;  and  when  McCook  got  up,  he 
went  on  the  right  of  Crittenden,  and  Buell  took  com- 
mand. Sherman's  captured  camp  was  at  this  time  in  the 
Confederate  rear,  and  to  that  as  an  objective  the  national 
line  advanced,  though  resisted  with  the  utmost  resolu- 
tion. 

Meantime  Lewis  Wallace  M^as  so  pressing  the  Confed- 
erate left  that  Beaureo-ard  was  constrained  to  re-enforce 
it  from  his  right,  notwithstanding  that  he  had  found 
that  Grant,  with  Buell,  was  too  strong  for  him  on  that 
wing.  Nelson,  having  now  less  pressure  ujDon  him,  be- 
gan again  to  move  forward,  though  not  without  severe 
fighting  and  alternations  of  success.  On  the  other  wing, 
Wallace  and  Sherman  were  steadily  advancing  toward 
Shiloh  meeting-house  against  a  furious  fire. 

McCook's  division  had  also  forced  back  the  Confeder- 
erate  centre.  In  front,  of  this  division  Beauregard  made 
his  last  decided  stand.  He  had  given  up  all  hope  of 
forcing  the  national  left.  Sherman  describes  the  musket- 
ry fire  arising  in  these  movements  as  the  severest  he  ever 
heard.  Wallace  says, "  Step  by  step,  from  tree  to  tree, 
position  to  position,  the  rebel  lines  went  back,  never  stop- 
ping again — infantry,  horses,  artillery,  all  went  back.  The 
firing  was  grand  and  terrific.  To  and  fro,  now  in  my 
front,  then  in  Sherman's,  rode  General  Beauregard,  incit- 
ing his  troops,  and  fighting  for  his  fading  prestige  of  in- 
vincibility. Far  along  the  lines  to  the  left  the  contest 
was  raging  with  equal  obstinacy.  As  indicated  by  the 
sounds,  the  enemy  were  retirins:  every  where. 

Beaurejrard  at  last  ^  "^  tit  i 

jJ2Jpe"ed  to  re-      Cheer  after  cheer  rang  through  the  woods, 
and  every  man  felt  that  the  day  was  ours." 


chap.l.]  aid  kendered  by  buell.  301 

Beauregard  now  found  that  nothing  more  could  be  done, 
and  ordered  a  retreat.  To  Breckinridge,  who  had  com- 
mand of  the  rear -guard,  he  exclaimed, "  Don't  let  this  be 
converted  into  a  rout." 

Grant's  captured  tents  were  recovered,  but  no  pursuit 

The  Confederate    could  be  made  uutil  the  next  day.     The 

losses.  Confederate  losses  in  this  dreadful  battle 

were  1728  killed,  8012  wounded,  959  missing  —  total, 

10,699. 

As  there  has  been  much  controversy  respecting  the 
actual  share  of  the  armies  of  Grant  and  of  Buell  in  the 
operations  of  the  two  days  (April  6th  and  7th),  I  give 
the  subjoined  tables,  which  may  enable  the  reader  to 
form  an  opinion. 

In  Grant's  army  there  were  six  divisions. 

The  national  losses.    ;^,.,  .!;^ 

Their  losses,  m  killed  and  wounded,  were : 


1st,  McClernand — loss  both  days 

.     1861 

2d,   W.  H.  L.  Wallace— loss  both  days  .  . 

.     2424 

3d,   Lewis  Wallace — loss  second  day.  .  . 

305  ■ 

4th,  Huiibut — loss  both  days   ....... 

.     1985 

5  th,  Sherman — loss  both  days 

.     2031 

6th,  Prentiss  (no  report) — loss  estimated  . 

.     2000 

Aersrreerate  loss 

.  10,606 

Of  Buell's  army,  four  divisions  had  marched  to  Grant's 
aid.     Of  these  three  were  engaged: 


2d,    McCook's  loss 881 

4th,  Nelson's        " 693 

5th,  Crittenden's" 390 

Aggregate  loss 1964 


In  view  of  all  the  facts,  it  appears  that  Grant  was  not 
How  far  Grant  was  indebted  to  Bucll  for  physlcal  aid  on  the 
indebted  to  Buell.    ^^^^  ^^^ .  ^^  j^^^  himsclf  rcpulscd  the  final 

Confederate  attack,  and  believed  that  as  soon  as  Lewis 
Wallace  joined  him  he  could  renew  and  win  the  battle. 


302  BEAUREGARD'S  RETREAT;  [Sect.  X. 

So  obstinate  was  tlie  resistance  he  had  made,  that  he  had 
inflicted  on  his  antagonist  as  severe  a  loss  as  he  had  him- 
self sustained.  The  well-known  approach  of  Buell  doubt- 
less did  give  him  moral  assistance. .  In  the  battle  of  that 
day  Sherman  stands  forth  as  the  central  figure:  the  in- 
comparable tenacity  with  which  he  held  the  national 
right  against  the  enemy's  utmost  efforts,  gave  Grant  the 
means  of  staying  the  disaster  that  was  befalling  the  left. 
Not  without  reason,  therefore,  did  Halleck  say, "  It  is  the 
Sherman  had  se-  unauiuious  opiulou  hcrc  that  Brigadier  Gen- 
cured  the  victory.    ^^^^  W.  T.  Shermau  savcd  the  fortunes  of 

the  day  on  the  6th,  and  contributed  largely  to  the  glori^ 
ous  victory  of  the  7th." 

Fortune  had  denied  to  Beauregard  victory.  He  was 
Beauregard's  re-  Compelled  to  rctrcat.  Au  eye-witness,  an 
cormth.  i^ppgggg(j  New-Yorker,  says :  "  I  made  a  de- 
tour from  the  road  on  which  the  army  was  retreating, 
that  I  might  travel  faster  and  get  ahead  of  the  main  body. 
In  a  ride  of  twelve  miles  alongside  of  the  routed  army  I 
saw  more  of  human  agony  and  woe  than  I  trust  I  shall 
ever  be  called  again  to  witness.  The  retreating  host 
wound  along  a  narrow  and  almost  impassable  road,  ex- 
tending some  seven  or  eight  miles  in  length.  Here  was 
a  long  line  of  wagons  loaded  with  wounded,  groaning 
and  cursing,  and  piled  in  like  bags  of  grain ;  while  the 
mules  plunged  on  in  mud  and  water  belly-deep,  the  wa- 
ter sometimes  coming  into  the  wagons.  Next  came  a 
straggling  regiment  of  infantry,  pressing  on  past  the 
train ;  then  a  stretcher  borne  upon  the  shoulders  of  four 
men,  carrying  a  wounded  officer;  then  soldiers  strag- 
gling along  with  an  arm  broken  and  hanging  down,  or 
other  fearful  wounds  which  were  enough  to  destroy  life. 
And  to  add  to  the  horrors  of  the  scene,  the  elements  of 
heaven  marshaled  their  forces,  a  fitting  accompaniment  of 
the  tempest  of  human  desolation  and  passion  which  was 


Chap.  L.]  THE  RETREAT  TO  CORINTH.  303 

raging.  A  cold  drizzling  rain  commenced  about  night- 
fall, and  soon  came  harder  and  faster.  It  turned  to  piti- 
less blinding  hail.  This  storm  raged  with  unrelenting 
violence  for  three  hours.  I  passed  long  wagon  trains  fill- 
ed with  wounded  and  dying  soldiers,  without  even  a 
blanket  to  shield  them  from  the  driving  sleet  and  hail, 
which  fell  in  stones  as  large  as  partridge  eggs,  until  it  lay- 
on  the  ground  two  inches  deep. 

"Three  hundred  men  died  during  this  awful  retreat. 
Their  bodies  were  thrown  out  to  make  room  for  others, 
who,  although  wounded,  had  struggled  on  through  the 
storm,  hoping  to  find  shelter,  rest,  and  medical  care." 

Was  this  the  triumphant  invasion  of  the  North  ?  Was 
it  for  this  that  Beauregard  had  issued  forth  from  the  for- 
tifications of  Corinth  ? 

The  following  day  (April  8th)  Sherman  was  sent  for- 
sherman's  pursuit  Ward  wlth  two  brfgadcs  to  foUow  ou  the 
of  the  Confederates,  -(^pg^^jgg  ^^f  ^\^q  eucmy,  aud  asccrtalu  what  they 

were  doing.  On  reaching  the  Confederate  hospital  at  the 
White  House  he  was  attacked  by  Forrest's  cavalry,  but 
repulsed  it.  He  then  learned  that  Beauregard  had  re- 
treated to  Corinth.  All  along  were  evidences  of  the 
great  discomfiture— the  dead  scattered  on  the  road-sides 
unburied,  the  farm-houses  full  of  wounded,  abandoned 
wagons,  caissons,  ammunition,  and  tents. 

As  soon  as  Beauregard  reached  Corinth,  he  telegraphed 
Beauregard's  report  to  Richmoud  that  he  "  had  galucd  a  great 
to  Richmond.  ^^^  glorlous  victory ;  had  taken  from  eight 
to  ten  thousand  prisoners  and  thirty-six  guns,  but  that 
Buell  having  re-enforced  Grant,  the  Confederate  army 
had  retired  to  Corinth."  He  had  sent  a  flag  of  truce  to 
Grant  asking  permission  to  bury  his  dead,  but  Grant  in- 
formed him  that  that  had  been  already  done. 

The  battle  of  Shiloh  was  thus  a  conflict  in  which,  dur- 


3Q4  COMMENTS  ON  THE  BATTLE.  [Sect.  X. 

Character  of  the    ^^g  ^^0  dajs,  0116  hundred  thousand  men 
battle  of  shiioh.     j^^^  ^^^^  engaged— engaged  in  the  heart  of 

a  forest.  From  that  circumstance  it  presented  no  brilliant 
military  evolutions.  It  may  be  said  to  have  been  a  gi- 
gantic  and  bloody  bush-fight.  Tha  twenty  thousand  kill- 
ed and  wounded  men  bore  testimony  to  its  severity.  On 
the  side  of  the  Confederates  it  was  simply  a  vigorous  ef- 
fort to  push  straight  down  to  Pittsburg  Landing ;  on  the 
national  side  it  was  a  determined  effort  to  resist.  The 
confusion  into  which  both  armies  fell  was  the  necessary 
consequence  of  the  wooded  and  broken  field.  The  brave 
Confederate  General  Johnston,  who,  in  such  an  untimely 
manner,  lost  his  life  in  the  front  of  the  battle,  saw  from 
the  beginning  that  his  duty  was  to  act,  not  as  the  com- 
mander, but  as  the  leader  of  his  men.  The  mixed-up  con- 
dition, the  inextricable  confusion  into  which,  as  related 
by  Bragg,  that  army  had  fallen  at  the  close  of  the  first 
day,  had  more  than  its  counterpart  on  the  national  side. 
In  the  very  crisis  of  the  battle,  the  guns  with  which  Grant 
checked  the  last  rush  of  the  Confederates  w^ere  brought 
from  all  quarters,  and  were  worked  by  chance  volunteers, 
soldiers,  artillerists,  and  a  doctor. 

In  some  remarks  which  he  published  on  this  battle, 
Sherman  has  pointed  out  how  strikingly  it  displayed  the 
characteristic  qualities  of  the  two  armies.  Opposed  to  the 
energy,  vigor,  vivacity  of  the  South  was  the  inflexible  de- 
termination of  the  North.  On  the  national  right  Sher- 
man himself  had  been  hammered  by  main  force  from  his 
camps  of  the  morning  until  he  had  been  brought  to  the 
bridge  at  Snake  Creek.  It  was  then  of  no  use  to  hammer 
at  him  any  longer ;  he  could  be  driven  in  no  more ;  the 
hammer  merely  rebounded  from  its  own  blows.  Grant, 
at  the  ravine  on  the  national  left,  had  not  been  conquered, 
but  only  compressed.  He  was  certain  to  recoil  the  more 
violently  in  proportion  as  the  pressure  was  more  severe. 


Chap.  L.]  SHEKMAN  BKEAKS  THE  RAILROAD.  3Q5 

This  battle  was  made  the  subject  of  the  most  extraor- 
Misrepresentations  dliiary  misrepresentations.  Eeporters  who 
of  the  battle.         ^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^^  plateau,  but  on  board  the 

steam-boats,  or  down  at  the  Landing,  gathered  from  the 
raw  troops  who  had  fled  many  false  statements.  Thus 
Prentiss,  who  fought  desperately  until  four  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  and  was  then  taken  prisoner,  with  four  regi- 
ments, because  he  would  not  recede  when  Hurlbut  and 
Wallace  were  forced  back,  was  said  to  have  been  sur- 
prised in  bed  in  the  morning,  and  captured  in  his  shirt ; 
Grant,  whose  movements  from  daybreak  we  have  related, 
was  said  to  have  been  absent  from  the  army ;  Buell  was 
said  to  have  purposely  delayed  his  march  out  of  jealousy. 
From  such  authorities  Beauregard  received  credit  for 
having  taken  Grant  by  surprise,  and  so  completely  over- 
thrown him  that  he  was  rescued  from  total  ruin  only  by 
the  arrival  of  Buell. 

]S"o  resolute  pursuit,  however,  having  been  made  by  the 
national  army  from  SKiloh,  Beauregard  occupied  himself 
in  strengthening  the  works  of  Corinth,  his  fortifications 
extending  more  than  fifteen  miles.  He  destroyed  the 
roads  and  bridges  of  approach,  and  made  every  thing 
ready  for  the  reception  of  Halleck,  who,  leaving  St.  Louis 
on  the  news  of  the  great  battle,  had  arrived  at  Pittsburg 
The  national  army  Landing.  The  uatloual  army  was  rapidly 
re-enforced.  re-cuforced.     Popc  brought  to  it  from  Mis- 

souri 25,000  men;  eventually  it  became  more  than  100,000 
strong. 

A  few  days  after  he  had  reached  Shiloh,  Halleck  or- 
dered Sherman  to  take  some  fresh  troops  from  Buell's 
army,  ascend  the  Tennessee  to  the  mouth  of  Bear  Creek, 
Sherman  breaks  the  ^ud  thcrc  break  thc  Memphis  and  Charles- 
great  railroad.  ^^^  Eailroad,  which  crosses  the  creek  by  a 
bridge  of  two  spans  and  about  five  hundred  feet  of  tres- 
tle-work. Accordingly,  Sherman  burnt  that  bridge  on 
H.— U 


306  HALLECK'S  ADVANCE  TO  CORINTH.  [Sect.  X. 

the  14tli  of  April,  and  effectually  severed  tlie  line  of  com- 
munication. 

Halleck,  on  joining  the  army,  put  Grant  as  "  second  in 
command,"  without  any  real  duty.  Grant  had  fallen  un- 
der his  displeasure,  being  blamed  for  the  manner  in  which 
Halleck  reorgan-  the  battle  of  Shiloh  had  been  fought.  The 
•  ^'^^^  ^^^  ^''°'^'  army  was  now  completely  reorganized,  and 
slowly  advanced  on  Corinth  during  the  month  of  May. 
As  if  to  indicate  the  cause  of  the  reproach  that  had  been 
cast  upon  Grant,  Halleck  intrenched  himself  incessantly 
as  he  moved  forward.  As  Grant  had  been  blamed  for 
want  of  precaution,  so  now  Halleck  was  blamed  for  over- 
precaution.  His  adversaries  affirmed  that  it  took  him 
six  weeks  to  march  fifteen  miles.  They  abstained,  how- 
ever, from  giving  weight  to  the  fact  that,  though  his  army 
and  advances  very  had  wou  a  great  battle,  it  was  still  a  raw 
slowly  on  Corinth.   ^^^^^  ncedlug  drill  and  time  for  cementing. 

In  the  opinion  of  the  best  officers  in  it,  it  was  not  fit  for 
marches  or  for  military  risks.  He  had  before  him  two 
grand  operations  which  demanded  great  efficiency  —  a 
march  southward  for  the  complete  opening  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, and  a  march  eastward  for  the  seizure  of  Chattanooga. 
Halleck  determined  to  conduct  his  operations  against 
Corinth  by  regular  approaches.  On  the  21st  of  May  his 
nearest  batteries  were  three  miles  distant  from  that  place. 
He  had  become  persuaded  that  the  works  were  exceed- 
ingly strong,  adequately  garrisoned,  and  that  an  energetic 
resistance  would  be  made.  Beauregard  had,  however, 
concluded  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  resist  such 
an  army  as  that  which  was  approaching.  Accordingly, 
he  commenced  secretly  evacuating;  the  place 

The  fall  of  Corinth.  ,        ^^,-         ^^^  ^^     ^    .       ,,        ^    ^        •*•,       -^ 

on  the  26th  of  May,  and  m  three  days  had 
removed  or  destroyed  every  thing  of  value.  He  then  re- 
treated by  the  southern  road  to  Tupelo.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  30th  the  national  troops  entered  the  town. 


Chap.  L.]  FALL  OF  CORINTH.  3Q^ 

They  found  that  they  might  have  taken  it  long  before. 
The  fortifications  were  substantially  a  counterfeit ;  no  ad- 
equate garrison  had  ever  been  present ;  in  some  of  the 
batteries  there  were  wooden  or  "  Quaker"  guns.  Halleck 
now  dispatched  Pope  and  Buell  in  pursuit  of  the  retreat- 
ing Confederates,  but  they  were  unable  to  overtake  them. 
Beauregard  left  his  army  when  at  Tupelo,  on  the  15th 
of  June,  relieving  himself  from  duty  on  the  plea  of  ill 
health.  He  went  into  retirement  at  Mobile  and  Bladon 
Springs,  having  turned  over  the  command  temporarily  to 
Beauregard  unjust-  Grcneral  Bragg.  No  sooner  did  Davis  hear 
ly  disgraced.         ^£  ^j^-^  ^^^^  j^^  Ordered  Bragg  to  assume 

permanent  command,  passionately  declaring  that  he  would 
not  reinstate  Beauregard  though  the  whole  world  should 
urge  him  to  the  measure. 

From  the  second  line,  thus  broken,  the  Confederates 
had  to  fall  back  on  the  third,  of  which  the  strategic 
points  were  Vicksburg,  Jackson,  Meridian,  and  Selma. 

In  view  of  the  whole  campaign,  from  the  attack  on  Fort 
Summary  of  the  Hcury  to  the  occupatlou  of  Corfuth,  it  must 
shiioh  campaign.  ^^  regarded  as  a  complete  success  for  the 
national  cause.  The  objects  originally  proposed  —  the 
breaking  through  the  Confederate  lines  of  defense,  the 
fall  of  the  powerful  blockading  works  on  the  Mississippi, 
the  opening  of  that  river  down  to  Memphis,  the  forcing 
of  the  enemy  from  their  camp  at  Bowling  Green,  the  oc- 
cupation of  Nashville,  the  severing  of  the  Memphis  and 
Charle^on  Road,  and  the  capture  of  Corinth — all  these 
objects  were  attained. 

Doubtless  more  might  have  been  accomplished  had 
there  been  more  celerity  in  the  advance  on  Corinth.  Had 
Halleck  acted  energetically  with  his  left,  he  might,  per- 
haps, have  crowned  his  triumph  with  the  destruction  of 
Beauregard's  army. 

On  the  part  of  the  Confederates,  the  rapidity  of  their 


3QS  MITCHELL'S  EXPEDITION.  [Sect.  X. 

concentration  at  Corinth,  their  plan  of  cam- 
piaTedVy'the  '^'    DaisTn,  their  conduct  on  the  field  of  Shiloh, 

Coufcdcr&tss.  X       o    /  7 

were  very  brilliant ;  and,  considering  how 
near  he  came  to  success  with  the  imperfect  means  he  had, 
Beauregard  was  justified  in  his  reproaches  of  the  Rich- 
mond authorities.  He  did  his  part  of  the  duty  fully. 
They  failed  in  giving  him  support. 

At  the  time  when  Buell  set  out  from  Nashville  to  re- 
enforce  Grant  at  Shiloh,  he  dispatched  Mitch- 
•  Mitcheu  to  break   ell  southward  to  dcstrov,  as  far  as  mio:ht  be 

the  railroad.  .  . 

possible,  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Road, 
Negley  being  left  in  command  of  the  reserves  at  Nash- 
ville. Mitchell  reached  Shelby  ville  on  the  4th  of  April, 
and  thence  made  forced  marches  to  Huntsville,  which  he 
seized  by  a  night  attack  on  the  11th,  getting  possession 
of  17  locomotives  and  more  than  100  passenger  cars. 
From  Huntsville  he  proceeded  to  destroy  the  road  east- 
ward as  far  as  Stevenson,  and  westward  as  far  as  Decatur 
and  Tuscumbia,  over  a  distance  of  one  hundred  miles. 
From  the  latter  place  he  was  driven  by  a  Confederate 
force  coming  from  Corinth,  but  in  his  retreat  he  burned 

His  complete  sue-   the  bridge  over  the  Tennessee  at  Decatur. 

c^^^-  It  was  his  intention  to  move  eastward  as 

far  as  Chattanooga,  and  destroy  the  railroads  there,  es- 
pecially that  to  Atlanta,  and  to  burn  the  founderies  and 
machine  shops  at  Rome. 

To  accomplish  the  destruction  of  the  Atlanta  Road,  he 
sent  out  a  secret  expedition  of  twenty-two  picked  men. 
They  rendezvoused  at  Marietta,  Georgia.  At  Big  Shan- 
ty, a  short  distance  from  Great  Kenesaw  Mountain,  they 
surreptitiously  uncoupled  from  a  train  a  locomotive,  with 
a  few  box  cars,  giving  out  that  it  was  a  powder-train  for 
Beauregard's  supply.  Then,  moving  away  with  all  speed, 
they  destroyed  the  telegraph  and  pulled  up  the  rails. 


Chap.  L.]  MITCHELL'S  EXPEDITION.  309 

They  were,  however,  pursued  by  a  Confederate  train  so 
closely  that  the  brass  journals  of  their  engine  melted. 

When  about  fifteen  miles  from  Chattanooga  they  were 
compelled  to  jump  from  the  cars  and  take  refuge  in  the 
woods.  Here  they  were  all  hunted  down ;  eight  of  them 
were  hanged.  Mitchell  used  every  exertion  to  capture 
Chattanooga,  but  the  force  under  Kirby  Smith  was  too 
strong  to  permit  success. 

The  operations  of  this  energetic  and  able  general  show 
what  might  have  been  done  by  Buell  had  there  been 
more  celerity  in  his  march  and  more  vigor  in  his  pro- 
ceedings. The  contrast  between  these  commanders  was 
so  striking  that  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  act  in  uni- 
son. The  subsequent  movements  of  Bragg  would  prob- 
ably have  had  a  very  different  issue  if  Mitchell  had  been 
his  antagonist.     In  an  evil  hour  Mitchell 

His  transfer  to  t    /.  .-,  pi  •     i     '-i-i*        i 

South  Carolina  and  was  rcmovcd  irom  the  scene  or  nis  brilliant 
expedition  to  South  Carolina,  where,  unhap- 
pily, he  died — a  loss  to  the  nation  and  to  science,  for  pre- 
viously to  the  war  he  had  distinguished  himself  by  his 
devotion  to  practical  astronomy. 

The  Memphis  and  Charleston  Kailroad  was  thorough- 
ly broken  by  this  burning  of  bridges  and  tearing  up  of 
rails.  The  Confederate  communications  between  the  At- 
lantic States  and  the  Mississippi  by  this  route  were  sev- 
ered. 


CHAPTEE  LI. 

CONTINUATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SHILOH.     THE  FIRST 
VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN. 

In  continuation  of  the  general  plan  of  the  campaign,  the  army  at  Corinth  was  di- 
vided. One  portion  of  it,  under  Buell,  marched  eastward  toward  Chattanooga, 
to  seize  that  strategic  point.  To  the  other,  under  Grant,  was  assigned  the  duty 
of  moving  southward  to  open  the  Mississippi. 

The  Confederate  armies  were  greatly  strengthened  by  conscription,  and  inspirited 
by  their  victories  in  Virginia. 

Grant's  army  was  weakened  to  strengthen  Buell.  He  was  compelled  to  defer  his 
southward  march.  The  Confederate  generals  in  front  of  him  were  tempted 
to  endeavor  to  retake  Corinth,  but  were  not  successful. 

Grant,  having  received  re-enforcements,  commenced  the  first  campaign  against 
Vicksburg,  but  was  forced  back.  Sherman,  having  passed  down  the  Mississippi 
with  the  same  intention,  was  repulsed  at  Chickasaw  Bayou. 

Capture  of  Arkansas  Post. 

Beaueegaed  had  thrown  the  die  and  lost.  In  the  for- 
Eesuits  of  the  Shi-  ^sts  of  SMloh  the  fate  not  only  of  the  Upper 
loh  campaign.  Misslsslppi,  but  also  apparently  that  of  the 
great  states  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  had  been  decided. 

A  vast  space  of  many  thousand  square  miles,  the  entire 
northwest  of  the  Confederacy,  had  been  wrenched  away. 

Not  without  reason,  then,  was  there  consternation  in 
Eichmond.  The  anger  of  Davis  when  he  ordered  Beau- 
regard into  retirement  seemed  to  be  almost  justified. 

Halleck,  however,  had  entered  Corinth,  not  with  the 
military  pomp  he  had  expected.  There  had  been  no  bril- 
liant operations,  no  triumphant  assault.  His  wily  antag- 
onist had  simply  given  him  the  slip. 

Corinth  gained,  Halleck  prepared  to  execute  the  re- 
The  march  of  Buell  maiudcr  of  hls  plan.  He  had  now  to  de- 
eastward.  ^^^-^  Bucll  castward  to  Chattanooga,  while 

he  himself  marched  southward  to  Mobile,  opening  the 
Mississippi  on  his  right  as  he  went.     Farragut  had  al- 


Chap.  LI.]  THE  AEMY  AT  CORINTH.  311 

ready  secured  its  moutli  by  the  capture  of  New  Orleans 
in  April.  Halleck's  army  was  more  than  100,000  strong. 
He  detached  Buell  on  his  eastward  march  to  Chattanoo- 
ga on  the  10th  of  June. 

But  the  terrible  energy  of  the  Eichmond  government 
chano;ed  the  expected  course  of  events.     A 

Effects  of  the  Con-  ^      _  ...         ,       t  ,       ^,,     , 

federate  conscrip-  rcmorsclcss  couscriptiou  had  not  only  nlled 
the  thinned  ranks  of  the  armies,  but  had 
greatly  increased  their  strength.  The  conscripts  had  con- 
verted McClellan's  peninsular  campaign  into  an  awful  na- 
tional disaster.  They  were  contemplating  a  march  upon 
Washington. 

As  soon  as  Bragg,  the  Confederate  general,  found  that 
The  countermarch  BucU  was  movlug  toward  Chattauooga,  fore- 
^'^^^'  seeing  the  disastrous  military  consequences 

which  must  follow  the  occupation  of  that  important  point 
by  a  national  army,  he  set  out,  and,  marching  with  the 
greatest  celerity,  reached  Chattanooga  before  his  adversa- 
ry, and  solidly  established  himself  in  it.  His  army  was 
now  greatly  re-enforced  by  conscription. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  national  government 
Removal  of  Haiieck  was  coustraiucd  to  take  Halleck  from  his 
towabhington.  victorious  Wcstcm  campaign,  and,  bringing 
him  to  Washington,  commit  to  him,  as  commander-in- 
chief,  a  duty  of  more  momentous  importance — the  resist- 
ing of  the  triumphant  Confederates  in  their  march  upon 
the  capital — the  heart  of  the  nation.  Halleck  left  Cor- 
inth, and  the  charge  of  the  great  Western  campaign  fell 
to  Grant,  his  second  in  command. 

But  this  was  not  all.     The  army  whose  duty  it  was  to 
Grant's  army      complctc  the  opcuiug  of  thc  Mlssisslppi  lost 
weakened,         ^^^  ^^^j  jts  gcucral — it  was  Hkewisc  de- 
pleted of  its  strength.    Bragg,  whose  strong  point  was  at 
Chattanooga,  had,  as  just  mentioned,  been  greatly  re-en- 
forced.    Buell  was  compelled  by  him  to  make  a  rapid  re- 


312  POSITION  OF  GRANT'S  EORCES.  [Sect.  X. 

treat  to  the  Ohio.  It  seemed  as  if  a  Confederate  march 
northward,  on  the  west  flank  of  the  Cumberland  Mount- 
ains, would  undo  all  that  Halleck  had  done  in  his  south- 
ward march  along  the  Tennessee.  At  all  hazards,  Bragg 
must  be  checked.  Troops  which  had  now  become  vet- 
erans were  withdrawn  from  Grant.  They  were  hurried 
up  the  Mississippi  and  the  Ohio  to  strengthen  Buell,  and 
Grant  was  left  weakened  in  presence  of  his  Confederate 
antagonists. 

The  expectation  which  had  been  entertained  in  Rich- 
mond that  Bragg's  march  on  Louisville  would  compel 
Grant  to  relax  his  grip  on  the  Mississippi  was  doomed 
but  he  still  ciipgs  to  disappointment.  Now  came  into  view 
to  the  Mississippi.  ^^^  ^f  ^^^  striking  lineaments  of  that  gener- 
al's character — his  unconquerable  tenacity.  Weakened 
though  he  was,  he  stood  fast,  combating  his  opponents, 
and  not  yielding  an  inch  that  he  could  hold.  He  patient- 
ly waited  until  he  was  re-enforced,  and  then  resumed  his 
southward  march. 

I  have  now  to  relate  his  temporary  operations  against 
his  antagonists  Price  and  Van  Dorn,  and  his  resumption 
of  the  march  toward  Vicksburg. 

After  the  departure  of  Halleck,  the  Shiloh  army,  under 
Position  of  Grant's  commaud  of  Graut,  was  stationed  from  Mem- 
forces.  pi^.g   ^^  Bridgeport,  Tennessee,  along   the 

Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad.  Grant  had  Mem- 
phis, Grand  Junction,  and  Corinth  as  his  strong  posts, 
with  his  head-quarters  at  Jackson,  Tennessee,  a  point  in 
the  rear,  where  the  Central  Mississippi  Railroad  unites 
with  the  Mobile  and  Ohio.  It  was  necessary  for  him  to 
hold  the  railroads  from  Corinth  and  Bolivar  north  to  Co- 
lumbus, which,  owing  to  the  low  water  in  the  Tennessee, 
had  been  made  his  base  of  supplies. 

In  front  of  Grant  lay  the  Confederate  forces  under  Price 


Chap.  LI.]    THE  CONFEDERATE  ATTEMPTS  ON  CORINTH.  313 


and  Van  Dorn.  They  could  concentrate  so 
pricranrvan^     as  to  tlircatcn  any  one  of  Hs  strong  points. 

Encouraged  by  the  fact  that  a  part  of  his 
troops  had  been  sent  into  Kentucky  to  aid  Buell  in  re- 
sisting Bragg,  every  man  who  could  be  spared  having 
been  thus  taken,  and  Grant  thrown  on  the  defensive, 
they  thought  that  they  might  execute  a  successful  ma-* 
noeuvre  for  the  recovery  of  Corinth.     Price  therefore 

moved  to  luka,  seemingly  with  the  inten- 

They  attempt  to       , .  p  •    j  •  t>  Tj_  ±    j 

take  coriath  by    tiou  01  assistius;  Btslq'q^.     it  was  expected 

stratagem.  i  >-i  i  i  i  t   p  r>i      •     ,1 

that  Grrant  would  be  tempted  irom  Oormtn, 
and  an  opportunity  thus  be  given  to  Van  Dorn '  of  seiz- 
ing it.  It  was  the  key  to  the  military  possession  of  Ten- 
nessee. 

Van  Dorn  being  at  Holly  Springs  and  Price  at  luka, 
Grant  thought  it  possible  to  destroy  the  latter  and  get 
back  to  Corinth  before  the  former  could  interfere.     He 

therefore  directed  Kosecrans,  who  was  at 

Counter  attempt  of   rn  i  •       1  t  t    i  t    y^    t    1 

Grant  to  destroy      luscumDia,  to  advauce  on  iuka,  and  Urd  to 

Price.  .  '  .  .11. 

move  m  combination  with  him,  attacking 
from  the  west  and  north. 

At  noon  (September  19th),  Kosecrans,  who  had  9000 
men,  was  within  seven  miles  of  luka,  moving  slowly  for- 
ward. Ord  had  been  directed  to  approach  the  place, 
but  not  to  attack  until  he  heard  the  sound  of  Kose- 
Affair  at  luka  ^I'^i^s's  guus.  Ho  was,  howcvcr,  prevcutcd 
by  a  strong  northwest  wind  from  hearing 
any  sound  at  all.  Meantime  Kosecrans,  who  was  delay- 
ing beyond  Grant's  expectations,  came  up  to  a -point  with- 
in two  miles  of  luka,  and  there,  about  4  P.M.,  encounter- 
ed the  Confederates  in  force.  A  severe  conflict  ensued, 
in  which  he  lost  a  battery  and  730  men  killed  and 
wounded.  It  was  continued  until  dark.  The  men  lay 
down  on  their  arms,  expecting  to  renew  the  engagement 
in  the  morning. 


314 


PRICE  AND  VAN  DORN. 


[Sect.  X. 


FROM   MEMPHIS   TO  VICKSBURG. 


When  inornino: 
came,  Ord,  who 
had  never  heard 
the  sound  of  the 
battle,  but  had 
learned  from  some 
negroes  that  it 
had  taken  place, 
moved  into  luka, 
and  found  that 
the  Confederates 
had  abandoned 
it.  They  had  es- 
Escape  of  Price  caped  by  the  Fulton  Koad,  which  Eose- 
to  Van  Dorn.  ^raus  was  to  have  occupied.  Kosecrans  pur- 
sued, but  could  not  overtake  them.  They  had  checked 
him  on  one  road  while  they  had  escaped  by  the  other. 
Their  loss,  however,  had  been  1438.  In  these  operations, 
Grant  was  very  far  from  being  satisfied  with  what  Eose- 
crans  had  done. 

The  two  Confederate  generals,  finding  that  their  at- 
Attempttotake  tcmpt  to  gct  posscsslou  of  CoHuth  by  strat- 
corinth  by  force.  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^-^^^^  determined  to  take  it  by 

force.  They  therefore  concentrated  at  Eipley.  Eosecrans 
was  in  command  at  Corinth  with  a  force  of  about  20,000 
men.     Ord  was  at  Bolivar,  and  Grant  at  Jackson. 


Chap.LL]  attack  on  CORINTH.  3I5 

On  the  2d  of  October,  Van  Dorn  moved  from  Chewalla 
toward  Corinth.  Its  defenses  had  been  much  changed 
since  Beauregard  had  originally  fortified  it.  Halleck  had 
constructed  works  inside  of  those  of  Beauregard,  and 
Grant,  who  had  been  eight  weeks  in  the  place,  had  made 
others  inside  of  those  of  Halleck.  Corinth  now  required 
a  much  smaller  force  for  its  defense. 

Learning  of  the  Confederate  advance,  Kosecrans  was  at 
first  in  doubt  whether  the  real  attack  was  to  be  made  on 
himself,  or  on  Grant,  or.  Ord.  At  first  he  suspected  that 
the  movement  upon  him  was  nothing  more  than  a  feint. 

"  ,^     ^  .  ^^   But  early  on  the  morniner  of  the  3d  Van 

Assault  on  Corinth.  m     i    i  • 

Dorn  assailed  him  strongly.  The  engage- 
ment soon  became  very  warm,  and  General  Mc Arthur, 
who  had  been  sent  to  the  front  and  presently  afterward 
re-enforced,  was  compelled  to  fall  back,  with  the  loss  of 
two  guns. 

Eosecrans,  now  perceiving  the  enemy's  intention,  made 
suitable  preparations  to  receive  him.  Hamilton's  divis- 
ion held  the  right,  Davies  the  centre,  McKean  the  left. 
Stanley  was  in  echelon  witb  McKean  and  nearer  to  Cor- 
inth. Just  before  dark  the  pressure  upon  Davies  was  so 
severe  that  he  was  compelled  to  give  ground. 

On  the  Confederate  side,  their  left,  under  Price,  was 
upon  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Eailroad,  north  of  Corinth ; 
then  came  Van  Dorn,  more  westwardly,  on  the  Chewalla 
Koad,  their  right  being  held  by  Lovell.  The  attack  was 
therefore  made  on  the  northwest  side  of  Corinth,  on 
which  Van  Dorn  had  been  informed  by  a  female  spy 
that  it  was  weakest.  But  the  works  which  Grant  had 
constructed,  consisting  of  four  redoubts,  had  materially 
changed  the  condition  of  things.  These  works  command- 
ed the  roads  along  which  the  Confederates  must  now 
pass. 

Some  cannonading  occurred  early  in  the  morning  (Oc- 


316  ATTACK  ON  CORINTH.  [Sect.  X. 

Gallant  conduct  of  tobei  4tli).  At  half  past  nine  Price's  col- 
the  Confederates.    ^^^  ^^^^  ^^^^  ^^  Eosecpans's  Centre  witli  a 

force  so  overpowering  as  to  compel  it  to  yield  and  fall 
back  The  column  advanced  in  the  form  of  a  wedge,  and 
was  received  by  the  fire  of  the  batteries,  which  tore  it 
through  and  through.  It  was  swept  by  a  direct,  cross, 
and  enfilading  fire.  Undismayed,  as  it  came  on  it  opened 
out  like  two  great  wings  right  and  left,  "  the  men  bend- 
ing their  necks  downward,  with  their  faces  averted  like 
those  who  strive  to  protect  themselves  against  a  driving 
storm  of  hail."  Davies's  division,  on  which  it  was  com-, 
ing,  began  to  give  way,  but  was  rallied  by  Rosecrans  in 
person.  The  storming  columns  carried  Fort  Richardson, 
and  even  captured  Rosecrans's  head-quarters.  The  fort 
was,  however,  almost  immediately  retaken,  and,  Hamil- 
ton's division  on  the  right  now  advancing.  Price's  column 
was  irretrievably  broken,  and  fled. 

Van  Dorn  should  have  made  his  attack  on  Rosecrans 
simultaneously  with  that  of  Price,  but  he  was  delayed 
by  the  difficulties  of  the  ground.  About  twenty  min- 
utes after  Price's  attack  he  advanced  in  four  columns, 
their  line  of  march  being  under  the  guns  of  two  forts, 
Williams  and  Robinette.  With  an  audacity  that  extort- 
ed the  admiration  of  the  national  troops,  the  Texas  and 
Mississippi  soldiers  came  forward.  They  advanced  until 
they  were  within  fifty  yards  of  Fort  Robinette,  receiving 
Failure  of  their  at-  without  fliuchiug  a  showcr  of  grape  and 
^^^^  canister,  when  "  the  Ohio  brigade  arose  and 

gave  them  such  a  murderous  fire  of  musketry  that  they 
reeled  and  fell  back  to  the  woods.  They,  however,  gal- 
lantly re-formed  and  advanced  again  to  the  charge,  led  by 
Colonel  Rogers,  of  the  Second  Texas.  This  time  they 
reached  the  edge  of » the  ditch,  but  the  deadly  musketry 
fire  of  the  Ohio  brigade  again  broke  them ;  and  at  the 
word  "  Charge  !"  the  Eleventh  Missouri  and  Twenty-sev- 


of  the  battle 


Chap.  LI.]        ROSECRANS'S  REPORT  OF  THE  BATTLE.  317 

enth  OMo  sprang  up  and  forward  at  them,  chasing  their 
broken  fragments  back  to  the  woods."  The  desperation 
of  their  attack  was  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  Ohio  Six- 
ty-third lost  one  half  of  its  number,  killed  and  wounded, 
in  resisting  them.  The  guns  of  Eobinette,  double  shot- 
ted, poured  forth  a  fire-storm  on  the  fugitives,  and  by 
noon  the  battle  was  over. 

The  Texan  Colonel  Eogers,  who  was  killed  at  the  edge 
of  the  ditch,  was  carefully  buried  by  his  victorious  and 
admiring  enemies.  They  neatly  rounded  off  the  little 
mound  that  marked  his  grave. 

The  assault  on  Corinth  was  very  sanguinary,  and  en- 
tailed on  the  Confederates  a  heavy  loss. 

In  an  order  issued  to  his  troops,  October  25th,  Rose- 
Eosecrans's  account  fi'^us  says!  Tho  cucmy  ^^^  numbered,  accord- 
ing  to  their  own  authorities,  nearly  40,000 
men — almost  double  your  own  numbers.  You  fought 
them  4n  the  position  we  desired  on  the  3d,  punishing 
them  terribly,  and  on  the  4th,  in  three  hours  after  the  in- 
fantry entered  into  action,  they  were  beaten.  You  killed 
and  buried  one  thousand  four  hundred  and  twenty-four 
officers  and  men.  Their  wounded,  at  the  usual  rate,  must 
exceed  five  thousand.  You  took  two  thousand  two  hun- 
dred and  sixty-eight  prisoners,  among  whom  are  one  hun- 
dred and  thirty-seven  field  officers,  captains,  and  subal- 
terns, representing  fifty-three  regiments  of  infantry,  six- 
teen regiments  of  cavalry,  thirteen  batteries  of  artillery, 
and  seven  battalions,  making  sixty-nine  regiments,  thir- 
teen batteries,  seven  battalions,  besides  several  companies. 
You  captured  three  thousand  three  hundred  and  fifty 
stand  of  small-arms,  fourteen  stand  of  colors,  two  pieces 
of  artillery,  and  a  large  quantity  of  equipments.  You 
pursued  his  retreating  columns  forty  miles  in  force  with 
infantry,  and  sixty  miles  with  cavalry." 

The  national  loss  in  the  battle  and  pursuit  was  315 
killed,  1812  wounded,  and  232  taken  prisoners. 


318  THE  FIRST  VICKSBURG  CAI^IPAIGN.  [Sect.  X. 

Grant  was  greatly  dissatisfied  that  Kosecrans  did  not 
press  the  pursuit  witli  energy,  believing  that  if  he  had 
done  so,  Van  Dorn  might  have  been  destroyed ;  but  the 
opportunity  was  lost. 

Grant  now  prepared  to  carry  out  the  original  intention 
The  first  vicksburg  ^^  ^he  Campaign  inaugurated  at  Donelson, 
campaign.  ^^^^  which  had  been  brought  into  abeyance 

by  the  abstraction  of  troops  from  him,  and  by  the  trans- 
fer of  Halleck  to  his  higher  command  at  Washington. 
His  plan  was  to  move  along  the  Mississippi  Central  and 
reduce  Vicksburg,  the  chief  obstacle  to  the  reopening  of 
the  river.  He  had  72,000  men  at  his  disposal,  of  whom 
18,000  were  at  Memphis;  but  he  commenced 
the  march  south-  hls  southward  march  with  only  30,000.    He 

ward.  %j  > 

summoned  Sherman,  who  was  at  Memphis, 
to  meet  him  at  Columbus,  Kentucky,  and  in  the  interview 
which  there  took  place  gave  him  the  necessary  orders. 

In  the  mean  time.  General  Pemberton,  who  had  been 
sent  from  Kichmond  to  command  the  Confederate  forces, 
took  post  behind  the  Tallahatchie  to  prevent  Grant  from 
moving  south  along  the  Central  Mississippi  Eailroad. 
But  in  November  he  did  move  down  that  road  to  Holly 
Springs,  Sherman  by  his  orders  marching  out  of  Memphis 
to  Tchulahoma,  and  forming  his  right.  Grant  simultane- 
ously ordered  General  Washburne,  with  a  small  force  of 
infantry  and  cavalry,  to  move  from  Helena,  Arkansas,  east- 
ward, so  as  to  strike  the  Central  Mississippi  about  Gre- 
nada, in  the  rear  of  Pemberton.     As  soon  as  Pemberton 

Pemberton  recedes  ^^^^     ^^^     ^^^^^     ^^     hastily     abaudoucd    his 

before  him.  stroug  posltiou  bchiud  the  Tallahatchie,  the 

national  forces  concentrating  and  forming  a  junction  near 
Oxford,  Mississippi. 

Vicksburg  was  now  the  next  step.  Grant's  cavalry 
pushed  as  far  as  Coffeeville,  and  there  ascertained, that 


Chap.  LI.]  CAPTURE  OF  HOLLY  SPRINGS.  319 

Pemberton  had  halted  at  Grenada,  and  adopted  the  Yal- 
abusha  as  his  line  for  defense.  At  Oxford,  on  Decem- 
ber 8th,  Grant,  in  an  interview  with  Sherman,  gave  him 

his  final  orders,  which  were  to  leave  three 
pL^s'SowS'^fhe  m£^  out  of  his  four  brigades  and  march  back  to 
bissippi.  Memphis,  distant  about  one  hundred  miles, 

and  there  organize,  as  quickly  as  he  could,  some  new 
troops  which  had  come  from  the  North,  and  proceed  to 
attack  Vicksburg  by  way  of  the  river.  Sherman  was  au- 
thorized to  take  from  the  force  at  Helena  as  many  men 
as  could  be  spared.  Accordingly,  he  obtained  there  about 
6000,  under  General  Steele.  He  had  already  organized 
three  divisions  at  Memphis,  under  A.  J.  Smith,  Morgan, 
and  M.  L.  Smith.  These  four  divisions,  embarking  about 
the  middle  of  December,  were  convoyed  by  the  gun-boat 
fleet  under  Admiral  Porter,  and  proceeded  straight  for 
Vicksburg. 

Grant's  plan  was,  that  while  Sherman  moved  rapidly 
by  the  river  against  Vicksburg,  he  would  himself  attack 
Pemberton  very  vigorously  and  advance  to  the  rear  of 
the  city  by  land — or,  while  he  was  holding  the  enemy, 
Sherman  might  seize  the  place.  At  that  date  no  army 
had  cast  loose  from  a  river  or  railroad  as  a  base  of  sup- 
ply, and  Grant  intended  to  make  use  of  the  Central  Mis- 
sissippi, which  had  been  repaired  up  to  Oxford.  Holly 
Springs  was  therefore  retained  as  a  grand  depot  and  hos- 
pital. While  Sherman  was  moving  down  the  river,  Van 
Dorn,  with  the  Confederate  cavalry,  executed  a  brilliant 
operation,  which  proved  fatal  to  the  expedition  of  Grant. 

He  passed  round  Grant  to  the  east,  and  sud- 
Hcll^spriugs^     denly  captured  Holly  Springs  (December 

20th),  then  guarded  only  by  a  single  regi- 
ment commanded  by  Colonel  Murphy.  "  The  surprised 
camp  surrendered  1800  men  and  150  officers,  who  were 
immediately  paroled.     The  extensive  buildings  of  the 


320  CAPTURE  OF  HOLLY  SPRINGS.  [Sect.  X. 

Mississippi  Central  Depot,  the  station-house,  the  engine- 
house,  and  immense  store-houses  filled  with  supplies  of 
clothing  and  commissary  stores,  were  burned.  Up  town, 
the  court-house  and  public  buildings,  livery-stables,  and 
all  capacious  establishments,  were  filled  ceiling-high  with 
medical  and  ordnance  stores.  These  were  all  fired,  and 
the  explosion  of  one  of  the  buildings,  in  which  was  stored 
one  hundred  barrels  of  powder,  knocked  down  nearly  all 
the  houses  on  the  south  side  of  the  square."  The  value 
of  the  property  destroyed  was  more  than  two  millions  of 
dollars.  Grant  had  warned  Murphy  by  telegraph  that 
he  was  about  to  be  attacked,  and  had  dispatched  re-en- 
forcements to  him.  In  an  order  issued  December  23d, 
Grant  says, "  It  is  with  pain  and  mortification  that  the 
general  commanding  reflects  upon  the  disgraceful  surren- 
der of  this  place,  with  all  the  valuable  stores  it  contained, 
on  the  20th  instant,  and  that  without  any  resistance,  ex- 
cept by  a  few  men  who  form  an  honorable  exception; 
and  this,  too,  after  warning  had  been  given  of  the  advance 
of  the  enemy  northward  the  evening  previous.  With  all 
the  cotton,  public  stores,  and  substantial  buildings  about 
the  depot,  it  would  have  been  perfectly  practicable  to 
have  made,  in  a  few  hours,  defenses  sufficient  to  resist 
with  a  small  garrison  all  the  cavalry  brought  against 
them,  until  the  re-enforcements  which  the  commanding 
officer  was  notified  were  marching  to  his  relief  could  have 
reached  him." 

This  serious  loss  compelled  Grant  to  restore  his  com- 
munications and  to  send  to  Memphis  for 
wm™aronce''S-    ucw  suppUcs.     Coucluding  that,  with  the 
Confederates  superior  to  him  in  cavalry,  and 
the  country  full  of  hostile  people,  he  could  not  rely  safely 
on  the  railroad,  he  determined  to  give  up  that  line  of  at- 
tack, and  move  his  whole  army  to  Vicksburg  down  the 
Mississippi  River. 


Chap.  LI.] 


CHICKASAW  BAYOU. 


321 


Slierman,  in  the  mean  time,  ignorant  of  what  hadtrans- 

sherman  reaches    pi^ed  at  Holly  Springs   and  Oxford,  had 

the  Yazoo  River,    p^g^^^  ^n  and  landed  up  the  Yazoo  River, 

and  had  made  an  attack  at  Chickasaw  Bayou,  on  the 

bluffs  between  Vicksburg  and  Haines's  Bluff. 

The  high  range  of  land  lying  between  the  Big  Black 
and  the  Yazoo  is  known  as  Walnut  Hills.  These  are 
about  two  hundred  feet  above  the  average  height  of  the 
river.  The  Mississippi  impinges  against  them,  making 
The  topography  ^  steep  bluff  at  Vlcksburg,  and  for  about 
near  Vicksburg.  ^^^  miles  above  and  several  below  on  the 
east  bank;  but  all  the  ground  on  the  west  is  alluvium. 


,^^^iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiuiiiiiiv.'nwiimiiini 


THE   CHICKASAW   BAYOU. 


I 


The  present  Yazoo  leaves  the  hills  at  a  point  about  twen- 
ty-three miles  above  its  existing  mouth,  at  a  place  known 
as  Haines's  Bluff.    That  mouth  is  about  ten  miles  above 

n.— X 


322  CHICKASAW  BAYOU.  [Sect.x: 

Vicksburg,  so  that  an  irregular  triangle  of  alluvium  lies 
between  the  Yazoo  and  the  Walnut  Hills.  The  Yazoo  in 
old  times  evidently  clung  to  these  hills,  and  has  left  old 
channels  or  bayous  of  deep  stagnant  water  or  mud,  and 
the  whole  triangle  is  cut  into  every  imaginable  form  by 
these  bayous.  The  present  river  and  the  old  bayous  are 
air  leveed  against  high  water,  and  the  lands  are  very  fer- 
tile. The  levees  vary  in  height  from  four  to  fourteen  feet ; 
their  shape  is  the  same  as  that  of  a  military  parapet ;  in- 
terior slope  45°,  superior  slope  from  twelve  to  fourteen 
feet  for  a  roadway,  exterior  slope  about  one  in  four. 
These  levees  entered  largely  into  the  Confederate  system 
of  defenses. 

Where  the  levee  is  continuous,  as  along  the  Mississippi 
Eiver,  and  along  the  bayou  from  Vicksburg  to  Haines's 
Bluff,  a  separate  roadway  is  made  behind  it.  Along  such 
a  road  masses  of  infantry  and  artillery  could  move  per- 
fectly under  cover. 

The  face  of  the  hills  between  Vicksburg  and  Haines's 
Bluff  is  very  abrupt,  and  cut  up  by  numerous  valleys  and 
ravines.  On  the  ridge  behind,  out  of  sight,  is  a  road, 
with  numerous  paths  cut  down  to  it.  Every  hill-top  had 
its  telegraph  station,  and  signal  corps  could  be  seen  tele- 
graphing the  movements  of  the  boats  and  troops. 

The  Chickasaw  Bayou  is  a  small  stream  flowing  be- 
The  Chickasaw  twccu  the  bluffs  and  the  river.  These  clay 
Bayou.  bluffs,  which  arc  here  more  than  two  hun- 

dred feet  high,  are  very  steep ;  the  alluvial  swamp  be- 
tween them  and  the  river,  with  its  quicksands  and  boggy 
bayous,  is  covered  with  cottonwood,  cypress,  and  a  dense 
growth  of  tangled  vines. 

On  reconnoitring  the  ground,  Sherman  found  that  im- 
mediately in  his  front  was  the  bayou,  passable  only  at 
two  points,  on  a  narrow  levee  and  on  a  sand-bar,  com- 
manded by  the  enemy's  sharp-shooters  on  the  opposite 


Chap.LL]         SHERMAN'S  attempt  at  CHICKASAW.  323 

bank.  BeMnd  this  was  an  irregular  strip  of  beach,  or 
table-land,  on  which  were  rifle-pits  and  batteries,  and  be- 
hind that  a  high,  abrupt  range  of  hills,  scarred  with  rifle- 
trenches  and  crowned  with  heavy  batteries.  The  coun- 
try road  from  Vicksburg  to  Yazoo  City  ran  along  the  foot 
of  these  hills,  and  served  the  enemy  as  a  covered  way 
along  which  he  moved  his  artillery  and  infantry  prompt- 
ly, to  meet  the  national  forces  at  any  point  where  they 
might  try  to  cross  the  bayou. 

The  attack  was  rendered  exceedingly  difficult  by  the 
The  difficulties  of     sw^ampy  nature  of  the  country.    A  fortified 

Sherman's  attempt.    -^-^^^  ^^^^^^    ^-j^^    -^    length,  had   bcCU    COU- 

structed  by  the  Confederates.  Through  this  it  was  Sher- 
man's intention  to  pierce.  He  determined  to  make  the 
real  attempt  at  the  head  of  Chickasaw  Bayou,  and  at 
another  place  where  the  bayou  is  barely  passable  by  in- 
fantry in  single  file ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  feints  were  to 
be  made  at  Haines's  Bluff,  Vicksburg,  and  as  many  inter- 
mediate points  as  possible.  Morgan's. division  moved 
The  battle  of  Chick-  ^loug  thc  Huc  of  Chlckasaw  Bayou,  M.L. 

asaw  Bayou.  g^-^j^   ^^^    ^^^^^^    ^    ^^^^    ^^   j^j^    ^ight,  A.  J. 

Smith  still  farther  to  the  right,  and  Steele  on  the  north, 
or  farther  side  of  the  bayou ;  but  before  the  real  assault 
Steele  had  reported  that  it  was  absolutely  impossible  for 
him  to  reach  the  foot  of  the  bluff,  by  reason  of  the  swamp 
and  submerged  ground.  He  was  therefore  recalled,  and 
sent  to  re-enforce  Morgan. 

As  soon  as  Steele's  leading  brigade  (F.  P.  Blair's)  had 
reached  the  ground,  Morgan  being  ready,  the  assault  was 
ordered.  Under  a  severe  fire  from  the  enemy,  Blair's 
brigade  and  De  Courcy's  of  Morgan's  division  crossed  the 
bayou,  drove  the  Confederates  from  their  first  rifle-pits, 
and  pushed  to  the  country  road  that  runs  along  the  base 
of  the  hills.  There,  being  unsupported,  they  were  sub- 
jected to  a  heavy  cross-fire  from  batteries  on  the  hill,  and 


324  FAILURE  OF  THE  ATTEMPT.  ^[Sect.  X. 

the  enemy,  rallying,  attacked  in  turn,  and  captured  many 
prisoners.  Had  Morgan  energetically  supported  his  lead- 
ing brigades,  he  might  have  secured  a  lodgment  and  oc- 
cupied the  face  of  the  hill.  At  that  moment  Sherman 
was  superintending  the  movement  at  the  other  point  of 
real  attack,  where  M.  L.  Smith's  division  was  to  cross. 
There  the  water  was  so  deep  that  the  men  could  only 
cross  in  single  file  at  great  hazard,  as  the  enemy  occupied 
the  levee  on  the  opposite  side.  The  Sixth  Missouri,  how- 
ever, did  cross  and  get  so  close  under  the  bank  that  they 
were  comparatively  safe,  but  they  could  not  get  up  it. 
By  the  time  Sherman  could  reach  Morgan,  the  broken 
fragments  of  Blair's  and  De  Courcy's  brigades  had  come 
back.  The  enemy  had  detected  the  real  points  of  attack, 
and  had  rallied  to  them. 

The  ground  was  very  blind  and  difficult  on  the  na- 
tional side,  but  the  Confederates  could  look 
th^e  confederate  ^  dowu  ffom  their  bluff,  and  detect  every 
movement.  Though  the  attempt  had  thus 
been  most  resolutely  made,  it  failed.  The  enemy's  line 
had  not  been  forced. 

The  national  loss  was  191  killed,  982  wounded,  756 
missing.  Total,  1929.  Of  the  missing  a  majority  were 
probably  taken  prisoners. 

Sherman  now  ordered  all  the  positions  to  be  strength- 
sherman  prepares  eued,  aud,  lu  au  iutcrvicw  with  Admiral 
to  renewthe  attack,  ^^^^q^,  arranged  to  embark  Steele's  divis- 
ion, to  make  a  strong  attack  on  Haines's  Bluff,  while  he 
should  renew  the  attack  at  Chickasaw,  and  effect  a  lodg- 
ment. The  movement  was  intended  for  night.  Steele's 
troops  were  accordingly  all  embarked,  but  so  heavy  a 
fog  settled  that,  just  before  daylight.  Porter  sent  a  mes- 
sage that  he  could  not  see  to  steer  the  boats,  and,  as  the 
movement  would  have  to  be  made  by  daylight,  he  doubt- 
ed its  success. 


Chap.  LI.]  ARKANSAS  POST.  325 

The  Confederates  were  now  fast  receiving  re-enforce- 
ments. Not  without  reason  did  they  triumph  in  their 
double  success.  They  had  forced  Grant  back,  and  had 
defeated  Sherman.  Trains  of  cars  could  be  heard  coming 
in  almost  every  hour,  and  fresh  troops  could  be  seen  on 
the  bluffs.  It  was  plain  that  they  were  either  from 
Haines's  Bluff  or  from  Pemberton's  army. 

At  this  time,  notwithstanding  every  precaution,  the  na- 
tional camp  was  full  of  spies.  From  these  Pemberton 
had  heard  of  Sherman's  movements  and  of  Grant's  change 
of  plan.  He  was  enabled  by  his  railroads  to  throw  into 
Vicksburg  a  force  too  great  to  be  overcome.  Sherman 
had  just  concluded  that  he  could  not  break  tlie  enemy's 
lines  when  General  McClernand  arrived.  To  him,  as  the 
senior  officer,  Sherman  reported  at  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo, 
explaining  the  state  of  affairs,  and  receiving  a  confirma- 
tion of  his  order  for  abandoninej  the  attempt 
on  Vicksburg.  McClernand  brought  down 
the  river  the  first  authentic  news  of  Grant's  abandon- 
ment of  the  other  line  of  attack,  and  the  return  to  Mem- 
phis of  the  advance  of  his  army.  It  happened  that  Sher- 
man had  left  Memphis  in  so  much  haste  that  he  had  not 
a  full  supply  of  ammunition  suited  to  his  guns.  It  had 
been  sent  down  the  Mississippi  after  him  on  a  boat,  which 
was  captured  by  the  Confederates  as  it  passed  by  the 
mouth  of  the  Arkansas  Eiver.  This  circumstance  satis- 
fied Sherman  that  before  operations  could  be  conducted 
against  Vicksburg  by  the  Mississippi  Kiver  it  would  be 
necessary  to  reduce  Arkansas  Post  (Fort  Hindman),  a 
well-constructed  fort  forty  miles  up  the  Arkansas,  behind 
which  the  Confederates  kept  several  steam-boats  for  the 
purpose  of  sallying  forth  from  that  river  and  molesting 
the  line  of  supply.  The  fort  was  on  the  site  of  an  old 
French  settlement  of  1685.  Sherman  represented  the 
matter  to  McClernand,  who  was  then  in  command,  in  the 


326  CAPTURE  OF  ARKANSAS  POST.  •  [Sect.  X. 

presence  of  Admiral  Porter,  and,  with  great  difficulty,  pre- 
vailed on  Mm  to  consent  to  the  expedition.  On  the  10th 
of  January  the  gun-boats  shelled  the  Confederate  sharp- 
shooters out  of  their  rifle-pits,  and,  under  their  fire,  the 
troops  pushed  up  through  the  half-frozen,  miry  swamps. 
In  the  cold  wintry  night,  without  fires,  they  made  ready 
for  an  assault  the  next  day,  when,  encountering  a  heavy 
fire  and  suffering  severely,  the  troops  advanced  within 
musket  range  of  the  defenses.  The  guns  of  the  fort  had 
been  silenced,  and,  as  the  men  were  moving  to  the  as- 
The  capture  of  Ar-  sault,  a  whlte  flag  was  hoisted  on  the  place, 
ansas  Post.         ^^^  -^  ^^^  Surrendered.     Sherman  himself 

was  the  second  person  to  ride  over  the  parapet.  5000 
prisoners,  17  guns,  3000  small-arms,  and  a  large  quantity 
of  stores  were  taken.  The  national  loss  was  977  men. 
The  expedition  then  dropped  back  to  Milliken's  Bend, 
where  Grant  joined  it,  and  from  that  time  till  July  4th 
he  commanded  the  army  in  person.  The  Mississippi  thus 
became  the  great  artery  of  his  supply  until  the  final  cam- 
paign. 


CHAPTER  LIL 

THE  FALL  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  AND  FIRST  FORCING  OF  THE 
MISSISSIPPI  RIVER  BY  FARRAGUT. 

The  national  government  determined  on  a  naval  expedition  for  the  capture  of  New 
Orleans,  and  assigned  Farragut  to  its  command.  An  auxiliary  land  force  was 
placed  under  the  command  of  Butler. 

Farragut,  with  a  fleet  of  wooden  ships,  forced  his  way  past  the  forts  defending  New 
Orleans.  He  destroyed  the  Confederate  fleet,  which  had  several  armored  ships, 
and  captured  the  city. 

He  then  sent  a  squadron  up  the  Mississippi,  reducing  the  chief  towns  upon  it.  He 
subjected  Vicksburg  to  an  inefi*ectual  bombardment,  forced  his  way  past  its  bat- 
teries, and  made  a  junction  with  the  fleet  from  Cairo. 

Again  passing  the  batteries,  he  descended  the  river  and  reduced  the  chief  places  on 
the  Texan  coast. 

The  government  of  New  Orleans  as  administered  by  Butler. 

Whoever  is  strong  enough  to  hold  New  Orleans  is 
jnaster  of  the  Mississippi  Valley. 

New  Orleans  was  not  only  the  largest,  but  also  the 
most  important  city  of  the  Confederacy.  The  charge  of 
it  was  at  first  committed  to  General  Twiggs,  as  a  reward 
for  his  having  surrendered  the  United  States  army  under 
his  command  in  Texas  (vol.  i.,  p.  544).  But  a  more  ener- 
getic officer  being  required,  General  Lovell  had  been  ap- 
pointed in  his  stead. 

In  the  autumn  of  1861,  the  national  government  re- 
solved upon  the  capture  and  occupation  of 

Preparations  for  the     ,,.         .,  -^1  *  i  ^  ti 

capture  of  New  Or-  tuis  citv.  It  was  cousidercd  expedient  not 
to  wait  for  the  progress  of  the  military  com- 
binations then  in  preparation  for  a  forcible  passage  down 
the  river,  but  to  accomplish  the  object  by  a  special  naval 
expedition  fitted  out  from  the  Atlantic  ports. 

The  command  of  this  expedition  was  assigned  to  Cap- 


328  FAREAGUT'S  ATTACK  ON  NEW  ORLEANS.  [Sect.  X. 

Thefleetundercom-  tain  D.  G.  Fairagut,  an  officer  of  great  skill 

xnandofFarragut.      ^nd  daring. 

In  addition  to  the  squadron  employed  in  enforcing  tlie 
blockade  on  the  western  portions  of  the  Gulf,  a  large 
fleet  of  armed  steamers  and  a  bomb  flotilla  was  ordered 
to  join  the  expedition.  This  flotilla  of  mortar  vessels, 
twenty-one  in  number,  and  capable  of  throwing  13-inch 
shells,  was  under  the  orders  of  Commander  Porter. 

Though  General  McClellan  admitted  that  the  capture 
of  New  Orleans  would  be  followed  by  important  results, 
he  would  not  permit  troops  to  be  taken  from  his  already 
unmanageable  Army  of  the  Potomac.  A  force  was,  how- 
ever, sent  to  Ship  Island  before  the  close  of  1861,  but  it 
was  not  until  Stanton  was  appointed  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment that  vigor  was  infused  into  the  undertaking.  An 
The  land  force  unr  army  of  eighteen  thousand  men  was  then 
der  Butler.  fumishcd.     Major  General  Butler  was  as- 

signed to  its  command.  He  was  to  assist  the  expedition, 
and  hold  New  Orleans  after  it  was  taken.  On  the  25th 
of  February,  1862,  Butler  sailed  from  Hampton  Koads/ 
Farragut  had  already  (February  20th)  reached  Ship  Isl- 
and, in  Mississippi  Sound. 

The  Mississippi  Eiver,  continuing  the  work  in  which  it 
Topography  of  the  ^^^  bceu  engaged  for  many  thousand  years, 
Mississippi,  jg  steadily  encroaching  on  the  waters  of  the 

Gul£  Its  long  watery  arm,  gauntlet ed  in  swamps  and 
mud,  spreads  out,  as  it  were,  into  a  grasping  hand,  of  which 
the  fingers  are  the  Pass  a  I'Outre,  Northeast  Pass,  South- 
east Pass,  South  Pass,  Southwest  Pass.  At  a  bend  about 
thirty  miles  up,  where  the  river  flows  east wardly,  the 
United  States  had  formerly  built  two  powerful  works. 
Fort  Jackson  on  the  south  bank,  and  Fort  St.  Philip  on 

and  defenses  of  New  ^^^  uorth.  Thcso  barrcd  tho  approach  to 
Orleans.  ^|^^  ^-^^  £^^^  ^l^^  Qulf,  aud  had  been  armed 

by  the  Confederates  with  126  guns  of  long  range  and  large 


Chap.  LII.] 


DEFENSES  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 


329 


^f/ssis^^^ 


THE  MISSISSIPPI   BELOW   NEW   ORLEANS. 


ealibre.  At  this  point,  too,  a  chain  had  been  stretched 
across  the  river ;  it  was  sustained  upon  eight  hulks,  the 
intervals  between  them  permitting  driftwood  to  pass. 
From  each  hulk  a  spar  trailed  astern,  so  that  boats  could 
not  easily  pass  from  one  to  another.  A  fleet  of  thirteen 
armed  steamers,  the  steam-battery  Louisiana,  of  sixteen 
guns,  and  the  ram  Manassas,  constituted  the  chief  defense 
afloat ;  but,  in  addition,  several  rafts  and  fire-ships  had 
been  provided.  Lovell  had  applied  to  the  governor  of 
the  state  for  a  re-enforcement  of  10,000  men,  but  it  was 
found  impossible  to  spare  him  more  than  3000  in  addi- 
tion to  those  he  had,  so  many  having  been  sent  to  the 
armies  in  the  Border  States. 

On  the  8th  of  April  the  national  fleet,  consisting  of  four 
sloops  of  war,  seventeen  gun -boats,  twenty -one  bomb- 


330 


FAREAGUT'S  PLAN  OF  ATTACK. 


[Sect.  X. 


schooners,  and  two  sailing-vessels,  but  having  no  iron- 
clads, had,  after  great  labor,  been  carried  over  the  bar. 
The  Brooklyn  had  been  forcibly  dragged  through  the 
mud  of  the  Southwest  Pass.  Since  the  blockade  the  wa- 
ter had  been  becoming  shoaler  because  of  the  non-pas- 
sage of  vessels,  and  at  this  time  there  were  but  fifteen 
feet  at  the  shallowest  part  of  the  channel. 

The  intended  plan  of  operations  w^as  for  Porter  to  bom- 

Farragut'8  plan  of  bard  the  forts,  aud  if  he  failed  to  reduce 

attack.  them,  Farragut  was  to  attempt  to  run  past 

them.     That  succeeding,  Butler  was  to  land  his  troops  in 

the  rear  of  St.  Philip,  and  carry  it  by  assault. 


THE   FORTS   OP   THE  MISSISSIPPI. 


For  eight  miles  below  Fort  Jackson  the  south  bank  of 
the  river  has  a  skirt  of  woods,  the  trees  being  thickly  in- 
terlaced with  vines.  Through  this  an  opening  had  been 
cut  by  the  Confederates  to  permit  their  guns  to  have 
Arrangement  of  the  ^^uge    ou    asccudiug   vcsscls.     Under   the 

mortar  vessels.  g^^,^^^  ^£  ^-^^^^  ^^^^^  fourtCCU  of  thc  UlOrtar 

vessels  were  placed,  the  remainder  being  on  the  other  side 
of  the  river.  It  being  found,  however,  that  the  latter 
were  too  much  exposed,  they  also  were  brought  over  un- 
der the  covert  of  the  woods.  For  more  effectual  conceal- 
ment, the  masts  of  all  the  vessels  were  dressed  with  leafy 


Chap.lil]  bombardment  of  the  forts.  331 

brandies.     Careful  surveys  were  made,  so  that  the  borabs 
might  be  thrown  with  accuracy,  though  the  forts  could  not 
be  seen.    The  chief  uncertainty  then  arose  from  the  varia- 
ble pressure  of  the  wind  on  the  projectiles  in  their  flight. 
On  the  17th  of  April  the  Confederates  sent  down  a 
fire-raft  with  the  intention  of  burning  the  ships,  which 
lay  about  four  miles  below.     This  and  others  which  fol 
lowed  were,  however,  easily  towed  by  the  national  sail 
ors  out  of  the  way,  and  did  no  harm.     On  the  follow- 
Bombardment  of   ^^g  momiug  the  bombardmeut  commenced 
thefoks.  During  that  day  1400  shells  were  thrown 

This  was  continued  with  but  slight  interruption  during 
six  days  and  nights.  Notwithstanding  the  assurances 
of  the  commandant  that  "  God  was  certainly  protecting 
them,"  the  garrisons  became  very  much  demoralized.  In 
Fort  Jackson  the  barracks  had  been  set  on  fire  soon  after 
the  bombardment  opened.  Its  guns  were  repeatedly  si- 
lenced. As  many  of  the  shells  burst  in  the  air,  owing  to 
the  badness  of  the  fuses,  the  fuses  were  put  in  full  length, 
to  delay  the  explosion  until  the  shells  had  entered  the 
ground.  They  "  penetrated  into  it  eighteen  or  twenty 
feet,  and,  exploding  after  a  time,  lifted  the  earth  up,  and 
let  it  fall  back  into  its  place  again,  demoralizing  the  men 
who  knew  not  what  the  consequences  were  going  to  be 
The  effect  was  like  that  of  an  earthquake."  The  return 
fire  from  the  forts  was,  however,  at  times,  very  severe 
shot  and  rifle  shell  came  crashing  through  the  woodg,  tear 
ing  trees  up  by  the  roots.  The  bombardment  went  stead 
ily  on,  fifteen  hundred  bombs  being  thrown  at  the  forts  ev 
ery  twenty-four  hours.  "  Overcome  with  fatigue,  the  com 
manders  and  crews  of  the  bomb-vessels  might  be  seen  ly 
ing  fast  asleep  on  deck,  with  a  mortar  on  board  the  vessel 
next  to  them  thundering  away.  The  windows  were  bro- 
ken at  the  Balize,  thirty  miles  distant."  Fish,  stunned 
by  the  explosions,  were  floating  about  in  all  directions. 


332  PREPARATIONS  FOR  PASSING  THE  FORTS.         [Sect.  X. 

On  the  third  day  of  the  bombardment  Farragut  held  a 
Farragut  resolves    council.    He  determined  to  cut  the  barricade, 
to  pass  the  forts.     ^^^  carry  the  fleet  past  the  forts  to  New 
Orleans.    Two  gun-boats  went  up  in  the  darkness  of  the 
ensuing  night  to  break  the  obstruction.    One  of  them  at- 
tempted, but  unsuccessfully,  to  blow  up  a  hulk  by  means 
Cutting  of  the  chain  of  a  petard.     The  other,  more   successful, 
arrica  e.  boardcd  thc  ccutral  hulk.     A  rocket  from 

Fort  Jackson  revealed  what  was  going  forward,  and  fire 
was  opened  on  them,  but,  with  a  cold  chisel  and  hammer, 
the  chain  was  cut.  The  current  at  once  swept  aside  the 
gun-boat  and  the  hulk,  which  had  been  lashed  together. 
After  much  difficulty  the  former  was  extricated,  and,  fa- 
vored by  the  darkness,  returned  with  her  consort  safely 
to  the  fleet. 

Preparations  for  the  passage  were  now  made.     Five 
'      ,  ships  and  twelve  2:un-boats,  carryino*  nearly 

The  order  of  battle.  ^  ^  -,   ,  '^      ^  *^ 

300  guns,  were  arranged  m  two  columns : 


LEFT   COLUMN. 

EIGHT   COLUMN. 

1st  Division  of  Ships. 

2d  Division  of  Ships. 

Hartford. 

Pensacola. 

Brooklyn. 
Richmond. 

Mississippi. 

d  Division  of  Gun-boats. 

Is^  Division  of  Gun-boats. 

Sciota. 
Iroquois. 

Cayuga. 
Oneida. 

Kennebec. 

Varuna. 

Pinola. 

Katahdin. 

Itasca. 

Kineo. 

.  Winona. 

Wissahickon. 

The  ships  of  the  left  column,  led  by  Farragut,  were  to 
attack  Fort  Jackson ;  the  second  division  of  gun-boats  in 
that  column  was  to  keep  the  middle  of  the  river,  disre- 
gard the  forts,  and  attack  the  Confederate  fleet  above. 
The  right  column,  under  Bailey,  was  to  attack  Fort  St. 
Philip.    Six  small  steamers,  belonging  to  Porter's  flotilla, 


Chap^LU.]  the  battle  of  the  MISSISSIPPI.  333 

were  to  silence  the  water  battery  below  Fort  Jackson,  but 
not  to  pass  it. 

Eacli  ship  was  got  ready  for  battle.  The  chain  cables 
The  ships  prepared  wcro  loopcd  ovcr  the  sidcs  in  two  layers,  to 
for  action.  ^-^^  ^^  iron-clad  protection.    The  decks  and 

gnn-carriages  of  some  were  whitewashed — an  expedient 
that  was  found  to  be  of  very  great  service  in  making 
things  visible  at  night.  Bags  of  sand,  coal,  and  other 
suitable  materials  were  so  placed  as  to  protect  the  en- 
gines. 

At  five  minutes  before  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  of 
Signal  for  the  at-  the  24th  of  April  two  red  lights  were  hung 
^*^^*  out.    It  was  the  signal  to  go  into  action.    In 

little  more  than  an  hour  the  fleet  w^as  all  fairly  under 
way.  Porter's  mortar -boats  redoubled  their  fire,  and 
made  the  air  alive  with  shells.  Care  had  been  previ- 
ously taken  to  get  accurate  range  for  them.  They  kept 
up  their  work  with  unceasing  vigor  until  after  the  last 
vessels  ofFarragut's  columns  were  in  the  heat  of  the  bat- 
tle. The  night  was  very  close,  hazy,  and  dark ;  the  smoke 
of  the  cannonading  lay  heavily  on  the  river.  A  rain  of 
bombs  was  falling  into  the  forts. 

Dark  as  it  was,  every  ship,  spar,  and  rope  soon  became 
visible^ — visible  through  the  smoke  in  the  red  light  of  the 
battle.  The  waning  crescent  of  the  moon  rose  just  at  the 
time  that  Farragut  was  going  into  action. 

Struggling  against  the  current  of  the  river,  Farragut 
passa-eofFarra-ut  cariied  his  ship,  thc  Hartford,  safely  through 

in  his'-flag-ship.  °       ^^^  ^^^^^^  ^^^.^^      -Q^^^  ^-^^  ^^^^g  ^^^^  g^.^^ 

on  him.  He  reserved  his  guns  for  fifteen  minutes,  until 
he  could  bear  fairly  on  Fort  Jackson ;  then  he  poured 
forth  such  broadsides  of  grape  and  canister  that  nothing 
living  could  stand  before  them.  The  cannoniers  in  the 
fort  fled  from  their  guns.  The  Confederate  ram  Manas- 
sas, which  had  been  hidden  from  sight  by  the  smoke. 


334  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI.  [Sect.  X. 

pushed  a  fire-raft  upon  him.     The  Hartford  was  soon  in 
flames  half  way  up  to  her  tops.     In  the  struggle  she  was 
forced  ashore.    But  while  she  was  on  fire  her  cannonading 
never  ceased.     Her  crew  extinguished  the  flames;  she 
was  backed  oflP,  and  again  headed  up  the  stream.     A 
Confederate  steamer  rushed  at  her  with  the  intention  of 
boarding  her.    One  shell  from  the  Hartford  blew  her  up. 
Farragut  was  now  passing  St.  Philip.     He  gave  it  such 
broadsides  as  he  had  given  Fort  Jackson,  and  silenced  it. 
Half  an  hour  more  carried  him  through  the  fiery  storm  of 
iron,  and  his  part  of  the  work  was  thoroughly  done. 
In  passing  the  barricade,  the  Brooklyn,  whose  place 
Passage  of  the     was  astem  of  the  Hartford,  missed  the  open- 
yn.  •  j^^^  grated  on  a  hulk,  and  became  entangled. 

She  received  the  fire  of  St.  Philip.  The  iron-clad  Manas- 
sas, when  within  ten  feet  of  her,  gave  her  a  shot  at  her 
steam-drum,  and  then  attempted  to  butt  her ;  but  the  dis- 
tance between  them  being  only  a  few  feet,  speed  could 
not  be  got  up,  and  the  blow  was  ineffectual.  While 
under  the  fire  of  Fort  Jackson  this  ship  encountered  an- 
other steamer.  "Our  port  broadside  (11  9-inch  shells), 
at  the  short  distance  of  fifty  or  sixty  yards,  completely 
finished  her,  setting  her  on  fire  almost  instantaneously." 
As  the  Brooklyn,  enveloped  in  a  black  cloud  of  smoke 
from  a  fire-raft,  passed  St.  Philip  in  only  thirteen  feet  of 
water,  her  grape  and  canister  drove  the  men  from  their 
guns,  and  for  a  time  completely  silenced  the  fort.  The 
Brooklyn  was  under  fire  an  hour  and  a  half 

In  the  same  manner,  Bailey,  who  headed  the  right  col- 
passage  of  the  right  umu,  weut  iu  the  Cayuga  through  the  bar- 
ricade, both  forts  opening  upon  him  and 
striking  him  repeatedly.  He  gave  his  fire  of  grape  and 
canister  at  short  range  as  he  passed  St.  Philip,  and  found 
himself,  owing  to  the  speed  of  his  ship,  ahead  of  his 
friends,  and  alone  in  the  midst  of  the  Confederate  fleet. 


Chap.  LII.]  FARRAGUT'S  VICTORY.  335 

He  beat  off  two  that  tried  to  board  him.  In  the  quaint 
phraseology  of  a  sailor,  he  says  that  "an  11 -inch  Dahl- 
gren,  at  thirty  yards,  quieted  a  third,  who  thereupon 
shoved  off  for  shore,  ran  aground,  and  burned  himself 
up."  The  Cayuga  was  struck  forty-two  times.  Boggs,  in 
the  Varuna,  following  her, "  got  into  a  nest  of  rebel  steam- 
ers." He  "  worked  both  his  sides,  loaded  with  grape," 
on  his  antagonists ;  exploded  the  boiler  of  one  of  them — 
she  drifted  ashore.  Three  others  were  driven  after  her 
in  flames.  The  Varuna  was  now  raked  by  the  fire  of  an 
iron-clad,  which  killed  four  and  wounded  nine  of  her 
men.  The  iron-clad  then  butted  her  twice ;  but,  while 
she  was  so  doing,  Boggs  "  managed  to  get  into  her  three 
8-inch  shell  and  several  shot  from  his  rifle,  thereby  dis- 
abling her."  Again  another  iron-clad  twice  butted  him, 
but,  happening  to  go  ahead  after  the  concussion,  he  was 
able  to  put  through  her  unarmored  stern  ^ve  8-inch  shells, 
"  that  settled  her,  and  she  went  ashore  in  flames."  The 
side  of  the  Varuna  had  been  crushed,  but  she  kept  up 
her  fire  until  the  water  was  over  her  gun-trucks.  In  M- 
Sinking  of  the  va-  "t^en  mluutcs  from  the  time  she  was  butted 
^''''^'  she  sank,  her  top-gallant  forecastle  only  be- 

ing out  of  the  water.     She  went  to  the  bottom  as  she 
"  settled"  her  antagonist. 

The  Mississippi,  one  of  the  ships  of  this  column,  was 
shot  through  and  through  eight  times ;  her  mizzen-mast 
was  shattered.  The  ram  Manassas  struck  her  on  the 
port  quarters,  making  a  hole  seven  feet  long  and  four 
inches  wide. 

Through  the  same  fiery  ordeal  the  other  steam-ships 
The  fleet  forces  its  ^ud  guu-boats  passed,  three  only  excepted— 
way  past  the  forts.  ^-^^  itasca,  whlch  had  becu  shot  in  her  boil- 
er ;  the  Kennebec,  caught  in  the  chain ;  and  the  Winona, 
The  Confederate  flo-  forccd  back.     The  Confederate  flotilla  was 
tiiia  destroyed.       ^^^^^j^  dcstroyed.     Its  chicf  reliaucc,  the 


336  NIGHT-SCENE  ON  THE  RIVER.  [Sect.  X. 

iron-clad  Manassas,  liad  been  run  ashore,  and  riddled  by 
the  broadsides  of  the  Mississippi.  Her  crew  escaped  to 
the  land ;  she  was  boarded,  set  on  fire,  drifted  down  the 
river,  and  blew  up.  Twelve  of  the  Confederate  flotilla 
had  been  sunk  or  burned. 

Commander  Porter,  who  kept  up  the  mortar  fire  while 
Farragut  was  forcing  his  way,  says  of  the  conclusion  of 
the  battle :  "  It  was  reported  to  me  that  the  celebrated 
ram  Manassas  was  coming  out  to  attack  us,  and,  sure 
enough,  there  she  was,  apparently  steaming  along  shore, 
ready  to  pounce  upon  the  defenseless  mortar  vessels ;  but 
I  soon  discovered  that  she  could  harm  no  one  again. 
She  was  beginning  to  emit  smoke  from  her  ports  or  holes; 
she  was  on  fire,  and  sinking.    Her  pipes  were  twisted  and 
riddled  with  shot ;  her  hull  was  well  cut  up.     She  had 
evidently  been  used  up  by  the  squadron  as  they  passed 
along.     I  tried  to  save  her  as  a  curiosity  by  getting  a 
hawser  round  her  and  securing  her  to  the 
mored  ram  Manas-    bank,  but  just  after  doiug  SO  she  faintly  ex- 
ploded.    Her  only  gun  went  off,  and,  emit- 
ting flames  through  her  bow-port,  like  some  huge  animal, 
she  gave  a  plunge  and  disappeared  under  the  water. 
"  Next  came  a  steamer  on  fire ;  after  her  two  others, 
burning   and  floating    down    the    stream. 
ofth"  S?er befoS   Flrcs  sccmcd  to  be  rac^ino;  all  along;  the  '  up 

daybreak.  •  ,  i  it  -, 

river,  and  we  supposed  that  our  squadron 
was  burning  and  destroying  the  vessels  as  they  passed 
along.  The  sight  of  this  night  attack  was  awfully  grand. 
The  river  was  lit  up  by  rafts  filled  with  pine  knots,  and 
the  ships  seemed  to  be  literally  fighting  among  flames 
and  smoke." 

At  five  o'clock  the  Cayuga  discovered  the  encampment 

of  the  Chalmette  regiment  on  the  right  bank 
towarlNew  or-^^    of  thc  rivcr,  and  compelled  it  to  surrender. 

The  telegraph  wires  ahead  were  cut,  the  fleet 


[ 


Chap.  LII.]         THE  FLEET  KEACHES  NEW  ORLEANS.  337 

proceeding  up  toward  New  Orleans,  encountering  cotton- 
loaded  ships  on  fire.  Three  miles  below  the  city,  the 
Chalmette  batteries,  mounting  twenty  guns,  were  reached. 
The  Cayuga,  leading,  sustained  their  cross-fire  for  some 
time  alone ;  but  the  Hartford,  Pensacola,  Brooklyn,  and 
other  ships  coming  up,  gave  the  batteries  such  a  storm 
of  shells,  shrapnel,  and  grape  as  drove  the  men  from  their 
guns.  "  The  forts  were  silenced,  and  those  who  could 
run  were  running  in  every  direction." 

Farragut  reports  that, "  owing  to  the  slowness  of  some 

of  the  vessels,  and  our  want  of  knowledge 

set  fire  to  their  cot-  of  thc  rlvcr,  we  did  not  reach  the  En2:lish 

ton  and  ships.  .^  .^       ■,  .--,  ,, 

Turn  until  about  10.30  A.M.  on  the  25th, 
but  all  the  morning  I  had  seen  abundant  evidence  of  the 
panic  which  had  seized  the  people  in  New  Orleans.  Cot- 
ton-loaded ships  on  fire  came  floating  down,  and  working 
instruments  of  every  kind,  such  as  are  used  in  ship-yards. 
The  destruction  of  property  was  awful.  The  levee  in 
New  Orleans  was  one  scene  of  desolation.  Ships,  steam- 
ers, cotton,  coal,  were  all  in  one  common  blaze,  and  our 
ingenuity  was  much  taxed  to  avoid  the  floating  confla- 
gration." 

Lovell,  seeing  what  had  taken  place  at  the  forts,  gal- 
loped to  New  Orleans.  He  ordered  the  land  defenses  to 
resist  to  the  utmost ;  but  the  water  in  the  river  was  so 
high  that  the  ships  could  command  all  the  earth-works. 
After  a  brief  and  angry  consultation  with  the  terror-strick- 
en municipality,  he  sent  off  his  munitions,  disbanded  his 
troops,  and  turned  the  city  over  to  the  mayor. 

In  the  midst  of  a  thunder-storm,  Farragut  anchored  his 
'  The  squadron  anch-  squadrou  off  Ncw  Orlcaus  at  1  P.M.  The 
ors  off  the  city.  populacc,  who  had  believed  that  the  defenses 
of  the  city  were  impregnable,  were  astounded,  and  in  an 
impotent  frenzy.  The  sailors  in  the  national  ships  were 
cheering,  the  crowd   ashore  was   cursing.     Some  were 

n.— Y 


338  SURRENDER  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  DEMAOT)ED.       [Sect.  X. 

clamoring  for  tlie  blood  of  the  commandant  of  tlie  forts; 
some  were  invoking  vengeance  on  Lovell ;  ^some,  ragged 
and  raging,  but  with  nothing  to  lose,  insisted  that  the  city- 
should  be  burned. 

A  demand  was  now  made  by  Farragut  for  a  surrender, 
Farrac^ut  demands  ^^^  tho  displaj  of  thc  United  Statcs  flag  on 
itssuiWer.        ^^^  p^^^.^  buildings.     So  suddculy  and  so 

unexpectedly  had  the  blow  fallen  on  them  that  the  may- 
or and  municipal  authorities  hardly  knew  what  to  do. 
On  one  side  they  had  an  unreflecting  and  turbulent  pop- 
ulace to  deal  with;  on  the  other,  a  clement  conqueror. 
Farragut,  as  merciful  in  victory  as  he  was  brave  in  action, 
appreciated  their  hour  of  bitterness,  and  listened  with 
generosity  to  the  mayor's  querulous  protestations. 

Upon  his  arrival  before  the  city,  Farragut  had  sent 
Captain  Bailey,  his  second  in  command,  to  the  mayor  with 
the  demand  for  the  surrender,  and  to  inform  that  func- 
tionary that  no  flag  but  that  of  the  United  States  would 
be  permitted  to  fly  in  presence  of  the  national  fleet. 

To  this  the  mayor  replied,  "  transmitting  the  answer 
which  the  universal  sentiment  of  my  con- 

Reply  of  the  mayor.  "^ 

stituency,  no  less  than  the  promptings  oi 
my  own  heart  dictate  to  me  on  this  sad  and  solemn  oc- 
casion." It  was  to  the  effect  that  the  city  was  utterly 
defenseless;  that  he  was  no  military  man ;  that  he  knew 
neither  how  to  command  an  army  nor  to  surrender  an 
undefended  place.  "  As  to  the  hoisting  of  any  flag  than 
the  flag  of  our  own  adoption  and  allegiance,  let  me  say 
to  you  that  the  man  lives  not  in  our  midst  whose  hand 
and  heart  would  not  be  palsied  by  the  mere  thought  of 
such  an  act;  nor  could  I  find  in  my  entire  constituency 
so  wretched  and  desperate  a  renegade  as  would  dare  to 
profane  with  his  hand  the  sacred  emblem  of  our  aspira- 
tions. Sir,  you  have  manifested  sentiments  which  would 
become  one  engaged  in  a  better  cause  than  that  to  which 


Chap.  LIIJ  THE  NATIONAL  FLAG  INSULTED.  339 

you  have  devoted  your  sword.  I  doubt  not  that  they 
spring  from  a  noble  though  deluded  nature,  and  I  know 
how  to  appreciate  the  motives  that  inspire  them.  You 
will  have  a  gallant  people  to  administer — a  people  sen- 
sitive of  all  that  can  in  the  least  affect  its  dignity  and 
self-a:espect." 

>    In  this  refusal  of  the  mayor  to  hoist  the  United  States 

flag  on  the  national  buildings — the  Custom- 

the  public  buijd-      house,  Post-office,  Mint — the  Common  Coun- 

ings.  ,  '  .  ' , 

cil  of  the  city  united.  Hereupon  Farragut 
sent  a  party  on  shore  to  perform  that  duty.  ^^They 
were  insulted  in  the  grossest  manner,  and  the  flag  that 

had  been  hoisted  by  his  orders  on  the  Mint 

It  is  insulted.  nii  tt 

was  pulled  down  and  dragged  through  the 
streets."  He  therefore  notified  the  mayor  to  remove  the 
w^omen  and  children  from  the  city  within  forty-eight 
hours,  as  the  fire  of  the  fleet  might  be  drawn  upon  it,  and 
an  amount  of  distress  ensue  to  the  innocent  population 
which  he  had  heretofore  declared  that  he  desired  by  all 
means  to  avoid. 

To  this  the  mayor  replied,  addressing  his  communica- 
The  mayor  express-  ^i^u  to  ^^  Mr.  Farragut,"  as  hc  ventured  to 
r^tVif  bemSeii'  dcsiguate  the  United  States  officer,  that  the 
^''^^*  interference  of  the  United  States  forces  while 

negotiations  were  pending  between  him  and  the  con- 
queror "  could  not  be  viewed  by  him  otherwise  than  as  a 
flagrant  violation  of  those  courtesies,  if  not  of  the  absolute 
rights  which  prevail  between  belligerents  under  such  cir- 
cumstances," and  that  his  "  views  and  sentiments  in  rela- 
tion to  such  conduct  remain  unchanged;"  that  the  notifi- 
cation to  remove  the  women  and  children  was  an  "  utter 
inanity."  "  They  can  not  escape  from  your  shells  if  it  be 
your  pleasure  to  murder  them  on  a  question  of  mere  eti* 
quette.  Even  if  they  could,  there  are  but  few  among  them 
who  would  consent  to  desert  their  families,  and  home^, 


340  SURRENDER  OF  THE  CITY.  [Sect.  X. 

and  the  graves  of  their  relatives  in  so  awful  a  moment. 
They  vs^ould  bravely  stand  the  sight  of  your  shells  rolling 
over  the  bones  of  those  who  were  once  dear  to  them,  and 
would  deem  that  they  had  not  died  ingloriously  by  the 
side  of  the  tombs  erected  by  their  piety  to  the  memory 
of  departed  relatives."  ^ 

Farragut  now  raised  the  United  States  flag  upon  the 
Custom-house,  and  sent  a  letter  to  the  mayor  requiring 
him  to  "  see  that  it  was  respected  with  all  the  civil  pow- 
er of  the  city." 

History  may  be  searched  in  vain  for  another  such  cor- 
respondence as  this  between  a  city  taken  by 

Singular  character        ,  ,.,  'ii/iip* 

of  tBis  correspond-  storm  aud  its  conqueror  m  the  flush  oi  vic- 
tory. It  is  impossible  not  to  see  that  the 
recalcitrant  civic  authorities  w^ere  implicitly  putting  their 
trust  in  the  forbearance  of  that  Great  and  Clement  Power 
which  they  w^ere  ostensibly  defying.  They  knew  that  it 
would  do  them  no  wrong. 

General  Butler,  who  had  witnessed  the  passage  of  the 
forts  by  Farragut,  now  proceeded  to  execute  his  part  of 
the  duty.  He  brought  his  forces  into  the  rear  of  St. 
Philip,  Porter  keeping  up  a  bombardment.  On  the  27th 
of  April  the  garrison  had  become  so  demoralized  as  to 
Surrender  of  the  r^fusc  to  fight  auy  lougcr.  Thc  forts  were 
two  forts.  therefore    surrendered    on    the    next    day. 

While  the  terms  were  being  adjusted,  the  ofiicers  of  the 
Confederate  ram  Louisiana  towed  her  out  into  the  cur- 
rent and  set  her  on  fire,  with  her  guns  all  shotted,  ex- 
pecting that  she  would  drift  down  and  explode  in  the 
midst  of  Porter's  fleet.  For  this  they  were  sent  close 
prisoners  to  the  North. 

On  the  1st  of  May  New  Orleans  was  formally  occu- 
pied by  United  States  troops. 

The  loss  on  the  national  side  in  achieving  this  great 
victory  was  40  killed  and  177  wounded.     It  was  not 


Chap.  LIL]  BATON  ROUGE.  341 

alone  tlie  capture  of  the  city  that  was  accomplished,  but 
the  destruction  of  iron-clads  which  Would  shortly  have 
become  very  formidable. 

Bailey,  the  captain  who  had  led  the  right  column,  truly 
described  the  battle:  "It  was  a  contest  between  iron 
hearts  in  wooden  vessels  and  iron-clads  with  iron  beaks, 
and  the  iron  hearts  won." 

Among  naval  authorities,  the  battle  of  the  Mississip- 
pi caused,  if  not  a  reversal,  at  least  a  suspen- 

The  value  of  wood-      .  ^.-i  ..  ^  tp  ,, 

en  against  iron  siou  01  the  opinious  lormed  irom  the  corn- 
ships.  ■*• 

bats  of  the  Merrimack  in  Hampton  Eoads. 
Farragut,  an  officer  equal  to  Nelson  in  audacity,  without 
hesitation  took  all  odds.  He  fought  walls  of  stone  and 
a  fleet  of  iron-clads  with  a  wooden  fleet,  and  actually  won 
the  battle. 

New  Orleans  having  thus  been  occupied,  a  part  of  the 
The  fleet  moves  up  ^^^^  was  scut  by  Farragut  up  the  Missis- 
the  Mississippi.      gj^p.^  capturing  without  resistance  Baton 

Rouge,  the  capital  of  the  state.  On  taking  possession  a 
correspondence  ensued  with  the  mayor,  the  counterpart 
of  that  which  had  taken  place  with  the  Mayor  of  New 
The  Mayor  of  Baton  Orlcaus.  That  officcr  dcclarcd  that  his  city 
^''"^^'  would  not  be  surrendered  voluntarily  to  any 

power  on  earth,  and  declined  to  "  offend  the  sensibilities 
of  his  people  by  hoisting  the  flag  of  the  United  States." 
Captain  Palmer,  the  commander  of  the  Iroquois,  hoisted 
over  the  arsenal  the  flag,  and,  in  reply  to  the  mayor,  re- 
marked that  "war  is  a  sad  calamity,  and  often  inflicts  se- 
verer wounds  than  those  upon  the  sensibilities."  In  a 
letter  reporting  the  state  of  affairs  to  Farragut  he  said, 
"  Here  is  the  capital  of  a  state,  with  7000  inhabitants,  ac- 
knowledging itself  defenseless,  and  yet  assuming  an  arro- 
gant tone,  trusting  to  our  forbearance.  I  was  determined 
to  submit  to  no  such  nonsense,  and  accordingly  weighed 
anchor  and  steamed  up  abreast  the  arsenal,  landed  a 


342  OPERATIONS  AGAINST  VICKSBURG.  [Sect.  X. 

force,  and  took  possession  of  the  public  property  of  tHe 
United  States,  and  hoisted  over  it  our  flag.  No  resist- 
ance was  offered." 

The  Iroquois  left  Baton  Eouge  (May  13),  and,  pro- 

captureof       ceediug  up  to  Natchez,  took  possession  of 

^^^^^^^         that  city. 

On  the  18th  of  May  the  advance  steamers  of  the 
squadron  had  reached  Vicksbur^r.     A  de- 

Demand  for  the  ;i  i?        xl,  i  _f»  xi      j       -T 

surrender  of  vicks-  maud  lOT  the  surrcndcr  01  that  citv  was  at 

burg.  1  •   1 

once  made,  to  which  the  military  governor 
replied,  "  I  have  to  state  that  Mississippians  don't  know 
and  refuse  to  learn  how  to  surrender  to  an  enemy.  If 
Commodore  Farragut  or  Brigadier  General  Butler  can 
teach  them,  let  them  come  and  try." 

Porter's  mortar -boats  had  to  be  towed  up  to  Vicks- 
burg.     It  was  not  until  the  28th  of  June,  when  sixteen 
of  them  had  arrived,  that  Farragut  was  ready.     The  ac- 
tion commenced  at  4  P.M.  by  a  bombardment.     Farra- 
Farragut  attacks    g^t's  flag-shlp,  thc  Hartford,  with  six  other 
the  place.  vcsscls,  thcu  passcd  the  batteries.    She  was 

under  fire  about  one  hour  and  a  half,  going  at  her  slow- 
est speed,  and  even  stopping  to  silence  a  battery  as  she 
passed.  The  loss  in  all  the  ships  was  15  killed  and  30 
wounded.  A  junction  was  made  with  the  forces  which 
had  come  down  the  river  from  Cairo.  The  United  States 
flag  had  been  carried  in  triumph  throughout  the  whole 
length  of  the  Mississippi. 

Further  operations  against  Vicksburg  having  been  for 

the  time  abandoned  under  orders  from  Wash- 

yfcksbm^\¥an°^    iusfton,  thcrc  beinsr  no  sufficient  land  force  to 

doned.  ~  '      ,  ~  , 

co-operate,  and  the  ships  being  unable  to 
maker  any  impression  on  the  Confederate  works,  Farragut 
once  more  steamed  past  the  batteries,  and,  as  the  river 
was  now  falling  fast,  went  down  to  New  Orleans  (July 
28),  and  thence  to  Pensacola ;  the  latter  place,  having 


Chap.  LII.]  BUTLER  IN  NEW  ORLEANS.  343 

been  evacuated  by  the  Confederates,  had  been  made  the 
depot  of  the  Western  Gulf  squadron,  its  advantages  be- 
ing superior  to  those  of  Ship  Island. 

While  a  part  of  the  squadron  lay  off  Baton  Eouge,  an 
attack  was  made  by  the  Confederates  on  the 

Confederate  attack  i        n    r^  i    tttmt 

on  General  wii-      commaud  01  (xenerai  Williams,  occupying 
that  place.     In  the  action  that  officer  was 
killed.     The .  gun-boats  could  not  be  brought  into  posi- 
tion until  late  in  the  day,  when  they  compelled  the. Con- 
federate left  wing  to  make  a  precipitate  retreat.    A  Con- 
federate ram,  the  Arkansas,  which  was  to  have  taken  part 
in  the   engagement,  remained  a  short  distance  above. 
Next  morning  the  Essex  encountered  her,  and,  after  a 
short  engagement,  blew  her  up. 
During  September,  detachments  sent  by  Admiral  Far- 
captnreofGai-     YSLgut  took  possesslou  of  Corpus  Chrfsti  aud 
veston.  Sabine  City ;  and  in  October,  the  defenses 

of  the  harbor  and  city  of  Galveston  were  captured,  there 
having  been  only  a  feeble  resistance. 

General  Butler  now  entered  on  the  difficult  task  of 
The  rule  of  Butler  govcming  Ncw  Oiicans.  Its  population, 
in  New  Orleans.  ^^^^^^  grcatty  diminished  to  strengthen 
the  Confederate  armies  in  the  Border  States — a  cause 
of  bitter  complaint  to  the  inhabitants — still  numbered 
about  140,000.  Almost  one  half  of  it  was  of  foreign 
birth.  Perhaps  no  city  in  the  world  had  in  its  lower 
classes  a  more  dangerous  and  desperate  population. 
There  was  a  widespread  hope  that  a  French  force  would 
soon  come  to  their  help. 

By  firmness,  strict  yet  considerate,  he  controlled  the 
municipal  authorities ;  by  severity  he  put  down  the  mob. 
He  was  a  terror  to  tricky  tradesmen,  a  benefactor  to  the 
starving  poor.  He  cleaned  the  streets,  enforced  sanitary 
regulations,  and  kept  out  yellow  fever.     He  put  an  ef- 


344  THE  WOMAN  OKDEE.  [Sect.  X. 

fectual  stop  to  the  operations  of  Confederate  agents,  who 
were  illicitly  obtaining  supplies  for  their  cause.  New  Or- 
leans found  that "  Butler  was  no  sham,  but  a  most  thor- 
ough proconsular  reality." 

He  arrested  Mumford,  the  person  who  had  hauled  down 

Execution  of      the  uatloual  flag  at  the  Mint,  brought  him 

Mumford.         before  a  military  commission,  convicted  and 

executed  him.    On  this  the  Confederate  President  issued 

the  following  proclamation  (December  23d,  1862) : 

"I,  Jefferson  Davis,  President  of  the  Confederate  States  ofAmer- 
Butier  proclaimed  a  ^^^j  ^^  their  name,  do  pronounce  and  declare  ^he 
felon  by  Davis.  g^id  Benjamin  F.  Butler  a  felon  deserving  capital 
punishment.  I  do  order  that  he  be  no  longer  considered  or  treat- 
ed simply  as  a  public  enemy  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America, 
but  as  an  outlaw  and  common  enemy  of  mankind ;  and  that,  in 
the  event  of  his  capture,  the  officer  in  command  of  the  capturing 
force  do  cause  him  to  be  immediately  executed  by  hanging ;  and  I 
do  further  order  that  no  commissioned  officer  of  the  United  States 
taken  captive  shall  be  released  on  parole  before  exchange  until  the 
said  Butler  shall  have  met  with  due  punishment  for  his  crimes. 
All  commissioned  officers  in  the  command  of  the  said  Benjamin  F. 
Butler  are  declared  not  entitled  to  be  considered  as  soldiers  en- 
gaged in  honorable  warfare,  but  as  robbers  and  criminals  deserving 
death,  and  that  they  and  each  of  them  be,  whenever  captured,  re- 
served for  execution." 

Some  women  of  New  Orleans,  relying  on  the  immunity 
National  officers  in-  of  their  sex,  gratified  their  animosity  by  in- 
suited  by  women,  g^^^tiug  uatloual  officcrs  lu  publlc  places. 
One  of  them  ventured  so  far  as  to  spit  in  the  face  of  an 
officer  who  was  quietly  walking  in  the  street.  Hereupon 
was  issued 

"  General  OfeDER  "No.  28. — As  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the 
United  States  have  been  subjected  to  repeated  in- 
sults from  the  women  (calling  themselves  ladies)  of 
New  Orleans,  in  return  for  the  most  scrupulous  non-interference  and 
courtesy  on  oifr  part,  it  is  ordered  that  hereafter,  when  any  female 
shall,  by  word,  gesture,  or  movement,  insult  or  show  contempt  for 
any  officer  or  soldier  of  the  United  States,  she  shall  be  regarded  and 


Chap.LIL]  the  FRENCH  consul.  345 

held  liable  to  be  treated  as  a  woman  of  the  town  plying  her  avoca- 
tion." 

Finding  tliat  it  was  impossible  to  co-ordinate  tlie  na- 
tional authority,  of  whicH  he  was  the  repre- 

Butler  suspends  the  1     1  •  •  ^i       j  i  •    •        i  ,^        •  1  • 

muuicipai  authori-    sentative,  With   the   municipal  authorities, 
who  openly  sustained  the  Confederate  cause, 
he  suspended  them.    A  French  war  ship,  supposed  to  be 
the  precursor  of  a  French  fleet,  having  come  into  the  riv- 
er, and  the  Common  Council  having  presumed  to  offer 
the  hospitalities  of  the  port,  Butler,  considering  the  dis- 
ease of  the  French  position  which  the  French  government  had 
warship.  manifested  to  intermeddle  in  American  af- 

fairs, ordered  the  Council  to  revise  its  action,  and  gave  it 
to  understand  that  the  United  States  authorities  were 
the  only  ones  in  New  Orleans  capable  of  dealing  with 
foreign  nations. 

His  dealings  with  the  numerous  and  insubordinate 
Accusations  against  foreigu  popuktiou  of  Ncw  Orlcaus  brought 

the  French  consul,      j^-^  -^^^   COllisioU  with  thc  forcigU   COUSuls. 

"  Count  Mejan"  (the French  consul), Butler  declared,"  has 
connived  at  the  delivery  of  clothing  for  the  Confederate 
army  since  the  occupation  of  New  Orleans  by  the  Federal 
forces ;  he  has  taken  away  nearly  half  a  million  of  specie 
to  aid  the  Confederates.  His  flag  has  been  made  to  cov- 
er all  manner  of  illegal  and  hostile  transactions,  and  the 
booty  arising. therefrom." 

The  feeling  of  personal  hatred  to  Butler  grew  daily 
Counter-accusations  i^ore  aud  morc  liitense.  He  was  accused 
against  Butler.  ^£  impropcr  tampering  with  the  banks,  spec- 
ulating in  sequestrated  property,  and,  through  the  agency 
of  his  brother,  carrying  on  illegal  but  profitable  transac- 
tions in  sugar  and  cotton — in  short,  prostituting  his  office 
for  personal  gain.  In  South  Carolina  a  reward  of  $10,000 
had  been  offered  for  his  assassination.  Throughout  the 
Confederacy  he  received  an  ignominious  surname,  and 


346  THE  GOVERNMENT  RECALLS  BUTLER.  [Sect.  X. 

was  known  as  "  Butler  the  Beast."  The  government  felt 
Investigation  of  his  constralned  to  send  a  commissioner  to  New 
transactions.  Orleans  to  investigate  his  transactions.     Its 

conclusion  was  that  he  had  evidently  acted  "  under  a  mis- 
apprehension, to  be  referred. to  the  patriotic  zeal  which 
governs  him,  to  the  circumstances  encircling  his  command 
at  the  time,  so  well  calculated  to  excite  suspicion,  and  to 
an  earnest  desire  to  punish,  to  the  extent  of  his  supposed 
power,  all  who  had  contributed,  or  were  contributing,  to 
the  aid  of  a  rebellion  the  most  unjustifiable  and  wicked 
that  insane  or  bad  men  were  ever  engaged  in." 

The  French  government  recalled  its  consul ;  the  Amer- 
The  French  consul  ^^^^  rccallcd  Butlcr,  Gcucral  Banks  arriving 
Zi^d  WNew  in  New  Orleans  (December  14th)  to  take 
Orleans.  -j^j^  place.     lu  a  farewcll  address  to  the  peo- 

ple of  that  city.  General  Butler  said : 

"  Commanding  the  Army  of  the  Gulf,  I  found  you  cap- 
Butier's  farewell  ^urcd,  but  uot  Surrendered ;  conquered,  but 
address.  uot  Orderly;  relieved  from  the  pressure  of  an 

army,  but  incapable  of  taking  care  of  yourselves.     I  re- 
stored order,  punished  crime,  opened  commerce,  brought 
provisions  to  your  starving  people,  reformed  your  current 
cy,  and  gave  you  protection  such  as  you  had 

He  states  what  he  ,  .  -,    p  -ttti  i 

haddone  for  the  uot  eujoyed  lor  many  years.  Whoever  has 
quietly  remained  about  his  business,  afford- 
ing neither  aid  nor  comfort  to  the  enemies  of  the  United 
States,  has  never  been  interfered  with  by  the  soldiers  of 
the  United  States. 

"  Some  of  your  women  flouted  at  the  presence  of  those 
who  came  to  protect  them.     By  a  simple 

He  defends  his  con-  TTnn  it  n    ii  * 

duct  to  their  worn-    Order,  1  callcd  upon  every  soldier  ot  this 

army  to  treat  the  women  of  New  Orleans  as 

gentlemen  should  deal  with  the  sex,  with  such  effect  that 

and  appeals  to  their    ^  ^^^  Call  UpOU    the  just-miudcd  kdicS   of 

just-minded  ladies.  ]^g^  Orlcaus  to  Say  whcthcp  they  ever  en- 


Chap.  LII.]  BUTLBR'S  PAREWELL  ADDEESS.  347 

joyed  so  complete  protection  and  calm  quiet  for  them- 
selves and  their  families  as  since  the  advent  of  the  Unit- 
ed States  troops. 

"I  hold  that  rebellion  is  treason,  and  that  rebellion 
Theprincipiesofhis  P^rsistcd  in  Is  deatli,  and  any  punishment 
administration.       gj^^^j.^  ^f  ^^^  ^^^  ^^  ^  traitor  glvcs  SO  much 

clear  gain  to  him  from  the  clemency  of  the  government. 
Upon  this  thesis  have  I  administered  the  authority  of  the 
United  States.     I  might  have  regaled  you  with  the  amen- 
ities of  British  civilization,  and  yet  been  within  the  sup- 
posed rules  of  civilized  warfare.     Your  property  could 
have  been  turned  over  to  indiscriminate  "  loot,"  like  the 
palace  of  the  Emperor  of  China;  works  of  art  which 
adorned  your  buildings  might  have  been  sent  away  like 
I   the  paintings  of  the  Vatican ;  your  sons  might  have  been 
blown  from  the  mouths  of  cannon  like  the  Sepoys  of 
Delhi,  and  yet   all  this  would  have  been 
from'author'ized     wlthlu  thc  rulcs  of  clvlUzed  warfare  as  prac- 

barbarities,  ,  .  ' 

ticed  by  the  most  polished  and  the  most 
hypocritical  nations  of  Europe.  But  I  have  not  so  con- 
ducted. On  the  contrary,  the  worst  punishment  inflicted, 
except  for  criminal  acts,  punishable  by  every  law,  has 
been  banishment,  with  labor,  to  a  barren  island  where  I 
encamped  my  own  soldiers  before  marching  here." 

"  I  have  levied  upon  the  wealthy  rebels  and  paid  out 
and  has  fed  the  ^^arly  half  a  million  of  dollars  to  feed  40,000 
starving  poor.  ^£  ^^  starving  poor  of  all  nations  assembled 
here,  made  so  by  this  war.  I  saw  that  this  rebellion  was 
a  war  of  the  aristocrats  against  the  middling  men — of  the 
rich  against  the  poor — a  war  of  the  landowner  against 
the  laborer ;  that  it  was  a  struggle  for  the  retention  of 
power  in  the  hands  of  the  few  against  the  many,  and  I 
found  no  conclusion  to  it  save  in  the  subjugation  of  the 
few  and  disenthralment  of  the  many.  I  therefore  felt  no 
hesitation  in  taking  the  substance  of  the  wealthy,  who 


348  BUTLER'S  FAREWELL  ABDRESS.  [Sect.  X. 

had  caused  the  war,  to  feed  the  innocent  poor  who  suf- 
fered by  it ;  and  I  shall  now  leave  you  with  the  proud 
consciousness  that  I  carry  wdth  me  the  blessings  of  the 
humble  and  loyal  under  the  roof  of  the  cottage  and  in 
the  cabin  of  the  slave,  and  so  am  quite  content  to  incur 
the  sneers  of  the  salon  or  the  curses  of  the  rich. 

"  I  found  you  trembling  at  the  terror  of  servile  insur- 
rection ;  all  danger  of  this  I  have  prevented 
slaves  may  be  gov-  bv  SO  treatiuo;  the  slave  that  he  had  no 

erned  by  kiuduess,         *'  ^ 

cause. to  rebel.     I  found  the  dungeon,  the 
chain,  and  the  lash  your  only  means  of  enforcing  obedi- 
ence on  your  servants.     I  leave  them  peaceful,  laborious, 
controlled  by  the  laws  of  kindness  and  justice. 
;    "  I  have  demonstrated  that  the  pestilence  can  be  kept 

from  your  borders;  I  have  added  a  million 
may  be  kept  out  of  of  dollars  to  vour  wcalth  in  the  form  of  new 

the  city.  *' 

land  from  the  batture  of  the  Mississippi. 
I  have  cleansed  and  improved  your  streets,  canals,  and 
public  squares,  and  opened  new  avenues  to  unoccupied 
land.     I  have  given  you  freedom  of  election  greater  than 

you  ever   enjoyed  before.     I  have   caused 

He  has  adminis-       ...  ,        i  t      .     .    ,  -x  .  ,  •    tt 

tered  impartial     justicc  to  bc   administered  so  impartially 
that  your  own  advocates  have  unanimously 
complimented  the  judges  of  my  appointment. 

"  You  have  seen,  therefore,  the  benefits  of  the  law- s  and 

He  appeals  to  the  justice  of  the  govcrnmeut  against  which  you 

P''P^''  have  rebelled.     Why,  then,  will  you  not  all 

return  to  your  allegiance  to  that  government,  not  with 

lip  service,  but  wdth  that  of  the  heart  ? 

"  There  is  but  one  thing  that  at  this  hour  stands  be- 
tween you  and  the  government,  and  that  is  slavery.  The 
institution,  cursed  of  God,  which  has  taken  its  last  refuge 
here,  in  His  providence  will  be  rooted  out  as  the  tares 
from  the  wheat,  although  the  wheat  be  torn  up  with  it. 
"  I  came  among  you  by  teachings,  by  habit  of  mind,  by 


Chap.  LIL]  BUTLER'S  FAREWELL  ADDRESS.  349 

im  lorin  them  to  P^^li^i^^^l  positloii,  by  soclal  affinity,  inclined 
abandon  slavery,  ^^  sustain  y  ouF  domestic  laws,  if  by  possibil- 
ity it  could  be  done  witli  safety  to  the  Union.  Months 
of  experience  and  observation  have  forced  the  conclusion 
on  me  that  the  existence  of  slavery  is  incompatible  with 
the  safety  either  of  yourselves  or  of  the  Union.  As  the 
system  has  gradually  grown  to  its  present  huge  dimen- 
sions, it  w^ere  best  if  it  could  be  gradually  removed ;  but 
it  is  better,  far  better  that  it  should  be  taken  out  at  once, 
than  that  it  should  vitiate  the  social,  political,  and  family 
relations  of  your  country.  I  am  speaking  with  no  phil- 
anthropic views  as  regards  the  slave,  but  simply  of  the  ef- 
fect of  slavery  on  the  master.  See  for  yourselves ;  look 
around  you,  and  say  whether  this  saddening,  deadening 
influence  has  not  all  but  destroyed  the  very  frame-work 
of  your  society.  I  am  speaking  the  farewell  words  of 
one  who  has  shown  his  devotion  to  his  country  at  the 
peril  of  his  life  and  fortune,  who  in  these  words  can  Kave 
neither  hope  nor  interest  save  the  good  of  those  whom 
he  addresses. 

"  Come,  then,  to  the  unconditional  support  of  the  gov- 
and  return  to  their  emmcut.  Take  luto  your  own  hands  your 
allegiance.  ^^^^  iustitutious.     Ecmodel  them  according 

to  the  laws  of  nations  and  of  God,  and  thus  attain  that 
great  prosperity  assured  to  you  by  geographical  position, 
only  a  portion  of  which  was  heretofore  yours." 


CHAPTER  LIII. 

THE  SORTIE  OF  BRAGG  AND  ITS  REPULSE.     BATTLES  OF  PERRY- 
VILLE  AND  MURFREESBOROUGH. 

Encouraged  by  its  successes  in  Virginia,  the  Confederate  government  ordered  Gen- 
eral Bragg  to  advance  from  Chattanooga  northward. 

He  executed  his  orders,  compelling  Buell  to  retreat  to  the  Ohio.  He  then  attempt- 
ed to  establish  a  Confederate  government  in  Kentucky. 

Buell  was  re-enforced ;  the  Battle  of  Perryville  was  fought ;  and  Bragg,  car- 
rying away  immense  plunder,  reti^ated.  Rosecrans  was  ordered  to  take  com- 
mand of  Buell's  army. 

Bragg,  marching  northward  again,  was  overthrown  by  Rosecrans  at  the  Battle  of 
MuRFREESBOROUGH ;  and  the  Confederates,  giving  up  all  hope  of  crossing  the 
Ohio,  retired  to  TuUahoma.     The  sortie  of  Bragg  had  failed. 

The  Civil  War  had  already  assumed  its  characteristic 
aspect.  The  Confederate  States  were  completely  belea- 
guered and  besieged. 

They  were  encircled  by  the  blockade  of  the  sea-coast, 

.  .   ^y  hostile  armies  on  the  north  of  Virginia 

tion  oftheconfed-  aiid  alous*  the  entire  line  of  the  Ohio,  bv 

eracy.  *-"  ,  'J 

a  patrol  of  national  gun-boats  on  the  Mis- 
sissippi as  far  as  Memphis,  and  by  Farragut's  ships  from 
New  Orleans  to  Vicksburg. 

I  have  now  to  relate  how  they  made  convulsive  efforts 
to  break  through  this  line  of  investment,  the  stringency 
of  which  was  daily  increasing.  The  campaigns  of  Bragg 
and  of  Lee  stand  in  the  attitude  of  gigantic  sorties — 
gigantic,  yet  only  in  proportion  to  the  vastness  of  the 
siege. 

The  Confederate  government  was  not  without  causes 
of  encouragement.  Conscription  had  re-enforced  its  ar- 
mies; victory  had  rewarded  its  efforts.     McClellan  had 


Chap.  LIII.]  THE  SORTIE  OF  BRAGG.  351 

been  driven  from  Eichmond;  his  peninsular  campaign 
had  totally  failed. 

It  seemed  as  if  the  time  had  now  come  for  gratifying 
Determination  to     thc  clamor  SO  importunately  raised  through- 

make  offensive  war.    ^^^  ^^^  g^^^|^  ^^^^  ^-^^  ^^^   ^^^^^^  ^^  ^^^_ 

ger  be  canied  on  defensively,  but  that  vigorous  offensive 
operations  should  be  instituted  in  the  Free  States.  The 
demand  had  become  irresistible  —  "Carry  the  war  into 
the  enemy's  country,  and  relieve  us  from  its  intolerable 
burdens." 

Accordingly,  as  the  proper  initiatory  steps,  Lee  was  di- 
The  sorties  of  Bragg  Tcctcd  to  move  iuto  Maryland  and  Bragg 
and  Lee.  -^^^  Kcutucky.    It  was  supposcd  that  those 

slaveholding  states,  thus  far  lost  to  the  Confederacy, 
would  be  easily  reclaimed;  that  from  them  the  North 
might  be  invaded,  and  peace  wrung  from  it  in  one  of  its 
great  cities. 

Lee's  movement  to  the  North  we  shall  have  to  consider 
in  a  subsequent  chapter.  In  this  we  have  to  speak  of 
Bragg's. 

Bragg  was  at  Chattanooga.  In  his  march  to  it  from 
Tupelo  he  had  outstripped  the  tardy  Buell,  who,  as  we 
have  seen  (p.  311),  had  been  dispatched  by  Hsilleck  on 
the  10th  of  June. 

It  was  clear  that  very  great  incidental  advantages 
would  arise  from  the  march  of  Brasfor's  army 

Advantages  of  ,  .,    _  ^  ,  i  i 

Bragg's  northward  uorthward  irom  Chattanooo;a  alons:  the  west 

marcn.  o  o 

flank  of  the  Cumberland  Mountains,  for  not 
only  might  he  recover  the  two  states  Tennessee  and  Ken- 
tucky, and  threaten  Louisville  and  Cincinnati,  but  he 
might  compel  the  detachment  of  a  large  part  of  the  force 
from  the  army  of  Grant  near  Corinth.  The  projected 
march  of  that  general  southward  toward  New  Orleans 
might  be  half  paralyzed  by  the  march  of  Bragg  north- 
ward to  Louisville.    The  event  more  than  justified  these 


352 


OSTENSIBLE  MOTIVE  EOR  BKAGG'S  SORTIE.        [Sect.  X. 


C//VC//V/VAT/ 

OHIO 


E       0     H      G      I     A 

ALTON 


THE   SORTIE   OF   BRAGG. 


expectations,  for  Buell  himself  was  at  once  thrown  from 
the  confines  of  Alabama  to  the  Ohio  Eiver,  a  distance  of 
three  hundred  miles. 

The  Confederate  authorities  had  considered  it  expe- 
An  ostensible  mo-  ^icut  to  havc  au  ostcnsiblc  as  well  as  a  real 
assigned.        motive  for  the  Northern  campaign  in  which 


tive 


chap.liii.]  the  confederates  march  northward.         353. 

Bragg  was  about  to  engage.  While  their  real  objects 
were  such  as  have  been  just  described,  they  gave  out  that 
they  were  undertaking  a  foray  into  Kentucky.  It  was 
affirmed  that  in  that  state  there  were  more  provisions 
and  live-stock  than  in  all  the  rest  of  the  South.  Bragg 
might  fail  in  destroying  the  national  forces,  in  driving 
them  north  of  the  Ohio,  in  capturing  Louisville  and  Cin- 
cinnati, in  detaching  the  Northwest  from  the  Union,  in 
arresting  Grant's  march  to  the  South,  but  it  was  hardly 
possible  for  him  to  fail  in  securing  a  vast  supply  of  pro- 
visions ;  and  it  was  supposed  that  the  Southern  people, 
expecting  no  more,  would  be  content  with  that. 

The  conscription  had  raised  Bragg's  army  to  50,000 

Brag- commences   ^^^'     ^  was   orgaulzcd  iu   three    corps. 

hism-arch.  rj.^^^^  ^^  Hardcc  and  Polk  were  with  him 

at  Chattanooga ;  that  of  Kirby  Smith  was  at  Knoxville. 
With  the  former  Bragg  commenced  moving  northward 
from  Chattanooga,  having  his  antagonist  Buell  on  his  left 
flank.  He  directed  his  march  toward  the  Louisville  and 
Nashville  Eailroad,  and  reached  it  at  Mumfordsville,  en- 
countering there  a  national  force,  which  he  compelled  to 
surrender. 

Meantime  Kirby  Smith  left  Knoxville  with  the  inten- 
Kirby  Smith  com-   tlou  of  joiulug  Bragg,  aud  marched  as  rapid- 

menceshismarch.    ly  aS  hc  COuld  thrOUgh  Big  CrCck  Gap.       At 

Eichmond,  Kentucky,  he  routed  a  national  force  under 
Brigadier  General  Manson,  their  loss  being,  according  to 
his  statement,  1000  killed  and  wounded,  5000  prisoners, 
9  guns,  10,000  small-arms,  and  a  large  quantity  of  pro- 
visions and  ammunition.  He  then  passed  through  Lex- 
ington, and  advanced  northward  as  far  as  Cynthiana. 

On  his  part,  Buell,  forestalled  in  the  occupation  of 
Buell  is  obliged  to  Chattauooga,  was  depending  on  Louisville 
rollback.  £^j.  gi^pplies,  and  hence  had  to  guard  near- 

ly 300  miles  of  railroad.    As  Bragg  marched  northward, 
H.— Z 


354  BUELL  FAIJ.S  BACK  TO  LOUISVILLE.  [Sect.X. 

Buell  was  compelled  to  execute  a  parallel  march,  and  fall 
back  upon  Nashville. 

From  Mumfordsville  Bragg  moved  to  Frankfort,  and 
Bragg  and  Smith  ^t  that  place  Kirbj  Smith,  coming  down 
'^'*^'  from  Cynthiana,  made  a  junction  with  him. 

He  had  been  pretending  to  attack  Nashville  while  his 
colleague  Smith  had  been  pretending  to  attack  Cincin- 
nati. Buell  had,  however,  detected,  from  dispatches  he 
had  intercepted,  that  their  true  object  was  Louisville, 
Their  movements  had  been  too  slow.  It  had  taken  Bragg 
six  weeks  to  march  from  Chattanooga  to  Frankfort ;  and 
Buell,  leaving  a*  garrison  for  the  protection  of  Nashville, 
reached  Louisville  first  (September  25th).  He  found  the 
Buell  forced  north-  cltj  lu  a  pauic.  Had  it  uot  becu  that  Bragg 
^^""^  was  detained  by  a  burnt  bridge  near  Bards- 

town,  the  Confederates  would  have  captured  the  place. 
,    At  Louisville  Buell  was  powerfully  re- enforced,  not 

He  is  re-enforced  at    Oulj  loj  UeW  IcvicS  aud  by  his  jUUCtloU  with 

Louisville.  General  Nelson,  but  also  by  veteran  troops 

sent  up  the  Mississippi  and  Ohio  from  the  army  of  Grant. 
Buell's  estimated  force  was  100,000  men.  But  the  gov- 
ernment, fearing,  from  what  had  occurred  on  his  march 
from  Corinth  toward  Chattanooga,  that  he  would  conduct 
the  campaign  on  the  principles  that  had  guided  McClel- 
lan,  transmitted  an  order  to  Louisville  relieving  him  from 
command.  This  was,  however,  revoked  at  the  urgent  re- 
quest of  General  Thomas,  who  had  been  appointed  in  his 
stead. 

Bragg  now  commenced  carrying  out  his  orders  for  re- 
Bra  g  commences  Organizing  Kentucky  on  Confederate  prim 
SinizatlS? o?^^  °^-  ciples.  He  issued  a  proclamation  in  which 
lentucky.  -^^   ^^^^^^  ^-^^   objccts   of  his    cxpcditiou. 

"  Kentuckians,  we  have  come  with  joyful  hopes.  Let  us 
not  depart  in  sorrow,  as  we  shall  if  we  find  you  wedded 
in  your  choice  to  your  present  lot.    If  you  prefer  Federal 


Chap.  LIII.]         BRAGG'S  POLITICAL  PROCEEDINGS.  355' 

rule,  show  it  by  your  frowns,  and  we  shall  return  whence 
we  came.  If  you  choose  rather  to  come  within  the  folds 
of  our  brotherhood,  then  cheer  ns  with  the  smiles  of  your 
women,  and  lend  your  willing  hands  to  secure  yourselves 
in  your  heritage  of  liberty.  Women  of  Kentucky !  your 
persecutions  and  heroic  bearing  have  reached  our  ear." 
"Let  your  enthusiasm  have  free  rein.  Buckle  on  the  ar- 
mor of  your  kindred,  your  husbands,  sons,  and  brothers, 
and  scoff  to  shame  him  who  would  prove  recreant  in  his 
duty  to  you,  his  country,  and  his  God."  He  also  gave  it 
to  be  understood  that  the  object  of  his  expedition  was  to 
secure  peace,  and  the  abandonment  by  the  United  States 
of  their  pretensions  to  govern  a  people  who  had  never 
been  their  subjects,  and  who  preferred  self-government 
to  union  with  them.  He  declared  that  the  Confederate 
government  would  guarantee  the  free  navigation  of  all 
the  Western  rivers,  and  that  the  Northwest  and  the  South 
have  a  common  interest,  and  can  not  exist  in  separation ; 
that  it  was  from  the  meddlesome,  grasping,  and  fanatical 
disposition  of  the  people  of  the  East  that  all  the  trouble 
had  come. 

The  Kichmond  authorities  had  been  indulging  in  a 

day-dream.    They  had  fallen  into  the  belief 

alliance  with  the    that  the  Northwestcm  Free  States  misrht  be 

Northwest.  •     t  i  • 

mduced  to  jom  them.  On  the  same  day 
that  Bragg  issued  his  proclamation,  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  made  a  majority  and  a  minority  report 
to  the  Confederate  Congress  respecting  the  propriety  of 
a  proclamation  with  a  view  of  influencing  the  Northwest- 
ern States :  this  was  to  touch  on  the  free  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries,  and  the  opening  of  the 
markets  of  the  South  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Northwest- 
ern States.  On  the  one  hand  there  were  thus  induce- 
ments held  out,  and  on  the  other  there  was  the  threaten- 
ing presence  of  Bragg  with  his  60,000  men.    The  people 


356  BRAGG  RETREATS  WITH  LARGE  SUPPLIES.        [Sect.  X. 

of  the  Northwest  had,  however,  already  definitively  made 
up  their  minds.  Denying  the  right  of  any  one  to  obstruct 
the  great  rivers,  they  had  no  intention  of  accepting  their 
free  navigation  as  a  boon,  either  from  the  Confederate 
government  or  any  other  power.  They  had  determined 
to  force  open  those  streams,  and  whoever  attempted  an 
obstruction  must  do  it  at  his  peril 

As  a  part  of  the  political  movement,  Bragg  and  Kirby 
Smith,  while   at  Frankfort  (October  4th), 

Bragg  inaugurates     .  ±    J  '    •  1  i?  j.1 

a  governor  of  Ken-  inaugurated  a  provisioual  govcmor  oi  the 
state. 
But,  while  this  was  being  done,  Bragg  was  not  un- 
mindful of  the  ostensible  object  which  had 
m'ainofjectwiii    brouglit  him  thus  far  into  Northern  Ken- 
tucky.    His  guerrillas  and  foraging  parties 
were  scouring  every  portion  of  the  country  to  which  they 
could  find  access,  and  carrying  off  live-stock,  bacon,  bread- 
he  collects  sup-    stuffs.    Shops  and  storcs  were  broken  open ; 
plies.  every  thing  that  was  wanted  was  taken 

away  and  paid  for  in  Confederate  money ;  and  as  the  state 
was  now  assumed  to  be  part  of  the  Confederacy,  the  Con- 
scription Act  was  enforced,  and  men  compelled  to  join  the 
army. 

'As  soon  as  Bragg  found  that  Buell  had  anticipated  him 
He  commences  his  ^'^  ^hc  occupatlou  of  LouisviUc,  and  that  the 
retreat,  maiu  objcct  of  the  campaign  was  lost,  he  pre- 

pared to  retreat  with  the  booty  he  had  collected.  On  the 
1st  of  October,  Buell,  having  re-enforced  and  reorganized 
his  army,  set  out  from  Louisville  to  take  the  offensive 
and  pursue  his  antagonist.  He  directed  his  march  upon 
Bardstown.  While  he  had  been  lingering  in  Louisville, 
is  pursued  by  Bu-  tho  Confederates  h-ad  been  devastating  the 
eii'8  troops,  country.     Though  he  moved  only  ten  miles 

a  day,  he  reached  Bardstown  just  as  they  left  it,  for  Bragg 
was  retreating  as  slowly  as  possible,  to  give  time  for  his 


'Chap.  LIII.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  PERRYVILLE.  357 

trains  to  escape.  Finding,  however  (October  7tli),  that 
Buell's  leading  corps,  under  McCook  and  Gilbert,  who 
formed  the  left  and  the  centre  respectively,  had  out- 
marched Crittenden,  whose  corps  formed  Buell's  right,  he 
and  turns  upon  tumcd  ficrcelj  upou  his  pursucrs,  in  hopes 
*^^'°'  of  defeating  them  before  Crittenden  could 

get  up ;  then  he  might  fall  upon  Crittenden,  or  retreat  be- 
fore his  arrival. 

Gilbert's  corps  first  overtook  Bragg,  but  McCook  came 
The  battle  of  Per-  ^V  about  1 1  A.M.  (Octobcr  8th),  having  suf 
ryvi  e.  fered  much  on  the  march  for  want  of  water. 

He  took  post  on  Gilbert's  left.  Soon  afterward,  in  the 
early  part  of  the  afternoon,  Bragg  assailed  them  furiously. 
The  shock  fell  on  McCook's  corps,  and  for  several  hours 
he  had  to  sustain  it  alone.  General  Jackson,  one  of  the 
division  commanders,  was  killed  at  the  first  fire.  He  was 
struck  by  a  fragment  of  shell  on  the  breast.  Terrill's  bri- 
gade was  panic-stricken,  and  he  himself  killed.  McCook's 
left  was  thus  driven  back.  Meantime,  on  his  right,  Rous- 
seau had  also  been  forced  back.  It  was  late  in  the  day 
before  any  re-enforcements  were  sent  them.  Colonel 
Gooding  was  at  length  ordered  by  Gilbert,  with  the  thir- 
tieth brigade,  to  the  extreme  left.  He  maintained  a  des- 
perate encounter  for  two  hours ;  his  horse  was  shot  under 
him,  and  he  was  made  prisoner.  This  brigade,  out  of 
1923  men,  lost  549.  McCook's  corps  had  thus  been  as- 
saulted on  both  flanks,  and  nearly  overwhelmed.  This 
had  brought  the  Confederates  on  the  left  flank  of  Gil- 
bert's, the  centre  corps.  There,  however,  they  were  not 
only  successfully  resisted,  but  driven  back  by  Generals 
E.  B.  Mitchell  and  Philip  H.  Sheridan,  through  Perry ville, 
as  night  came  on.  Bragg,  knowing  that  Crittenden 
would  now  come  up,  took  advantage  of  the  darkness  and 
retreated.  He  had  lost  in  the  battle  2500.  Buell's  losses, 
as  reported  by  himself,  were  916  killed,  2943  wounded. 


358  FAILURE  OF  BRAGG'S  SORTIE.  [Sect.  X: 

489  missing,  and  10  guns  taken.     Bragg  left  behind  him 
more  than  1000  wounded,  and  eight  of  the  captured  guns. 
Continued  retreat    He  withdrew  to  Harrodsbui'g,  and  thence, 
''^'''''  with  Kirby  Smith,  to  Camp  Dick  Kobinson. 

They  then  hastened  back  to  Chattanooga  through  Cum- 
berland Gap.  Buell  followed  them  as  far  as  London,  but 
at  that  point  gave  up  the  pursuit  and  returned  to  Bowl- 
ing Green.  His  movements  had  been  so  languid  that 
the  government,  dissatisfied  with  the  very  inadequate  use 
Buell  is  removed  ^^  ^^^  made  of  his  large  army,  removed  him 
from  command.  (Qctober  30fch)  fi'om  its  commaud,  and  as 
signed  Eosecrans  to  it  in  his  stead. 

So  far  as  gaining  a  firm  foothold  in  Kentucky  was  con- 
cerned, the  Confederate  expedition  had  proved  a  failure 
In  the  other  particular,  the  gathering  of  supplies,  its  sue 
cess  had  been  better.    The  Eichmond  newspapers  boast- 
The  supplies  ob-    ^d  that "  the  wagon-train  of  supplies  brought 
tained  ty  Bragg.    ^^^^  ^^  Kcutucky  by  Kirby  Smith  was  forty 

miles  long.  It  brought  a  million  yards  of  jeans,  with  a 
large  amount  of  clothing,  boots  and  shoes,  and  200  wag- 
on-loads of  bacon,  6000  barrels  of  pork,  1500  mules  and 
horses,  8000  beeves,  and  a  large  lot  of  swine." 

Bragg  had  thus  retreated  from  Kentucky,  his  main  ob- 
FaiiureofBragg's  j^^^^  uuaccomplished.  Hc  had  gained  no 
operations.  brilliant  victory;  he  had  not  taken   either 

Louisville  or  Cincinnati;  the  Northwestern  States  had  not 
sought  an  alliance  with  the  Confederacy ;  but  few  Ken- 
tuckians  had  voluntarily  joined  his  army.  The  number  of 
those  whom  he  had  seized  by  conscription  was  exceeded 
by  those  he  had  lost  through  desertion.  Persons  of  sub- 
stance throughout  the  state  not  only  felt  outraged  by  the 
seizure  of  their  property  paid  for  in  Confederate  money, 
but  indignant  at  the  needless  destruction  and  devastation 
he  had  committed.  Instead  of  able-bodied  volunteers, 
crowds  of  refugees  accompanied  his  retreat,  carrying  with 


Chap.liii.]  he  is  ordered  to  renew  his  attempt.  359 

them  their  negroes,  whose  emancipation  they  foresaw  was 
at  hand. 

-  Bragg's  expedition  into  Kentucky  had,  however,  occa- 
Evacuationofcum-  sioned  the  evacuatioH  of  Cumberland  Gap 
beriandGap.  ^^  ^j^^  uatioual  forccs  uuder  General  Mor- 
gan. His  supplies  were  cut  off.  On  September  I7th  he 
blew  up  the  magazine,  burnt  his  tents,  wagons,  gun-car- 
i  riages,  and  whatever  he  could  not  withdraw.  He  then 
retreated  250  miles  to  the  Ohio,  incessantly  skirmishing 
with  the  enemy,  foraging  on  the  country,  and  often  suf- 
fering for  want  of  water.  He  reached  the  Ohio  on  Octo- 
ber 4th.  The  force  which  he  had  brought  from  the  Gap 
was  more  than  10,000,  with  20  pieces  of  artillery  and  400 
wagons. 

The  Confederate  government  was  greatly  disappointed 
Bra-c  ordered  to  with  thc  issuc  of  Bragg's  Campaign.  Scarce- 
renewhis  attempt,  j^  ^^^  ^^  Tcachcd  Chattauooga  wheu  he  was 

ordered  to  move  northward  again. 

Rosecrans,  on  assuming  the  command  of  Buell's  army, 
Roeecrans  succeeds  ^^ow  kuowu  as  the  14th  Army  Corps,  found 
Bueiim  command.  -^  j^  ^  ^^^^  dilapidated  couditiou ;  but,  re- 
ceiving large  re-enforcements  from  the  new  levy  of  600,000 
men  called  out  by  the  government,  he  reorganized  it  rap- 
idly, and,  having  repaired  the  railroad  from  Louisville  to 
Nashville,  which  had  been  greatly  injured,  he  concentrat- 
ed his  forces  at  Nashville,  and  there  accumulated  large 
supplies.  This  was  necessary  to  be  done  before  he  could 
safely  move  southward  to  confront  Brag^, 
reorganizes  the      for  hc  could  uot  rclv  OH  the  couutrv  which 

army.  "  *' 

had  been  wasted  by  the  movements  of  two 
armies,  and  the  Confederate  cavalry  could  easily  sever 
the  railroad  in  his  rear. 

Bragg  had  already  reached  Murfreesborough  on  his 
second  northward  march  from  Chattanooga.    Eosecrans 


360  ROSECKANS'S  ADVANCE.  [Sect.X. 

Bragg  returns  to  ^^^  glveii  out  that  it  was  Hs  intention  to 
Murfreesborough.    ^^^^  ^^  j^-^  ^.^^^^  quarters  at  Nashville, 

and  Bragg,  supposing  that  this  would  be  the  case,  sent 
out  strong  detachments  of  cavalry  under  Morgan  and  For- 
rest, the  former  being  ordered  to  break  Kosecrans's  com- 
munications. As  it  was  about  the  season  of  Christmas, 
Winter  festivities  Murfreesborough  was  the  scene  of  much 
*^^'^*  gayety.     Davis,  the  President  of  the  Con- 

federacy, had  come  from  Richmond  to  counsel — perhaps 
to  invigorate — Bragg.  There  were  wedding  festivities,  at 
one  of  which  the  Bishop-general  Polk  officiated,  and  the 
giddy  Confederates  danced  on  floors  carpeted  with  the 
American  flag. 

Suddenly,  on  the  26th  of  December,  Eosecrans  moved. 
Rosecrans  suddenly  His  march  commeuccd  in  a  heavy  rain.  The 
moves  on  Bragg.  Confederate  outposts  retired  before  his  ad- 
vance, the  pressure  upon  them  being  so  vigorous  that 
they  had  not  time  to  destroy  the  bridges  on  the  Jefferson 
and  Murfreesborough  turnpikes.  On  the  30th,  Bragg, 
finding  he  was  about  to  be  assailed,  had  concentrated  his 
army  a  couple  of  miles  in  front  of  Murfreesborough. 
The  position  of  the  national  army,  which  was  43,000 
Position  of  Rose-   stroug  ou  the  eveulug  of  that  day,  was  on 

crans'sarmy.  ^^^    ^^^^    ^j^^     ^^  g^^^^^    j^-^^^^,^  ^    sluggish 

stream  fringed  with  cedar  brakes,  and  here  flowing  in  a 
north-northwesterly  course.  The  line  ranged  nearly  north 
and  south,  and  was  three  or  four  miles  in  length.  Crit- 
tenden was  on  its  left,  with  three  divisions.  Wood,  Van- 
cleve.  Palmer ;  Thomas  in  the  centre,  with  two  divisions, 
IsTegley  and  Rousseau,  the  latter  in  reserve ;  McCook  on 
the  right,  with  three,  Sheridan,  Davis,  Johnson.  The  left 
wing  touched  the  river,  the  right  stretched  a  little  be- 
yond the  Franklin  Road. 

Bragg's  army,  62,000  strong,  stood  between  Rosecrans 
and  Murfreesborough,  ranged,  for  the  most  part,  parallel 


Chap.  LIII.]    POSITION  OF  THE  CONFEDEKATE  ARMY. 


361 


]^^--ll^ 


BATTLE   OF   MURFREESBOROUGH. 


Position  ^f  the  Con-  to   tlic   national  line;   his  right,  however, 

federate  army.  ^^^^^  ^^^^^^  ^^^^^^      Breckimidge's  division 

formed  his  right ;  in  his  centre,  under  Polk,  were  two  di- 
visions, those  of  Withers  and  Cheatham;  on  his  left,  un- 
der Hardee,  two  divisions,  Cleburne  and  McCown.  The 
river  separated  Breckinridge  from  the  rest  of  the  Confed- 
erate army. 

Eosecrans  had  concentrated  two  thirds  of  his  force  on 
Rosecrans'spianof  ^^^  l^ft.  His  iutcntion  was  that  his  right 
the  battle.  wlug,  staudlug  ou  the  defensive,  should  sim- 

ply hold  its  ground ;  but  his  extreme  left,  the  divisions 
of  "Wood  and  Vancleve,  crossing  Stone  Eiver,  should  as- 


362  THE  BATTLE  OF  MURFREESBOROUGH.  [Sect.  X. 

sail  Breckinridge's  division,  exposed  there,  and  seize  the 
heights,  from  which  an  artillery  fire  would  not  only  take 
in  reverse  the  works  in  front  of  the  enemy's  centre,  but 
also  enable  the  national  centre,  with  the  remainder  of  the 
left  wing,  to  overthrow  ifc.  Meantime  the  assailing  divi- 
sions of  the  left  would  swing  into  Murfreesborough,  and, 
continuing  their  movement,  cpme  round  to  the  Franklin 
Eoad,  thereby  forcing  the  Confederates  from  their  line  of 
retreat.  It  was  a  disadvantage  to  the  national  general 
that  in  this  movement  the  river  must  be  crossed. 

On  his  part,  also,  Bragg  had  determined  to  take  the  of 
Bragg'spianofthe  feusive,  aud  with  his  left  to  strike  Eose- 
^^"  ^*  crans's  right.     There  was  thus  a  similar  in- 

tention on  the  two  sides,  and  not  a  dissimilar  disposi- 
tion of  force.  Both  intended  to  strike  with  the  left,  and 
therefore  both  massed  their  force  on  that  wing.  Bragg's 
plan  was  to  wheel  his  attacking  force  on  Polk's  extreme 
right,  as  on  a  pivot,  and,  pressing  his  antagonist  back  to 
Stone  River,  seize  the  turnpike  and  railroad  to  Nashville, 
his  lines  of  communication  in  the  rear. 

In  the  dawn  of  the  last  day  of  the  year  (1862),  while 
The  battle  of  Mur-  Eosccraus's  left  was  rapidly  crossing  Stone 
freesborough.        Riyer  to  make  its  expected  attack,  Bragg, 
with  his  left,  had  already  anticipated  him.     Coming  out 
of  a  fog  which  had  settled  on  the  battle-field,  he  fell  furi- 
ously upon  Johnson's  division,  and  so  unexpectedly  that 
two  of  its  batteries  were  taken  before  a  gun  could  be 
Bragg  obtains  the  fif^d.      Thc   Confederate    success  was   de- 
mitiative.  clsivc.     Johusou's   divislou,  which  was  on 

the  extreme  national  right,  was  instantly  swept  away. 
Davis,  who  stood  next,  was  assailed  in  front  and  on  his 
uncovered  flank.  He  made  a  stout  resistance,  but  the 
Rosecrans's  right  is  s^iock  was  too  great;  he  was  compelled  to 
overthrown.  ^-^^^  wsijj  with  the  loss  of  many  guns.    And 

now  the  triumphant  Confederate  left,  the  centre  also  com- 


Chap.  LIII.]  OVERTHROW  OF  THE  NATIONAL  RIGHT  WING.        353 

ing  into  play,  rushed  upon  the  next  division — but  that 
was  commanded  by  Sheridan. 

Rosecrans's  aggressive  movement  was  already  para- 
He  has  to  abandon  lyzed;  nay,  more,  it  had  to  be  abandoned. 
his  movement.  jjg  ]jg^^  ^q  wlthdraw  his  left  for  the  purpose 
of  saving  his  right  and  defending  his  communications. 
He  must  establish  a  new  line. 

The  possibility  of  doing  this — the  fate  of  the  battle — 
rested  on  Sheridan.     He  was  furiously  as- 

The  Confederates  mt*       /»  ,    ^         ii        n        o    i  1        !••• 

checked  by  sheri-  Sailed  m  irout  by  the  Coniederate  division 
of  Withers ;  on  his  flank,  uncovered  by  the 
overthrow  of  Johnson  and  Davis,  he  was  attacked  by 
their  victors,  McCown  and  Cleburne.  The  front  attack 
he  received  with  such  an  artillery  and  musketry  fire  that 
the  Confederates  were  not  only  checked  and  broken,  but 
were  pursued  across  the  field  to  their  intrenchments. 
Then,  by  retiring  his  right  and  reserves,  he  swung  his  line 
round  so  as  to  -come  perpendicularly  to  its  former  direc- 
tion. He  faced  now  south  instead  of  east,  and  stood  par- 
allel to  the  Wilkinson  Turnpike.  The  Confederate  di- 
visions in  front  of  him,  and  greatly  overlapping  him  in 
this  his  new  position,  were  at  once  held  in  check.  Before 
they  could  advance  to  the  N'ashville  roads,  and  so  seize 
Rosecrans's  communications,  Sheridan  must  be  put  out 
of  the  way. 

,  But  it  took  an  hour  to  do  that.     As  his  antagonists 
pressed  on  his  flank,  he  changed  his  front 
?ompSild  trill    again.     Pivoting  on  the  right  flank  of  Neg- 
ley's  division,  he  wheeled  round  his  line  so 
as  to  face  to  the  west,  thereby  covering  the  rear  of  Neg- 
ley's  line.     With  Negley  he  was  now  forming  a  wedge- 
shaped  mass,  with  his  batteries  at  the  point  of  the  wedge. 
Here  he  withstood  an  impetuous  attack  of  Cheatham's 
division  and  of  other  heavy  masses.     All  three  of  his 
brigade  commanders  had  been  killed,  his  ammunition 


364  KOSECEANS  RENEWS  HIS  LINE.  [Sect.  X. 

train  tad  been  captured;  lie  could  not  resist  mucli  lon- 
ger, for  tlie  cartridge-boxes  of  his  men  were  empty.  The 
time  had  come  when  even  Sheridan  must  fall  back.  But, 
if  he  had  not  powder,  he  had  steel.  The  fixed  bayo- 
nets of  his  reserve  brigade  covered  him,  and  he  retired, 
unconquered  and  unshaken,  out  of  the  cedar  thicket  to- 
ward the  Nashville  Road.  In  this  memorable  and  most 
glorious  resistance  he  had  lost  1630  men.  "Here's  all 
that  are  left,"  he  said  to  Rosecrans,  w^hom  he  had  saved 
and  now  met. 

After  Sheridan  had  been  pushed  back,  there  was  noth- 

Resistance  of  Neg-  l^g  for  Ncglcy  but  tO  follow.  Hc  did  SO, 
ley  and  Rousseau.      g^^^^pj^g  ]^|g  y^^j  agalust   all  rCSistaUCe.       lu 

vain  had  Thomas  sent  his  other  division  under  Rousseau 
to  the  front  of  the  battle.  It  too,  after  a  desperate  strug- 
gle, was  forced  out  of  the  cedar  grove. 

Meantime,  on  a  knoll  in  the  plain  to  which  these  di- 
Rosecrans  estab-  vlslous  had  rcccdcd,  Rosccraus  had  massed 
lishesanewiine.  j^-^  artillery.  He  was  forming  a  new  line, 
in  which  the  army  would  face  southwestwardly,  with  the 
Nashville  Turnpike  on  its  rear.  In  the  critical  moment 
of  establishing  this  new  formation,  every  thing  depended 
on  the  resistance  of  Hazen's  brigade,  which  was  on  the 
left  of  Palmer's  division.  Of  that  division  the  two  right 
brigades  had  been  forced  away,  but  Hazen  stood  firm,  de- 
livering such  a  fire  as  to  sweep  his  assailants  back,  though 
losing  one  third  of  his  numbers.  While  thus  he  held 
firm,  Rosecrans  had  adjusted  his  new  front,  and  was  ready 
for  the  final  Confederate  charge. 

On  that  new  line  the  gray-coated  Confederates  came 
Final  charge  of  the  forth  from  the  ccdar  thickets  they  had  won. 
Confederates.  advauclug  ovcr  tlic  ]3lain,  a  magnificent  col- 
umn of  attack.  Their  advance  was  but  for  a  moment.  In- 
stantly in  front  of  them  sprang  up  a  cloud- wall  of  sul- 
phury smoke  that  shut  out  Rosecrans's  line  from  their 


Chap.  LIII.]  RETREAT  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES.  3^5 

view.  There  burst  fortli  from  tlie  cannon  hidden  in  it 
a  double-shotted  iron-fire,  from  the  musketry  a  sirocco  of 
lead.  Four  times  the  Southern  soldiers  tried  to  face  the 
tempest.  A  horrible  slaughter  ensued.  The  momentum 
of  the  fire  hurled  them  back  into  the  dark  green  shade 
of  the  cedars.  One  of  Cleburne's  brigades  was  in  an  in- 
stant almost  destroyed. 

It  was  all  over  in  front ;  but  Bragg,  unwilling  to  be 
foiled,  now  brought  Breckinridge,  who  had  hitherto  been 
untouched,  across  the  river  to  make  a  final  attempt  on 
Eosecrans's  left  flank  with  7000  fresh  men.  His  first  at- 
tack was  repulsed ;  he  made  a  second ;  it  shared  the  same 
fate. 

So  stood  affairs  when  night  came — a  clear  and  beauti- 
ful starlight  night — the  closing  night  of  1862.  On  New 
Year's  Day  nothing  was  done ;  the  two  armies,  breathless 
with  their  death  -  struggle,  stood  looking  at  each  other. 
Kosecrans  holds  his  Ou  Jauuary  2d  Eosecrans  was  found,  not 
grouud.  retreating,  but  busily  engaged  in  trying  to 

carry  out  his  original  plan.  He  had  made  his  position 
impregnable ;  he  had  thrown  a  force  across  Stone  Eiver, 
and,  as  he  at  first  intended,  was  getting  ready  to  crown 
with  artillery  the  heights  beyond  the  east  bank.     Here- 

Renewaiofthe    ^pou  Bragg  brought  BrecMnridgc  back  to 

battle.  j^ig  ^2(1  position,  ordering  him  to  drive  the 

enemy  across  the  river — a  task  which  that  officer  brave- 
ly tried,  but  only  imperfectly  accomplished,  for  the  artil- 
lery on  the  opposite  bank  tore  his  division  to  pieces.  In 
twenty  minutes  he  lost  two  thousand  men. 

A  violent  storm  prevented  the  renewal  of  the  battle  on 
Brag^retreats  to  tho  3d.  Ou  that  ulght  Bragg,  dcspairiug  of 
TuiiaTioma.  succcss,  wlthdrcw  from  Murfreesborough,  re- 

treating to  Tullahoma,  and  Eosecrans  at  last  grasped  his 
blood-clotted  prize,  so  crippled,  however,  that  it  was  im- 
possible for  him  to  make  any  pursuit. 


366  ^^^  BATTLE  LOSSES.  [Sect.  X. 

In  these  dreadful  battles  the  Confederates  lost  14,700 
Losses  in  the  ^^^n.  On  the  national  side  there  were  kill- 
batties.  ^^  ^gg3^  wounded  more  than  7000,  prison- 

ers more  than  3000 ;  more  than  one  third  of  its  artillery 
and  a  large  portion  of  its  train  were  taken.  The  losses 
were  about  one  fourth  of  each  army.  Henceforth  the 
Confederates  abandoned  all  thought  of  crossing  the  Ohio 
Eiver.  Two  desperate  but  unsuccessful  attempts  had 
convinced  them  that  they  could  not  break  through  the 
line  of  investment  between  the  Cumberland  Mountains 
and  the  Free  States. 


SECTION  XL 

CAMPAIGN  FOR  THE  CAPTURE  OF  RICHMOND. 


CHAPTER  LIV. 

THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.     FIRST  PERIOD.     THE  ADVANCE. 

The  national  government  undertook  a  campaign  for  the  capture  of  Richmond. 

It  was  based  on  incorrect  principles,  and  carried  out  with  irresolution  by  General 

McClellan. 
The  movement  of  the  army  was  so  much  procrastinated  that  the  government  was 

constrained  to  order  an  advance.     Scarcely  had  the  expedition  departed  for  the 

Peninsula  when  it  was  found  that  Washington  had  been  left  unprotected. 
General  McClellan  besieged  Yorktown,  captured  it,  and  slowly  advanced  up  the 

Peninsula. 
The  battles  of  Fair  Oaks  and  Seven  Pines. 

From  the  West  we  have  now  to  turn  to  the  East — from 
the  Mississippi  Valley  to  the  Atlantic  border. 

If  in  the  West  there  was  a  popular  war-object  univer- 
sally adopted — the  opening  of  the  Missis- 

The  war-cry  of  the         •        •  "d*  •       ,i        ta       ,    xl  X. 

Eastwas  the  capture  sippi  Kivcr,  lu  thc  Last  thcrc  was  a  war-ob- 

of  Richmond.  ,  ^  ^  t  t 

ject  not  less  distinctly  accepted — the  cap- 
ture of  Eichmond.    "  On  to  Eichmond"  became  a  war-cry. 
This  was   not  because  Eichmond  was   a   source   of 
strength  to  the  Confederacy;  not  because  it  offered  any 
historical  recollections;  not  because  it  was  the  emblem 
of  a  nationality,  but  because  in  the  eyes  of  the  loyal 
Americans  it  was  a  token  of  defiance  to  the  republic. 
We  have  already  seen  (p.  143)  that  the  strength  of  the 
Confederacy  lay  not  in  the  possession  of  any 

Incorrectness  of  the    ,         -I'lii**.  •  tt 

Eichmond  cam-       locality,  Dut  lu  its  armics,  and  hence,  m  a 

military  point  of  view,  campaigns  directed 

to  the  capture  of  Eichmond  were  not  based  upon  a  cor- 


308  THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  [Sect.  XL 

rect  principle.  The  operations  now  to  be  described,  dis- 
astrous to  the  nation,  but  glorious  to  the  Confederacy, 
were  not  decisive  of  the  contest,  nor  would  they  have 
been  so  had  their  result  been  reversed. 

Military  operations  having  the  city  of  Kichmond  for 
their  objective  once  determined  upon,  the 

The  problem  of  the  , .  •  i      j  ,^  t  , 

Kichmond  cam-      qucstiou  arose  m  what  manner  they  ought 
to  be  conducted. 

In  solving  that  problem  there  was  a  special  condition 
to  be  steadfastly  borne  in  mind. 

A  paramount  con-        '^^    movemcut    was    admissiblc    which 
^'^''''''  would  risk  the  capture  of  Washington  by 

the  enemy. 

That  condition  accepted,  it  implied  an  adequate  force 
covering  Washington,  and  if  to  act  offensively,  acting  on 
the  direct  line  between  that  city  and  Richmond. 

Military  authorities  declare  that  the  fewer  the  lines  of 
Effect  of  many  lines  opcratlou  thc  bcttcr.  It  is  better  to  have 
of  operation.  ^^^  Hnes  of  opcratlou  than.iive;  better  one 

than  two.   . 

The  more  numerous  the  lines  o^  operation,  the  more 
must  the  force  for  disposal  upon  them  be  divided,  and 
therefore  the  weaker  it  must  be  on  each.  Such  lines  are 
exterior  to  an  enemy  holding  a  central  position,  and  there- 
fore at  his  choice  able  to  deliver  overwhelming  blows  in 
succession  against  each. 

Still  more  dangerous  is  this  division  if  the  lines  are 
not  purely  military,  but  naval  and  military 

Effect  of  mixed  .         ^        rrt-,       .     .         t        ,•  r»    i  •        •         i      • 

lines,  naval  and  mixed.  Ihc  lutroductiou  01  shippins;  brings 
an  extraneous,  perhaps  an  independent  com- 
mand; precision  and  punctuality  of  movement  are  endan- 
gered, for  even  since  the  introduction  of  steam  naval  op- 
erations are  greatly  controlled  by  the  weather.  In  such 
a  mixed  movement  a  general  must  necessarily  feel  that 
his  army  is  not  in  hand. 


Chap.  LIV.]     MILITARY  PRINCIPLES  INVOLVED  IN  IT.  359 

However,  at  this  epoch  of  the  war,  and  by  the  advice 
Course  determined  of  Ge^eral  McClellan,  though,  as  we  shall 
uponbyMccieiian.  gge,  agaiiist  the  judgment  of  the  President, 
two  lines  of  operation  were  determined  on  for  the  pro- 
posed campaign.  The  primary  line  was  from  the  sea- 
coast  to  Kichmond ;  it  was  the  offensive.  The  secondary 
line  was  from  Washington  to  Richmond ;  it  was  the  de- 
fensive. 

The  offensive  line  presented  the  serious  inconveniences 
Imperfection  of  his  ^^^^  hsLVQ  bccu  m^tioucd  as  appertaining 
offensive  line.  ^^  combiued  uaval  and  military  operations. 
It  involved  necessarily  a  prodigious  expense.  Military 
critics  have  shown  that,  considering  the  Atlantic  region 
as  being  divided  into  two  portions,  an  east  and  a  west, 
operations  conducted  in  the  former  against  Richmond 
could  not  be  decisive  against  the  Confederates.  In  the 
latter  they  might  be. 

Such  considerations,  arising  from  the  general  topog- 
raphy of  the  country,  were,  however,  disregarded;  the  re- 
sult being  that  100,000  men,  with  their  material,  were 
transported  180  miles  by  water  at  a  cost  of  nineteen  days 
of  time  and  an  enormous  expenditure  of  money,  to  avoid 
one  day's  march  by  land ;  for  they  had  already  marched 
to  Centre ville,  were  thence  marched  back  to  Alexandria, 
and  had  subsequently  to  march  the  entire  length  of  the 
Peninsula. 

In  one  week  the  Confederates  could  march  from  the 
front  of  McClellan  at  Washington  to  confront  him  again 
in  the  Peninsula.  President  Lincoln  was  therefore  justi- 
fied in  his  remark  that,  by  the  Peninsular  movement, 
"  nothing  had  been  gained,  but  much  had  been  lost ;  that 
the  difficulty  had  been  shifted,  not  surmounted." 

Moreover,  the  great  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  by  this 
determination  brought  into  a  narrow  peninsula,  where 
it  might  be  obstructed  by  a  comparatively  insignificant 
II.— A  A 


370  ERRORS  OF  THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.        [Sect.  XL 

force.  It  could  hardly  liope  that  flanking  op- 
SSfJfSiTpenin-  cratlons  would  be  possible;  its  movements 

must  be  executed  by  attacks  in  front.  Espe- 
cially must  this  be  the  case,  as  the  lateral  waters  were 
sealed— that  on  the  south  by  the  armored  ship  Merri- 
mack, that  on  the  north  by  the  works  of  Yorktown.  The 
topography  of  the  Peninsula  seemed  to  deny  the  oppor- 
tunity of  getting  at  the  enemy's  communications. 

If,  under  such  circumstances,  success  was  to  be  obtain- 
ed, it  could  only  be  by  i^pidity  of  movement  and  resolu- 
tion in  attack ;  any  sluggishness,  any  wavering,  would 
render  the  .case  hopeless. 

In  the  preceding  paragraphs  I  have  reproduced  pro- 
spectively the  criticisms  which  have  been  made  on  the 
Peninsular  campaign  by  military  writers  subsequently  to 
its  disastrous  issue.  The  reader,  in  possession  of  these 
principles,  has  a  guide  in  the  study  of  the  actual  details, 
and  on  the  many  interesting  questions  arising  can  form 
for  himself  a  correct  opinion. 

Should  that  opinion  be  adverse  to  General  McClellan's 

decision  of  the  plan  of  the  campaign,  it  must 

ment  was  relpoSi-  uot  bc  forsiotteu  that  thc  mistake  was  very 

ble  for  the  error.  °  ,  . 

largely  concurred  m  by  the  government  it- 
self For,  though  the  President  gave  a  most  reluctant 
consent  to  the  Peninsular  campaign,  he  did  not  object  to 
other  movements  the  principle  of  which  was  equally  in- 
correct. It  has  just  been  stated  that  there  were  two 
lines  of  operation  against  Kichmond,  meaning  by  that 
two  under  the  more  immediate  contemplation  of  McClel- 
lan;  but,  in  fact,  there  were  not  fewer  than  SiVe;  for 
Banks  was  operating  on  a  third  in  the  Shenandoah  Val- 
ley, Fremont  on  a  fourth  in  the  Alleghanies,  and  Burn- 
side  on  a  fifth  at  Koanoke.  It  was  the  misfortune  of 
operations  conducted  in  the  proximity  of  Washington 


Chap.  LIV.]       INACTIVITY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  AEMY. 


371 


that  they  were  under  political  influences.  Lincoln,  in 
Effect  of  political  ^  Icttcr  to  McClcUan,  declares  that  he  had 
influences.  ^^^^^  uuable  to  rcsist  such  influences:  he 

was  alluding  to  his  having  detached  Blenker's  division. 
No  more  striking  confirmation  of  this  need  be  giveii  than 
the  fact  that,  in  the  very  crisis  of  the  war,  General  Meade 
was  appointed  to  command  the  army  marching  to  Get- 
tysburg, not  because  he  was  a  good  soldier,  but  because 
he  was  a  Pennsylvanian.  However,  he  won  that  immor- 
tal victory,  not  because  he  was  a  Pennsylvanian,  but  be- 
cause he  was  a  good  soldier. 

These  influences  were  less  felt  in  the  campaigns  con- 
ducted between  the  Alleghanies  and  the  Mississippi.  Af- 
fairs were  intrusted  to  professional  generals,  not  to  polit- 
ical aspirants.  Eventually  it  was  found  absolutely  nec- 
essary to  bring  those  professional  generals  into  the  At- 
lantic region,  and  there  they  made  an  end  of  the  war. 

In  the  winter  of  1861-2,  the  epoch  with  which  this 
Position  of  the  two  chaptcr  bcgius,  the  Confederate  army,  still 
armies.  iuspirltcd  by  its  victory  of  the  preceding 

summer  at  Bull  Eun,  lay  round  Manassas,  in  front  of  the 
great  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which,  under  General  McClel- 
lan,  lay  at  Washington. 

Tired  of  the  inactivity  which  McClellan  displayed,  the 

Mccieiian's  inac-  govemmeut  was  perpetually  urging  upon 

^'''''^"  him  the  necessity  of  doing  something  with 

the  great  army  that  had  been  placed  under  his  command. 

For  some  time  after  his  promotion  to  his  high  position, 
McClellan  undoubtedly  contemplated  vigorous  opera- 
tions— "  a  crushing  defeat  of  the  rebel  army  at  Manas- 
sas, not  to  be  postponed  beyond  the  25th  of  November, 
if  possible  to  avoid  it." 

By  degrees  it  became  apparent  that  his  movements 
were  guided  not  only  by  military,  but  also  by  political 


372  STEENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES.  [Sect.  XL 

Effect  of  political  in-  consideratioiis.   In  the  latter  respect  lie  look- 

fluences  on  him.  ^^  ^^^  ^^^^^  ^^  ^^^  ^.^^^  ^^  ^^^  ^^^^^  ^^^^ 

tion  of  tlie  Democratic  party  (p.  36),  becoming  eventu- 
ally its  candidate  for  tlie  Presidency.  In  common  with 
many*  other  good  men,  he  hoped  that  the  extremities  of 
war  might  be  avoided  by  some  compromise  with  the 
leaders  of  the  South — a  benevolent  sentiment  truly,  but 
inappropriate  in  an  officer  who  had  been  appointed  to 
wield  the  armed  force  of  the  nation.  He  was  unwilling 
to  do  any  thing  which  might  jeopardize  the  institution 
of  slavery. 

.  McClellan,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  apj)ointed,  July, 
strength  of  the  two  18^1,  to  the  commaud  of  the  Army  of  the 
armies.  Potomac.     Ou  the  1st  of  November  he  was 

appointed  to  the  chief  command  of  the  armies  of  the 
United  States.  At  the  latter  date  the  Potomac  Army 
had  an  effective  strength  of  134,285  men,  with  nearly 
300  guns.  The  Confederate  force  in  front  of  him  did  not 
exceed  55,000.  On  the  1st  of  February  the  aggregate 
strength  of  his  army  had  risen  to  222,196;  present  for 
duty,  190,806  (p.  195). 

The  autumn  and  the  winter  passed  by,  and  brought 

McClellan's  excuses  HOthlug  but  CXCUSCS  for  iuactioU.  It  WaS 
for  not  moving.  ^^^  ^^^   ^^  ^^^    ^^^^  .    ^^^^^  ^^^^    ^^^    ^^^^ 

leaves  on  the  trees,  or  the  roads  too  miry.  In  reality, 
however,  up  to  Christmas,  the  weather  had  been  superb ; 
not  once  in  twenty  years  had  the  roads  been  in  as  good 
a  condition  at  that  season. 

Expenses  were  accumulating.     The  public  was  begin- 
ning to  be  alarmed.     Newspaper  correspondents  and  pri- 
vate letter- writers  at  Washington  were  spreading  not  only 
dissatisfaction, but  consternation.    They,  said 
andpJopiTS-^dis-  that  the  aered  General  Scott,  stretched  upon 

satisfied.  /»-,t  tti 

his  sofa,  had  commanded  to  better  purpose ; 
that  the  army  was  as  much  organized  in  October  as  it 


Chap.  LIV.]  PUBLIC  DISSATISFACTION.  373 

ever  would  be,  or  as  it  needed  to  be ;  th%t  it  was  en- 
camped in  shameful  inactivity;  that  imposing  reviews 
were  given  for  the  gratification  of  women,  but  not  a  recon- 
noissance  was  made  to  disturb  the  enemy ;  that  the  gen- 
eral could  now  find  nothing  better  to  do  than  to  send  to 
the  War  Department  the  project  of  a  splendid  uniform 
for  himself  and  staff;  that  he  was  enveloped  in  an  omi- 
nous reserve ;  that  cabinet  ministers  had  waited  in  his  an- 
techambers ;  and  that  even  the  President  of  the  United 
States  had  been  detained  there  unnoticed. 

Non-military  men,  not  without  some  show  of  reason, 
criticised  and  censured  the  prevailing  military  ideas.  A 
rebellion,  they  said,  can  never  be  put  down  by  standing  on 
the  defensive;  the  Confederacy  can  not  be  overthrown 
by  building  fortifications  at  Washington.  There  were 
officers  who  were  acting  as  though  they  supposed  that 
nothing  more  would  be  requisite;  some  who  affirmed, 
with  General  Scott,  that  railroads  would  exert  but  little 
influence,  and,  like  that  veteran — unconscious  of  a  coming 
Sheridan  —  declared  that  cavalry  would  be  of  no  use. 
There  were  some  who  expected  that  the  war  would  be 
nothing  more  than  an  artillery  duel. 

During  the  dreary  winter  that  followed,  Washington 
Washington  block-  was  au  lusultcd  city.  The  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Railroad  was  broken  on  one  side,  the 
Potomac  blockaded  by  batteries  on  the  other ;  the  Con- 
federate flag  was  flying  in  actual  sight  of  the  Capitol. 
The  heart  of  the  nation  was  sinking.  Every  thing  that 
the  young  general  had  asked  for  had  not  only  been  grant- 
ed, but  lavishly  given — and  there  was  nothing  in  return 
but  reviews,  and  parades,  and  procrastination. 

Perhaps  without  duly  considering  the  effect  which 
might  be  produced  in  the  sentiments  of  the 
French  princes  Empcror  of  the  Freuch,  the  proffered  serv- 
ices of  the  Orleans  princes  were  accepted. 


374  McCLELLAN'S  INTENTIONS.  [Sect.  XL 

They  were  received  into  General  McClellan's  confidence. 
The  Prince  de  Joinville,  defending  the  general's  course, 
has  since  that  time  imparted  some  interesting  explana- 
tions. He  says :  "  We  have  the  right,  we 
viue  explains         think,  to  sav  that  McClellan  never  intend- 

McClellan's  coarse.  '  *' 

ed  to  advance  upon  Centreville.  His  long- 
determined  purpose  was  to  make  Washington  safe  by 
means  of  a  strong  garrison,  and  then  to  use  the  great  nav- 
igable waters  and  immense  naval  resources  of  the  North 
to  transport  the  army  by  sea  to  a  point  near  Richmond. 
For  weeks,  perhaps  for  months,  this  plan  had  been  secret- 
ly maturing.  Secrecy,  as  well  as  promptness,  it  will  be 
understood,  was  indispensable  here  to  success.  To  keep 
the  secret  it  had  been  necessary  to  confine  it  to  few  per- 
sons, and  hence  had  arisen  the  long  ill  feeling  to  the  un- 
communicative general. 

"  Be  this  as  it  may,  as  the  day  of  action  drew  near, 
those  who  suspected  the  general's  project  and  were  angry 
at  not  being  informed  of  it,  those  whom  his  promotion 
had  excited  to  envy,  his  political  enemies  (who  is  without 
them  in  America  ?) — in  short,  all  those  beneath  or  beside 
him  who  wished  him  ill,  broke  out  into  a  chorus  of  accu- 
sations of  slowness,  inaction,  incapacity.  McClellan,  with 
a  patriotic  courage  which  I  have  always  admired,  dis- 
dained these  accusations  and  made  no  reply.  He  satis- 
fied himself  with  pursuing  his  preparations  in  laborious 
silence.  But  the  moment  came  in  which,  notwithstand- 
ing the  loyal  support  given  him  by  the  President,  that 
functionary  could  no  longer  resist  the  tempest.  A  coun- 
cil of  war  of  all  the  divisional  generals  was  held ;  a  plan 
of  campaign,  not  that  of  McClellan,  was  proposed  and  dis- 
cussed. McClellan  was  then  forced  to  explain  his  pro- 
jects, and  the  next  day  they  were  known  to  the  enemy. 
Informed,  no  doubt,  by  one  of  those  female  spies  who  keep 
up  his  communications  in  the  domestic  circles  of  the  Fed- 


Chap.LIV.]    the  confederates  evacuate  MANASSAS.  375 

era!  enemy,  Jolinston  evacuated  Manassas  at  once.  This 
was  a  skillful  manoeuvre.  Incapable  of  assuming  the 
offensive,  threatened  with  attack  either  at  Centreville, 
where  defense  would  be  useless  if  successful,  or  at  Rich- 
mond, the  loss  of  which  would  be  a  great  check,  and  uii- 
able  to  cover  both  positions  at  once,  Johnston  threw  his 
whole  force  before  the  latter  of  the  two." 

The  mere  rumor  that  McClellan  was  about  to  move  led 
to  the  instant  evacuation  of  Manassas  (March 
eva^cuate  Manas-     9th).     Ou  the  eusuiug  momlug  McClellan 
put  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  motion, 
advancing  toward  the  deserted  position.     His  object  in 
doing  this  was  stated  to  be  "to  verify  the  evacuation, 
to  take  the  chance  of  cutting,  off  the  enemy's  rear-guard, 
to  deceive  him,  if  possible,  as  to  the  general's  real  inten- 
tions, and  to  gain  the  opportunity  of  cutting 

The  Army  of  the       t  ^  t  i  i  t  1    i  ' 

Potomac  verifies    loose  irom  all  uscless  bas^sfasre,  and  to  erive 

the  evacuatiou.  °^.°.,.° 

the  troops  a  tew  days  experience  m  bivouac 
and  on  the  march."  Not  without  surprise  and  mortifica- 
tion did  the  soldiers  of  that  great  army  see  the  insignifi- 
cant earthworks  and  Quaker  guns — logs  of  wood  shaped 
in  the  form  of  cannon — by  which  an  enemy  not  much 
more  than  one  fourth  of  their  number  had  held  them  so 
long  at  bay. 

There  can  be.no  doubt  that  by  these  events  the  Presi- 
Corps  commanders  dcut's  coufidcuce  IB.  McClellau  had  beeu 
appointed.  ^^^^  seriously  affected.     It  had  become  ob- 

vious that  the  administration  must  be  in  more  reliable 
contact  with  the  army.  The  President  therefore  issued 
(March  8th)  a  general  war-order,  directing  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  into  four  corps,  to  be 
commanded  by  Generals  McDowell,  Sumner,  Heintzel- 
man,  and  Keyes  respectively ;  a  fifth  corps  was  under  the 
command  of  General  Banks,  formed  from  his  own  and 
General  Shields's  divisions.    This  establishment  of  "army 


376  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  CORPS  COMMANDERS.     [Sect.  XL 

corps"  was  very  mucli  in  opposition  to  tlie  wislies  of 
McClellan ;  not  but  that  lie  recognized  tlie  necessity  of 
having  a  higlier  unit  in  an  army  of  200,000  men  than  the 
"division;"  his  objection,  as  stated  by  the  Prince  de  Join- 
ville,  being  rather  against  the  time  than  the  principle : 
it  "would  throw  into  subaltern  positions  some  young 
generals  of  division  who  had  his  personal  confidence." 
Doubtless  it  was  in  part  to  reach  this  very  object  that 
the  change  was  insisted  on  by  the  government. 

On  the  return  of  the  army  from  its  promenade  to  Ma- 
nassas (March  11th),  the  President  issued 

McClellan  restricted  ,-,  -^  -,.       .  -nT/-^in         jy  ii 

to  the  Potomac  de-  auotbcr  ordcr,  relieving  McOlellan  irom  the 
command  of  all  the  military  departments 
except  that  of  the  Potomac.  The  ostensible  cause  of  this 
was  the  consideration  that  the  campaign  on  which  the 
Potomac  Army  was  about  to  enter  would  require  all  the 
resources  and  all  the  attention  of  its  commander ;  the 
real  cause  was  a  decline  of  confidence  in  his  ability.  If, 
as  current  events  were  apparently  showing,  the  army  un- 
der his  immediate  charge  was  more  than  he  could  wield, 
it  was  out  of  the  question  to  add  to  it  many  other  armies 
operating  at  distances  of  many  hundred  miles. 

A  movement  determined  upon,  the  question  had  next 
arisen.  In  what  direction  should  it  be  ?     So 

Difference  between    -,  ht    /-^t    ^^  ^^  1j  t 

the  President  and    ionQ!'  as  McClcllan  adhered  to  an  advance 

McClellan.  °  , 

upon  the  enemy  m  such  a  manner  as  not  to 
uncover  Washington  and  thereby  risk  its  capture,  he  was 
in  accord  with  the  President ;  but  when  it  appeared  that 
his  plan  was  to  attack  Richmond  by  way  either  of  Ur- 
bana  or  Fortress  Monroe,  there  was  a  serious  difference 
between  them. 

McClellan  seems  not  to  have  appreciated  distinctly  the 

momentous  consequences  of  the  capture  of 


Lincoln  requires 
that  Washington 
shall  be  secure. 


"Washington  by  the  Confederates,  the  expul- 
sion of  the  national  government,  the  seizure 


I 


chap.liv.]  their  opinions.  S77 

of  the  public  edifices  and  arcMves  of  the  nation.  It 
would  have  instantly  brought,  though  it  would  not  have 
justified, European  recognition  of  the  Confederate  power, 
and  that,  perhaps,  not  only  as  a  Southern,  but  as  the  na- 
tional government.  The  President  clearly  perceived  that 
the  capture  of  Kichmond,  no  matter  with  what  brilliant 
military  operations  it  might  be  attended,  could  not  bal- 
ance for  a  moment  that  dreadful  catastrophe.  He  there- 
fore correctly  and  firmly  took  the  ground  that,  whatever 
the  movements  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  might  be, 
the  city  of  Washington  must  be  left  absolutely  secure. 

And  now  appeared  that  incidental  advantage  of  the 
Opinions  of  the  appoiutmcut  of  corps  commanders  to  which 
corps  commanders,  reference  has  just  been  made.  To  McClel- 
lan  and  to  them  the  President  referred  the  question.  In 
the  conference  which  accordingly  took  place  they  con- 
sented to  the  movement  by  the  Peninsula,  among  other 
conditions,  however,  expressly  stipulating  unanimously 
"  that  the  forces  to  be  left  to  cover  Washington  shall  be 
such  as  to  give  an  entire  feeling  of  security  for  its  safety 
from  menace."  Keyes,  Heintzelman,  and  McDowell  agreed 
"  that,  with  the  forts  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Potomac 
fully  garrisoned,  and  those  on  the  left  bank  occupied,  a 
covering  force  in  front  of  the  Virginia  line  of  25,000  men 
would  suiBSice."  In  Sumner's  opinion,  "  a  total  force  of 
40,000  men  for  the  defense  of  the  city  would  suffice." 

Hereupon  the  Secretary  of  War  addressed  the  follow- 
ing: 

"War  Department,  March  13th,  1862.. 
"To  Major  General  George  B.  McClellan : 
"  The  President,  having  considered  the  plan  of  operations  agreed 
Orders  to  General    ^P^n  by  yourself  and  the   commanders   of  army 
McClellan.  corps,  makes  no  objection  to  the  same,  but  gives  the 

following  directions  as  to  its  execution : 

"  1st.  Leave  such  a  force  at  Manassas  Junction  as  shall  make  it 
entirely  certain  that  the  enemy  shall  not  repossess  himself  of  that 
position  and  line  of  communication. 


378        DEPARTURE  OF  THE  PENINSULAR  EXPEDITION.  [Sect.  XI. 

"  2d.  Leave  Washington  entirely  secure. 

"  3d.  Move  the  remainder  of  the  force  down  the  Potomac,  choos- 
ing a  new  base  at  Fortress  Monroe,  or  any  where  between  here  and 
there ;  or,  at  all  events,  move  such  remainder  of  the  army  at  once 
in  pursuit  of  the  enemy  by  some  route. 

"Edwin  M.  Stantoi^,  Secretary  of  War." 

The  movement  by  Fortress  Monroe  being  determined 

The  Peninsular     tipon,  there  Were  chartered  113  steamers,  188 

expedition  sails,    g^hooners,  88  barges,  with  which,  in  37  days, 

there  were  transported  to  Fortress  Monroe  121,500  men, 

14,592  animals,  1150  wagons,  44  batteries,  74  ambulances, 

besides  a  vast  quantity  of  equipage. 

Scarcely  had  McClellan  set  out  from  Washington  when 

McDowell's  corps    1^  was  discovered  that  the  entire  force  about 

detained.  ^^  ^^  ^q^^  for  the  protectiou  of  that  city  was 

only  1 9,022  men.   The  President  was  therefore  constrained 

to  withhold  McDowell's  army  corps  from  the  force  under 

McClellan,  and  detain  it  for  the  security  of  the  capital. 

Against  this  detention  McClellan  earnestly  protested. 
McClellan  protests  Ho  scemed  to  havo  forgotten  that  the  pro- 

against  that  deten-     ...  r*  ttt      i  •        j  i       t    t  t 

tion.  tection  ot  Washington  had  been  made  an 

imperative  part  of  his  duty,  and  that  all  his 
calculations  must  be  on  that  condition.  A  letter  written 
to  him  at  the  time  by  the  President  not  only  justifies 
completely  the  course  that  had  been  taken,  but  also  ex- 
hibits Mr.  Lincoln's  firmness  and  courteous  forbearance, 
his  views  respecting  the  campaign  now  undertaken,  to 
which  he  had  given  a  most  reluctant  consent,  and  his  ap- 
prehension that,  instead  of  action,  there  Avould  be  an  in- 
vention of  new  delays. 

"Washington,  April  9th,  18<)2. 
"  Major  General  McClellan : 
"  My  dear  Sir, — Your  dispatches,  complaining  that  you  are  not 
The  President's  let-  Properly  sustained,  while  they  do  not  offend  me,  do 
ter  to  him.  p^^jj  j^q  ygj,y  much.     Blcnkcr's  division  was  with- 

drawn from  you  before  you  left  here,  and  you  know  the  pressure 


Chap.  LIV.]  LINCOLN  AND  McCLELI^AN.  379 

under  which  I  did  it  (p.  371),  and,  as  I  thought,  acquiesced  in  it— 
certainly  not  without  reluctance.  After  you  left  I  ascertained  that 
less. than  20,000  unorganized. men,  without  a  single  field  battery, 
were  all  you  designed  to  be  left  for  the  defense  of  Washington  and 
Manassas  Junction,  and  part  of  this  even  was  to  go  to  General 
Hooker's  old  position.  General  Banks's  corps,  once  designed  for 
Manassas  Junction,  was  diverted  and  tied  up  on  the  line  of  Win- 
chester and  Strasburg,  and  could  not  leave  it  without  again  expos- 
ing the  Upper  Potomac  and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad.  This 
presented  (or  would  present  when  McDowell  and  Sumner  should  be 
gone)  a  great  temptation  to  the  enemy  to  turn  back  from  the  Rap- 
pahannock and  sack  Washington.  My  explicit  order  that  Washing- 
ton should,  by  the  judgment  of  all  the  commanders  of  the  army 
corps,  be  left  entirely  secure,  had  been  neglected.  It  was  precisely 
this  that  drove  me  to  detain  McDowell. 

"  I  do  not  forget  that  I  was  satisfied  with  your  arrangement  to 
leave  Banks  at  Manassas  Junction ;  but  when  that  arrangement  was 
broken  up,  and  nothing  was  substituted  for  it,  of  course  I  was  con- 
strained to  substitute  something  for  it  myself;  and  allow  me  to  ask. 
Do  you  really  think  I  should  permit  the  line  from  Richmond  via 
Manassas  Junction  to  this  city  to  be  entirely  open,  except  what  re- 
sistance could  be  presented  by  less  than  20,000  unorganized  troops  ? 
This  is  a  question  which  the  country  will  not  allow  me  to  evade — 

"And  once  more  let  me  tell  you  it  is  indispensable  to  you  that 
you  strike  a  blow.  7"  am  powerless  to  help  this.  You  will  do  me 
the  justice  to  remember  I  always  insisted  that  going  down  the  Bay 
in  search  of  a  field  instead  of  fighting  at  or  near  Manassas  was  only 
shifting,  and  not  surmounting  a  difficulty — that  we  should  find  the 
same  enemy  and  the  same  or  equal  intrenchments  at  either  place. 
The  country  will  not  fail  to  note— is  now  noting — that  the  present 
hesitation  to  move  upon  an  intrenched  enemy  is  but  the  story  of 
Manassas  repeated. 

"  I  beg  to  assure  you  that  I  have  never  written  to  you  or  spoken 
to  you  in  greater  kindness  of  feeling  than  now,  nor  with  a  fuller 
purpose  to  sustain  you  so  far  as  in  my  most  anxious  judgment  I 
consistently  can.     But  you  must  act.     Yours  very  truly, 

"  A.  Lincoln." 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  now  fairly  landed  on 
Siege  of  Yorktcvn  ^^^  Peninsuk,  and  there  lay  before  it,  under 
commences.  General  Magruder,  a  Confederate  force  of 

8000  men,  defending  a  line  of  thirteen  miles  from  York- 


3 so  SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN.  [Sect.  XI. 

town  across  the  Peninsula.  "  To  my  utter  surprise,"  says 
that  general, "  he  (McClellan)  permitted  day  after  day  to 
elapse  without  an  assault.  In  a  few  days  the  object  of 
his  delay  was  apparent.  In  every  direction  in  front  of 
our  lines,  through  the  intervening  woods  and  in  the  open 
fields,  earthworks  began  to  appear."  The  whole  month 
of  April  was  consumed  in  these  operations.  The  troops 
were  not  triumphantly  marching  on  Eichmond,but,  unac- 
climated,  were  busily  digging  their  own  graves.  A  re- 
quest was  sent  to  Washington  to  have  siege-guns  taken 
out  of  the  works  of  that  city  and  brought  to  Yorktown ; 
miles  of  corduroy  road  were  constructed;  miles  of  trench- 
es and  batteries  were  mad^.  It  was  expected  that  on  the 
morning  of  May  6th  fire  would  be  opened.  Two  days 
previously,  however,  the  Confederates  quiet- 

The  Confederates  % 

abandon  the  Iv  abaudoucd  thclr  works  and  retired  up 
the  Peninsula.  "  With  5000  men,"  says  Ma- 
gruder, "  exclusive  of  the  garrisons,  we  had  stopped  and 
held  in  check  over  100,000  of  the  enemy."  Disease,  con- 
tracted in  the  swamps  and  trenches  of  Yorktown,  had 
taken  a  fearful  hold  on  the  army,  as  its  chief  engineer  re- 
ported, and  "  toil  and  hardship,  unredeemed  by  the  excite- 
ment of  combat,  had  impaired  its  morale." 

As  soon  as  it  was  discovered  that  the  Confederates  had 

The  battle  of  wii-   withdrawu,  a  column  was  sent  in  pursuit. 

liamsburg.  j^  camc  up  wlth  the  retreating  rear-guard 

at  Williamsburg,  now  re-enforced  from  Johnston's  army. 
Longstreet's  division,  which  had  already  passed  beyond 
the  town,  retraced  its  steps  to  aid  in  resisting  the  attack, 
and  for  nine  hours  Hooker's  division  alone  made  head 
against  the  whole  Confederate  force.  That  general  says, 
"History  will  not  be  believed  when  it  is  told  that  the  noble 
officers  and  men  of  my  division  were  permitted  to  carry 
on  this  unequal  struggle  from  morning  until  night,  unaid- 
ed, in  the  presence  of  more  than  30,000  of  their  comrades 


Chap.  LIV.] 


BATTLE  OF  WILLIAMSBURG. 


381 


THE   PENINSULMl   CAMPAIGN. 


with  arms  in  their  hands ;  nevertheless,  it  is  true."  The 
entire  loss  during  the  day  was  2228,  of  whom  456  were 
killed. 

General  Hooker  was  justified  in  this  bitter  complaint. 
It  has  been  reported  that  he  was  relieved 

Hooker  complains     -,  -,  ,      -.  ■,     ■,       -^t  ^        i 

that  he  was  not      bv  a  Davonet  charfi^e  made  by  Hancock :  but 

sustained.  *'  *'  ^  ,         ,  , 

there  must  have  been  an  error  m  this  asser- 
tion. The  troops  by  whom  it  was  said  to  have  been 
made  first  encountered  the  enemy  about  4  P.M.  of  the 
preceding  afternoon.  It  was  a  drizzly  day,  and  the  men 
marched  forward  in  no  small  confusion,  over  leaves  in  the 
woods,  slippery  with  the  rain,  over  fallen  trees,  and  across 
ravines,  so  that  it  was  impossible  to  preserve  an  align- 
ment of  a  company,  much  more  of  a  brigade.  The  night 
came  on  pitch-dark;  the  43d  New  York  fired  by  mis- 
chance into  a  Pennsylvania  regiment.     Next  day  the  for- 


382  EETREAT  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES.  [Sect.  XL 

mer  had  to  "be  withdrawn  and  another  New  York  and  a 
Maine  regiment  put  in  its  stead.  All  the  morning  heavy 
firing  was  heard.  It  was  that  which  Hooker  was  encoun- 
tering. Hancock's  troops  lay  in  line  of  battle  from  1  P.M.- 
to  4  P.M.,  when  they  receded  before  a  front  attack  of  a 
North  Carolina  regiment,  aided  by  a  flank  attack  of  the 
Twenty-fourth  Virginia.  There  was  no  bayonet  charge. 
At  ten  o'clock  at  night  McClellan  sent  a  dispatch  to 
Washington  that  Johnston  was  in  front  of  him  with 
a  force  very  much  greater  than  the  national,  and  very 
strongly  intrenched ;  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  en- 
contiuued  retreat  of  ^my  to  dlsputo  cvcry  stcp  to  Richmoud. 

the  Confederates.        r\       ±l  •  •  i  •  i 

On  the  ensuing  morning,  however,  it  was 
found  that  Williamsburg  was  evacuated,  and  the  enemy 
gone. 

From  Williamsburg  to  Richmond  the  distance  is  about 
fifty  miles.  The  national  army  resumed  its  march  on  the 
8th  of  May,  but  in  a  manner  so  dilatory  that  it  might  al- 
most be  characterized  as  disastrous.  Not  less  than  eleven 
days  were  consumed  in  what  ought  to  have  been  accom- 
plished in  three — a  lingering,  a  fatal  delay.  It  was  not 
thus  that  Caesar  and  Napoleon  trod  the  path  to  victory. 

While  thus  the  national  army  showed  hesitation  and  in- 

Their  admirable  dccisloU,  ItS  autagOulst  displayed  good  gen- 
conduct,  eralship.  If  the  maintenance  of  a  bold  front 
by  Magruder  at  Yorktown  elicits  our  admiration — for  he 
stood  his  ground  against  prodigious  odds — not  with  less 
praise  can  we  speak  of  his  timely  evacuation  and  perfect- 
ly-conducted retreat.  The  manner  in  which  the  Confed- 
erate rear-guard  turned  upon  its  pursuers  at  Williams- 
burg, and  gave  them  a  bloody  check,  will  ever  exact  the 
applause  of  military  critics. 

The  movement  of  the  national  army  up  the  Peninsula 
Surrender  of  Nor-  l^d  at  ouce  to  thc  withdrawal  of  the  Con- 
^°^^'  federate  force  from  Norfolk,  the  surrender 


i 


Chap.LIV.]  surrender  of  NORFOLK.  383 

of  that  place,  tlie  destruction  of  the  iron-clad  frigate  Mer- 
rimack, and  the  opening  of  James  River.  An  expedi- 
tion under  General  Wool  set  out  from  Fortress  Monroe 
(May  10th),  and  found  that  Norfolk  was  abandoned  by 
the  enemy.  It  was  surrendered  by  its  mayor.  The  Con- 
federates had  destroyed  the  navy  yard  as  completely  as 
Destruction  of  the  they  could,  aud  on  tlfe  morning  of  May  1 1th 
Merrimack.  "blew  up  the  Mcrrlmack.     So  much  dissatis- 

faction was  expressed  in  the  Confederacy  respecting  this 
latter  act  that  a  court  of  inquiry  was  ordered.  It  was 
decided  that  her  destruction  had  been  unnecessary. 
These  events  left  James  River  open  to  General  McClel- 
lan,  and  upon  its  bank,  had  he  pleased,  he  might  have 
established  his  base  of  supply.  He  preferred,  disastrous- 
ly, as  will  be  eventually  seen,  to  have  it  on  the  York 
River. 

Meantime  Franklin's  division  had  passed  up  York  Riv- 
er from  Yorktown  to  West  Point.  Communication  was 
opened  with  him.  The  advance  had  reached  White 
House  on  the  loth.  At  this  place  the  railroad  from 
West  Point  to  Richmond  crossed  the  Pamunkey  River. 
Locomotives  and  cars  were  at  once  put  on  the  track,  it 
The  new  base  of  bclng  intended  to  make  this  the  line  for  fur- 
earmy.  nlshiug  the   army  supplies.     On  the  22d 

the  army  began  to  cross  the  Chickahominy  at  Bottom's 
Bridge.  The  next  da}i  the  advance  was  within  seven 
miles  of  Richmond. 

General  Fitz  John  Porter  was  now  (May  24)  ordered 
Affair  at  Hanover  to  uiovc  to  Hauovcr  Court-housc  to  facill- 
court-house.        ^^^^  ^^^  juuctiou  with  McDowcll's  corps, 

expected  from  Fredericksburg.  He  was  attacked  near 
that  place  by  the  Confederates,  but  defeated  them,  their 
loss  being  about  1000,  his  being  nearly  400.  He  cap- 
tured and  destroyed  their  camp.  But  McDowell  was 
withheld,  and  not  only  did.  the  two  armies  not  unite,  but 


384 


THE  CHICIiAHOMINY. 


[Sect.  XL 


orders  came  from  Washington  to  burn  the  bridges  that 
had  been  seized.  The  principal  bridge  burnt  was  that 
over  the  South  Anna.  On  the  29th  Porter  returned  to 
his  original  camp. 

.  The  national  army,  advancing  toward  Richmond,  found 
crosaiug  of  the  that  the  brldgcs  over  the  Chickahominy  had 
chickahommy.  ^^^^  destK)yed  by  the  Confederates  in  their 
retreat.  The  stream  flows  through  a  swampy  and  wood- 
ed country,  liable  to  be  overflowed  when  freshets  occur. 
Keyes's  corps  crossed  it  about  the  24th  of  May,  having  re- 
paired Bottom's  Bridge.  Casey's  division  of  this  corps 
advanced  as  far  as  Fair  Oaks  Station;  Couch's  lay  at 
Seven  Pines ;  and  Heintzelman's  corps,  following  Keyes's 
over  the  river,  took  up  a  position  in  its  rear.  His  left 
rested  on  Whiteoak  Swamp.  The  strength  of  these  two 
corps  was  about  30,000  men.  Sumner's  corps  was  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Chickahominy. 

At  this  moment  McClellan's  army  was  in  a  most  dan- 
Dangerous  position  gerous  position.     One  of  its  wings  was  on 
the  right,  the  other  on  the  left  of  the  creek 


of  the  army. 


BATTLE   or   FAIR   OAKS.  AND   SEVEN  PINES. 


Chap.  LIV.]         POSITION  OF  THE  NATIONAL  ARMY.  335 

— creek  it  could  hardly  be  called,  for  it  was  about  to  be 
swollen  to  tbe  dimensions  of  a  river.  The  only  availa- 
ble connection  was  at  Bottom's  Bridge.  The  position  of 
the  army  was  like  the  letter  V,  Bottom's  Bridge  being  at 
the  point.  The  left  wing,  in  four  divisions,  lay  in  eche- 
lon along  the  York  Eiver  Eailroad.  It  answered  to  the 
left  branch  of  the  V.  The  right  wing,  consisting  of  ^ve 
divisions,  and  the  reserves,  answered  to  the  other  branch. 
From  the  extremity  of  one  wing  to  that  of  the  other,  by 
way  of  Bottom's  Bridge,  was  a  distance  of  more  than 
twelve  miles,  though  by  an  air-line  they  were  not  very  far 
apart.  Through  the  midst  of  the  V  flowed  the  Chicka- 
hominy.  The  outposts  of  the  left  wing  were,  as  just 
stated,  at  Fair  Oaks  Station,  on  the  York  Eiver  Eailroad, 
and  at  Seven  Pines,  on  the  Williamsburg  Eoad.  Under 
such  circumstances,  the  Confederates  could  of  course  as- 
sail one  of  the  two  wings  separately.  As  we  are  now  to 
see,  they  accordingly  attacked  the  left  wing,  the  action 
being  known  aa  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks. 

A  heavy  rain,  described  as  being  like  a  tropical  deluge, 
^,   ^   ,  occurred  round  Eichmond  on  the  nierht  of 

The  thunder-storm.    -«--,-,  ~ 

May  30th,  and,  foreseeing  that  the  Chicka- 

hominy  would  rise,  and  that  Keyes's  corps,  which  was  on 

the  Eichmond  side  of  the  stream,  would  be  isolated  from 

the  rest  of  McClellan's  army,  Johnston,  who  commanded 

the  Confederates,  determined  to  attempt  to  destroy  it. 

He  seems  not  to  have  known  that  Heintzelman  had 

The  Confederate    ^Iso  crosscd.     Hc  therefore  (May  31st)  di- 

attack.  rected  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill  to  attack 

it  in  front  upon  the  Williamsburg  Eoad,  Huger  to  gain 

its  left  flank  by  passing  down  the  Charles  City  Eoad, 

and  Gustavus  Smith  its  right  flank  by  the  New  Bridge 

and  Nine-mile  Eoads.     He  expected  to  overwhelm  the 

isolated  corps  —  two  fifths  of  the  force  of  his  adver- 

H.— B  B 


386  ^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^  SEVEN  PINES.  [Sect.  XI. 

sary  —  by  throwing   upon   it   the    whole   Confederate 

army. 

As  the  country  was  all  under  water  with  the  rains — 
,    ,^  .  ^  ,     in  some  places  a  couple  of  feet  deep — Ca- 

Battle  of  Fair  Oaks.  ,        ,.     .    .  i  •    i  • 

sey  s  division,  which  was  m  the  front,  was 
altogether  unprepared  for  an  attack,  except  by  siich  indi- 
cations as  the  sound  of  the  running  of  railroad  ears  all 
night  from  Eichmond.  Casey  resisted  the  Confederate 
shock,  which  occurred  at  about  1  P.M.,  very  resolutely. 
The  day  was  dark  and  gloomy,  and  from  an  air-balloon 
it  was  seen  that  the  entire  Confederate  army  was  ad- 
vancing. 

Casey  was  outnumbered  and  overwhelmed.  He  was 
^ .  .  .^         driven  back,  after  a  three-hours'  struererle, 

Defeat  of  Casey.  m         i       i  •  ?  i  • 

more  than  a  mile ;  he  lost  six  guns,  and  his 
camp  was  taken.  He  was  compelled  to  retire  upon 
Couch. 

Couch,  who  had  been  sending  forward  regiments  to 
Battle  of  Seven  thc  support  of  Cascy,  ficrccly  attempted  to 
^'°^^'  maintain  himself  at  Seven  Pines,  Heintzel- 

man  coming  up  to  his  help.  The  battle  had  now  been 
going  on  from  1  P.M.  to  4J  P.M.,  Longstreet  not  only 
pressing  the  line  in  front,  but  also  on  its  right  and  left 
flanks. 

McClellan,  who  was  ill  in  bed  at  New  Bridge,  on  the 
other   side   of  the  Chickahominy,  ordered 

Sumner's  advance.  i         t    p  i  • 

bumner  to  send  reliei  across  the  river  to 
the  hard-pressed  troops.  Sedgwick's  division  of  Sum- 
ner's corps  crossed  the  swollen  stream  over  the  upper  one 
of  two  tottering  bridges  that  he  had  constructed  about 
half  way  down  the  V.  Tottering  as  it  was,  it  proved  to 
be  the  salvation  of  the  national  army.  Sumner,  listening 
as  he  went  through  the  woods,  guided  his  march  by  the 
roar  of  the  battle. 

The  Confederates  had  found  that  they  could  not  turn 


Chap.  LIV.]  FAIR  OAKS  AND  SEVEN  PINES.  387 

the  left  of  the  national  left  wing,  for  it  rested  on  the 
Whiteoak  Swamp.  In  the  most  determined  manner 
they  were  trying  to  pass  down  between  the  right  of 
that  wing  and  the  Chickahominy,  and  force  their  way  to 
Bottom's  Bridge.  If  this  could  be  done,  nothing  remain- 
ed for  the  entire  left  wing  but  to  surrender.  It  had  no 
retreat. 

Steadily  the  Confederates  forced  their  way.  The  even- 
ing was  coming  on  dark  and  gloomy — dark  and  gloomy 
was  the  prospect  for  Heintzelman  and  Keyes. 

Sumner  had  got  Sedgwick's  division  across  the  rickety 
He  checks  the  Con-  bridge,  aud  with  it  had  dragged  over  a  bat- 

federate  advance.      ^^^^    ^^  tWCUty-foUr  ISTapolcOU    gUUS,  which 

he  had  planted  in  a  clearing  of  the  woods.  The  Con- 
federate column,  pressing  on  victoriously  for  Bottom's 
Bridge,  must  show  its  flank  to  this  battery.  The  flanker 
was  outflanked. 

No  man  could  pass  the  fire-storm  from  this  battery. 
The  South  Carolina  troops  rushed  at  it  in  vain ;  the 
march  of  the  Confederate  column  was  checked- — it  wa- 
vered. Volleys  of  musketry  were  poured  into  it.  Ter- 
ror-stricken, and  with  fearful  slaughter,  it  w^as  hurled 
back  upon  Fair  Oaks  Station. 

About  sunset,  General  Johnston,  the  Confederate  com- 
wonndingof  maudcr,  was  severely  wounded  by  a  frag- 
johnston.         ^^^^  ^^  ^  gj^^^^  ^^^  General  Smith  took 

the  command. 

What  now — asks  the  Prince  de  Joinville,  who  was  an 
Mismana-^eraent  of  cye-witucss  of  thc  battle — what  now  would 
the  natioSai  troops,  j^^^,^  happened  if,  iustcad  of  fifteen  thou- 
sand men  whom  Sumner  had  brought  over,  the  whole 
right  wing — fifty  thousand — had  crossed  ? 

It  was  not  until  seven  o'clock  that  evening  that  the 
The  flood  in  the  i^ca  of  throwiug  brfdgcs  across  the  stream 
chickahominy.     ^^^  crossing  the  whole  army. was  entertain- 


333  EEPULSE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES.  [Sect.  XI. 

ed.  It  was  then  too  late — tlie  water  was  fast  rising ;  in 
the  course  of  the  night  it  flooded  Sumner's  bridges,  and 
by  morning  filled  the  entire  valley. 

In  the  morning  the  Confederates  renewed  the  attack 
Repulse  of  the  bravclj,  but  without  ordcr.  The  wounding 
Confederates.  ^£  Johustou  was  a  scrious  mischauce  to  them. 
They  were  finally  repulsed  about  noon,  and  recoiled  in  in- 
extricable confusion.  They  carried  off  as  trophies  the 
spoils  of  the  camps  of  Casey  and  Couch,  which  they  had 
captured;  but  McClellan  made  no  attempt  to  follow  them. 
Importunately  and  incessantly  he  had  called  on  the  gov- 
ernment for  more  troops — here,  at  this  critical  moment,  he 
had  thirty-five  thousand  men  doing  nothing. 

It  is  now  known  that  the  fugitives  might  have  been 

Losses  in  the      foUowcd  luto  Eichmoud,  so  great  was  the 

battles.  disorganization  and  dismay  following  this 

Confederate  repulse.     Their  loss  in  the  battle  had  been 

4233  ;  the  national,  5739,  of  whom  890  were  killed. 

McClellan  recovered  shortly  after,  without  resistance, 
the  posts  of  Fair  Oaks  and  Seven  Pines,  the  two  armies 
resuming  substantially  their  former  positions. 

On  the  second  day  after  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  Gen- 
eral Hooker  advanced  within  four  miles  of 
Eichmond,  but  was   ordered  to  withdraw 
by  McClellan,  to  whom  the  government  dispatched  a  di- 
vision from  McDowell's  corps  and  whatever  re-enforce- 
ments they  could  collect.     Still,  however,  the  telegraph 
brought  the  staple  excuses — the  dreadful  state  of  the 
roads,  the  weather,  the  overwhelming  number  of  the  ene- 
my in  front — still  the  same  cry  for  re-enforcements.    Day 
after  day  the  great  army  lay  idle  and  chafing  at  its  lot. 
It  heard  with  amazement  and  indignation  that  the  Con- 
stnart  rides  round  federate  GcneralJ.  E.  B.  Stuart,  with  1500 
the  arrny.  cavalry,  had  ridden  round  its  right  flank 

(June  12, 13)  and  gained  its  rear  without  resistance,  de- 


Chap.  LIV.]  LEE'S  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN.  339 

stroying  forage  and  supplies,  capturing  prisoners,  and  re- 
turning with  impunity  to  Richmond.  The  middle  of 
June  (14th)  came.  It  brought  nothing  but  the  telegram 
"All  quiet  in  every  direction."  McClellan's  force  was 
now  156,838,  of  whom  115,102  were  present  for  duty. 
-General  Johnston  having  been  disabled  at  Fair  Oaks, 
the  command  of  the  Confederate  army  had 

Lee  assigned  to  the    -•  tit  /^  i    "r»    i  t^    t 

Confederate  com-     becu  dcvolved  ou  (jeueral  Kobert  h,.  Lee. 

mand. 

He  had  been  appointed  in  March  general  in 
chief,  an  office  specially  created  for  him.  His  plan  was 
to  construct  fortifications  for  Richmond,  so  that  the  city 
might  be  defended  by  a  minimum  of  men,  and  then,  tak- 
ing the  mass  of  the  army,  to  operate  with  it  on  the  north 
of  the  Chickahominy,  and  break  McClellan's  communica- 
tions with  York  River.  He  therefore  began  at  once  to 
strengthen  his  army  in  front  of  Richmond  by  rapidly 
drawing  to  it  all  the  forces  within  reach.  He  intended 
Lee's  plan  of  to  Strike  a  dcclslve  blow  against  the  dilato- 
campaign.  ^^  ^^^  hcsitatiug  McClcllan.  For  this  pur- 
pose, among  other  re-enforcements,  Stonewall  Jackson  was 
brought  from  the  Valley,  every  means  being  used  to  de- 
ceive McClellan  as  to  what  was  going  on,  and  with  so 
much  success  that  he  was  led  to  believe  that  the  move- 
ment was  in  the  other  direction,  and  that  re-enforcements 
were  being  sent  from  Richmond  to  Jackson.  It  was  not 
until  June  24th  that  McClellan  discovered  the  truth — 
Jackson  being  then  close  upon  him,  making  ready  to  at- 
Mccieiian's  ground-  tiick  hls  rear.  At  once  McClellan  took 
less  alarms.  alarm,  telegraphing  to  Washington^hat  he 

was  about  to  be  assailed  by  200,000  men — that  if  his 
army  should  be  destroyed  by  such  overwhelming  num- 
bers, it  was  his  purpose  to  die  with  it  and  share  its  fate. 
But,  in  truth,  the  force  of  his  antagonist  was  but  little 
more  than  half  his  own :  it  amounted  to  about  80,000 
men. 


CHAPTEH  LV. 

THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.     SECOND  PERIOD— THE  RETREAT. 

StonewallJackson,  after  throwing  the  North  into  consternation  by  a  brilliant  offens- 
ive movement  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  made  good  his  junction  with  the  army 
of  Lee  in  front  of  Richmond. 

The  Confederates,  taking  the  initiative,  compelled  McClellan  to  change  his  base. 
He  retreated,  during  a  week  of  fighting,  to  James  River. 

The  Peninsular  campaign  ended  in  a  complete  triumph  for  the  Confederacy.  The 
national  government  withdrew  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  front  of  Wash- 
ington. 

For  a  clear  comprehension  of  the  second  period  of  the 
stone^yallJackson's  Peninsular  Campaign,  it  is  necessary  to  re- 
campaign.  j^^.^  ^^^  opcrations  of  Stonewall  Jackson  in 

the  Shenandoah  Valley :  they  constitute  a  brilliant  por- 
tion of  the  military  annals  of  the  Confederacy. 

In  the  autumn  of  1861,  after  the  battle  of  Bull  Eun, 
Jackson  had  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Con- 
federate forces  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 

Two  days  (February  24th,  1862)  after  the  time  desig- 
nated by  the  President's  order  for  the  simul- 

Banks's  movement     .  ,        r>   I'l  *  •  t  • 

on  the  Confederate  taueous  movcmcnt  01  thc  uatioual  armies, 

left. 

Banks  took  possession  of  Harper's  Ferry, 
partly  with  a  view  to  the  reconstruction  of  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  Railroad,  and  partly  for  the  purpose  of  threat- 
ening ik^  Confederate  left  flank.  This  movement,  togeth- 
er with  advices  received  from  female  spies  in  Washington 
that  McClellan  was  about  to  advance  on  Richmond,  led 
to  the  evacuation  ofManassas,  Johnston,  who  commanded 
the  Confederate  forces  there,  falling  back  toward  Rich- 
mond. 

Under  these  circumstances,  Jackson  also  retired  up  the 


Chap.lv.]  stonewall  JACKSON'S  campaign.  39I 

,  ,       ,.         Valley,  so  as  to  be  in  easy  communication 

Jackson  retires  up  •/  '  «/ 

the  Valley.  with  Jolinston ;  lie  evacuated  Winchester  on 

the  11th  of  March.  Learning,  however,  that  Shields,  of 
Banks's  corps,  who  was  following  him,  had  been  weak- 
ened by  the  withdrawal  of  a  part  of  his  force,  he  deter- 
mined to  turn  upon  him.  Shields  feigned  to  retreat,  and 
concealed  his  true  strength.  In  an  action  which  took 
place  (March  23d)  at  Winchester,  the  Confederates  ac- 
cordingly suffered  a  severe  defeat.  They  were  compelled 
to  resume  their  retreat  up  the  Valley,  and  remained  in 
communication  with  Johnston  until  he  went  to  the  Pen- 
insula to  confront  McClellan.  At  that  time  Ewell's  di- 
vision was  sent  to  Jackson,  increasing  his  force  by  about 
10,000  men. 

The  purpose  of  the  Confederate  government  in  retain- 
ing this  large  force  in  the  Valley  was  to  threaten  Wash- 
ington and  embarrass  the  movements  of  McClellan  in  the 
Peninsula.  ♦ 

Jackson  was  therefore  now  confronting  three  national 
^  .,.     ^,^        armies — that  of  Fremont,  on  his  left;  that  of 

Position  of  the  na-  '  ' 

tionai  armies.  Bauks,  bcfore  him ;  that  of  McDowell,  on  his 
right. 

Fremont  had  been  ordered  by  the  President  to  come 
Jackson  Checks  ^^^11  to  Fraukliu  aud  Harrisonburg,  con- 
Fremont,  verging  toward  Banks.  Jackson,  learning 
this,  determined  to  strike  at  them  in  succession.  Leav- 
ing Ewell  to  confront  Banks,  he  himself  rapidly  moved 
against  Fremont's  advance,  compelling  it  to  retreat  to 
Franklin.  Then,  quickly  crossing  the  Shenandoah  Mount- 
ains, he  rejoined  Ewell  at  Newmarket,  and,  moving  up 
the  Valley  between  the  Blue  Kidge  and  the  Masanutten 
range  to  Front  Boyal,  he  accomplished  a  double  object; 
he  created  a  panic  in  Washington,  and,  indeed,  as  we  shall 

and  attacks  Kenly     ^^^^    ^"^    thrOUghout    thc    IN'orth,   aud    fell    iu 

at  Front  Royal.      ovcrwhelmiug  forcc  ou  Colonel  Kenly,  who 


392 


THE  SHENANDOAH  VALLEY. 


[Sect.  XI. 


THE    SHENANDOAH   VALLEY. 


was  at  Front  Koyal,  capturing  many  prisoners  and  guns, 
and  a  large  amount  of  stores.  This  was  on  the  23d  of 
May. 

About  a  week  "before  this  time  (May  17th),  the  nation- 
al government,  desirous  of  re-enforcing  McClellan  in  the 


Chap.lv.]  the  retreat  of  banks.  393 

Detachments  sent  Peniiisula,  had  Ordered  Shields  to  leave 
toMccieiian.  Banks's  coips  and  jolii  that  of  McDowell, 
which  was  on  its  march  to  McClellan,  Banks  being  or- 
dered to  fall  back  to  Strasburg  and  there  fortify  himself. 
He  was  thus  left  with  about  6000  men  to  defend  the 
valley. 

Banks  heard  of  the  disaster  at  Front  Eoyal  on  the 
evening  of  its  occurrence.  He  saw  his  peril. 
at^tSckedby  jJck-'^  He  retreated  instantly  from  Strasburg  (May 
24th),  the  Confederate  advance  already  ap- 
pearing. His  losses  in  this  forced  march  were  great,  but 
he  gained  Winchester  by  midnight.  He  was  unable  to 
rest  there  more  than  a  couple  of  hours,  for  Jackson  was 
fast  enveloping  him.  He  resumed  his  flight,  turning  upon 
his  pursuers  whenever  he  could,  in  order  to  give  time  for 
his  trains  to  escape.  As  he  passed  through  Winchester, 
the  women  threw  from  the  windows  hot  water  and  mis- 
siles of  every  description  on  his  troops.  In  the  course  of 
the  afternoon  he  reached  Martinsburg,  a 
treat  precipi-  march  of  22  miles,  and,  resting  his  footsore 
troops  only  two  hours  and  a  half,  marched 
again  twelve  miles,  and  gained  the  Potomac  opposite  Wil- 
liamsport  the  same  night. 

In  this  pursuit  Jackson  captured  two  guns,  more  than 
9000  small-arms,  and  more  than  3000  prisoners.  Banks's 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  about  200.  "  Never," 
says  that  general — not  a  very  soldierly  confession— "were 
there  more  grateful  hearts  in  the  same  number  of  men 
than  when  at  midday,  on  the  26th,  we  stood  on  the  oppo- 
site shore"  of  the  Potomac. 

"  The  scene  on  the  river  when  the  rear-guard  arrived 
escapes  across  the  was  of  the  most  animated  and  exciting  de- 
poto|iac.  scription.   A  thousand  camp-fires  were  burn- 

ing on  the  hill-side,  a  thousand  carriages  of  all  sorts  were 
crowded  upon  the  banks  of  the  broad  stream  between 


394  CONSTERNATION  IN  WASHINGTON.  [Sect.  XI. 

the  exhausted  troops  and  their  coveted  rest.  The  ford 
was  too  deep  for  the  teams  to  cross  in  regular  succession ; 
only  the  strongest  horses,  after  a  few  experiments,  were 
allowed  to  essay  the  passage  over  before  morning.  The 
single  ferry  was  occupied  by  the  ammunition  trains,  the 
ford  by  the  wagons.  The  cavalry  was  secure ;  the  troops 
only  had  no  transportation.  No  enemy  appeared  in  sight. 
Fortunately,  there  were  several  boats  belonging  to  the 
pontoon  train  brought  from  Strasburg,  which  were  launch- 
ed and  devoted  exclusively  to  the  soldiers." 

A  rush  like  that  of  Stonewall  Jackson  through  the  Val- 
ley in  pursuit  of  Banks  was  what  the  nation  expected  of 
McClellan  when  Magruder  attempted  to  stop  him  in  the 
Peninsula. 

The  attack  at  Front  Eoyal  and  on  Strasburg  produced 
Consternation  in  constcmation  iu  Washiugtou.  McDowell 
Washington.        ^^^  ^^  ^^^^  ordcrcd  to  fall  back ;  he  was 

within  fifteen  miles  of  Hanover  Court-house,  and  on  the 

point  of  making  a  junction  with  McClellan.    In  letters  to 

the  Secretary  of  War  and  to  the  President 

McClellan's  re-en-       ,  i   i  •  ,    •  i  t      i 

forceraents  ordered  hc  expresscQ  his  rcgrct  lu  a  soldierJy  man- 
ner. He  at  once  proceeded  to  execute  his 
orders,  which  were  to  aid  in  intercepting  Jackson  and 
cut  off  his  retreat  in  the  Valley.  On  the  same  day  (May 
24)  Fremont  was  ordered  by  telegraph  to  march  instant- 
ly in  aid  of  the  same  attempt.  By  the  route  he  was  or- 
dered to  take  he  might  have  intercepted  Jackson,  but  he 
assumed  the  responsibility  of  going  by  another,  which 
permitted  Jackson  to  escape.  It  had  been  hoped  that, 
between  McDowell  and  Fremont,  Jackson's  retreat  would 
be  stopped. 

In  the  consternation  of  the  moment,  in  addition  to 
these  military  orders,  dispatches  were  #ent 

Northern  gov-     to  thc   sfovcmors  of  thc  Northern.  States. 

6rnors  • 

They  were  of  the  following  tenor : 


Chap.  LV.]  JACKSON'S  RETREAT.  395 

"  Washington,  May  25th,  1862. 
"To  the  Governor  of  Massachusetts : 
"  Intelligence  from  various  quarters  leaves  no  doubt  that  the  en- 
emy in  great  force  are  marching  on  Washington.     You  will  please 
organize  and  forward  immediately  all  the  militia  and  volunteer 
force  in  your  state. 

"  EpwiN  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War." 

On  the  same  day  (May  25th)  the  President  took  mili- 
The -overnment  taiy  possesslon  of  all  the  railroads  in  the 
seized  the  railroads,  -jj^-^^^  g^^^^^^  Ordering  their  officers  and 

servants  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  for  the  trans- 
portation of  troops  and  munitions  of  war,  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  all  other  business. 

It  w^as  now  high  time  for  Stonewall  Jackson  to  retreat 
from  the  front  of  Harper's  Ferry.  Accord- 
son  fro™  Harp-"  ingly  he  did  so  (May  29),  leaving  Ewell  as 
a  rear-guard.  That  officer  made  some  ener- 
getic demonstrations  on  the  night  of  the  30th.  "The 
night  was  intensely  dark;  the  hills  around  were  alive 
with  signal  lights ;  the  rain  descended  in  torrents ;  vivid 
flashes  of  lightning  illuminated  at  intervals  the  green  and 
magnificent  scenery,  while  the  crash  of  the  thunder  echo- 
ing among  the  mountains  threw  into  comparative  insig- 
nificance the  roar  of  the  artillery."  Next  morning  it  was 
found  that  Ewell  had  disappeared.  To  overtake  Jackson, 
he  marched  thirty-four  miles  on  that  day ! 

We  have  seen  that  Fremont  changed  his  prescribed 
line  of  march.  He  did  this  with  a  view  of  finding  a 
readier  passage  over  the  Shenandoah  Mountains  from 
Franklin,  where  he  had  concentrated.  He  went  north- 
ward forty  miles  to  Moorfield ;  then,  crossing  the  ridge — 
though  he  had  stripped  his  men  even  of  their  knapsacks, 
and  marched  as  expeditiously  as  he  could  over  roads 
made  almost  impassable  by  the  incessant  rain — he  reach- 
Faiiure  of  Fremont  ^d  Strasburg  (Juuc  Ist)  just  after  Jacksou 

to  intercept  him.       ^^^  ^^^^^^   thrOUgh    it.       Shiclds,   who    WaS 


396  JACKSON'S  EETREAT*  [Sect.  XL 

moving  along  the  South  Fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  on  the 
east  of  the  Masanutten  range,  while  Fremont  was  thus 
moving  on  the  west,  attempted  to  intercept  Jackson  far- 
ther south.  But  that  general  retarded  the  pursuit  of 
Fremont  and  delayed  Shields  by  burning  the  bridges  as 
he  passed  them.  Marching  rapidly  through  Harrisonburg, 
he  made  his  way  through  the  South  Fork  of  the  Shenan- 
doah at  Port  Kepublic,  repulsing  (June  5)  an  attack  of  the 
national  cavalry  on  his  rear,  but  losing  in  the  combat  .Gen- 
eral Ashby,  a  very  brave  officer,  who  was  in  command  of 
Affair  at  Port  ^^^  cavalry.  At  Port  Kepublic  the  river  di- 
Repubhc.  vides ;  the  larger  of  its  branches  is  crossed 

by  a  wooden  bridge,  the  smaller  by  a  ford.  Here  Fre- 
mont at  length  brought  him  to  bay  (June  8),  near  a  ham- 
let known  as  Cross  Keys,  but  in  vain,  for  he  repulsed  the 
attack. 

While  he  was  thus  engaged  with  Fremont,  who  had 
come  down  from  the  northwest,  Shields  was  converging 
upon  him  from  the  northeast.  The  advance  cavalry  and 
artillery  of  that  officer  dashed  into  Port  Kepublic,  expect- 
ing to  seize  Jackson's  train,  but  in  a  few  minutes  they 
were  driven  out  and  compelled  to  fall  back  on  their  ad- 
vancing infantry.  The  infantry,  in  its  turn,  was  over- 
whelmed. A  battery  was  captured  and  recaptured.  Jack- 
son, in  his  report,  says, "  Three  times  was  this  battery  lost 
and  won  in  the  desperate  effi^rts  to  capture  and  recover 
Jackson  makes  it."  Aftcr  a  determined  contest,  Jackson 
good  his  re'treat.    £^^^^^  ^^^^  j^.g  ^ssailauts,  pursulug  thcm 

nearly  five  miles,  making  good  his  retreat  across  the  riv- 
er, and  setting  fire  to  the  bridge.  He  had  lost  a  thou- 
sand men  (1167)  and  one  gun  since  he  left  Winchester, 
and  had  captured  about  a  thousand  men  (975)  and  sev- 
en guns. 

Jackson  had  thus  dexterously  slipped  between  McDow- 
ell on  one  side,  and  Fremont  on  the  other,  at  Strasburg. 


Chap.  LV.]         INACTIVITY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  ARMY.  39^ 

The  results  he  had  He  liad  been  pursued  in  vain  by  three  major 
achieved.  geuerals,  and,  turning  upon  his  pursuers  at 

every  opportunity,  had  made  good  his  retreat.  He  had 
diverted  large  re-enforcements  from  McClellan,  had  neu- 
tralized a  national  force  of  60,000  men,  and  given  to  the 
Southern  armies  the  prestige  of  victory.  He  was  now 
ready  to  join  the  army  in  front  of  Kichmond  opposing 
McClellan's  advance.  • 

The  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  was  fought  on  the  31st  of  May, 
Inactivity  of  the  Po-  ^^^  ^^^  almost  a  mouth  General  McClellan's 
tomacArmy.  army  lay  inactive  in  its  position   on  the 

banks  of  the  Chickahominy.  Richmond  gradually  re- 
covered from  its  terror,  and  the  Confederate  army  from 
its  repulse.  Opportunity  was  given,  in  the  welcome  res- 
pite thus  afforded,  to  obtain  re-enforcements  through  the 
Conscription  Act,  to  bring  detachments  from  the  West, 
to  reorganize  under  General  Lee,  the  new  commander, 
and  to  enable  Jackson,  after  his  brilliant  campaign  in  the 
Valley,  to  take  part  in  the  contemplated  proceedings. 

During  the  long  period  of  mortal  inactivity — mortal 
so  far  as  the  peninsular  campaign  of  the  Potomac  Army 
was  concerned — McClellan  had  fortified  himself  strongly 
on  the  Chickahominy.  His  left  wing  was  on  the  south 
of  that  stream,  between  Whiteoak  Swamp  and  New 
Bridge;  the  roads  towarf  Kichmond  were  commanded 
by  heavy  guns.  His  right  wing  was  north  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy, extending  beyond  Mechanicsville.  He  had  sol- 
idly constructed  several  bridges  over  the  stream,  thereby 
bringing  the  two  wings  of  his  army,  into  easier  communi- 
cation. The  reason  he  assigned  for  delay  in  his  move- 
ments was  the  state  of  the  roads  and  the  want  of  these 
bridges. 

Meantime,  as  has  been  mentioned  (p.  388),  General  J. 
E.  B.  Stuart,  with  1500  Confederate  cavalry,  had  shown 


398    THE  POTOMAC  ARMY  ORDERED  TO  ADVANCE.  [Sect.  XL 

Stuart  rides  round  ^i^w  caslly  McClelkn's  commuiiicatioiis  with 
^^  his  base  of  supplies  at  "White  House  might 

be  severed.  He  defeated  two  squadrons  of  national  cav- 
alry at  Hanover  Old  Church,  then  rode  round  the  army 
by  way  of  Tunstall's  Station,  capturing  supplies  and  pris- 
oners. He  rested  three  hours  at  Talleysville,  crossed  the 
Chickahominy  near  Long  Bridge,  and  returned  next  morn- 
ing to  Kichmond  unassailed — an  ominous  warning  by 
which  the  national  general  would  have  done  well  to 
profit. 

At  length,  on  the  25th  of  June,  the  army,  having  115,102 
It  is  at  length  order-  prcscut  for  duty,  Icamed  with  transport  that 

ed  to  advance.  -^   ^^^  ^^    ^^^^    ^^^^-^    ^^^^^    ^^^  pestilcutial 

swamps  in  which  it  had  been  spell-bound.  Hooker  had 
received  orders  to  advance  beyond  Fair  Oaks  on  the  road 
to  Eichmond.  After  a  sharp  struggle,  he  secured  the 
ground  which  he  had  been  ordered  to  occupy. 

That  very  night,  however,  the  unwelcome  tidings  ar- 
rived that  the  same  apparition  which  had  scared  Banks 
from  Strasburg  was  approaching  the  national  communi- 
cations with  the  York  Kiver.  Stonewall  Jackson  had 
come  out  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  was  at  Hanover 
Court-house. 

Hooker  was  at  once  recalled.  The  advance  on  Kich- 
The  advance  coun-  moud  was  abaudoucd.  For  the  army  on 
termanded.  ^-^^  Chickahomiuy  there  was  something  else 

to  do  than  to  march  in  triumph  to  the  Confederate  cap- 
ital. 

A  Confederate  council  of  war  was  held  on  the  same 
day  (25th)  in  Eichmond.     The  defensive 

The  Confederates        ,.  t    ,t  •  i  i    i  'i. 

resolve  on  offensive  liucs  rouud  the  citv  Were  uow  complctc ;  it 

operations.  "^  _  ^    -z 

was  thought  that  a  small  part  ot  the  army 
would  be  sufficient  to  hold  them.  Jackson  had  been 
brought  out  of  the  Valley  to  aid  in  the  proposed  move- 
ment.    It  was  concluded  that  the  time  had  come  for  the 


Chap.  LV.]  ITS  PERILOUS  POSITION.  399 

mass  of  the  army  to  cross  to  tlie  nortli  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  to  sweep  down  the  river  on  that  side,  and  threat- 
en McClellan's  communications  with  York  Eiver.  It  was 
perceived  that  he  must  either  retreat,  or  give  battle  out 
of  his  intrenchments. 

McClellan  had  now  to  determine  what  he  would  do. 
Position  of  Mcciei-  The  peuiusular  campaign  had  culminated  in 
Ian  at  this  time.  ^-^^  withdrawal  of  Hooker  from  his  advance. 
The  bridges  over  the  Chickahominy  gave  opportunity  to 
throw  either  wing  to  the  assistance  of  the  other. 

But  it  was  very  clear  that  the  communications  with 
He  resolves  on  a  WMto  House  could  uo  lougcT  be  safcly  held. 
Change  of  base.     ^^^  ^-^^^  ^j^^  capturo  of  Norfolk  aud  the  de- 

struction  of  the  Merrimack,  Jam6s  Eiver  had  been  opened. 
Some  transports  had  already  found  their  way  to  City 
Point. 

If  McClellan  concentrated  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
Chickahominy,  it  was  a  public  abandonment  of  the  cap- 
ture of  Richmond ;  it  implied  a  disastrous  and  unsup- 
ported retreat  to  Yorktown.  If  he  concentrated  on  the 
south  bank,  he  lost  his  communications  with  White 
House,  and  must  execute  the  perilous  operation  of  a 
change  of  base  by  a  flank  movement.  It  was  seventeen 
miles  from  Fair  Oaks  to  James  River;  there  was  only 
one  road  on  which  the  movement  could  be  executed, 
and  that  was  exposed  to  many  roads  radiating  from 
Richmond. 

The  movement  to  James  River  being  determined  upon, 
the  mode  of  its  execution  admitted  of  little 

Mode  in  which  it        ,      .  ^,  •    i  ,        •  j1       jy      ii  •  i 

was  to  be  accom-    choicc.     ihc  iie^ht  wmsT,  ou  the  farther  side 

plished. 

of  the  Chickahominy,  must  oppose  the  best 
resistance  it  could  to  the  enemy ;  its^trains  must  be  sent 
over  the  bridges  across  that  stream.  It  was  not  to  be  ex- 
pected that  that  wing  should  gain  a  victory ;  all  tliat  it 
was  called  upon  to  do  was  to  resist  stoutly.     The  trains, 


400  THE  SEVEN  DAYS'  CAMPAIGN.  [Sect.  XI. 

once  over  and  well  on  their  way  on  tlie  opposite — the 
south  —  side  toward  James  Kiver,  the  right  wing  must 
slowly  follow  them,  passing  the  bridges,  which  then  must 
be  destroyed.  The  only  bridges  in  possession  of  the  Con- 
federates were  ten  miles  above,  at  Mechanicsville ;  they 
therefore  would  have  to  make  a  long  march  to  go  round 
by  that  way.  With  the  start  so  secured,  the  national 
army  might  retreat  securely  to  James  River,  and  there 
come  under  shelter  of  the  gun-boats  which  had  already 
reached  Harrison's  Landing. 

Military  critics  have  regarded  the  execution  of  this 
movement — for,  as  we  are  now  to  see,  it  was  executed — as 
a  very  brilliant  operation.  But  the  historian  can  not  for- 
get that  it  was  not  for  the  purpose  of  exhibiting  the  spec- 
tacle of  a  retreat,  no  matter  how  splendid  it  might  be, 
that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  advanced  to  the 
Chickahominy. 

The  campaign  now  instituted  by  Lee  against  McClel- 
The  seven  days'     ^^^  ^^J  ^^  convemeutly  dlvidcd  according 

campaign.  ^^  ^^^^^       rpj^^y  ^^.^  ^^  folloWS  I 

1st  Day,  Thursday,      26th  of  June — Mechanicsville. 

2d      "     Friday,  27th       "      —The   Chickahominy,  Gaines's 

Mill,  or  Cold  Harbor. 

3d      "     Saturday,       28th        "      —The  Retreat. 

4th    "     Sunday,         29th       "      —Savage's  Station. 

5th     "     Monday,        30th        "      — Frazier's  Farm. 

6th    "     Tuesday,        1st     of  July— Malvern  Hill. 

7th    "     Wednesday,  2d  "      — Retreat  to  Harrison's  Land- 

ing. 

TJie  first  Day^  Thursday^  June  2QtIi.  Mechanicsville. 
Assault  at  Mechan-  —^^^  Confederate  General  A.P.Hill  was 
icsviiie.  ordered  to  cross  to  the  north  side  of  the 

Chickahominy  and  move  on  Mechanicsville.  Longstreet 
and  D.  H.  Hill  were  to  support  him.  It  was  expected 
that  Jackson  would  arrive  in  time  to  join  them.     They 


Chap.  LV.]  BATTLE  OF  MECHANICSVILLE.  401 

were  to  sweep  down  to  the  York  Eiver  Eailroad.  Hill 
waited  for  Jackson  until  nearly  three  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon, and  then  determined  to  act  without  him.  The  na- 
tional advance  retired  to  a  stronger  position  about  a  mile 
distant,  across  Beaver  Dam  Creek.  As  it  was  very  for- 
midable in  front,  the  Confederates  attempted  to  turn  it 
first  on  the  right,  then  on  the  left,  but  at  both  points  met 
with  a  disastrous  repulse,  their  loss  being  about  1500. 

The  second  Day,  Friday,  June  2^tK  Battle  of  the 
Battle  of  the  Chick-  Ghiclaliominy .—Ki  daybreak  Jackson  was 
ahominy.  crossiug  Bcaver  Dam  Creek,  some  distance 

up  that  stream,  and  coming  down  toward  the  national 
right.  The  bridges  at  Mechanicsville  were  soon  repaired, 
and  the  Confederate  troops,  finding  their  enemy  gone,  fol- 
lowed after  them.  D.  H.  Hill  bore  to  the  left  to  unite 
with  Jackson ;  A.  P.  Hill  and  Longstreet  kept  near  the 
Chickahominy. 

On  the  national  side,  McClellan  was  withdrawing  his 
trains  to  the  south  bank  of  the  Chickahominy.  Before 
daybreak  he  had  sent  as  many  guns  and  wagons  as  pos- 
sible over  that  river,  and  prepared  to  retire  the  troops  to 
a  position  on  its  north  bank  stretching  round  the  bridges, 
so  that  their  flanks  would  be  secure.  In  his  opinion  it 
was  not  advisable  to  bring  them  across,  as  that  would 
have  enabled  Jackson  to  interrupt  the  proposed  retreat  by 
passing  the  Chickahominy  at  some  of  the  lower  bridges 
before  the  national  army,  with  its  trains,  could  reach  Mal- 
vern. Porter's  train  crossed  successfully  over  the  bridges, 
and  had  joined  the  trains  of  the  troops  on  the  south  side 
in  their  movement  to  James  Kiver.  The  upper  bridge. 
New  Bridge,  had  been  destroyed.  Stoneman  had  been 
sent  with  a  column  of  cavalry  to  evacuate  the  depot  at 
White  House,  and  to  destroy  there,  and  along  the  York 
Eiver  Eailroad,  whatever  could  not  be  removed.  The 
2;reater  part  of  the  heavy  guns  and  wagons  having  thus 
H.— C  c 


DIAGRAM   OF  THE   KETREAT. 


Chap.  LV.]  BATTLE  OF  THE  CHICKAHOMINY.  4()3 

been  removed,  the  delicate  operation  of  withdrawing  the 
troops  which  had  been  engaged  at  Mechanicsville  was 
commenced  about  dawn.  They  were  retired  about  five 
milesj  to  Gaines's  Mill. 

The  new  position  occupied  by  Porter  was  an  arc  of  a 
Position  of  the  na-  circlc,  coverfng  the  approaches  to  the  bridges 
tionai  forces.         ^^^^^  couuccted  the  right  wing  with  the 

troops  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river.  The  troops 
were  arranged  in  two  parallel  lines,  those  which  had  been 
engaged  on  the  day  before  being  in  the  rear  of  the  first. 
They  were  all  in  position  by  noon.  They  were  to  defend 
the  bridges  in  their  rear,  to  cross  them  in  the  evening,  and 
then  to  destroy  them. 

Shortly  after  noon  the  Confederates  were  discovered 
Advance  of  the  Con-  approachiug  iu  force  under  A.  P.  Hill,  and 
federates.  vcry  soou  the  firing  became  heavy.     The 

ground  over  which  they  were  advancing  was  an  open 
field,  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  wide,  traversed  by  a 
stream,  the  sides  of  which  were  morasses.  Hill  crossed 
the  plain  and  the  swamp,  but  was  repulsed  when  he  at- 
tempted to  ascend  the  hill  beyond,  on  which  the  national 
troops  were  posted.  At  2  P.M.  Porter  asked  for  re-en- 
forcements, and  Slocum's  division  was  sent  across  the  riv- 
er to  him.  At  3  the  engagement  became  so  severe  that 
the  second  line  and  reserves  had  to  be  moved  forward 
to  sustain  the  first  against  repeated  and  desperate  as- 
saults. 

The  contest  on  the  left  was  for  a  strip  of  woods  run- 
ning almost  at  right  angles  to  the  Chickahominy.  The 
Confederates  charged  up  to  this  wood  several  times,  but 
were  driven  back  with  heavy  loss,  notwithstanding  that 
Longstreet  had  advanced  to  the  aid  of  Hill.  The  na- 
tional loss  also  was  very  great,  and  the  troops,  most  of 
whom  had  been  under  arms  more  than  two  days,  were.be- 
coming  exhausted. 


404  BATTLE  OF  THE  CHICKAHOMINY.  [Sect.  XL 

,  Thougli  Slocum's  division  had  increased  Porter's 
streDgtli  to  35,000,  tlie  national  line  was  strongly  pressed 
in  several  points. 

About  4  P.M.  Jackson  had  reached  the  ground,  and 
the  Confederates  then  made  a  general  assault.  It  was 
commenced  by  an  attack  on  the  national  right  by  D.  H. 
Hill.  He  pushed  up  the  slope  in  front,  but  was  forced 
back.  Ewell  attempted  the  same  movement,  and  met 
with  a  like  repulse.  The  battle  swayed  doubtfully  as 
the  whole  line  became  involved,  attack  after  attack  being 
repeatedly  repelled.  Of  the  assailants  large  numbers 
were  conscripts  who  had  never  been  under  fire  until  the 
day  before.  They  soon  showed  what  kind  of  soldiers 
they  were.  With  a  shrill  yell  they  forced  their  way 
across  the  intervening  swamp,  and  came  up  to  the  very 
muzzles  of  Porter's  guns.  Under  the  fire  they  received 
they  went  down  like  grass  before  the  scythe.  At  5 
o'clock  Porter  reported  his  position  as  critical.  His  as- 
sailants had  now  double  his  strength.  The  brigades  of 
French  and  Meagher  were  therefore  ordered  to  cross  the 
Chickahominy  to  his  support.  They  got  up  just  in  time 
The  national  lines  ^o  prcvcut  a  total  rout,  for  thc  Confederates, 
broken.  ^-^^  £^^  ^^^  houY  aud  a  half  had  been  mak- 

ing the  most  desperate  charges,  had  finally  carried  the 
woods  on  the  left.  This  reverse,  aided  by  the  confusion 
which  followed  an  unsuccessful  charge  by  four  compa- 
nies of  national  cavalry,  caused  a  general  retreat  toward 
the  bridges. 

French's  and  Meagher's  brigades  advanced  boldly, 
dashing  to  the  front  through  a  crowd  of  fugitives  who 
were  rushing  to  the  bridges  over  the  swamp  and  river. 
The  hurrahs  with  which  these  brigades  were  greeted 
warned  the  Confederates  that  re-enforcements  had  ar- 
rived. Under  a  canopy  of  smoke,  through  which  the  set- 
ting sun,  crimson  in  color,  sent  his  diminished  rays,  the 


chap.lv.]  results  of  the  battle.  405 

national  troops  rallied.  The  Confederates  paused,  and 
did  not  follow  np  the  advantage  they  had  gained. 

Porter  had  thus  accomplished  the  object  of  this  des- 
perate struggle.     He  had  held  the  front  of  the  bridges, 
and  given  time  for  the  operation  of  retreat  on  the  other 
bank.     When  night  came  he  crossed,  and  then  destroy- 
•  ..  u ...    ^^  them.     The  Confederate  loss  had  been 

Losses  in  the  battle. 

very  great.  In  Jackson's  corps  alone  589 
were  killed  and  2671  wounded.  McClellan  had  lost  about 
9000  men  and  22  guns. 

But,  heavy  as  were  their  losses,  the  Confederates 
thought  they  had  cheaply  purchased  the  advantages  they 
supposed  they  had  gained.  They  believed  that  McClel- 
lan was  cut  off  from  his  communications  and  isolated, 
and  that  his  supplies  at  White  House  would  fall  an  un- 
resisting prey.  Not  without  bitter  disappointment  did 
they  learn,  on  the  following  afternoon,  that  White  House 
had  been  evacuated,  and  the  stores  which  could  not  be 
Mccieiian's  actual  Carried  away  destroyed ;  that  McClellan,  in- 
condition.  stead  of  being  cut  off,  had  concentrated  his 

troops  on  the  other  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  with 
five  thousand  wagons,  a  siege  train,  a  herd  of  twenty-five 
hundred  oxen,  and  vast  quantities  of  material  in  advance 
of  him,  had  actually,  in  their  faces,  accomplished  a  change 
of  base,  and  was  marching  to  a  junction  with  the  nation- 
al fleet  at  James  River. 

In  a  dispatch  to  the  Secretary  of  War  (June  28), 
McClellan  declared  that  his   soldiers  had 

His  accusations  ,  i     i  i   i  1 1 

against  the  govern-  becu  overwuelmed  by  vastly  superior  num- 
bers, but  that  even  now,  with  10,000  addi- 
tional men,  he  could  take  Richmond  to-morrow;  that, 
however,  as  it  was,  he  should  be  glad  to  cover  his  retreat 
and  save  the  personneJy  of  his  army.  With  truth  he  de- 
clared that  no  one  need  blush  for  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac.    Asserting  .that  the  government  had  not  sustained 


^QQ  THE  RETREAT.  [Sect.  XI. 

Mm,  he  so  far  forgot  Mmself  as  to  say  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  "  If  I  save  this  army  now,  I  tell  you  plainly  that  I 
owe  no  thanks  to  you  or  to  any  other  persons  in  Wash- 
ington. You  have  done  your  best  to  sacrifice  this  army." 
The  third  Day,  Saturday,  June  ^%th.  The  Retreat, — 
The  retreat  to  Immediately  after  the  battle  of  the  Chicka- 
jamcs  River.  iioj^ij^y^  McClellau  assembled  his  corps  com- 
manders. He  seemed  even  at  this  moment  to  be  vacil- 
lating, and  half  inclined  to  cross  to  the  north  side  of  the 
Chickahominy  and  renew  the  contest.  Heintzelman  ad- 
vised him  against  that  step.  Then  he  finally  determined 
on  a  change  of  base,  and  informed  his  generals  of  his 
method  of  executing  it.  Ominous  whispers  were  already 
passing  through  the  ranks  that  the  campaign  had  failed, 
and  that  a  retreat  was  in  prospect.  When,  during  the 
night,  the  bridges  were  blown  up,  the  officers  tried  to 
close  their  eyes  to  what  they  perceived  but  too  plainly 
was  about  to  come  to  pass.  A  few  hours  more,  and  the 
fact  could  no  longer  be  concealed. 

Malvern  was  distant  a  dozen  or  fifteen  miles.  There 
Topography  of  the  was  uo  cucmy  iu  frout  to  obstruct  the  march, 
lyxe  of  retreat.       rpj^^  ^^^^^  difficulty  lay  iu  the  couutry.    The 

Whiteoak  Creek,  a  branch  of  the  Chickahominy,  passes 
through  the  midst  of  a  swamp,  which  stretches  in  a  north- 
westerly direction  toward  Eichmond  for  about  eight  miles. 
Near  Eichmond  the  swamp  is  about  four  miles  wide.  At 
its  more  distant  extremity  it  narrows  down  to  a  few  hun- 
dred yards.  This  swamp  McClellan  had  to  cross  in  his 
retreat. 

Southward  of  the  Eichmond  and  York  Eiver  Eailway 
four  roads  diverge  from  Eichmond  toward  the  east ;  they 
are:  (1.)  The  Williamsburg  Eoad;  (2.)  the  Charles  City 
Eoad ;  (3.)  the  Central  Eoad ;  (4.)  the  Newmarket  Eoad. 
The  first  runs  in  a  general  manner  parallel  to  the  rail- 
way; the  other  three  cross  almost  perpendicularly  the 


chap.lv.]  the  BETREAT.  •         407 

Quaker  Eoad  wliicli  comes  from  the  swamp  down  to- 
ward Malvern  Hill.  Through  the  swamp  and  down  the 
Quaker  Road  was  the  line  of  McClellan's  retreat. 

On  the  morning  of  the  28th,  Lee  was  in  doubt  as  to 
Movements  of  the  the  course  McClellau  had  taken.  Cavalry 
Confederates,  recounoissances,  however,  satisfied  him  that 
he  was  not  crossing  the  lower  bridges  of  the  Chickahom- 
iny  with  an  intention  of  passing  down  the  peninsula,  but 
was  on  his  way  to  James  River.  Thereupon  Lee  deter- 
mined by  forced  marches  to  intercept  him.  Longstreet 
and  A.  P.  Hill  crossed  the  Chickahominy  at  New  Bridge, 
which  had  been  already  repaired.  They  were  to  move 
past  Richmond  and  then  along  the  Central  Road.  Ma- 
gruder  was  on  the  Williamsburg,  and  Huger  marched 
along  the  Charles  City  Road.  These  movements  would 
bring  them  on  the  flank  of  McClellan's  retreat.  Jackson, 
crossing  the  Chickahominy  at  the  Grapevine  Bridge,  was 
to  follow  the  retreating  columns  and  press  upon  their 
rear. 

McClellan  ordered  Keyes  to  move  his  corps  across 
and  of  the  na-  Whitcoak  Crcck  and  seize  strong  positions 
tionai  troops.  ^^  ^-^^  opposlte  sldc,  to  cover  the  troops 
and  trains,  and  guard  their  retreat.  Franklin  and  Porter 
followed  by  the  same  route.  Heintzelman  and  Sumner 
were  to  fall  back  to  Savage's  Station  from  the  works  in 
front,  and  then  cross  the  swamp  and  unite  with  the  rest 
of  the  army.  The  rear-guard  of  the  retreating  column 
was  to  keep  a  bold  front  toward  its  pursuers,  and  special 
directions  were  given  to  guard  against  flank  attacks  on 
the  three  roads  radiating  from  Richmond. 

The  day  was  hot  and  stifling.  The  vast  caravan, 
with  less  confusion  than  might  have  been  anticipated, 
pursued  its  dusty  way.  At  11  A.M.  the  telegraph  wires 
to  White  House  ceased  to  work ;  the  enemy  had  cut 
them.    Whatever  munitions  or  supplies  could  not  be  car- 


408  •  SAVAGE'S  STATION.  [Sect.  XI. 

ried  away  were  destroyed.  Under  the  bushes  in  the 
woods  by  the  roadside  many  a  sick  and  wounded  man 
was  left,  casting  imploring  looks  on  the  receding  column 
as  it  passed  by. 

The  fourth  Day,  Sunday,  June  ^^th.  Savage^  s  Station, 
— The  morning  was'  suffocating  and  hot.  Magruder,  mov- 
ing along  the  Williamsburg  Road,  found  the  works  at  Fair 
Sumner  at  sav-  Oaks  abandoucd.  Sumner  and  Heintzelman 
age's  station.  ^ere  retiring  toward  Savage's  Station,  which 
they  reached  in  the  afternoon.  Their  orders  were  to  hold 
that  point  until  night,  but,  through  some  misunderstand- 
ing, Heintzelman  retired  before  the  appointed  time,  and 
crossed  the  swamp,  having  first  destroyed  the  stores  and 
ammunition  which  could  not  be  carried  away.  A  loco- 
motive, with  a  train  of  cars  heaped  up  with  supplies  and 
shells,  was  turned  loose  on  the  railroad,  and  sent  headlong 
over  the  broken  bridge  into  the  Chickahominy.  The 
train  had  been  set  on  fire  before  it  started,  and  the  shells 
were  exploding  as  it  went. 

Magruder  made  an  attack  on  Sumner's  corps  about 
half  past  5  P.M.  It  was  still  in  front  of  Savage's  Sta- 
tion. The  action  continued  until  dark,  Sumner  maintain- 
ing his  ground.  During  the  night  he  passed  into  the 
Abandonment  of  Whltcoak  Swamp,  leaviug  2500  sick  and 
the  hospitals.  mounded  in  the  hospital  at  the  station.  Ma- 
gruder now  received  orders  to  leave  the  Williamsburg 
Road  and  cross  over  to  the  Newmarket.  Before  sunrise 
the  national  troops  had  passed  Whiteoak  Bridge,  which 
was  then  destroyed. 

The  fifth  Day,  Monday,  June  2>0th.  Frazier''s  Farm. 
— The  day  was  exceedingly  hot,  but  the  Confederate 
general  vigorously  pursued  McClellan's  retreating  army. 
Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill  had  crossed  the  Chickahominy 
at  New  Bridge,  and,  having  moved  round  the  head  of  the 
swamp,  marched  rapidly  down  the  Central  Road,  in  ex- 


Chap.  LV.]  BATTLE  OF  FRAZIER'S  FARM.  409 

pectation  of  striking  McCleUan's  flank.  They  hoped  to 
Battle  of  rrazier's   pi^rce  Hs  line  and  throw  the  rear  of  his  dol- 

Farm,  or  Glendale.     ^^^  ^^^-^  ^^^^  JacksOn  and  D.  H.  Hill,  who 

had  crossed  over  Grapevine  Bridge,  and  were  approach- 
ing on  his  track.  On  all  sides  Jackson  encountered  a 
vast  wreck  of  military  stores.  Blue  overcoats  in  count- 
less numbers  had  been  thrown  into  the  bushes  or  trod- 
den under  foot  in  the  decaying, leaves  or  in  the  dust  of 
the  roads. 

To  aid  in  piercing  McClellan's  line,  which  was  more 
than  eight  miles  long,  Magruder  and  Huger  were  now 
marching  parallel  to  Longstreet.  A  brigade  was  also 
brought  over  the  James  Kiver  from  Fort  Darling.  It 
was  expected  that  80,000  men  would  be  brought  to  bear 
on  the  national  line.  Jefferson  Davis  came  from  Rich- 
mond to  witness  the  apparently  inevitable  national  ca- 
tastrophe. 

Longstreet  and  Hill  encountered  the  retreating  line 

vicorofthecon-    about  4  P.M.  at  Frazier's  Farm.     It  was 

federate  attack.  j^^CaU's  divisiou  which  happened  to  be 
passing  their  front.  They  threw  upon  it  brigade  after 
brigade,  and  tried  to  break  and  pierce  through  it.  McCall, 
in  his  report  of  this  portion  of  the  battle,  says, "  Randall's 
battery  was  charged  upon  by  the  enemy  in  great  force, 
with  a  reckless  impetuosity  I  never  saw  equaled.  They 
advanced  at  a  run  over  six  hundred  yards  of  open  ground. 
The  guns  of  the  battery  mowed  them  down,  yet  they  nev- 
er paused.  A  volley  of  musketry  was  poured  into  them 
at  a  short  distance  by  the  Fourth  Regiment,  in  support 
of  this  battery,  but  it  did  not  check  them  for  an  instant ; 
they  dashed  on,  and  pistoled  and  bayoneted  the  cannon- 
iers  at  their  guns." 

Notwithstanding  these  determined  efforts,  the  attack 

The  national  col-    failed)  the  uatioual  line  was  not  pierced. 

umn unbroken,      ^agrudcr  aud  Hugcr  did  not  get  up;  the 


^^Q  BATTLE  OF  FRAZIER'S  FARM.  [Sect.  XI. 

troops  from  Fort  Darling  were  driven  back  by  shells  from 
tlie  gun-boats. 

Jackson,  who  was  to  have  attacked  the  rear-gnard  of 
Jackson  in  check  at  the    retreating    army,   reached   Whiteoak 

Whiteoak  Bridge.       ^^^^^    ^^^^^    ^^^^^       jj^    f^^^^   ^^^    ^^.^^^^ 

over  it  destroyed,  and  Franklin  barring  his  passage.  In 
spite  of  his  utmost  efforts,  he  was  kept  at  bay  the  whole 
afternoon. 

The  contest  continued  until  after  dark;  the  advance 
of -theX^onfederates  was  checked;  the  national  army  se- 
curely fell  back  during  the  night  to  Malvern  Hill.  The 
rear  of  the  supply  trains  and  the  reserve  artillery  had 
reached  that  point  on  the  previous  afternoon. 

Of  McCall's  division,  nearly  one  fourth  had  been  killed 
or  wounded.     He  himself,  riding  out  after 

Losses  in  the  battle.       .-i.ati,  •,  ,    i 

nightfall  to  reconnoitre,  was  taken  prisoner. 
General  Meade  had  been  severely  wounded.    On  the  part 
of  the  Confederates,  the  losses  had,  been  awful ;  for  in- 
stance. General  Pryor,  of  the  fifth  brigade  of  Longstreet's 
corps,  speaking  of  the  Fourteenth  Alabama,  says  it  was 
nearly  annihilated.     He  adds :  "  I  crossed  the  Chickahom- 
iny  on  the  26th  with  1400  men ;  in  the  fights  that  fol- 
lowed I  suffered  a  loss  of  849  killed  and  wounded,  and 
11  missing. 
Sixth  Day,  Tuesday ,  July  1st.     Malvern  Hill. — Mal- 
BattieofMai-     ^em  Hill,  to  whlch  the  national  army  had 
vern  Hill.  ^^^  rctreatcd,  and  on  which  it  prepared  to 

make  a  stand  against  its  pursuers,  is  "  an  elevated  plateau, 
cleared  of  timber,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  long  by  three 
fourths  of  a  mile  wide,  with  several  converging  roads  fun- 
ning over  it.  In  front  are  numerous  defensible  ravines, 
the  ground  sloping  gradually  toward  the  north  and  east 
Topography  of  to  the  woodlaud,  giving  clear  ranges  for  ar- 
the  field.  •  tillery  in  those  directions.  Toward  the 
northwest  the  plateau  falls  off  more  abruptly  to  a  ravine. 


Chap.lv.]  MALVERN  hill.  411 

wMcli  extends  to  James  Eiver.  From  tlie  position  of  the 
enemy,  his  most  obvious  lines  of  attack  were  from  the  di- 
rection of  Eichmond  and  Whiteoak  Swamp,  and  would 
almost  of  necessity  strike  the  national  army  on  its  left 
wing.  Here,  therefore,  the  lines  were  strengthened  by 
massing  the  troops  and  collecting  the  principal  part  of 
the  artillery." 

On  this  formidable  position  McClellan's  wayworn 
Position  of  the  na-  troops,  weary  with  marching  by  night  and 
tionai  army.  .  gg^j^^jj^g  ^^j  ^^j^  overwhclmcd  with  the  mid- 
summer heat,  and  sickened  with  the  pestiferous  miasma, 
were  at  last  concentrated.  Both  flanks  of  the  army  rest- 
ed on  James  River,  under  the  protection  of  the  gun-boats. 
The  order  in  which  the  troops  lay,  from  their  left  to  their 
right,  was.  Porter,  Heintzelman,  Sumner,  Franklin,  Keyes. 
The  approaches  to  the  position  were  commanded  by  about 
seventy  guns,  several  of  them  heavy  siege  cannon. 

As  soon  as  Franklin  had  withdrawn  from  the  White- 
oak  Creek,  Jackson  crossed  over,  following  the  retreating 
columns  to  Malvern.     Between  9  and  10  A.M.,  the  Con- 
federates commenced  feeling  along  the  national  left  wing 
with  artillery  and  skirmishers.     Their  fire,  however,  soon 
died  away.     They  perceived  the  difficulties  before  them. 
There  were  crouching  cannon  waiting  for  them,  and 
strength  of  the     Tcady  to  dcfeud  all  the  approaches.     Shel- 
position.  tered  by  fences,  ditches,  ravines,  were  swarms 

of  infantry.  There  were  horsemen  picturesquely  career- 
ing over  the  noontide  and  sun-seared  field.  Tier  after 
tier  of  batteries  were  grimly  visible  upon  the  slope,  which 
rose- in  the  form  of  an  amphitheatre.  With  a  fan-shaped 
sheet  of  fire  they  could  sweep  the  incline,  a  sort  of  natu- 
ral glacis  up  which  the  assailants  must  advance.  A 
crown  of  cannon  was  on  the  brow  of  the  hill.  The  first 
line  of  batteries  could  only  be  reached  by  traversing  an 
open  space  of  from  three  to  four  hundred  yards,  exposed 


4][2  BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL.  [Sect.  XI. 

to  grape  and  canister  from  tHe  artillery,  and  musketry 
from  the  infantry.  If  that  were»carried,  another,  and  still 
another  more  difficult  remained  in  the  rear. 

Not  without  reason  did  Hill  express  to  Lee  his  disap- 
The  Confederates  pi'<^^^l  of  the  attack  about  to  be  made ;  nev- 
ordeiedto  carry  it.  ertheless,  Lce  Ordered  the  position  to  be  car- 
ried. 

During  the  afternoon  the  Confederate  artillery  opened, 
but  it  was  only  in  feeble  force  and  in  detail.  It  was  at 
once  silenced  by  the  national  guns.  Magrudey  had  come 
up,  and  was  ordered  to  take  post  on  the  right  of  Hill,  who 
was  on  the  right  of  their  line. 

At  six  o'clock  the  enemy  suddenly  opened  with  the 
whole  strength  of  his  artillery,  and  at  once  began  pushing 
forward  columns  of  attack.  ^'Brigade  after  brigade," 
says  McClellan  in  his  report, "  formed  under  cover  of  the 
woods,  started  at  a  run  to  cross  the  open  space  and 
charge  our  batteries,  but  the  heavy  fire  of  our  guns,  with 
the  cool  and  steady  volleys  of  our  infantry,  in  every  case 
sent  them  reeling  back  to  shelter,  and  covered  the  ground 
with  their  dead  and  wounded.  In  several  instances  our 
infantry  withheld  their  fire  until  the  attacking  columns, 
which  rushed  through  the  storm  of  canister  and  shell 
from  our  artillery,  had  reached  within  a  few  yards  of  our 
lines.  They  then  poured  in  a  single  volley  and  dashed 
forward  with  the  bayonet,  capturing  prisoners  and  colors, 
and  driving  the  routed  columns  in  confusion  from  the 
field." 

Lee,  who  was  momentarily  expecting  that  his  batteries 
would  break  the  national  lines,  had  ordered  his  division 
commanders  to  advance  as  soon  as  they  should  hear  Ar- 
mistead,  who  was  in  position  to  see  the  effect  of  the  fire, 
charging  with  a  yell.  Hill  thought  he  heard  the  signal 
Failure  of  their  as-  about  au  hour  and  a  half  before  sunset,  and 
^^''^''  at  once  advanced,  but  soon  found  that  he 


Chap.  LV.]  BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL.  413 

could  not  stand  before  tlie  tempest.  Magruder,  on  his 
right,  was  making  a  desperate  attack.  It  was  the  noise 
of  his  advance  that  was  mistaken  by  Hill  for  the  signal 
yell.  Magruder  also  found  that  it  was  utterly  impossi- 
ble to  rush  through  the  sheet  of  fire.  No  impression 
whatever  could  be  made.  Malvern  Hill  absolutely  quiv- 
ered under  the  concussions  of  the  cannonade.  Shells  from 
the  gun-boats  in  the  river  were  bursting  overhead.  The 
Confederate  general  was  uselessly  and  unjustifiably  send- 
ing his  men  to  be  massacred.  Until  dark  he  persisted 
in  his  efforts  to  seize  the  position,  but  every  one  of  his 
attacks  was  repulsed  with  horrible  loss.  Not  until  after 
nine  o'clock  did  he  give  up  his  attempt,  and  the  artillery 
cease  its  fire. 

The  battle  was  followed  by  a  dark  and  stormy  night, 

Awfai  night  after  hiding  the  agouy  of  thousands  who  lay  on 

the  battle.  ^^^  blood-stalucd  slopcs  of  Malvcm  Hill, 

and  in  the  copses  and  woodlands  beyond.     The  rain 

came  down  in  torrents. 

Neither  Jackson,  nor  Longstreet,  nor  A.  P.  Hill  had 
taken  part  in  this  attack.  It  was  made  by  D.  H.  Hill 
and  Magruder.  Some  of  their  men  slept  through  the 
tempestuous  night  within  one  hundred  yards  of  the  na- 
tional batteries.  With  inexpressible  astonishment,  when 
day  broke,  they  cast  their  eyes  on  the  hill  from  which 
they  had  been  so  fearfully  repulsed.  Their  enemy  had 
vanished — the  volcano  was  silent. . 

Among  the  Confederates  every  thing  was  in  the  most 
dreadful  confusion.  One  of  their  generals,  says :  "  The 
next  morning,  by  dawn,  I  went  off  to  ask  for  orders,  when 
I  found  the  whole  army  in  the  utmost  disorder.  Thou- 
sands of  straggling  men  were  asking  every  passer-by  for 
their  regiments ;  ambulances,  wagons,  and  artillery  ob- 
structing every  road,  and  all  together  in  a  drenching  rain, 
presenting,  a  scene  of  the  most  woeful  and  heart-rending 
confusion." 


414  RETEEAT  TO  HAERISON'S  LAm>ING.  [Sect.  XI. 

Seventh  Day^  Wednesday^  July  2d      The  Retreat  to 

HarrisoriJs  Landing.— 'Eot  even  in  tlie  awful  night  that 

^    ^     followed  this  awful  battle  was  rest  allotted 

McClellan  retreats 

to^Harrison's  Land-  to  the  national  armj.  In  less  than  two  hours 
after  the  roar  of  the  conflict  had  ceased,  or- 
ders wer6  given  to  resume  the  retreat,  and  march  to  Har- 
rison's Landing.  At  midnight  the  utterly  exhausted  sol- 
diers were  groping  their  staggering  way  along  a  road  de- 
scribed as  desperate,  in  all  the  confusion  of  a  fleeing  and 
routed  army.  There  was  but  one  narrow  pass  through 
which  the  army  could  retreat,  and  though  the  distance  was 
only  seven  miles^  it  was  not  until  the  middle  of  the  next 
day  that  Harrison's  Landing  was  reached.  The  mud  was 
actually  ankle-deep  all  over  the  ground.  The  last  of  the 
wagons  did  not  reach  the  selected  site  until  after  dark 
on  the  3d  of  July.  The  rear-guard  then  moved  into  their 
camp,  and  every  thing  was  secure.  The  paralyzed  Con- 
federates made  a  feeble  pursuit,  and  on  the  8th  went 
back  to  Richmond. 

Not  without  profound  reluctance  was  the  order  to 
Indignation  in  the  coutiuue  the  rctrcat  to  Harrison's  Landing 
,  national  army.  ^i^^j^^^  Gcncral  Kcamy,  thau  whom  there 
was  not  a  more  noble  soldier  in  the  whole  army,  ex- 
claimed, in  a  group  of  indignant  ofiicers, "  I,  Philip  Kear- 
ny, an  old  soldier,  enter  my  solemn  protest  against  this 
order  to  retreat.  We  ought,  instead  of  retreating,  to 
follow  up  the  enemy  and  take  Eichmond.  And,  in  full 
view  of  all  the  responsibility  of  such  a  declaration,  I  say 
to  you  all  that  such  an  order  can  only  be  prompted  by 
cowardice  or  treason." 

The  French  princes  left  the  army  early  the  next  morn- 
The  French  princes  i^g.  Its  couditlou  was,  to  all  appcarauccs, 
abandon  the  army,  ^esperate.  They  went  on  board  a  steamer, 
and  soon  after  departed  for  the  North. 

The  Committee  of  Congress  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 


Ghap.lv.]  the  contedekate  triumph.        ^  415 

referring  to  these  events,  declare,  ^'  The  re- 

Perilous  condition    ,  ,        p  ,  i  r»  hit   t  a.      tt 

of  the  national      treat  01  the  armv  from  Malvern  to  Harri- 

army.  __,^ 

son's  Bar  was  very  precipitate.  The  troops, 
upon  their  arrival  there,  were  huddled  together  in  great 
confusion,  the  entire  army,  being  collected  within  a  space 
of  about  three  miles  along  the  river.  No  orders  were 
given  the  first  day  for  occupying  the  heights  which  com- 
manded the  position,  nor  were  the  troops  so  placed  as  to 
be  able  to  resist  an  attack  in  force  by  the  enemy,  and 
nothing  but  a  heavy  rain,  thereby  preventing  the  enemy 
from  bringing  up  their  artillery,  saved  the  army  from  de- 
struction." 

There  had  been. sent  to  the  Peninsula  about  one  hun- 
dred and  sixty  thousand  men  (159,500). 
ciosTSf  the^am-  ^  Ou  the  3d  of  July,  after  this  great  army  had 
reached  the  protection  of  the  gun-boats  at 
Harrison's  Landing,  McClellan  telegraphed  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  that  he  presumed  he  had  not  "  over  50,000 
men  left  with  their  colors."  Hereupon  President  Lin- 
coln (July  7)  went  to  Harrison's  Landing,  and  found 
that  there  were  about  86,000  men  there. 

Lee,  in  his  report,  says :  "  The  siege  of  Richmond  was 
raised,  and  the  object  of  a  campaisrn,  which 

Lee's  report  of  the    i-ir  j.     ^       n,  l^  i* 

Confederate  tri-  had  Dcen  prosccutcd  alter  months  of  prep- 
aration, at  an  enormous  expenditure  of  men 
and  money,  completely  frustrated.  More  than  10,000 
prisoners,  including  officers  of  rank,  52  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  upward  of  35,000  stand  of  small  -  arms,  were  cap- 
tured. The  stores  and  supplies  of  every  description  which 
fell  into  our  hands  were  great  in  amount  and  value,  but 
small  in  comparison  with  those  destroyed  by  the  enemy. 
His  losses  in  battle  exceeded  our  own,  as  attested  by  the 
thousands  of  dead  and  wounded  left  on  every  field,  while 
his  subsequent  inaction  shows  in  what  condition  the  sur- 
vivors reached  the  protection  to  which  they  fled." 


416  CLOSE  OF  THE  PENINSULAE  CAMPAIGN.        [Sect.  XI. 

General  McClellan  remained  at  Harrison's  Landing 
until  the  4th  of  August,  when  he  received 

Withdrawal  of  the  -,         ,  • ,  i    i  i  •  ,         a 

national  array  from  au  Order  to  Withdraw  his  army  to  Acquia 

the  Peuinsula.  ,       ,  ,  *'  -•■ 

Creek,  to  aid  in  repelling  the  Confederate 
movement  toward  Washington.  Most  reluctantly  did  he 
comply  with  this  order.  The  bulk  of  the  army  moved  by 
land  to  Fortress  Monroe.  The  general  left  that  place  on 
the  23d  of  August,  and  reached  Acquia  Creek  the  next 
day. 

Thus  ended  the  great,  the  ill-starred,  the  melancholy 
Peninsular  expedition.    It  had  no  presiding 

Total  failure  of  .  ,       it  •      t         mi 

the  Peninsular     p;enius,  uo  coutrollmg  mmd.     ihere  was  an 

campaign.  y  •   t  •  ^  t 

incredible  sluggishness  m  the  advance;  it 
actually  gave  the  Confederates  time  to  pass  their  con- 
scription law  and  bring  their  conscripts  into  the  field. 
The  magnificent  army,  which  had  been  organized  with  so 
much  pageantry  at  Washington,  and  moved  down  Ches- 
apeake Bay  with  so  much  pomp,  had  sickened  in  the 
dismal  trenches  of  Yorktown,  and  left  thousands  upon 
thousands  in  the  dark  glades  and  glooniy  marshes  of  the 
blood-stained  Chickahominy.  It  is  the  testimony  of  the 
corps  commanders  that  they  were  left  as  best  they  might 
to  conduct  the  fatal  retreat.  The  general  was  importu- 
nately demanding  of  the  government  more  troops — never 
using  all  that  he  had.  Countless  millions  of  money  had 
been  wasted,  tens  of  thousands  of  men  had  been  de- 
stroyed. 

From  the  inception  of  the  campaign  to  its  end,  milita- 
ry audacity  was  pitted  against  military  timidity,  prompt- 
ness against  procrastination,  and  the  result  could  not  be 
other  than  it  was.  The  Confederates  at  Centreville,  in 
inferior  numbers  and  in  contemptible  works,  held  McClel- 
lan at  bay.  They  did  the  same*  at  Yorktown,  though  he 
had  much  more  than  ten  times  their  strength.  Their  au- 
dacity culminated  in  their  march  to  the  north  bank  of  the 


Chap.  LV.]      CLOSE  OF  THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN. 


417 


CHckahominy,  wlien  they  actually  divided  their  army  in 
his  presence,  putting  the  mass  of  it  on  the  more  distant 
side  of  a  river  which  he  might  have  rendered  impassable, 
and  leaving  nothing  between  him  and  Eichmond  but  a 
body  of  troops  which  he  might  have  overwhelmed  with- 
out difficulty. 
II.— Dd 


CHAPTER  LVL 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  IRON  SHIPS. 

The  steam  frigate  Merrimack  was  converted  bj  the  Confederates  into  an  armored 
ship. 

Coming  out  of  Norfolk,  she  destroyed  the  wooden  war-ships  Cumberland  and  Con- 
gress. 

Ericsson's  armored  turret-ship,  the  Monitor,  built  expressly  for  the  purpose,  ob- 
tained a  victory  over  her,  and  disabled  her. 

Importance  of  this  battle  to  naval  powers. 

"When  the  navy  yard  at  Norfolk  was  seized  "by  Vir- 
srinia,  amonsr  tlie  ships  partly  destroyed  was 

The  Merrimack  con-   f,  \  ?•       x      n/       •  i         i»  p    1 

verted  into  an  iron-  tho  steanL  irigate  MerrimacK,  01  forty  guns 
(p.  84).  She  was  one  of  the  finest  vessels  in 
the  navy,  and  was  worth,  when  equipped,  nearly  a  million 
and  a  quarter  of  dollars. 

She  had  been  set  on  fire,  and  also  scuttled  by  the  offi- 
cers who  had  charge  of  the  yard.  Her  upper  works 
alone,  therefore,  had  suffered.  Her  hull  and  machinery 
were  comparatively  uninjured. 

The  Confederate  government  caused  her  to  be  raised 

Particulars  of  her  ^^^  tumcd  luto  aU  extcmporaneOUS  iron- 
construction,  ^i^^^  ^g  mentioned  (p.  207),  her  hull  was 
cut  down,  and  a  stout  timber  roof  built  upon  it.  This 
was  then  strongly  plated  with  three  layers  of  iron,  each 
one  inch  and  a  quarter  thick,  the  first  layer  being  placed 
horizontally,  the  second  obliquely,  the  third  perpendicu- 
larly. The  armature  reached  two  feet  below  the  water- 
line,  and  rose  ten  feet  above.  The  ends  were  constructed 
in  the  same  manner.  A  false  bow  was  added  for  the  pur- 
pose of  dividing  the  water,  and  beyond  it  projected  an 
iron  beak.     Outwardly  she  presented  the  appearance  of 


Chap.  LVI.]       THE  AKMORED  FRIGATE  MERRIMACK. 


419 


Her  armament. 


.an  iron  roof  or  ark.  It  was  expected  that,  from  her  slop- 
ing armature,  shots  striking  would  glance  away.  Her 
armament  consisted  of  eight  11 -inch  guns, 
four  on  each  side,  and  a  100 -pound  rifled 
Armstrong  gun  at  each  end. 

As  the  fact  of  her  construction  could  not  be  concealed, 
the  Confederate  authorities  purposely  circulated  rumors 
to  her  disadvantage.  It  was  said  that  her  iron  was  so 
heavy  that  she  could  hardly  float ;  that  her  hull  had  been 
seriously  injured,  and  that  she  could  not  be  steered.  Of 
course  they  could  have  no  certain  knowledge  of  her  capa- 
bilities as  a  w^eapon  of  war,  and,  as  was  the  case  with 
many  officers  of  the  national  navy,  perhaps  they  held  her 
in  light  esteem. 

About  midday  on  Saturday,  March  8th,  she  came  down 
She  comes  out  from  the  Elizabeth  Kiver,  under  the  command  of 
Norfolk.  Franklin  Buchanan,  an  officer  who  had  aban- 

doned the  national  navy.     She  was   attended  by  two 
armed  steam -boats,  and  was  afterward  joined  by  two 


HAMPTOX   ROADS. 


420  SINKING  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND.  [Sect.  XI. 

otiiers.  Passing  the  sailing  frigate  Congress,  and  receiv-. 
ing  from  her  her  fire,  she  made  her  way  to  the  sloop  of 
war  Cumberland,  of  24  guns  and  376  men.  This  ship 
had  been  placed  across  the  channel  to  bring  her  broad- 
side to  bear,  and,  as  the  Merrimack  approached,  she  re- 
ceived her  with  a  rapid  fire.  At  once  one  of  the  prob- 
lems presented  by  the  Merrimack's  construction  was 
solved ;  the  shot  of  the  Cumberland,  from  thirteen  9  and 
10  inch  guns,  glanced  from  her  armature 

She  attacks  and      // ti  hat  •  •,!        in 

sinks  the  Cum-  "  like  SO  mauy  peas.  Advancing  with  all 
the  speed  she  had,  and  receiving  six  or  eight 
broadsides  while  so  doing,  she  struck  her  antagonist  with 
her  iron  beak  just  forward  of  the  main  chains,  and  instant- 
ly opened  her  fire  of  shells  from  every  gun  she  could  bring 
to  bear.  The  battle  was  already  decided.  Through  the 
hole  she  had  made,  large  enough  for  a  man  to  enter,  the 
water  poured  in.  In  vain  Lieutenant  Morris,  who  com- 
manded the  Cumberland,  worked  the  pumps  to  keep  her 
afloat  a  few  moments  more,  hoping  that  a  lucky  shot 
might  find  some  weaker  place.-  He. only  abandoned  his 
guns  as  one  after  another  the  settling  of  the  sinking  ship 
swamped  them  in  the  water.  The  last  shot  was. fired  by 
Matthew  Tenney,  from  a  gun  on  a  level  with  the  water. 
That  brave  man  then  attempted  to  escape  through  the 
port-hole,  but  was  borne  back  by  the  incoming  rush,  and 
went  down  with  the  ship.  With  him  went  down  nearly 
100  dead,  sick,  wounded,  and  those  who,  like  him,  could 
not  extricate  themselves.  The  Cumberland  sank  in  54 
feet  of  water.  The  commander  of  her  assailant  saw  the 
flag  of  the  unconquered  but  sunken  ship  still  flying  above 
the  surface.  He  was  not  a  Virginian,  but  a  Marylander 
by  birth,  and  had  served  under  that  flag  for  thirty-five 
years. 

The  sailing  frigate  Congress,  which  had  fired  at  the 
Merrimack  as  she  passed,  and  exchanged  shots  with  the 


Chap,  LYI.]  THE  CONGRESS  DESTROYED.  421 

armed  steam-boats,  had  been  run  aground  by  her  com- 
mander with  the  assistance  of  a  tug.  The  Merrimack 
now  came  up,  and,  taking  a  position  about  150  yards 
and  sets  the  Con-  from  hcr  stcm,  fircd  shell  into  her.  One 
gressonflre.  ghcll  killed  17  mcu  at  ouc  of  thc  guus.  Of 
the  only  two  guns  with  which  she  could  reply,  one  was 
quickly  dismounted,  and  the  muzzle  of  the  other  knock- 
ed off.  The  Merrimack  ranged  slowly  backward  and  for- 
ward at  less  than  100  yards.  In  her  helpless  condition, 
the  Congress  took  fire  in  several  places,  and  nearly  half 
her  crew  were  killed  or  wounded.  Among  the  former 
was  her  commander.  The  flag  was  therefore  hauled 
down,  and  a  tug  came  alongside  to  take  possession  of 
her.  But  fire  being  opened  upon  the  tug  by  some  sol- 
diers on  shore,  the  Merrimack  recommenced  shelling,  do- 
ing the  same  again  later  in  the  day,  after  the  crew  of  the 
Congress  had  abandoned  her.  The  Congress  was  set 
thoroughly  on  fire.  About  midnight  she  blew  up.  Out 
of  her  crew  of  434  men,  only  218  survived.  In  little 
more  than  two  hours  Buchanan  had  killed  or  drowned 
more  than  300  of  his  old  comrades. 

When  the  Merrimack  first  came  out,  the  commander 
of  the  steam  frigate  Minnesota  got  his  ship  under  way, 
intending  to  butt  the  iron-clad  and  run  her  down.  As 
he  passed  Sewall's  Point,  he  received  the  fire  of  a  rifle 
battery  there,  and  had  his  mainmast  injured.  It  was  ebb 
tide;  the  Minnesota  drew  23  feet  water;  at  one  part  of 
the  channel  the  depth  was  less,  but,  as  the  bottom  was 
soft,  it  was  hoped  that  the  ship  could  be  forced  over. 
She,  however,  took  the  ground,  and,  in  spite 

She  commences  an        ^  i*  i  •  i  i  rr\i 

attack  on  the  Min-  01  cvcry  cxcrtion,  becamo  immovable,  ihe 
Merrimack,  having  destroyed  the  Cumber- 
land and  Congress,  now  came  down  upon  the  Minneso- 
ta. Her  draft,  however,  prevented  her  coming  nearer  to 
her  intended  victim  than  a  mile,  and  the  fire  on  both 


422  ARKIVAL  OF  THE  MONITOR.  [SECf.  XI. 

sides  was  comparatively  ineffective.  But  the  armed 
steam-boats  ventured  nearer,  and,  with  their  rifled  guns, 
killed  and  wounded  several  men  on  board  the  Minneso- 
ta. On  her  part,  she  sent  a  shot  through  the  boiler  of 
but  retires  as  night  ouc  of  them.  Night  was  coming  on;  the 
comes  on.  MciTimack  did  not  venture  to  lie  out  in  the 

Roads;  so,  expecting  another  easy  victory  in  the  morn- 
ing, she  retired  at  7  P.M.,  with  her  consorts,  behind  Sew- 
all's  Point. 
The  Minnesota  still  lay  fast  on  the  mud-bank.    The  re- 
coil of  her  own  firin2f  had  forced  her  harder 

Night  attempts  to  ...  ,  t,i'1;«t  t 

release  the  Minne-  ou.  Attempts  wcrc  made  at  high  tide,  and, 
indeed,  all  through  the  night,  to  get  her  off, 
but  in  vain.  The  steam  frigate  Eoanoke,  disabled  some 
months  previously  by  the  breaking  of  her  shaft,  and 
the  sailing  frigate  St.  Lawrence,  had  both  likewise  been 
aground,  but  had  now  gone  down  the  Roads. 

At  nine  o'clock  that  night  Ericsson's  new  iron-clad  tur- 
Arrivaiofthetur-  Tct-ship,  the  Mouitor,  rcachcd  Fortress  Mon- 
ret-ship  Monitor.   ^^^  ^^^^^  ^^^  york.     Evcry  cxcrtiou  had 

been  made  by  her  inventor  to  get  her  out  in  time  to  meet 
the  Merrimack ;  and  the  Confederates,  finding  from  their 
spies  in  JSTew  York  that  she  would  probably  be  ready, 
put  a  double  force  on  their  frigate,  and  worked  night  and 
day.  It  is  said  that  this  extra  labor. gained  that  one  day 
in  which  the  Merrimack  destroyed  the  Cumberland  and 
the  Congress. 

The  Monitor  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant  John  L. 
Her  dreadful  sea-  Wordcu.  A  drcadf ul  passagc  of  thi'cc  days 
voyage.  -^^^  almost  wom  out  her  crew.     The  sea 

had  swept  over  her  decks ;  the  turret  was  often  the  only 
part  above  water.  The  tiller-rope  was  at  one  time  thrown 
off  the  wheel.  The  draft-pipe  had  been  choked  by  the 
pouring  down  of  the  waves.  The  men  were  half  suf 
focated.     The  fires  had  been  repeatedly  extinguished. 


Chap.  LVI.]  THE  MEERIMACK  AND  MONITOR.  423 

Ventilation  had,  however,  been  obtained  through  the  tur- 
ret.    Throughout  the  previous  afternoon  Worden  had 
heard  the  sound  of  the  cannonading.     He  delayed  but  a 
few  minutes  at  the  Fortress,  and  soon  after  midnight  had 
anchored  the  Monitor  alongside  the  Minnesota  (March  9). 
Day  broke — a  clear  and  beautiful  Sunday.    The  flag 
The  Merrimack  re-  of  the   Cumberland  was   still  flying;    the 
8umes  her  attack,    ^^j,^^^^  ^f  ^^^  defcuders  werc  floating  about 

on  the  water.  The  Merrimack  approached  to  renew  her 
attack.  She  ran  down  toward  the  Fortress,  and  then 
came  up  the  channel  through  which  the  Minnesota  had 
passed.  Worden  at  once  took  his  station  at  the  peep- 
holes of  his  pilot-house,  laid  the  Monitor  before  her  ene- 
she  is  assailed  by  ^y,  aud  gave  the  fire  of  his  two  11-inch 
the  Monitor.        ^^^^    rj.j^^  ^-^^^  of  cach  was  168  pouuds' 

weight.  Catesby  Jones,  who  had  taken  command  of  the 
Merrimack,  Buchanan  having  been  wounded  the  previ- 
ous day,  saw  at  once  that  he  had  on  his  hands  a  very  dif- 
ferent antagonist  from  those  of  yesterday.  The  turret 
was  but  a  very  small  mark  to  fire  at,  nine  feet  by  twenty ; 
the  shot  that  struck  it  glanced  off.  One  bolt  only  from 
a  rifle-gun  struck  squarely,  penetrating  into  the  iron ;  "  it 
then  broke  short  off,  and  left  its  head  sticking  in."  For 
the  most  part,  the  shot  flew  over  the  low  deck,  missing 
their  aim. 

Five  times  the  Merrimack  tried  to  run  the  Monitor 
Attempts  to  mn  the  dowu,  and  at  each  time  received,  at  a  few 
Monitor  down.  '  ^^^^  dlstauce,  tho  fire  of  the  11-inch  guns. 
In  her  movements  at  one  moment  she  got  aground,  and 
the  light-drawing  Monitor,  steaming  round  her,  tried  at 
every  promising  point  to  get  a  shot  into  her.  Her  ar- 
mor at  last  began  to  start  and  bend. 

Unable  to  shake  off  the  Monitor  or  to  do  her  any  in- 
ner conflict  with  jury,  the  Merrimack  now  renewed  her  at- 
the  Minnesota.     ^^^^^  ^^  ^^^  ^j^^^^  Minuesota,  rcceiviug 


424  BATTLE  OF  THE  IRON  SHIPS.  [Sect.  XI, 

from  her  a,  whole  "broadside  whicli  struck  squarely.  "  It 
was  enougli/'  said  Captain  Van  Brunt,  who  commanded 
the  frigate,  "  to  have. blown  out  of  the  water  any  wooden 
ship  in  the  world."  In  her  turn,  she  sent  from  her  rifled 
bow -gun  a  shell  through  the  Minnesota's  side:  it  ex- 
ploded within  her,  tearing  four  of  her  rooms  into  one,  and 
setting  her  on  fire.  Another  shell  burst  the  boiler  of  the 
tug-boat  Dragon,  which  lay  alongside  the  Minnesota.  The 
frigate  was  firing  on  the  iron-clad  solid  shot  as  fast  as 
she  could. 

Once  more  the  Monitor  intervened  between  them,  com- 
pelling her  antagonist  to  change  position,  in  doing  which 
the  Merrimack  again  grounded,  and  again  received  a 
whole  broadside  from  the  Minnesota.  The  blows  she 
was  receiving  were  beginning  to  tell  upon  her.  As  soon 
sheretreats, pursued  ^s  sho  could  get  clcar,  sho  rau  dowu  the  bay, 
by  the  Monitor.  fon^wed  by  the  Mouitor.  Suddenly  she 
turned  round,  and  attempted  to  run  her  tormentor  down. 
Her  beak  grated  on  the  Monitor's  deck,  and  was  wrench- 
ed. The  turret -ship  stood  unharmed  a  blow  like  that 
which  had  sent  the  Cumberland  to  the  bottom ;  she  mere- 
ly glided  out  from  under  her  antagonist,  and  in  the  act 
of  so  doing  gave  her  a  shot  while  almost  in  contact.  It 
seemed  to  crush  in  her  armor. 

The  Monitor  now  hauled  off  for  the  purpose  of  hoist- 
The  Monitor  gains  i^g  Hioro  shot  iuto  hcr  tuiTet.  Catcsby 
the  victory.  Joues  thought  he  had  silenced  her,  and  that 

he  might  make  another  attempt  on  the  Minnesota.  He, 
however,  changed  his  course  as  the  Monitor  steamed  up, 
and  it  was  seen  that  the  Merrimack  was  sagging  down 
at  her  stern.  She  made  the  best  of  her  way  to  Craney 
Island.  The  battle  was  over ;  the  turreted  Monitor  had 
driven  her  from  the  field  and  won  the  victory. 

The  Minnesota  had  fired  247  solid  shot,  282  shells,  and 
more  than  ten  tons  of  powder.     The  Monitor  fired  41 


chap.lvl]       the  monitor  gains  the  victory.  425 

The  last  shot       sliot,  and  was  struck  22  times.  The  last  shell 
wounds  worden.   ^^^^  -^^  ^^^  Merrimact  at  her  struck  her 

pilot-house  opposite  the  peep-hole,  through  which  Wor- 
den at  that  moment  was  looking.  He  was  knocked  down 
senseless,  and  blinded  by  the  ex]3losion.  When  conscious- 
ness returned,  the  first  question  this  brave  officer  asked 
was, "  Did  we  save  the  Minnesota  ?' 

The  shattering  of  the  pilot-house  was  the  greatest  in- 
rnjuries  received  by  jurj  that  the  Mouitor  reccivcd.  One  of  the 
the  Monitor.  irou  logs,  ulue  iuchcs  by  twelve  inches  thick, 

was  broken  in  two. 

On  board  the  Merrimack  two  were  killed  and  nineteen 
Injuries  of  the     'wouudcd.     Shc  lost  her  iron  prow,  her  star- 
Mernmack.        l^oard  auchor,  and  all  her  boats ;  her  armor 
was  dislocated  and  damaged;  she  leaked  considerably; 
her  steam-pipe  and  smoke-stack  were  riddled;  the  muz- 
zles of  two  of  her  guns  were  shot  away ;  the  woodwork 
round  one  of  the  ports  was  set  on  fire  at  every  discharge. 
In  his  report  on  the  battle,  Buchanan  states  that  in 
fifteen  minutes  after  the  action  began  he 

Buchanan's  report.    ,       ^  .in         l.      1        J    1  xl.    x  i        T 

had  run  the  Cumberland  down ;  that  he  dis- 
tinctly heard  the  crash  when  she  was  struck,  and  that 
the  fire  his  ship  received  did  her  some  injury;  that  there 
was  great  difficulty  in  managing  the  Merrimack  when 
she  was  near  the  mud,  and  that  this  was  particularly 
the  case  in  getting  into  position  to  attack  the  Congress. 
It  was  while  firing  the  red-hot  shot  and  incendiary 
shell  by  which  that  ship  was  burnt  that  he  was  him- 
self wounded. 

This  engagement  excited  the  most  profound  interest 
Important  results  throughout  thc  civilizcd  world.  It  seemed 
of  this  battle.        ^g  .£  ^-^^  ^^y  of  wooden  navies  was  over. 

Nor  was  it  alone  the  superiority  of  iron  as  against  wood 
that  was  settled  by  this  combat;  it  showed  that  a 
monitor  was  a  better  construction  than  a  mailed  broad- 


426  END  OF  THE  MERRIMACK  AND  MONITOR.        [Sect.  XL 

• 

side  ship,  and  tLat  inclined  armor  was  inferior  to  a 
turret. 

On  the  invasion  of  the  Peninsula  by  McClellan,  the 
Destruction  of  the  Confederate  government  determined  on  the 
Merrimack.  abaudoumeut  of  Norfolk  (p.  383),  and  the 

Merrimack  was  blown  up  by  them  (May  11th).    A  few 
days   subsequently,  the  Monitor,  with  the  Galena  and 
Naugatuck,  made  an  ineffectual  attack  on  Fort  Darling, 
Att.ack  on  Fort     lt>ut  it  was  fouud  that  the  turret  guns  could 
Darling.  ^^^  ^^  elcvatcd  sufficiently  to  be  of  advan- 

tage. Toward  the  close  of  the  year  she  was  ordered  to 
Beaufort,  South  Carolina,  and  foundered  in  a  storm  off 
Cape  Hatteras. 


CHAPTEE  LVn. 

THE  SORTIE  OF  LEE.  FORCING  OF  THE  NATIONAL  ARMY  UNDER 
POPE  INTO  THE  DEFENSES  OF  WASHINGTON. 

General  Pope  was  placed  in  command  of  an  army  concentrating  in  front  of  Wash- 
ington. 

The  Confederate  government,  flushed  with  its  overthrow  of  McClellan,  and  its  ar- 
mies being  greatly  strengthened  by  the  conscription,  resolved  on  a  sortie  under 
Lee,  the  counterpart  of  that  under  Bragg.  It  hoped  to  capture  Philadelphia,  and 
there  dictate  peace. 

The  first  portion  of  these  operations  was  completely  successful.  Pope  was  forced 
into  the  fortifications  of  Washington,  and  the  way  through  Maryland  opened  by 
the  Confederates. 

Military  events  showed  tliat  it  was  necessary  to  cor- 
rect the  false  distribution  of  the  forces  in  the  vicinity  of 
Washington.     The  armies  that  had  been  under  the  com- 
mand of  Generals  Fremont,  Banks,  and  McDowell  were 
consolidated  into  one,  which  was  desi2:nated 

Formation  of  the     .-,         .  ^^y.       .     .  p       i  •    t     .i 

national  Army  of  thc  Army  01  Virginia,  01  which  those  armies 
formed  the  First,  Second,  and  Third  Corps 
respectively.     Major  General  Pope  was  called  from  the 
Pope  placed  in  Wcst,  aud,  by  ordcr   of  the  President,  took 
command.       commaud    (Juue    26,  1862).     Fremont   was 
shortly  after  relieved  at  his  own  request,  and  the  com- 
mand of  his  corps  given  to  Sigel.     In  addition,  Burnside 
was  brought  from  Koanoke  Island  to  Alexandria. 

At  this  time  McClellan  was  occupying  a  position  on 
both  sides  of  the  Chickahominy.  It  was  hoped  that  his 
long-delayed  operations  against  Richmond  might  be  fa- 
cilitated by  the  vigorous  use  of  the  newly-consolidated 
He  proposes  to  ^Huy.  For  this  purpose.  Pope  intended  to 
advance    by  way    of   Charlottesville    upon 


propc 
aid  McClellan. 


428  THE  SORTIE  OF  LEE.  [Sect.  XL 

James  Eiver,  above  Riclimond,  thereby  compelling  Lee 
to  detach  a  part  of  his  army  from  the  front  of  Richmond, 
and  thus  enable  McClellan  to  complete  his  movement 
successfully.  Scarcely,  hov^ever,  had  the  march  begun, 
when  McClellan  commenced  his  disastrous  retreat  to 
Harrison's  Landing.  That  changed  at  once  the  v^hole 
plan  of  the  campaign.  A  meeting  of  the  cabinet  was 
held,  and  Pope  called  before  it.  It  was  plain  that  some- 
thing must  be  done  for  the  relief  of  the  Potomac  Army, 
by  a  direct  march  ^ud  that  Speedily.  Pope  offered  to  march 
upon  Richmond.  ^^^^  Frcdcricksburg  direct  upon  Richmond 
with  his  whole  force — notwithstanding  that  Lee  would 
be  between  him  and  McClellan,  and  could  strike  in  suc- 
cession at  both — on  condition  that  peremptory  orders 
should  be  sent  to  McClellan,  and  such  measures  taken  in 
advance  that  it  would  not  be  possible  for  him  to  evade 
on  any  pretext  making  a  vigorous  attack  upon  the  enemy 
with  his  whole  army  the  moment  he  heard  that  Pope  was 
engaged.  At  this  time  Pope's  force  was  forty-three  thou- 
sand men. 

On  assuming  command,  Pope  issued  an  order  to  his 
army,  in  which  there  occurred  certain  expressions  sup- 
posed to  cast  reflections  on  McClellan : 

"  I  have  come  to  you  from  the  West,  where  we  have 
Pope's  offensive  always  sceu  the  backs  of  our  enemies — from 
an  army  whose  business  it  has  been  to  seek 
the  adversary,  and  to  beat  him  when  found — whose  poli- 
cy has  been  attack,  and  not  defense.  I  desire  you  to  dis- 
miss from  your  minds  certain  phrases  which  I  am  sorry 
to  find  much  in  vogue  among  you.  I  hear  constantly  of 
taking  strong  positions,  and  holding  them — of  lines  of  re- 
treat, and  bases  of  supplies.  Let  us  discard  such  ideas. 
The  strongest  position  a  soldier  should  desire  to  occup}^ 
is  one  from  which  he  can  most  easily  advance  against  the 
enemy.    Let  us  study  the  probable  lines  of  retreat  of  our 


Chap.  LVII.]  POPE  AND  McCLELLAN.  429 

opponents,  and  leave  our  own  to  take  care  of  themselves. 
Let  us  look  before,  and  not  behind." 

If  the  appointment  of  Pope  to  his  new  command  was 
Its  unhappy  con-  distasteful  to  McClellau  and  his  military 
sequences.  eutouragc,  such  iusinuatious  could  not  fail 

to  engender  a  bitter  animosity.  With  reluctance  does  the 
historian  allude  to  these  personal  differences,  and  find 
himself  constrained  to  draw  his  reader's  attention  to 
them,  since  there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  they  had  an 
influence  in  producing  the  disasters  of  the  ensuing  cam- 
paign. 

It  was  the  desire  of  the  government  (1)  that  Pope 
Duties  assigned  to  shouM  covcr  Washiugtou ;  (2),  that  he 
^°^^'  should  assure  the  safety  of  the  Valley  of 

the  Shenandoah ;  (3),  that  he  should  so  operate  as  to 
draw  a  part  of  Lee's  army  from  Richmond,  and  thereby 
facilitate  McClellan's  movements.  It  seemed  to  Pope 
that  the  security  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley  was  not  best 
obtained  by  posting  troops  in  the  Valley  itself,  but  by 
concentrating  his  forces  at  some  point  from  which,  if  any 
attempt  were  made  to  enter  the  Valley,  he  should  be  able 
to  interpose  and  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  force  making 
such  attempt. 

Accordingly,  he  gave  orders  to  that  effect.  But,  while 
the  movements  were  in  progress,  McClellan 
McClellan's  i"e-'°  rctrcatcd  to  Harrlsou's  Landing.  When  it 
was  first  known  in  Washington  that  this  re- 
treat was  contemplated,  Pope  suggested  to  the  President 
its  impolicy,  and  urged  that  orders  should  be  sent  to 
McClellan  to  mass  his  whole  force  on  the  north  side  of 
the  Chickahominy,  and  endeavor  to  make  his  way  in  the 
direction  of  Hanover  Court-house.  He  added  that  to 
retreat  to  James  River  was  to  go  away  from  re-enforce- 
ments, so  far  as  his  army  was  concerned,  and  to  give  the 
enemy  the  privilege  and  power  of  exchanging  Richmond 


430  HALLECK  APPOINTED  GENERAL  IN  CHIEF.       [Sect.  XI. 

for  Washington;  that  to  them  the  loss  of  Eichmond 
would  be  trifling,  while  the  loss  of  Washington  would  be 
conclusive,  or  nearly  so,  in  its  results  upon  the  war. 
Deeply  impressed  with  these  views,  he  addressed  a  letter 
to  McClellan  at  Harrison's  Landing,  earnestly  asking  his 
views  and  offering  him  co-operation.  To  this  he  received 
a  lukewarm  reply.  It  became  apparent  that,  considering 
the  situation  in  which  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the 
Army  of  Virginia  were  placed  in  relation  to  each  other, 
and  the  absolute  necessity  of  harmonious  and  prompt 
co-operation  between  them,  some  military  superior,  both 
of  McClellan  and  Pope,  ought  to  be  called 
poTutin/naifedc   to  Washin^tou  and  placed  in  2:eneral  com- 

general  in  chief.  '-'  ^  ■"■  V 

mand.  It  was  under  these  circumstances 
that  Halleck  was  brought  from  the  West  and  appointed 
general  in  chief  Pope,  now  believing  that  the  interests 
of  the  nation  would  be  best  subserved  by  his  so  doing, 
requested  to  be  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  Army 
of  Virginia,  and  to  be  returned  to  the  West.  But  this 
was  not  complied  with. 

Encouraged  by  the  extraordinary  good  fortune  that 

had  befallen  it  in  the  complete  failure  of 

tiou  o?the  Con-'    McClcllan's  campaie^n,  the  Confederate  0:0 v- 

federates.  .        ^  .  °. 

ernment  detei^mmed  on  resorting  to  offensive 
operations.  The  conscription  had  so  greatly  re-enforced 
its  armies,  they  had  become  so  invigorated  by  victory,  that 
nothing  seemed  impossible.  The  troops  before  whom  the 
Peninsular  expedition  had  recoiled  might  well  expect  to 
force  their  way  through  all  resistance,  and  break  every 
investing  line.  A  triumphant  march  through  Maryland 
would  be  followed  by  the  fall  of  Washington,  and  the  in- 
dependence of  the  Confederacy  might  be  secured  by  a 
treaty  of  peace  exacted  in  Philadelphia. 

A  sortie  through  Maryland  was  therefore  resolved 


Chap.  LVII.]    THE  CONFEDERATES  ON  THE  RAPIDAN.  43 1 

They  resolve  upon  ^P^^'  Such  WRs  the  military  strengtli  de- 
a  sortie  rivcd  from  the  conscription  that  a  simulta- 

neous movement  with  a  similar  object  was  ordered  on 
the  other  side  of  the  AUeghanies.    Bragg  was  to  force  his 
way  to  Louisville  and  Cincinnati,  Lee  to  Philadelphia. 
In  Chapter  LIIL  we  have  described  the  fortune  that 
befell  Bragg's  sortie ;  in  this  and  the  suc- 
the  sortie  of '^       ceedinsT  chapter  we  have  to  consider  that 

Bragg.  /»x 

01  Lee. 

Early  in  August  the  divisions  of  Ewell,  Hill,  and  Jack- 
Their  advance  to    SOU  had  advauccd  to  the  Rapidan,  and  the 
the  Rapidan.        natloual  govcmment,  having  ascertained  the 
intention  of  its  antagonist,  made  preparation  for  resist- 
ance.    All  farther  thoughts  of  an  advance  against  Eich- 
mond  were  abandoned ;  it  was  determined  to  accomplish 
the  junction  of  McClellan's  forces  with  those  of  Pope  on 
the  Rappahannock  by  bringing  them  to  Acquia  Creek. 
McClellan  earnestly  entreated  that  the  order  for  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Potomac  Army  might  be  rescinded,  and 
even  took  the  responsibility  of  delaying  the  evacuation 
of  Harrison's  Landing  for  several  days.     On  the  14th  of 
August  the  movement  was  commenced.     As  the  corps 
reached  Alexandria  and  Acquia  Creek,  they 

The  Potomac  Army  ,1111,1  in 

brou|ht  to  Acquia  wcrc  to  DC  placcQ  uudcr  the  command  oi 
Pope.  The  forces  heretofore  in  Western 
Virginia  were  also  drawn  toward  Washington,  and  an  or- 
der was  issued  by  the  President  calling  for  300,000  men 
by  draft  (August  4th,  1862). 

The  principles  upon  which  Pope  proposed  to  conduct 
Pope's  principles  thc  Campaign  were  in  strong  contrast  with 
of  the  campaign.    ^^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  obscrvcd  by  McClellau. 

Among  other  things,  he  ordered  his  troops  to  subsist  on 
the  country,  giving  vouchers  for  the  supplies  they  took ; 
contributions  for  the  subsistence  of  the  cavalry  were  to 
be  laid  on  villages  and  neigtborhoods ;  the  inhabitants 


432  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  [Sect.  XI. 

along  railroad  and  telegraph  lines  were  teld  responsible 
for  damages  done  to  them  otherwise  than  by  the  Confed- 
erate army;  if  a  soldier  was  fired  at  from  a  house,  the 
house  was  to  be  razed  to  the  ground.  Disloyal  citizens 
were  to  be  arrested,  and,  if  they  refused  to  give  security 
for  good  conduct,  were  to  be  sent  South,  beyond  the  ex- 
treme pickets ;  should  they  return,  they  were  to  be  treat- 
ed as  spies.  As  the  Confederate  army  largely  counted 
on  the  aid  it  expected  to  receive  from  the  inhabitants  of 
the  country  through  which  it  intended  to  pass,  these  or- 
ders were  received  witli  indignation  at  Kichmond.  A 
retaliatory  order  was  issued,  declarinsf  that 

Eetaliatory  raeas-      -pj  -,  ,  .  •      •  t    ^ 

tires  of  the  Con-     roDe  snio.  uis  commissioucd  omcers  were  not 

federates.  •  i     t  i 

entitled  to  be  considered  as  soldiers ;  that^ 
in  the  event  of  his  capture,  he  should  be  placed  in  close 
confinement.  His  ofiicers  were  to  be  dealt  with  in  the 
same  manner;  and  if  any  Confederate  citizen  was  exe- 
cuted under  his  order,  a  prisoner  selected  from  the  na- 
tional commissioned  officers  should  in  retaliation  be  hung. 
In  a  letter  from  Lee  to  Halleck  (August  2d)  in  rela- 
tion to  these  retaliations,  the  former  so  far  forgot  himself 
as  to  extort  from  Halleck  the  rebuke,  "  As  these  letters 
are  couched  in  language  exceedingly  insulting  to  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States,  I  must  respectfully  decline 
to  receive  them.     They  are  returned  herewith." 

As  a  guide  to  the  reader  through  what  he  might  other- 
Generai  sketch  of  wlsc  fiud  coufusiug  aud  pcrhaps  unintelligi- 
Lee's  campaign.  ^^^  dctails,  it  may  bc  statcd  that,  at  the  out- 
set of  the  campaign.  Pope's  front  was  perpendicular  to  the 
Potomac,  his  left  wing  resting  against  that  river.  Writers 
on  military  affairs  insist  that,  when  an  army  points  thus 
with  one  wing  against  an  insurmountable  object,  the  other 
wing  being  "in  the  air,"  it  is  always  to  be  attacked  on  this 
last  wing  and  pressed  against  the  obstacle,  when  it  will 
be  forced  to  surrender.     The  Confederate  general  accord- 


chap.lvii.]  cedar  mountain.  433 

ingly  followed  tliat  precept.  It  was  his  intention  to  have 
defeated  Pope  before  the  Potomac  Army  could  come  to  his 
support,  but  delays  taking  place  rendered  that  impracti- 
cable ;  he  then  proceeded  to  turn  the  right  wing  of  the 
national  army  by  sending  Jackson  through  Thoroughfare 
Gap,  apd  afterward  again  he  outflanked  it  at  Centreville. 
This  brought  Pope  into  the  fortifications  of  Washington. 
Not  that  these  movements  were  executed  without  er- 
Miiitary  mistakes  ^or.  Whcu  Lce  dlvldcd  his  army  in  front 
on  both  Bides.  of  }iig  autagouist,  he  committed  a  serious 
mistake.  He  gave  Pope  an  opportunity  of  dealing  him 
a  fatal  blow.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  a  grave  mistake 
that  Pope  was  not  sufliciently  re-enforced  to  take  advan- 
tage of  that  opportunity,  and  the  persistence  with  which 
the  left  wing  of  his  army  retained  its  position  was  also  a 
serious  fault.  Burnside  ought  to  have  been  brought  from 
Fredericksburg.  For  these  things,  however.  Pope  can 
hardly  be  held  responsible,  since  he  was  under  injunc- 
tions from  Washington — injunctions  arising  from  reasons 
connected  with  the  movements  of  the  Potomac  Army. 

The  first  contact  of  the  opposing  armies  took  place 
The  affair  at  Cedar  (August  9th)  at  Ccdar  Mouutaiu,  half  a  doz- 
Mountam.  ^^  milcs  south  of  Culpcppcr  Court-house, 

where  Pope  had  established  his  head-quarters,  and  was 
threatening  Gordonsville  with  a  view  to  facilitate  the 
withdrawal  of  the  army  from  the  Peninsula.  A  contest 
ensued  between  the  divisions  of  Ewell  and  Jackson  on 
the  Confederate  side,  and  the  corps  of  Banks  on  the  na- 
tional. After  a  severe  struggle  the  latter  was  defeated. 
Jackson  held  his  position  on  the  mountain  for  the  two 
following  days,  and  then,  finding  that  his  communications 
were  endangered,  retired  across  the  Eapidan. 

From  an  autograph  letter  of  Lee  which  fell  into  Pope's 
hands  (August  16th),  it  was  ascertained  that  that  com- 
II.— E  E 


THE  SORTIE  OF  LEE. 


Chap.  LVII.]  THE  TURNING  OF  POPE'S  RIGHT.  435 

mander  was  moving  by  forced  marches,  with  the  whole 
Confederate  army,  to  attack  Pope  before  a  junction  could 
be  formed  between  him  and  the  Potomac  Army,  and  to 
outnumber  and  destroy  him.  Under  instructions  from 
Pope  retires  from  Hallcck,  Popc  thcrcforc  abstalucd  from  cross- 
theRapidan.  -^^  ^j^^  Eapldau,  aud, .  retiring,  took  post 
behind  the  North  Fork  of  the  Kappahannock  (August 
19th).  On  the  same  day,  Lee,  with  a  large  force,  crossed 
the  Kapidan. 

Finding  himself  about  to  be  overmatched,  and  yet  or- 
dered to  maintain  his  communications  with  Fredericks- 
burg, Pope  telegraphed  again  and  again  to  Washington 
that  he  must  either  be  re-enforced  or  retreat ;  that  the  en- 
emy was  moving  toward  his  right,  and  that  it  was  impos- 
sible for  him  to  extend  his  lines  to  resist  it  without  aban- 
doning Fredericksburg.  He  was  instructed  to  hold  his 
ground  for  two  days  longer,  when  he  should  be  re-en- 
forced: he  did  so  for  four  days,  and'had  then  only  re- 
ceived about  7000  men.  On  the  night  of  the  2  2d  the  Con- 
federate General  Stuart,  having  the  previous  day  crossed 
the  river  at  Waterloo  Bridge  with  some  cavalry,  sur- 
Hig  head-quarters  prlscd  Popc's  hcad-quartcrs  at  Catlett's  Sta- 
captured.  ^-^^  duriug  tho  darkucss  of  a  violent  storm, 

Pope  himself  being  at  the  time  near  Kappahannock  Sta- 
tion. Stuart  captured  his  personal  baggage,  with  his  dis- 
patch-book, and  destroyed  several  wagons. 

It  was  not  Lee's  intention  to  force  a  passage  of  the 
Lee  turns  Pope's  i*iver.  Hls  objcct  was,  by  a  flank  movement, 
"^^^"  to  turn  Pope's  right,  get  in  his  rear,  and  cut 

off  his  supplies  from  Washington,  and  place  the  Confed- 
erate army  in  such  a  position  that  it  could  either  move 
upon  that  city  or  through  Leesburg  into  Maryland. 

While  Jackson  was  executing  this  movement  on  the 
national  right,  Longstreet  was  operating  on  Pope's  front 
to  engage  his  attention.     Jackson  passed  through  Thor- 


436  POPE  FALLS  BACK.  [Sect.  XI. 

oughfare  Gap,  reaching  (August  26tli)  Bristow's  Station 

on  tlie  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad. 

through  Thor-^     Witliout  dclav  lie  sent  a  detachment  under 

oughfare  Gap.  -n  r  t  • 

Stuart  to  Manassas  Junction,  and  captured 
it  that  night,  taking  8  guns,  10  locomotives,  7  trains,  and 
immense  quantities  of  quartermaster  and  commissary 
stores. 

Pope  was  thus  attempting  to  hold  at  bay  the  entire 
Pope  waiting  for  Confederate  army,  anxiously  expecting  the 
the  Potomac  Army,  pj^^mised  re  -  euforccmcnts  from  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  He  had  assigned  those  troops  as  they 
should  come  up  to  suitable  positions,  directing,  among 
other  things,  that  the  first  division  which  should  reach 
Manassas  Junction  should  take  post  in  the  works  of  that 
place,  and  that  its  cavalry  should  be  pushed  forward  to 
watch  Thoroughfare  Gap. 

On  the  day.  following  the  capture  of  Manassas  Junc- 
tion, an  attempt  was  made  by  some  troops  stationed  on 
the  other  side  of  Bull  Run  to  recover  it ;  but  they  were 
unsuccessful,  and  the  Confederate  cavalry,  passing  the 
Run,  advanced  beyond  Fairfax  Station.  Jackson  had 
now  brought  up  from  Bristow  his  own  and  Hill's  divis- 
ions ;  but,  finding  that  Pope's  army  was  converging  upon 
him,  he    abandoned  Manassas,  having    de- 

Jackson  destroys         ,  tt  ....  p  -,.  ir»n 

supplies  at  Ma-      stroycd  large  quantities  ot  supplies,  and  tell 
back  toward  Longstreet,  who  was  to  come 
through  Thoroughfare  Gap. 

When  Pope  discovered  the  Confederate  movement  on 
Pope  again  falls  ^^^  Tight  flauk,  and  fouud  that  he  was  dis- 
^^""^  appointed  in  the  re-enforcements  from  the 

Potomac  Army,  he  fell  back,  in  three  columns,  from  War- 
renton  and  Warrenton  Junction.  His  force,  as  estimated 
by  himself,  was  at  this  moment  about  forty  thousand, 
that  of  the  Confederates  at  least  eighty  thousand.  He 
was,  however,  now  joined  by  Heintzelman's  corps  of  ten 


Chap.  LVII.]  POPE  AND  JACKSON.  437 

thousand,  but  it  came  without  artillery  wagons,  or  horses 
for  the  field  and  general  officers.  Porter's  division  ar- 
rived broken  down  with  fatigue.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, it  was  not  possible  for  Pope  to  maintain  his  front 
after  a  suitable  body  had  been  detached  to  defeat  Jack- 
son on  his  flank.  In  his  report  he  says :  "  The  movement 
of  General  Jackson  in  the  direction  of  Thoroughfare  Gap, 
while  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  confronted  me  at  Sul- 
phur Springs  and  Waterloo  Bridge,  was  well  known  to 
Is  still  expecting  re-  ^^,  ^^^  I  ^^^  rclled  Confidently  upon  the 
enforcements.  forccs  wHch  I  had  bccu  assurcd  would  be 
sent  from  Alexandria,  and  one  strong  division  of  which 
I  had  ordered  to  take  post  on  the  works  at  Manassas 
Junction.  I  was  entirely  under  the  belief  that  these 
would  be  there,  and  it  was  not  until  I  found  my  com- 
munication intercepted  that  I  was  undeceived.  I  knew 
that  this  movement  was  no  raid,  and  that  it  was  made 
by  not  less  than  25,000  men." 

Of  Pope's  retreating  columns,  that  under  Hooker  en- 
Hooker  defeats  couutcred  the  Confederates,  under  Ewell,  on 
^^^'"-  the  27th,  driving  him  from  the  field  with 

considerable  loss.  Hooker's  division  went  into  this  ac- 
tion with  only  forty  rounds  of  ammunition,  and  when  the 
work  was  done  had  only  ^ve  rounds  to  each  man  left.  It 
was  this  defeat  of  Ewell  that  compelled  Jackson  to  evac- 
uate Manassas.  His  position  had  become  perilous.  K 
Pope  could  have  blocked  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  pre- 
vented the  passage  of  Longstreet,  he  might  have  fallen 
with  an  overwhelming  force  on  Jackson.  To  aid  in  this 
movement,  Pope  sent  explicit  orders  to  Porter,  but  they 
were  not  executed. 

Jackson,  seeing  his  danger,  fell  back  from  Manassas, 

Jackson  retires     ^ot  loj  the  route  through  which  he  had 

from  Manassas,     qqj^q^  whlch  would  have  brought  him  upon 

McDowell  and  Sigel,  who  were  west  of  him,  but  across 


438  POPE  AND  JACKSON.  [Sect.  XL 

Bull  Run  by  Centreville.    Pope  readied  Manassas  about 
midday  on  the  28tli,  in  less  tlian  an  hour  after  Jackson 
and  is  followed  by  ^'^  persou  had  left  it.     He  pushed  forward 
Pope.  Hooker,Kearny,  and  Eeno  upon  Centreville, 

ordering  Porter  to  come  to  the  Junction,  and  McDowell 
to  move  upon  Centreville.  McDowell  had  detached  Rick- 
etts's  division  toward  Thoroughfare  Gap,  so  that  it  was 
no  longer  available  in  this  movement. 

In  the  evening  of  the  28th  Kearny  drove  the  enemy's 
rear-guard  out  of  Centreville.  One  portion  of  it  took  the 
road  to  Sudley's  Spring,  the  other  the  Warrenton  Turnpike 
toward  Gainesville,  destroying  the  bridges  over  Bull  Run 
and  Cub  Run.  The  corps  of  McDowell  and  Sigel,  with 
Reynolds's  division,  now  marching  toward  Centreville, 
encountered  the  advance  of  Jackson's  force,  retreating  to- 
ward Thoroughfare  Gap,  about  six  o'clock  that  evening. 
An  action  took  place  which  was  indecisive,  and  was  ter- 
minated by  the  darkness.  On  learning  this.  Pope,  who 
was  now  at  Centreville,  felt  that  there  was 

Expectation  that  r*  t      i  \  T        i         i 

Jackson  would  be  uo   escapo  lor  JacKSon.     Accorclinsrly,  he 

enveloped.  ^     o  c/  / 

sent  orders  to  McDowell  to  hold  his  ground 
at  all  hazards,  and  prevent  the  retreat  of  Jackson  to  the 
West.  He  intended  that  at  daylight  the  entire  national 
forces  from  Centreville  and  Manassas  should  attack  the 
enemy,  who  must  be  crushed  between  them.  He  sent 
orders  to  Kearny  to  move  cautiously,  after  midnight, 
from  Centreville  along  the  Warrenton  Turnpike,  to  keep 
close  to  the  enemy,  and  at  daylight  to  assault  him  vigor- 
ously with  his  right  advance.  Hooker  and  Reno  would 
support  him  very  soon  after  dawn.  He  ordered  Porter, 
who  he  supposed  was  at  Manassas  Junction,  to  move 
upon  Centreville  as  soon  as  it  was  light. 

Pope's  forces  were  therefore  so  disposed  that  McDowell, 

Pope's  arrangements   Slgcl,  aud  RcyUoMs,  whoSC  COnjolut  StrCUgth 

for  that  purpose.       ^^^  25,000,  wcrc  immediately  west  of  Jack- 


Chap.LVII.]  the  battle  OF  GAINESVILLE.  439 

son,  between  him  and  Thorouglifare  Gap,  while  Kearny, 
Hooker,  Reno,  and  Porter,  of  tlie  same  strength,  were  to 
fall  on  him  from  the  east  at  daylight.  Longstreet  was 
so  far  off  that,  by  using  the  whole  force  vigorously.  Pope 
could  crush  Jackson  before  Longstreet  could  possibly  ar- 
rive. 

Before  daylight,  however.  Pope  learned  that  King's 
Longstreet  passes  divlsiou,  wMch  had  beeu  attempting  to  bar 
Thoroughfare  Gap.  L^^^gstreet's  Way,  had  fallen  back  from  Thor- 
oughfare Gap  toward  Manassas  Junction.  The  passage 
through  the  Gap  was  now  open.  New  dispositions  had 
become  necessary. 

Pope  therefore  at  once  sent  orders  to  Sigel,  supported 
Pope  adopts  new  ^J  Reyuolds,  to  attack  the  enemy  vigorous- 
dispositions.        2^  ^g  g^^^  ^g  ^^  ^^^g  light  enough  to  see,  and 

bring  him  to  a  stand.  He  ordered  Heintzelman  to  push 
forward  from  Centreville  toward  Gainesville  at  the  same 
time  with  the  divisions  of  Hooker  and  Kearny.  Reno 
was  directed  to  follow  them  closely.  As  soon  as  they 
came  up  with  Jackson,  they  were  to  attack  him  with  the 
utmost  vigor.  Pope  also  ordered  Porter,  then  at  Manas- 
sas, to  move  with  the  greatest  rapidity  on  Gainesville, 
and  turn  Jackson's  flank  at  the  point  where  the  Warren- 
ton  Turnpike  is  intersected  by  the  road  from  Manassas 
Junction  to  Gainesville.  > 

Accordingly,  Sigel  attacked  Jackson  at  daylight  on 
the  29th,  a  mile  or  two  east  of  Groveton. 

Battle  of  Gaines-         tt      i  t    tt-  •   t  i 

viiie,  or  Second  Bull  MooKer  ancl  Kcamy  quickly  coming  up, 
Jackson  fell  back  some  distance,  but  he  was 
so  closely  pressed  that  at  length  he  was  compelled  to 
make  a  stand.  He  accordingly  took  up  a  position  with 
his  left  in  the  neighborhood  of  Sudley's  Spring,  his  right 
a  little  to  the  south  of  Warrenton  Turnpike,  and  his  line 
covered  by  an  old  railroad  grade  which  leads  from  Gaines- 
ville in  the  direction  of  Leesburg.     His  batteries,  which 


440 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GAINESVILLE. 


[Sect.  XI. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   GAINESVILLE. 


were  numerous,  and  some  of  them  of  heavy  calibre,  were 
posted  behind  ridges  in  the  open. ground  on  both  sides 
of  Warrenton  Turnpike,  while  the  mass  of  his  troops 
was  sheltered  in  dense  woods  behind  the  railroad  em- 
bankment. Pope  arrived  from  Centreville  about  noon, 
Pope's  report  of  the  ^^^  fouud  both  armies  much  cut  up  by  the 
^^"^^"  action  in  which  they  had  been  already  en- 

gaged. Heintzelman  was  on  the  right  of  the  line;  Sigel 
on  his  left,  extending  a  short  distance  south  of  the  War- 
renton Turnpike.  The  extreme  left  was  occupied  by 
Reynolds.  Of  Reno's  corps,  part  had  gone  into  action, 
and  part  was  in  reserve  in  the  rear  of  the  centre.  Pope 
now  informed  the  different  commanders  that  Porter  and 
McDowell  w^ere  coming  up  from  Manassas  Junction,  and 
would  soon  be  in  position  to  fall  upon  Jackson's  right 
flank,  and  probably  upon  his  rear.  From  twelve  till  four 
o^clock  very  severe  skirmishes  constantly  occurred  when- 
ever Jackson  showed  a  disposition  to  retreat.  About 
two  o'clock  firing  was  heard  in  the  direction  of  Jackson's 


Chap.  LVII.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  GAINESVILLE.  441 

right.  Pope  now  supposed  that  Porter  and  McDowell 
had  reached  their  position,  and  were  coming  into  action. 
The  firing,  however,  soon  ceased.  Information  then  came 
that  McDowell  would  be  up  in  a  couple  of  hours.  Pope 
then  sent  peremptory  orders  to  Porter  to  attack  the  ene- 
my's right,  and,  if  possible,  turn  his  rear.  "When  a  suffi- 
cient time  had  elapsed  for  this  to  be  done,  he  ordered 
Heintzelman  and  Eeno  to  attack  in  front.  Accordingly, 
they  did  so,  forcing  back  Jackson's  left  toward  his  centre, 
and  driving  it  from  that  part  of  the  field.  In  this  attack, 
Grover's  brigade,  of  Hooker's  division,  was  particularly 
distinguished  by  a  bayonet  charge  it  made,  breaking  two 
of  the  enemy's  lines,  and  penetrating  to  the  third  before 
it  could  be  checked.  McDowell  had  now  arrived  on  the 
field  and  joined  in  the  battle,  but  Porter  never  came; 
At  sunset  Longstreet's  troops  from  the  Gap  were  fast 
Arrival  of  Long-    comiug  up  to  tho  re-cnforcemeut  of  Jackson, 

street  on  the  field.    ^^^  ^^  ^^^-^^  ^^^^  ^^^j^^  ^^^^^^  ^^  ^^^  ^^^^^ 

each  having  lost  about  7000  men. 

In  his  report  Pope  says :  "  About  8  P.M.  the  greater 
Pope's  accusations  portlou  of  tho  field  of  battlc  was  occupied 
against  Porter.  ^^  ^^^  army.  Nothiug  was  heard  of  Gen- 
eral Porter  up  to  that  time,  and  his  forces  took  no  part 
whatever  in  the  action,  but  were  suffered  by  him  to  lie 
idle  on  their  arms,  within  sight  and  sound  of  the  battle, 
during  the  whole  day.  So  far  as  I  know,  he  made  no  ef 
fort  whatever  to  comply  with  my  orders  or  to  take  any 
part  in  the  action.  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that,  if  he  had 
discharged  his  duty  as  became  a  soldier  under  the  circum- 
stances, and  had  made  a  vigorous  attack  on  the  enemy, 
as  he  was  expected  and  directed  to  do,  at  any  time  up  to 
eight  o'clock  that  night,  we  should  have  utterly  crushed 
and  captured  the  larger  portion  of  Jackson's  force  before 
he  could  have  been  by  any  possibility  sufficiently  re-en- 
forced to  have  made  an  effective  resistance.     I  did  not 


442  ^OPE  IS  INADEQUATELY  SUSTAINED.  [Sect.  XI. 

myself  feel  for  a  moment  that  it  was  necessary  for  me, 
having  given  General  Porter  an  order  to  march  toward 
the  enemy  in  a  particular  direction,  to  send  him,  in  addi- 
tion, specific  orders  to  attack ;  it  being  his  clear  duty,  and 
in  accordance  with  every  military  precept,  to  have  brought 
his  forces  into  action  whenever  he  encountered  the  enemy, 
when  a  furious  battle  with  that  enemy  was  raging  during 
the  whole  day  in  his  immediate  presence.  I  believe — in 
fact,  I  am  positive — that,  at  ^ve  o'clock  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  29th,  General  Porter  had  in  his  front  no  consider- 
able body  of  the  enemy.  I  believed  then,  as  I  am  very 
sure  now,  that  it  was  easily  practicable  for  him  to  have 
turned  the  right  flank  of  Jackson  and  to  have  fallen  upon 
his  rear ;  that,  if  he  had  done  so,  we  should  have  gained 
a  decisive  victory  over  the  army  under  Jackson  before  he 
could  have  been  joined  by  any  of  the  forces  under  Long- 
street,  and  that  the  army  of  General  Lee  would  have  been 
so  crippled  and  checked  by  the  destruction  of  this  large 
force  as  to  have  been  no  longer  in  condition  to  prosecute 
farther  operations  of  an  aggressive  character." 

On  the  next  morning  (30th)  the  battle  was  renewed 

but  it  was  now  too  late.     Pope's  horses  had  been  in  har 

ness  for  ten  days — two  days  they  had  been  without  for 

age.     To  his  urgent  appeals  for  re-enforcements,  McClel 

He  could  not  Ob-    l^u,  who  was  uow  at  Alexandria,  had  re 

tain  aid.  ^^.^^  ^^  ^^^  27th,  ^^  do  uot  scc  that  we 

have  force  enough  in  hand  to  form  a  connection  with 
Pope,  whose '  exact  position  we  do  not  know."  To  his 
entreaty  for  rations  on  the  28th,  the  same  officer  had  an- 
swered that  he  should  have  them  "  as  soon  as  he  would 
send  in  a  cavalry  escort  to  Alexandria  as  a  guard  to  the 
trains."  In  his  report  Pope  says,  "  I  do  not  see  what 
service  cavalry  could  have  rendered  in  guarding  railroad 
trains.  It  was  not  until  I  received  this  letter  that  I  began 
to  feel  discouraged  and  nearly  hopeless  of  any  successful 


Chap.  LVII.]        HE  FALLS  BACK  TO  CENTKEVILLE.  443 

issue  to  the  operations  witli  whicli  I  was  charged."  To 
Ms  request  on  the  30th  for  more  ammunition,  he  was  an- 
swered, "  I  know  nothing  of  the  calibres  of  Pope's  artille- 
ry." In  a  telegram  to  President  Lincoln  on  the  afternoon 
of  August  29th,  at  the  very  moment  when  Pope  was  hero 
ically  engaged  with  Jackson,  and  momentarily  expecting 
the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  General  McClellan  suggested 
that  among  the  courses  that  might  be  adopted  there  was 
one — "to  leave  Pope  to  get  out  of  his  scrape,  and  at  once 
use  all  our  means  to  make  the  capital  perfectly  safe." 
It  is  said  that  when  President  Lincoln  read  this  dispatch 
he  was  so  horror-stricken  that  he  fell  back  in  his  chair. 

Pope's  report  of  the  transactions  of  the  30th  is  as  fol- 
lows :  "  The  enemy's  heavy  re-enforcements  having  reach- 
ed him  on  Friday  afternoon  and  night,  he  began  to  mass 
on  his  right  for  the  purpose  of  crushing  our  left,  and  oc- 
cupying the  road  to  Centreville  in  our  rear.  His  heavi- 
est assault  was  made  about  ^ve  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, 
when,  after  overwhelming  Fitz  John  Porter  and  driving 
his  forces  back  on  the  centre  and  left,  mass  after  mass  of 
his  forces  was  pushed  against  our  left.  A  terrible  con- 
test, with  great  slaughter,  was  carried  on  for  several  hours, 
our  men  behaving  with  firmness  and  gallantry,  under  the 
immediate  command  of  General  McDowell.  When  night 
closed  our  left  had  been  forced  back  about  half  a  mile, 
but  still  remained  firm  and  unshaken,  while  our  right 
held  its  ground.  General  Franklin,  with  his  corps,  ar- 
rived after  dark  at  Centreville,  six  miles  in  our  rear,  while 
Sumner  was  four  miles  behind  Franklin.  I  could  have 
brought  up  these  corps  in  the  morning  in  time  to  have 
renewed  the  action,  but  starvation  stared  both  men  and 
horses  in  the  face,  and,  broken  and  exhausted  as  the}^ 
Is  compelled  to  re-  wcrc,  they  >vere  in  no  condition  to  bear  hun- 
tire  to  centreville.  ^^^  ^^^^^  j  accordiugly  retired  to  Centre- 
ville that  night  in  perfect  order." 


444  CHANTILLY.  [Sect.  XI. 

On  the  31st  Lee  sent  Jackson  northward  for  the  pur- 
pose of  again  turning  Pope's  right.    Pope,  supposing  that 
this  attempt  would  be  made,  had  prepared  to  resist  it, 
^^^   ^.„     and  on  the  eveninoj  of  the  foUowins:  day  a 

Battle  of  Chantilly.  O  ^  ^         &  J 

conflict  occurred  near  Chantilly,  in  the  midst 
of  a  terrible  thunder-storm.  In  this  General  Stevens  and 
General  Kearny  were  killed,  but  the  attack  was  checked. 
Pope,  now  forced  back  to  the  works  of  Washington,  re- 
signed his  command,  and  was  succeeded  by  McClellan. 
Losses  of  the  His  losses  iu  the  campaign  were  probably 
campaign.         ^^^  j^^^  ^-^^^  30,000  meu,  30  guns,  20,000 

small-arms,  and  vast  quantities  of  munitions  and  supplies. 
Lee's  loss  during  these  operations  was  probably  about 
15,000  men. 

Justice  has  not  yet  been  rendered  to  General  Pope  for 
Pope's  conduct  in    ^^^  couduct  lu  this  Campaign.    He  had  a 
the  campaign.       ^^^^  difficult  task  to  accomplish,  and  had  to 
depend  on  very  unreliable  means.     Though  there  never 
was  purer  patriotism  than  that  which  animated  the  sol- 
diers of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  that  army  had  been 
brought,  through  the  influence  of  ofiicers  who  surround- 
conditionofthe    ^^  General  McClellan,  into  a  most  danger- 
potomacArmy.     ^^^  couditlou — daugcrous  to  the  best  in- 
terests of  the  nation — of  having  a  wish  of  its  own,  and 
that  wish  in  opposition  to  the  convictions  of  the  govern- 
ment.   In  armies  it  is  but  a  very  short  step  from  the  pos- 
session of  a  wish  to  the  expression  of  a  will.    Perhaps  at 
no  period  of  the  war  were  thoughtful  men  more  deeply 
alarmed  for  the  future  of  the  nation  than  when  they 
heard  of  the  restoration  of  McClellan  to  the  command, 
and  recognized  the  unmistakable  constraint  under  which 
the  government  had  acted.    It  was  in  vain  for  well-mean- 
ing persons  to  affirm  that  the  general  had  never  been  re- 
lieved, and  that  what  had  now  taken  place  was  no  more 


CJhap.LVII.]      POPE'S  CONDUCT  IN  THE  CAMPAIGN.  445 

than  an  ordinary  proceeding :  the  Peninsular  disaster  was 
too  recent,  the  complaints  and  asseverations  of  Pope  of 
disobedience  to  Ms  orders  among  the  higher  officers  too 
loud  for  the  real  state  of  affairs  to  be  concealed. 

"  Leave  Pope  to  get  out  of  his  scrape !"  What  had 
Pope  done  to  merit  inevitable  destruction  ? 
E  eufrgVticauT  He  had  gone  down  to  the  Rapidan  in  obe- 
dience to  orders  to  compel  the  enemy  to  re- 
lease his  hold  on  the  army  in  the  Peninsula.  He  was 
keeping  at  bay  in  the  best  manner  he  could — nay,  more, 
he  was  desperately  assailing  Lee's  ablest  lieutenants.  For 
more  than  a  fortnight  he  was  fighting  battle  after  battle 
against  overwhelming  forces,  first,  to  prevent  the  junction 
of  his  antaoconists,  and  then  to  resist  their  whole  mass. 
He  mio-ht  have  been  indiscreet  in  his  reflections  on  the 
generalship  of  his  predecessor,  but,  had  he  been  ten  times 
more  so,  this  was  not  the  moment  of  retaliation  for  such 
offenses.  "Was  he  not  now  the  soldier  of  the  republic,  at 
the  head  of  her  forlorn  hope  in  the  very  breach  ?  When, 
from  the  midst  of  the  fire  converging  upon  him,  he  cried 
out  for  more  ammunition  to  enable  him  to  keep  his  foot- 
hold, how  was  he  a^iswered ?  "I  know  nothing  of  the 
calibres  of  Pope's  artillery." 

The  operations  of  Pope  with  the  Army  of  Virginia 
but  he  received  wcre  based  entirely  on  the  expected  junc- 
lukewarm  support.  ^-^^  ^^  rc-euforcemeuts  from  the  Army  of 

the  Potomac.  Not  without  indignation  does  he  say  in 
his  report,  "Twenty  thousand  five  hundred  men  were 
all  of  the  ninety-one  thousand  veteran  troops  from  Har- 
rison's Landing  who  ever  drew  trigger  under  my  com- 
mand, or  in  any  way  took  part  in  this  campaign."  "  The 
complete  overthrow  of  Lee's  army,  or  at  least  the  entire 
frustration  of  his  movement  toward  the  Potomac,  was 
defeated  by  the  failure  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to 
effect  a  junction  in  time  with  the  Army  of  Virginia  on 


446  CEITICAL  POSITION  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT.      [Sect.  XI. 

tte  line  of  the  Eappahannock,  or  even  so  far  back  as 
the  line  ofBullKun." 

In  his  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  general  in 
chief,  Halleck,  referring  to  these  events,  says, "  Some  of 
the  corps  (from  the  Peninsula)  moved  with  becoming 
activity,  but  the  delays  of  others  were  neither  creditable 
nor  excusable."  "  Most  of  the  troops  actually  engaged  in 
these  battles  fought  with  great  bravery,  but  some  of  them 
could  not  be  brought  into  action  at  all.  Many  thousands 
straggled  away  from  their  commands ;  and  it  is  said  that 
not  a  few  voluntarily  surrendered  to  the  enemy,  so  as  to 
be  paroled  prisoners  of  war." 

From  the  tenor  of  Pope's  complaints,  the  reader  can 
critical  position  of  ^^^  ^^^^  *^  disccm  that  the  national  govern- 
the  government,  meut  was  at  this  time  passing  through  a 
serious  crisis.  The  triumphant  Confederate  army  threat- 
ening Washington  w^as  by  no  means  the  only  formidable 
object  before  the  republic.  Individual  grievances  are  of 
little  moment  in  the  eye  of  history  save  when  they  are 
connected  with  national  interests — they  become  of  su- 
preme importance  when  they  presage  public  perils. 
Enough  has  been  said  to  enable  the  reader  to  perceive 
that  at  this  momentous  period  the  government  was  act- 
ing under  constraint. 

General  McClellan  Jiimself  has  told  us  what  were  Mr. 

Lincoln's  impressions  as  to  the  army  at  that 

piores^MccSiaT'    tlmc.    "  Thc  Prcsidcut  informed  me  that  he 

to  sustain  Pope.  it 

had  reason  to  believe  that  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  not  cheerfully  co-operating  with  and  sup- 
porting General  Pope,  and  now  asked  me,  as  a  special 
favor,  to  use  my  influence  in  correcting  this  state  of 
things.  The  President,  who  was  much  moved,  asked  me 
to  telegraph  to  ^  Fitz  John  Porter,  or  some  other  of  my 
friends,'  and  try  to  do  away  with  any  feeling  that  might 


I 


Chap.  LVIL]    CRITICAL  POSITION  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT.  44^ 

exist,  adding  that  I  could  rectify  tlie  evil,  and  that  no 
one  else  could." 

In  consequence  of  this  urgent  appeal  to  him,McClellan 

Mccieiian  sends  a  ^^^^  ^^  ^^^^  J^^^  Porter  Ms  dispatch  of  Sep- 
dispatch  to  Porter,  tembcr  Ist  I  "  I  ask  of  you,  for  my  sake,  that 
of  the  country,  and  the  old  Army  of  the  Potomac,  that 
you  and  all  of  my  friends  will  lend  the  fullest  and  most 
cordial  co-operation  to  General  Pope  in  all  the  operations 
now  going  on,"  etc. 

Lincoln  was  ostensibly  reconciled  to  the  reinstating  of 

McClellan  by  the  circumstance  that  he,  of 

to  Mccieiian's  re-    all  the  2;enerals,  was  most  familiar  with  the 

instatement.  -in 

defenses  of  Washington.  What  with  fa- 
tigue, disappointment,  and  anxiety,  Halleck's  health  was 
almost  broken  down. 

Military  critics  will  doubtless  point  out  professional 
Position  of  anxiety  ^listakes  lu  Pope's  Campaign.  In  justice, 
of  Lincoln.  howcvcr,  they  must  bear  in  mind  his  disap- 

pointed expectations  of  support.  Well  might  Lincoln, 
who,  notwithstanding  his  general  buoyancy,  was  subject 
to  paroxysms  of  deep  dej^ression,  almost  despair  when  he 
saw  so  much  gallantry  wasted.  Well  might  his  heart 
sink  within  him  when  he  was  now  sardonically  told,  in 
allusion  to  his  former  solicitude  for  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment at  the  outset  of  the  Peninsular  campaign,  "  at  once 
to  use  all  our  means  to  make  the  capital  perfectly  safe." 
And  well  was  it  for  him  that  he  had  a  cool  and  coura- 
geous Secretary  of  War,  who  looked  beyond  the  shame 
and  disasters  of  the  passing  moment ;  who,  in  their  many 
weary  watches  together  through  the  night-hours  at  the 
War  Department,  could  sustain  him  in  his  anxieties,  and 
organize  for  him  victory  at  last. 

All  things  looked  auspiciously  for  the  Confederacy. 
Lee's  sortie  thus  far  Thc  uatioual  army  had  been  thrust  from  its 
c3?^  ^  "''"■       ground,  and  had,  after  awful  losses,  sought 


448  IEEE'S  SUCCESS  IN  THE  CAMPAIGN.  [Sect.  XI. 

shelter  in  the  defenses  of  Washington.  The  sortie  of  Lee 
seemed  to  be  a  brilliant  success.  There  was  nothing  now 
to  prevent  him  passing  into  Maryland— apparently  noth- 
ing to  prevent  his  proposed  march  to  the  JSForth.  Joy 
was  diffused  throughout  every  Southern  state ;  peace  and 
independence  seemed  to  be  close  at  hand. 


CHAPTEE  LVm. 

THE  SORTIE  OF  LEE  AND  ITS  REPULSE.  THE  BATTLE  OF  AN- 
TIETAM.  THE  CONFEDERATES  RETIRE  TO  THE  RAPPAHAN- 
NOCK. BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 

The  Confederate  general,  entering  Maryland,  could  not  induce  the  people  to  join 

him. 
He  was  followed  in  his  march  by  McClellan  from  Washington,  and  ventured  on 

dividing  his  army  in  presence  of  that  general,  detaching  one  portion  of  it  to  cap- 
ture Harper's  Ferry,  in  which  he  succeeded. 
At  the  same  time,  McClellan  attacked  another  portion  on  South  Mountain,  and 

drove  it  before  him. 
Battle  of  Antietam.    The  Confederate  sortie  was  repulsed,  and  Lee  forced  back 

again  into  Virginia. 
McClellan,  failing  to  press  vigorously  on  the  Confederates,  was  removed  by  the  gov-: 

ernment  from  command,  Burnside  succeeding  him. 
Battle  of  Fredericksburg.     The  Confederates  repulsed  the  national  army. 

Hooker  was  assigned  to  command  in  Burnside's  stead. 

The  Confederate  army  had  driven  its  antagonist  into 
the  fortifications  of  Washington,  and  had  opened  for  it- 
self a  way  to  the  North. 

On  the  same  day  (September  5th)  that  Bragg,  on  a 
Invasion  of  Mary-  similar  duty,  entered  Kentucky,  Lee,  cross- 
land  by  Lee.  -^^  ^j^^  Potomac  Hear  Point  of  Kocks,  enter- 
ed  Maryland,  and  marched  toward  Frederick. 

The  general  plan  for  the  Kentucky   and  Maryland 

campaigns,  as  conceived  in  Kichmond,  rest- 

tuck/and  Mary-    ed  OH  the  QTesit  military  strens^th  which  the 

land  sorties.  •  .       .  ^      ,       ,         .      "^  ^ 

conscription  had  given.  It  proposed  the 
reorganization  of  the  governments  of  those  states  on  Con- 
federate principles,  and  a  march  to  tha  North  for  the  ex- 
action of  a  treaty  of  peace. 

Lee  had  no  intention  of  making  a  direct  attack  on 
Washington.     He  knew  that  if  a  successful  issue  should 
IL— F  F 


450  ^^^  ENTERS  MARYLAND.  [Sect.  XI. 

crown  his  campaign,  tlie  land  communica- 


A  direct  attack  on 


washineton  not     tions  between  the  North  and  that  city  be- 
ing  cut  off,  it  must  necessarily  fall  of  itself. 
On  the  8th  of  September  he  issued  at  Frederick  an  ad- 
Lee's  address  to    drcss  to  the  people  of  Maryland.     He  de- 
theMaryianders.   ^^^^^^  ^j^^^  ^^^  ^^^^1^  ^^  ^^^  Confederate 

States  had  marked  with  the  deepest  sympathy  the 
wrongs  and  outrages  that  had  been  inflicted  on  Mary- 
land— the  illegal  imprisonment  of  its  citizens,  the  usurpa- 
tion of  the  government  of  Baltimore,  the  arbitrary  disso- 
lution of  the  Legislature,  the  suppression  of  the  freedom 
of  speech  and  of  the  press.  Believing  that  the  people  of 
Maryland  had  too  lofty  a  spirit  to  submit  to  a  govern- 
ment guilty  of  such  wrongs,  and  to  aid  them  in  throw- 
ing off  its  foreign  yoke,  he  had  brought  his  army  among 
them  to  assist  them  in  regaining  the  rights  of  which 
they  had  been  unjustly  despoiled. 

The  Confederate  general  had  supposed  that  large  re- 
They  decline  euforcemeuts  would  flock  to  him,  but  in  this 
joining  him.  ^^  ^^^  dcstiucd  to  disappointment.  It  turn- 
ed out,  as  it  did  with  the  corresponding  movement  of 
Bragg  in  Kentucky,  that  the  number  of  volunteers  did 
not  compensate  for  the  deserters.  It  did  not  amount  to 
five  hundred  men.  At  this  the  whole  South  was  bitterly 
chagrined.  Its  popular  sentiment  had  displayed  toward 
this  state  the  most  affectionate  sympathy.  "  Maryland, 
my  Maryland,"  was  the  burden  of  the  most  beautiful  lyric 
composed  in  the  South  during  the  war.  It  was  sung  with 
patriotic  rapture,  and  nowhere  more  so  than  at  the  fire- 
sides of  Virginia. 

In  this  lukewarmness  of  the  Marylanders  Lee  saw  at 
It  defeats  the      ^uce  thc  failurc  of  his  enterprise.    He  could 
campaign.         ^^^  commlt  hls  army  to  an  invasion  of  Penn- 
sylvania with  Maryland  doubtful  or  hostile  at  his  back. 
Conscription,  though  it  makes  numerous  brave,  makes  also 


Chap.  LVIII.]  ALARM  lU  PENNSYLVANIA.  451 

numerous  unwilling  soldiers.  It  is  one  thing  to  defend 
one's  own  fireside,  another  to  engage  in  a  distant,  perhaps 
a  Quixotic  expedition.  Lee  saw  very  plainly  the  true  in- 
terpretation of  the  daily  increasing  desertions  from  his 
army. 

Bragg,  in  his  sortie,  had  an  advantage  over  Lee.  An 
Ostensible  object  osteusible  objcct  had  been  assigned,  and  that 
of  the  sortie.  ^^^^  Satisfactorily  and  successfully  present- 
ed when  it  was  clear  that  there  would  be  a  failure  in  ob- 
taining the  true  result.  Fortune,  however,  was  not  un- 
mindful of  Lee.  She  threw  into  his  way  the  brilliant  in- 
cident of  the  capture  of  the  garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry. 
At  once  that  was  put  forth  as  the  real  object  of  the  whole 
movement.  In  truth,  however,  it  was  too  insignificant  a 
temptation  to  induce  so  important  a  step,  and  it  was  im- 
possible that  any  such  expectation  could  have  been  enter- 
tained at  the  outset,  since  the  probabilities  were  that  the 
post  would  be  evacuated  long  before  the  Confederates 
could  reach  it.  It  was  an  accidental  stroke  of  luck,  which 
was  made  to  answer  the  purpose  of  covering  a  deep  disap- 
pointment. 

The  Confederate  advance  into  Maryland  was  the  signal 
Alarm  in  pennsyi-  f^^  ^u  iutcnse  excitcmeut  lu  thc  adjoluing 
^'^'''''*  state,  Pennsylvania,  and,  indeed,  throughout 

the  North.  The  governor  notified  the  mayor  of  Philadel- 
phia that  he  had  reliable  information  of  a  movement  of 
the  Confederate  army  on  Harrisburg,  and  called  upon 
him  to  "  send  20,000  men  to-morrow."  On  its  part,  the 
Confederate  army,  justly  transported  with  delight  at  the 
Boast  of  the  Con-  Tcsults  of  thc  Virginia  campaign,  so  glorious 
federate  soldiers.  ^^  j^^  ^^^^^^  avowcd  its  cxpcctation  of  dic- 
tating a  peace  in  Philadelphia.  The  same  hall  which  had 
witnessed  the  signing  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
of  the  United  States  was  to  witness  the  signing  of  a 
treaty  acknowledging  the  independence  of  the  South. 


452  McCLELLAN  FOLJ^OWS  LEE.  [Sect.  XI. 

New  York  and  Boston  were  to  be  visited  witli  dire  pun- 
ishment for  their  misdeeds,  and  submit  to  a  dread  altern- 
ative— the  choice  between  a  ransom  and  the  torch. 

But  in  Maryland  the  Confederate  soldiers  conducted 
Their  conduct  in  themsclvcs  with  marked  moderation.  So 
Maryland.  £^^,  from  molcstlug  any  one,  they  tried  to  in- 

gratiate themselves  with  the  people.  It  was  true  that 
vast  droves  of  cattle  and  lines  of  wagons  might  be  seen 
crossing  the  Potomac  into  Virginia,  but  it  was  asserted 
that  every  thing  had  been  paid  for  at  the  option  of  the 
seller,  either  in  Confederate  or  in  national  money. 

As  soon  as  it  was  ascertained  with  certainty  that  Lee 
Mccieiian  ordered  1^^^  passed  luto  Maryland,  orders  were  given 
to  follow  Lee.  McClelkn  to  follow  him  with  all  the  troops 
not  needed  for  the  defense  of  Washington.  On  the  12th 
of  September  McClellan  reached  Frederick,  which  had 
just  been  evacuated  by  the  Confederates,  and  in  that 
place  obtained  a  copy  of  Lee's  order  of  march.  From 
this  it  appeared  that  it  was  his  intention  to  capture  the 
garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry.  To  this  end  he  had  sent 
25,000  men  under  Jackson  across  the  Potomac,  thus  di- 
viding his  army  in  the  very  face  of  McClellan,  who  had 
it  in  his  power,  on  the  14th,  to  have  overwhelmed  the  di- 
vision of  the  Confederate  General  McLaws  and  relieved 
Harper's  Ferry.  Listead  of  doing  this,  however,  he  fol- 
lowed the  main  body  of  the  Confederates  toward  the 
South  Mountain,  for  they  lingered  in  their  march  to  give 
time  for  the  reduction  of  Harper's  Ferry.  His  advance 
overtook  their  rear  just  beyond  Middletown,  eight  miles 
from  Frederick,  early  that  morning.  The  turnpike  to 
Hagerstown  goes  through  Turner's  Gap ;  the  road  from 
Jefferson  to  Rohrersville  through  Crampton's  Gap. 

The  battle  of  South  Mountain  was  opened  by  an  at- 
The  battle  of  South  tcmpt  of  the  Confederates,  under  D.  H.  Hill, 
Mountain.  ^^  ^^^-^^  ^^^  passagc  ovcr  Catoctin  Creek. 


Chap.LVIII.] 


FORCING  OF  TURNER'S  GAP. 


453 


KATTLES   0»    SOUXH   MOUNTAIN. 


i 


In  this  they  were  not  successful.  They  then  retired  to  a 
stronger  position  up  the  mountain  toward  Turner's  Gap. 
Eight  and  left  of  the  main  road  are  country  roads.  It 
was  upon  these  that  the  action  chiefly  took  place.  The 
Confederates  had  artillery  bearing  on  all  the  approaches. 

At  8  A.M.  (September  14th),  Cox's  division  of  Eeno's 
Forcing  of  Tur-  corps  of  Bumsidc's  column  moved  up  the 
left  country  road  and  carried  the  crest  in 
their  front.  Ke-enforcements  were  received  by  the  Con- 
federates, and,  Cox's  position  becoming  critical,  he  too  was 
re-enforced.  A  very  severe  conflict  was  maintained  all 
day,  General  Reno  being  killed.  Cox,  however,  held  the 
ground  at  dark. 

At  3  P.M.,  Hooker's  corps  of  Burnside's  column  moved 


ner's  Gap. 


454  rOECING  OF  CEAMPTON'S  gap.  [Sect.  XI. 

up  the  right  country  road.  Meade  carried  the  eminence 
on  one  side  of  that  road;  Patrick,  supported  by  Double- 
day  and  Phelps,  the  other.  Eicketts's  division  pressed  up 
the  mountain  about  5  P.M.,  arriving  at  the  crest  in  time 
to  participate  in  the  engagement. 

Thus  Hooker  carried  the  mountain  sides  on  the  right 
of  the  Gap,  and  Keno  those  on  the  left,  notv^ithstanding 
the  extreme  steepness  and  difficulty. 

About  4  P.M.  Longstreet  came  ujp  from  Hagerstown 
with  r^-enforcements  for  Hill,  and,  outranking  him,  took 
command. 

It  remained  now  for  the  national  forces  to  move  up  the 
main  or  central  road.  Late  in  the  afternoon  Burnside 
ordered  Gibbon's  brigade  to  advance  along  that  road 
upon  the  Confederate  central  position.  Though  stub- 
bornly resisted,  it  forced  its  way,  pressing  the  enemy  be- 
fore it.  After  dark  it  was  relieved  by  one  of  Sedgwick's 
brigades. 

The  Confederates,  being  now  outflanked  right  and  left, 
abandoned  their  position  during  the  night,  leaving  also 
their  dead.  On  the  quiet  valley — and  it  is  one  of  the 
most  beautiful  valleys  in  Atlantic  America — the  morning 
sun  once  more  shed  his  welcome  beams.  Seen  from  the 
heights  which  the  national  soldiers  had  w^on,  the  Catoc- 
tin  lay  like  a  silver  thread  in  the  meadows.  The  turn- 
pike was  crowded  with  an  advancing  line  of  troops  and 
artillery;  the  green  fields  in  the  distance  were  dotted 
with  white  army  wagons. 

Crampton's  Gap,  six  miles  to  the  south  of  Turner's 
Forcing  of  Cramp-  Grap,  hcld  by  thc  Confederates  under  How- 
tonsGap.  ^j^  Cobb,  was    simultaucously  carried  by 

Franklin.  He  drove  them  from  their  position  at  the  base 
of  the  mountain,  where  they  were  protected  by  a  stone 
wall,  steadily  forced  them  back  up  the  slope,  and,  after 
an  action  of  three  hours,  gained  the  crest.     The  Confed- 


Chap.  LVIII.]    JACKSON  CAPTURES  HARPER'S  PERRY.  455 

efates  hastily  fled  down  the  mountain  on  the  other 
side. 

The  national  loss  at  Turner's  Gap  was  328  killed, 
1463  wounded  and  missing.  The  loss  at  Crampton's 
Gap  was  115  killed,  and  418  wounded  and  missing.  Lee 
Object  of  Lee  in  had  veutured  on  this  resistance  merely  to 
these  battles.  ^^-^  ^- ^^^  £^^  ^^^  completiou  of  his  enter- 
prise at  Harper's  Ferry ;  and  though  in  the  actual  en- 
gagement the  victory  was  with  the  national  side,  the  suc- 
cess of  the  whole  operation  was  with  the  Confederates. 

For  Jackson  appeared  at  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  morn- 
Harper's  Ferry  cap-  ing  of  the  13th,  the  post  being  in  charge  of 

tared  by  Jackson.       Colouel  MilcS,  who,  thoUgh  he  had  bcCU  Or- 

dereci  to  fortify  Maryland  Heights,  had  neglected  to  do 
so.  Those  heights  and  Loudon  Heights  were  speedily 
occupied  by  the  Confederates,  and  Harper's  Ferry  was  at 
their  mercy.  Miles  had  with  him  at  this  time  about 
14,000  men,  of  whom  2500  were  cavalry;  the  latter  cut 
their  way  through  the  enemy's  lines  on  the  night  of  the 
14th.  On  the  morning  of  the  15th  Miles  surrendered 
11,583  men,  73  guns,  13,000  small-arms,  200  wagons,  and 
large  quantities  of  supplies. 

His  object  thus  accomplished,  Jackson  did  not  delay 
He  hastens  to  An-  to  rcceive  the  suiTcnder.  He  left  that  to 
tietam.  Hill,*    aud,  hurryiug    across    the    pontoon 

bridge  into  Maryland,  marched  without  stopping  until 
he  joined  Lee  in  time  to  assist  him  at  the  battle  of  An- 
tietam,  which  was  fought  on  the  17th  of  September. 

McClellan  had  pushed  forward  his  right  wing  and  cen- 
Lee'sarmyatAn-  ^^^  ^^  pursuit  of  the  Confederates,  and  had 
tietam.  fouud  them  on  the  15th,  along  the  western 

bank  of  Antietam  Creek,  a  sluggish  stream  entering  the 
Potomac  eight  miles  above  Harper's  Ferry.  The  creek 
was  on  their  front,  the  Potomac  on  their  rear,  behind 
them  and  near  the  midst  of  their  line  the  little  town  of 


456  ^EE  FALLS  BACK  TO  ANTIETAM.  [Sect.  XL 

Sharpsburg.  It  is  about  a  mile  from  tlie  creek.  A 
road  leads  from  it  to  tlie  Shepherdstown  ford  of  the  Po- 
tomac. 

At  this  moment  Lee's  army  was  divided.  A  part  of 
his  force,  tinder  Jackson,  McLaws,  and  Walker,  was  op- 
erating at  Harper's  Ferry.  The  post  surrendered,  how- 
ever, on  the  morning  of  that  day,  and  Jackson,  as  we  have 
seen,  with  all  speed  hastened  his  march  to  Sharpsburg. 
It  had  become  clear  that  the  detaching  of  Maryland  from 
the  Union,  and  the  'projected  invasion  of  Pennsylvania, 
were  destined  to  failure.  Forced  out  of  the  passes  of 
South  Mountain,  Lee's  hope  of  escaping  the  consequences 
of  dividing  his  army  rested  on  one  thing  only — the  dila- 
toriness  of  his  antagonist.  But  he  remembered  thfe  Pen- 
insula, and  took  courage. 

Lee"  was  constrained,  not  by  military,  but  by  political 
He  is  constrained  ^casous,  to  fight  the  battle  of  Autictam.  The 
to  fight.  South  would  never  be  satisfied  with  the  bar- 

ren laurels  acquired  from  Pope;  nor  was  it  possible  to 
give  up  the  expedition  to  the  North  without  a  struggle. 
And  yet  he  did  not  do  well  in  fighting  a  merely  defensive 
battle,  especially  in  fighting  wdth  a  river  at  his  back. 

On  the  16th  McClellan's  army  had  for  the  most  part 
Position  of  the  na-  ^mved,  and.  the  day  was  spent  in  prepara- 
tionai  troops.  ^'^j^  f^j,  coufrouting  the  enemy.  Hooker's 
and  Sumner's  corps  were  placed  on  the  right.  Porter's  in 
the  centre,  Burnside's  on  the  left. 

On  the  Confederate  side,  Longstreet  was  on  the  right, 
Position  of  the  con-  ^ith  his  right  flauk  rcstiug  on  a  curve  of 
federate  troops.  ^^^  Autictam ;  D.  H.  Hill  was  on  the  left; 
but  one  of  Longstreet's  divisions  (Hood's)  was  on  the  left 
of  that.  In  a  general  manner,  their  line  stood  north  and 
south;  but  the  last-named  division  made  an  angle  with 
the  rest,  and,  facing  northward,  stood  across  the  Hagers- 
town  Eoad.     Upon  the  west  side  of  that  road,  half  a 


Chap.  LVIII.] 


TOPOGRAPHY  OF  ANTIETAM. 


457 


Topography  of  An-  ^^^^  ^^  thereabout  from  tlie  rear  of  the  Con- 
tietam.  federate  left  was  a  meeting-house  known 

as  the  Dunker  Church.  It  was  enveloped  in  a  skirt  of 
woods,  which,  extending  in  a  rudely  circular  form  north- 
ward, inclosed  a  cultivated  area,  across  which,  like  a  di- 
ameter, the  Hagerstown  Eoad  passed.  In  the  woods,  near 
the  church,  were  ledges  of  limestone,  affording  an  excel- 
lent breastwork — a  rocky  citadel.  The  middle  part  of 
the  area  was  a  corn-field ;  its  eastern  side  had  been  re- 
cently plowed.  This  area,  encircled  by  woods,  was  the 
focus  of  the  battle  of  Antietam. 

Three  stone  bridges  here 
cross  the  Antietam.  One, 
in  front  of  the  national 
left,  was  therefore  opposite 
Burnside;  a  second,  in  front 
of  the  centre,  was  opposite 
Porter;  a  third,  on  the 
right,  was  opposite  Hook- 
er :  near  this  there  was 
also  a  ford. 
McClellan's 
plan  for  the  impending  en- 
gagement was  to  attack  the 
enemy's  left  with  the  corps 
of  Hooker  and  Mansfield, 
supported  by  Sumner's,  and,  if  necessary,  by  Franklin's; 
and  as  soon  as  matters  looked  favorably  there,  to  move 
the  corps  of  Burnside  against  the  enemy's  extreme  right, 
upon  the  ridge  running  to  the  south  and  rear  of  Sharps- 
burg,  and,  having  carried  that  position,  to  press  along 
the  crest  toward  their  left,  and,  whenever  either  of  these 
flank  movements  should  be  successful,  to  advance  his  cen- 
tre with  all  the  forces  then  disposable. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  16th  Hooker  accordingly  cross- 


McClellan's  plan 
of  battle. 


BATTLE    OF  ANTIETAM. 


458  '^^^  BATTLE  OF  ANTIETAM.  [Sect.  XI. 

Approach  of  the  na-  ^d  the  Aiitietam,  and,  advancing  south  west- 
tionai  right  wing,  ^^^rdlj,  Came  to  the  eastern  edge  of  what 
has  been  described  as  the  battle-area.  He  lay  there 
in  the  woods  that  night,  for  the  Confederates  had  sent 
two  brigades  across  from  the  Dunker  Church,  and  they 
were  just  in  front  of  him.  Mansfield's  corps  had  followed 
Hooker,  and  lay  a  little  in  his  rear.  Sumner  was  ready 
to  follow  them  at  daybreak.  On  the  Confederate  side, 
during  the  night,  Hood's  division  had  been  relieved  by  a 
part  of  Jackson's  corps. 

As  soon  as  he  could  see.  Hooker  made  so  furious  an 
The  battle  of     attack,  supportcd  by  batteries  on  the  east 
Autietam.         ^-^^  ^^  ^^^  Autlctam,  that  Jackson's  brigades 
could  not  retain  their  hold,  but  were  expelled  with  severe 
loss  across  the  corn-field  of  the  battle-area,  over  the  Ha- 
gerstown  Eoad,  and  into  the  woods  beyond  the  Dunker 
Church,  in  which  were  their  reserves.     These,  issuing 
forth,  after  an  infuriated  struggle,  succeeded  in  checking 
Hooker's  advance.     The  antagonists,  fighting  in  a  cloud 
of  sulphury  smoke,  almost  exterminated  each  other.  Jack- 
son says :  "  The  carnage  on  both  sides  was  terrific — more 
than  half  the  brigades  of  Lawton  and  Hays  were  either 
killed  or  wounded,  and  more  than  a  third 

tioSafryht  and  ^  ofTrimble'si  all  thclr  resiimental  command- 
confederate  left.  '  •  1       T  -n    1 

ers,  except  two,  were  either  killed  or  wound- 
ed." It  was  necessary  to  withdraw  the  wreck  of  regi^ 
ments  to  the  rear,  and  replace  it  by  Hood's  division.  On 
the  other  side.  Hooker's  corps  was  nearly  destroyed. 

Mansfield's  corps  had  now  (7^  A.M.)  reached  the  field, 
and  had  made  its  way  down  to  the  Hagerstown  Eoad, 
where  it  was  met  by  the  division  of  D.  H.  Hill,  which 
had  come  out  of  the  woods  at  the  Dunker  Church.  An- 
other furious  encounter  ensued :  the  valley  was  filled 
with  smoke.  Out  of  the  battle-din— -the  yells  of  the  Con- 
federate, the  cheers  of  the  national  troops — down  in  the 


chap.lviil]  the  battle  of  antietam.  459 

corn-field,  came  forth  a  ghastly  procession  of  wounded 

men.     Mansfield's  troops  were  driven  back  to  the  woods 

Death  of  Mans-    ^^^^  whlch  thcj  had  emerged.     Mansfield 

^^^^'  was  killed,  and  Hooker  shot  through  the 

foot. 

In  its  turn,  Sumner's  corps  had  arrived.  It  was  nine 
o'clock.  The  Confederates  now  could  neither  advance 
nor  hold  their  position.  Their  officers  saw  that  to  re- 
main where  they  were  was  only  useless  butchery.  Sum- 
ner's right  division,  Sedgwick's,  followed  the  retiring  but 
still  desperately  resisting  Confederates  across  the  blood- 
stained area,  forcing  their  way  into  the  woods  beyond 
the  Dunker  Church.  At  that  moment  the  divisions  of 
McLaws  and  Walker,  which  had  just  come 

Eepeated  charges  ^  -rr  ?      tt*  i?        j.    j    x i 

andcouuter-        up  irom  Harpcr  s  Jjerry,  confronted  them. 

charges.  -■■  •*•  i 

ihese  troops  had  taken  post  among  the 
rocky  ledges,  which  formed  stone  bulwarks  waist  high. 
They  leaped  forth  and  compelled  their  antagonists  to  re- 
treat, expelling  them  from  the  Dunker  woods,  through  the 
corn-field,  and  into  the  woods  beyond.  But,  in  their  turn, 
they  were  driven  back  by  Franklin,  who  now  came  up, 
and  compelled  them  to  make  the  bloody  passage  to  the 
Dunker  Church  again.  The  corn-field  was  now  finally 
hold  by  the  national  troops. 

Though  dreadfully  exhausted,  the  Confederates  did  not 
give  up  their  attempt.  While  Sumner's  right  was  thus 
engaged  with  McLaws,  his  left  divisions  had  advanced 
halfway  from  the  Antietam  to  Sharpsburg.  A  desperate 
attack  was  made  on  the  left  flank  of  his  left  division,  but 
it  was  foiled.  The  Confederates  then  tried  to  force  their 
way  between  that  and  his  centre  division,  but  were  re- 
pulsed. His  line  succeeded  eventually  in  holding  the 
ground  it  had  won. 

Such  were  the  events  on  McClellan's  right.  A  battle- 
wave  of  blood  pulsated  back  and  forth  over  the  contest- 


4(30  THE  BATTLE  OF  ANTIETAM.  [Sect.  XI. 

ed  area.    Alternately  the  national  troops  advanced,  alter- 

Burnside's  attkck    lately  the  Confederates.     On  his  left,  Burn- 

on  the  left  ^-^^  recelved  orders  at  8  A.M.  to  force  the 

lower  stone  bridge  and  gain  the  opposite  heights.     The 

approach  to  the  bridge  formed  a  kind  of  defile,  which  was 

swept  by  the  enemy's  artillery.    Delay  occurred.    It  was 

not  until  one  o'clock  that  Burnside  made  the  passage. 

Had  this  been  done  earlier  in  the  day,  it  would  have 

weakened  the  resistance  that  Lee  was  making  at  the 

Dunker  Church,  and  probably  have  given  McClellan  the 

victory.     It  was  done  too  late  for  that,  and,  indeed,  too 

late  altogether,  for  by  the  time  it  was  accom- 

His  success ;  but  he       t»    i       i     a     -r»   TT*n    i       i  n  tt 

is  at  last  forced      plishcd  A.  r.  Hili  had  come  up  from  Harp- 
er's Ferry,  and,  falling   on  Burnside's  left 
flank,  forced  him  back  to  the  bridge. 

Porter's  corps,  which  constituted  the  national  centre, 
was  in  reserve,  and  had  taken  no  direct  part  in  the  bat- 
tle. It  had  been  reduced  by  the  sending  of  detachments 
to  other  portions  of  the  field  to  4000  men. 

The  battle  of  Antietam  thus  closed  without  those  well- 
marked  results  which  might  have  been  ex- 

Close  of  the  battle.  ,     t     />  ,  i  i  /.     i 

pected  irom  the  preponderance  ot  the  na- 
tional force.  The  Confederates  had  made  a  most  gallant 
defense  in  their  perilous  position.  The  error  on  McClel- 
lan's  part  was  characteristic.  He  had  used  his  troops 
too  much  in  driblets  and  detail  instead  of  in  an  over- 
whelming mass.  His  total  strength  was  87,164,  of  which 
4320  were  cavalry.     His  losses  were  2010  killed,  9416 

wounded,  1043    missins: ;    that   is,   nearly 

Losses  in  the  battle.    _^^^^      .  ,-,     /^^.^^>Pt       ,        n 

13,000  m  all  (12,469).  Lee's  force  was 
about  45,000  at  the  beginning  of  the  battle,  but  during 
the  day  it  was  increased  to  70,000;  of  these,  2700  were 
buried  by  McClellan,  others  having  been  buried  by  the 
Confederates  themselves.  His  total  loss  was  about  13,533. 
As  an  ojffset  to  their  success  at  Harper's  Ferry,  McClellan 


Chap.lviil]        battle-field  of  antietam.  4^1 

says,  "13  guns,  39  colors,  upward  of  15,000  stand  of 
small-arms,  and  more  than  6000  prisoners,  were  the  tro- 
phies which  attest  the  success  of  our  arms  in  the  battles 
of  South  Mountain,  Turner's  Gap,  and  Antietam.  Not  a 
single  gun  or  color  was  lost  by  our  army  during  these 
battles." 

Not  long  after  the  battle  of  Antietam  I  visited  the 
The  battle-field  on  ^^l^,  aud  was  au  eye-wltucss  of  some  of 
the  next  day.  those  sccues  which  Captain  Noyes  has  so 
well  described.  That  officer  says:  "Through  torn -up 
corn-fields,  robbed  of  their  tasseled  grain  by  hungry 
horses  and  hungry  men,  past  farm-houses,  barns,  and  out- 
houses crowded  with  the  wounded,  I  came  to  a  quiet  lit- 
tle grove  near  the  roadside,  and  here  I  found  my  train. 
How  charming  to  my  jaded  senses  appeared  the  scene. 
At  a  camp-fire  sat  the  teamsters,  cooking  their  noontide 
meal  of  mutton,  potatoes,  and  coffee.  The  horses  stood 
half  asleep,  tethered  to  the  wagons.  It  was  a  sudden 
and  quick  transition  from  the  battle-field,  with  its  con- 
stant strain  of  excitement,  to  a  picnic  in  peaceful  woods. 

"  My  route  carried  me  over  the  late  battle-field,  and  I 
Devastation  in  the  spcut  much  of  thc  aftcmoon,  part  of  the 
7*"^^'  time  in  company  with  a  friend,  in  visiting 

some  of  the  most  severely  contested  points,  to  be  awe- 
struck, sickened,  almost  benumbed  with  its  sights  of  hor- 
ror. Within  this  space  of  little  more  than  a  mile  square 
— this  spot,  once  beautiful  with  handsome  residences  and 
well-cultivated  farms,  isolated,  hedged  in  with  verdure, 
sacred  to  quiet,  calm  content,  the  hottest  fury  of  man's 
hottest  wrath  had  expended  itself,  burning  residences 
and  well-filled  barns,  plowing  fields  of  ripened  grain  with 
artillery,  scattering  every  where,  through  corn-field,  wood, 
and  valley,  the  most  awful  illustrations  of  war.  Not  a 
building  about  us  which  was  not  deserted  by  its  occu- 
pants, and  rent  and  torn  by  shot  and  shell ;  not  a  field 


462  BATTLE-FIELD  OF  ANTIETAM.  [Sect.  XL 

wihicli  had  not  witnessed  tlie  fierce  and  bloody  encoun- 
ter of  armed  and  desperate  men. 

"Let  us  first  turn  off  to  the  left  of  the  Hagerstown 
The  dead  in  the  Tumpike ;  but  we  must  ride  very  slowly  and 
corn-field,  carcfully,  for  lying  all  through  this  corn-field 

are  the  victims  of  the  hardest  contest  of  our  division. 
Can  it  be  thait  these  are  the  bodies  of  our  late  antap:o- 
nists  ?     Their  faces  are  so  absolutely  black  that  I  said  to 
myself  at  first,  This  must  have  been  a  negro  regiment. 
Their  eyes  are  protruding  from  the  sockets;  their  heads, 
hands,  and  limbs  are  swollen  to  twice  the  natural  size. 
"Passing  through  this  corn-field,  with  the  dead  lying 
and  in  the  fields    ^^1  through  its  aislcs,  out  into  an  unculti- 
beyond.  vatcd  ficM  beyoud,  I  saw  bodies    attired 

mainly  in  rebel  gray,  lying  in  ranks  so  regular  that  Death, 
the  Eeaper,  must  have  mowed  them  down  in  swaths.  Our 
burying  parties  were  already  busily  engaged,  and  had 
put  away  to  rest  many  of  our  own  men — still  here,  as 
every  where,  I  saw  them  scattered  over  the  fields.  The 
ground  was  strewn  with  muskets,  knapsacks,  cartridge- 
boxes,  and  article-s  of  clothing ;  the  carcasses  of  horses, 
and  thousands  of  shot  and  shell.  And  so  it  was  on  the 
other  side  of  the  turnpike,  nay,  in  the  turnpike  itself. 
Eide  where  we  may,  through  corn-field,  wood,  or  ravine, 
and  our  ride  will  be  among  the  dead,  until  the  heart 
grows  sick  and  faint  with  horror.  Here,  close  to  the  r©ad, 
were  the  haystacks  near  which  our  general  and  staff 
paused  for  a  while  when  the  division  was  farthest  ad- 
vanced, and  here,  at  the  corner  of  the  barn,  lay  one  of  our 
men,  killed  by  a  shell,  which  had  well-nigh  proved  fatal 
to  them  also. 

"  Just  in  front  of  these  haystacks  was  the  only  pleasing 
picture  on  this  battle-field — a  fine  horse,  struck  with 
death  at  the  instant  when,  cut  down  by  his  wound,  he 
was  attempting  to  rise  from  the  ground.     His  head  was 


Chap.  LVIIL]  BATTLE-FIELD  OF  ANTIETAM.  4^3 

half  lifted;  his  neck  proudly  arched;  every  muscle  seemed 
replete  with  animal  life.  The  wound  which  killed  him 
was  wholly  concealed  from  view,  so  that  I  had  to  ride 
close  up  before  I  could  believe  him  dead.  Hundreds  of 
his  kind  lay  upon  the  field,  but  all  were  repulsive  save 
himself,  and  he  was  the  admired  of  every  passer-by.  Two 
weeks  afterward  I  found  myself  pausing  to  gaze  upon 
him,  and  always  with  the  wish  that  some  sculptor  would 
immortalize  in  stone  this  magnificent  animal,  in  the  exact 
pose  of  his  death-hour.  One  would  like  to  see  some- 
thing from  a  battle-field  not  wholly  terrible. 

"  Over  this  grave-yard  of  the  unburied  dead  we  reach- 
The  Dunker  ^^  a  wood,  evcry  tree  pierced  with  shot  or 
Church.  ^^^  ^j^l^  bullets,  and  came  to  the  little  brick 

Dunker  Church  on  the  turnpike.  This  must  have  been 
a  focal  point  in  the  battle,  for  a  hundred  round  shot  have 
pierced  its  walls,  while  bullets  by  thousands  have  scarred 
and  battered  it.  A  little  crowd  of  soldiers  was  stand- 
ing about  it,  and  within  a  few  severely-wounded  rebels 
were  stretched  on  the  benches,  one  of  whom  was  raving 
in  his  agony.  Surgical  aid  and  proper  attendance  had 
already  been  furnished,  and  we  did  not  join  the  throng 
of  curious  visitors  within.  Out  in  the  grove  behind  the 
little  church  the  dead  had  been  collected  in  groups  wait- 
ing for  burial,  some  of  them  wearing  our  own  uniform, 
but  the  large  majority  dressed  in  gray.  No  matter  in 
what  direction  we  turned,  it  was  all  the  same  shocking 
picture,  awakening  awe  rather  than  pity,  benumbing  the 
senses  rather  than  touching  the  heart,  glazing  the  eye 
with  horror  rather  than  filling  it  with  tears. 

"  I  had,  however,  seen  many  a  poor  fellow  during  my 
m  Bariai  of  the  killed.  ^^^^^  something  iu  whosc  positiou  or  appear- 
^m  ance  had  caused  me  to  pause ;  and  here,  ly- 

ing side  by  side  with  three  others,  I  saw  a  young  rebel 
officer,  his  face  less  discolored  than  the  rest,  whose  feat- 


464  BATTLE-FIELD  OF  ANTIETAM.  [Sect.  XL 

ures  and  expression  called  fortli  my  earnest  sympathy, 
not  so  mucli  for  Mm  as  for  those  who  in  his  Southern 
home  shall  see  him  no  more  forever.  No  one  among  the 
burying-party  knew  his  name,  and  before  night  he  was 
laid  in  a  trench  with  the  rest  —  no  head-stone  to  mark 
his  resting-place — one  of  the  three  thousand  rebel  dead 
who  fill  nameless  graves  upon  this  battle-field.  So  ends 
the  brief  madness  which  sent  him  hither  to  fight  against 
a  government  he  knew  only  by  its  blessings— against  his 
Northern  brothers  who  never  desired  to  encroach  upon  a 
single  right  or  institution  of  his,  who  were  willing  that 
he  should  hug  to  his  breast  forever  the  Nessus  shirt  of 
slavery,  asking  only  that  he  should  not  insist  upon  for- 
cing its  poison. folds  oyer  their  shoulders  also.  So  dis- 
appears the  beloved  of  some  sad  hearts — another  victim 
of  that  implacable  Nemesis,  who  thus  avenges  upon  the 
white  man  the  WTongs  of  the  black,  and  smiles  with  hor- 
rid satisfaction  as  this  fearful  game  of  war  goes  on. 

"  Very  slowly,  as  men  move  through  the  burial-places 
of  the  dead,  we  rode  through  the  woods  at  the  back  of 
the  church,  and  reached  the  rocky  citadel  behind  which 
crouched  the  enemy  to  receive  our  charging  battalions, 
sweeping  their  ranks  with  destruction  and  compelling 
their  retreat.  I  was  astonished  to  see  how  cunningly 
Nature  had  laid  up  this  long  series  of  rocky  ledges  breast 
high  for  the  protection  of  the  rebel  lines.  In  front  of 
The  dead  in  front  of  ^hls  brcastwork  wc  fouud  a  majority  of  the 

the  rock  ledges.  ^^^^   drCSSCd  iu  bluC.       At    this    poiut    alsO 

commenced  a  long  barricade  of  fence-rails,  piled  closely 
to  protect  the  rebel  lines,  and  stretching  off  toward  the 
north.  Here  is  one  more  evidence  of  the  use  to  which 
the  rebel  generals  put  every  spare  moment  of  time,  and 
of  their  admirable  choice  of  position. 

"  One  more  scene  in  this  battle-picture  must  be  seen, 
and  with  a  visit  to  it  our  ride  may  end.    It  is  a  narrow 


Chap.lviil]  expected  renewal  of  the  attack.  455 

country  lane,  hollowed  out  somewhat  be- 
tween the  fields,  partially  shaded,  and  now 
literally  crowded  with  rebel  corpses.  Here  they  stood  in 
line  of  battle,  and  here,  in  the  length  of  five  hundred 
feet,  I  counted  more  than  two  hundred  of  their  dead.  In 
every  attitude  conceivable — some  piled  in  groups  of  four 
or  six ;  some  grasping  their  muskets  as  if  in  the  act  of 
discharging  them ;  some,  evidently  officers,  killed  while 
encouraging  their  men ;  some  lying  in  the  position  of  calm 
repose,  all  black,  and  swollen,  and  ghastly  with  wounds. 
This  battalion  of  the  dead  filled  the  lane  with  horror. 
As  we  rode  beside  it — we  could  not  ride  in  it — I  saw  the 
field  all  about  me  black  with  corpses,  and  they  told  me 
that  the  corn-field  beyond  was  equally  crowded.  It  was 
a  place  to  see  once,  to  glance  at,  and  then  to  ride  hurried- 
ly away,  for,  strong-hearted  as  was  then  my  mood,  I  had 
gazed  upon  as  much  horror  as  I  was  able  to  bear." 

I  have  quoted  in  detail  Captain  Noyes's  description  of 
the  battle-field  of  Antietam,  partly  because  of  its  intrinsic 
merit,  and  partly  because  of  the  special  interest  it  pre- 
sents to  me.  It  was  within  the  shell-torn 
walls  of  the  Dunker  Church  that  those  gen- 
eral intentions  to  which  I  have  alluded  in  my  Preface 
took  the  form  of  a  final  resolve  to  write  this  book.  I 
leaned,  in  the  melancholy  and  rainy  morning,  against  the 
rocky  ledges  once  the  breastworks  of  Confederate  sol- 
diers, and  walked  throusfh  the  lane  of  death,  in  every 


Personal  visit. 


^&"    — ^ —    ^^ — —y 


panel  of  the  fences  of  which  there  was  then  a  grave. 

Long  before  the  next  day  broke,  the  national  troops, 
rising  from  their  rest  on  the  bare  ground, "  made  ready 
their  cofi*ee,  and,  eating  their  siniple  breakfast,  prepared 
The  army  expects  to  ^r  a  rcuewal  of  thc  battle."    They  believed 

renew  the  attack.       ^-^^^  j^^^  ^^^  ^^  ^^^^^^^       rj.^^  ^.^^^  ^^^  ^^ 

his  back.     A  re-enforcement  of  14,000  men  had  joined 
II.— G  G 


465  LEE  CROSSES  THE  POTOMAC.  [Sect.  XI. 

them.  Their  strength  was  far  greater  than  his.  The  end 
of  the  war  was  at  hand.  But  the  sun  rose,  the  morning 
passed,  the  sun  declined,  and  evening  came — still  there 
was  no  order  for  attack  Some,  who  had  been  in  the 
Peninsula,  related  to  their  comrades  the  dilatory  move- 
ments of  those  times ;  some  recalled  that  it  had  taken 
in  this  campaign  seven  days  to  march  a  distance  of  forty 
miles ;  some  wondered  at  the  generalship  which  had  been 
sending  driblets  of  troops  successively  toward  the  Bun- 
ker Church,  not  to  carry  the  position,  for  they  were  too 
Soldiers' criticisms  wcak  for  that,  but  to  a  certain  massacre. 
of  the  battle.  There  were  veterans  sunning  themselves  on 
the  ground,  who  were  telling  that,  if  they  had  been  con- 
sulted, they  should  have  thrown  the  right  wing  of  the 
army  in  one  irresistible  mass  on  the  enemy,  and,  by  work- 
ing the  left  wing,  would  have  given  Lee  other  occupation 
than  to  concentrate  his  whole  strength  at  the  Dunker 
Church.  It  is  the  privilege  of  veterans  to  criticise  their 
generals — sometimes  they  do  it  very  sagaciously — and  to 
demonstrate  to  their  raw  comrades  how  battles  that  have 
been  lost  might  easily  have  been  won. 

A  second  wearisome  night  ushered  in  another  morning, 
and  then  there  was  news.  Lee  had  given  McClellan  the 
Passage  of  the  po-  slip.  He  had  actually  crossed  the  Potomac 
tgmac  by  Lee.  uumolcstcd,  aud  cscapcd  iuto  Virginia.  The 
soldiers'  hearts  sank  within  them.  Was  this  all  that  had 
come  from  the  horrible  carnage  of  that  day  ?  What  if 
Lee  had  abandoned  3000  dead,  and  2000  too  severely 
wounded  to  be  removed,  he  had  compensated  for  the  loss 
of  a  victory  by  executing  a  brilliant  retreat  from  the  bat- 
tle-field under  the  very  eye  of  his  antagonist,  and  had 
converted  the  Potomac,  from  an  apparently  insuperable 
obstacle,  into  a  line  of  defense. 

In  his  report.  General  McClellan  states  the  considera- 
tions which  led  him  to  determine  on  inactivity.     They 


CHAP.LVni.]         STUART'S  PENNSYLVANIAN  RAID.  457 

Mccieiian  fails  to  WGie   the   fatlguG    and  exhaustion    of  his 
pursue  him.         tpoops ;  the  absence  of  the  supply  trains ; 
the  losses  of  the  army,  and  demoralization  of  some  of 
the  corps ;  the  want  of  ammunition.     President  Lincoln, 
thankful  for  the  expulsion  of  Lee,  but  dissatisfied  that  he 
Lincoln  visits  the  was  uot  pursucd,  visited  the  army  on  the 
the  army.  -j^^^  of  October,  aud  remained  with  it  several 

days.  Porter  made  a  reconnoissance  in  force  beyond  the 
Potomac  on  the  20th,  but  was  driven  back.  Lee  delib- 
erately retired  toward  Winchester.  A  portion  of  his  cav- 
alry, under  Stuart,  however,  recrossed  the  river  on  the 
10th  of  October,  at  once  insulting  the  national  army,  and 
making  good  the  boast  of  the  Confederates  by  a  raid  into 
Stuart's  raid  into  Peunsylvauia.  He  captured  Chambersburg 
Pennsylvania.       -^  ^|^^^  state,  aud  thcre  destroyed  a  large 

quantity  of  supplies.  He  burned  machine  shops,  trains 
of  cars,  and  other  property.  He  made  a  complete  circuit 
round  McClellan's  army,  and  returned  into  Virginia  by 
•crossing  the  Potomac  below  him.  The  Confederates 
might  truly  boast  that  they  had  at  length  carried  the 
war  into  the  Free  States. 

So  ended  Lee's  sortie.     It  had  cost  him  nearly  30,000 
Failure  of  Lee's     Toaei!,  aud,  notwithstanding  the  capture  of 
expedition..        Harpcr's  Ferry,  had  been  a  signal  failure. 
Day  after  day  passed  on.     The  Confederates  were  be- 
ing re- enforced  and  reorganized.     The  government  was 
incessantly  urging  McClellan  to  advance.     He,  on  his 
part,  was  standing  still,  and  importunately  demanding  re- 
enforcements,  clothing,  shoes,  horses.     His  army  became 
at  length  150,000  strong.     On  October  6th  Halleck  tel- 
egraphed to  him:  "The  President  directs 
eramSforM^ccid-  that  vou  cross  tile  Potomac  and  orive  battle 

lan's  advance.  "^  t-ot  -x-r 

to  the  enemy,  or  drive  him  South.  Your 
army  must  move  now,  while  the  roads  are  good."  An- 
other fortnight  elapsed  (October  21),  and  still  there  was 


468  BURNSIDE  IN  McCLELLAN'S  STEAD.  [Sect.  XL 

no  forward  movement.  Halleck  telegraphed  again :  "  The 
President  does  not  expect  impossibilities,  but  he  is  very 
anxious  that  all  this  good  weather  should  not  be  wasted 

His  repeated  pro-  1^  iuactivlty."  McClellau  now  fixed  upon 
November  1st  as  the  earliest  date  at  which 
he  should  be  ready,  and  about  that  time  crossed  the  Po- 
tomac, moving  leisurely  down  the  east  side  of  the  Blue 
Kidge,  Lee  moving  parallel  to  him  in  the  valley  on  the 
other  side.  McClellan's  direction  w^as  toward  Gordons- 
ville.  Lee,  therefore,  to  prevent  the  Confederate  com- 
munications being  severed,  marched  directly  and  rapidly 
to  that  place.  It  became  evident  that  McClellan's  rela- 
tions with  the  government  were  operating  very  disad- 
vantageously.  On  the  7th  of  November  a  heavy  snow- 
storm set  in ;  the  approach  of  winter  was  betokened. 
He  is  removed  from  Liucolu's  forbcarauce  at  last  gave  way.  At 
midnight  of  that  day  orders  arrived  from 
Washington  directing  McClellan  to  turn  over  the  com- 

Burnside  succeeds  J^^ii^  ^^  ^^^   army  to  General  Burnside. 

^'^'  McClellan  at  this  time  had  reached  Rector- 

town. 

A  portion  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  now  reor- 
ganized in  grand  divisions.  Burnside,  believing  that  the 
true  line  of  operations  against  Richmond  was  the  direct 
Bumsideresoivesto  oue,  rcsolvcd  ou  uioving  thc  army  to  Fred- 
SSck^at^F^-edeSks-  clicksburg,  masMug  his  intention  by  a  pre- 
^^'^'  tended  advance  on  Gordonsville.    Lee,  how- 

ever, discovered  what  the  real  movement  was  to  be,  and 
while  Burnside  marched  along  the  north  bank  of  the 
Rappahannock  to  Falmouth,  he  marched  along  the  south 
bank  to  Fredericksburg.  ^The  two  armies  thus  stood 
confronting  each  other  on  the  opposite  sides  of  the  river. 

Burnside  had  hoped  to  cross  the  Rappahannock  before 
Lee  could  resist  him  successfully.    On  reaching  Falmouth 


Chap.LVIII.]  fkedericksbueg.  469 

he  found,  however,  that  the  passage  across  the  river  to 
Fredericksburg  was  checked.  The  bridges  had  been 
burned,  and  the  pontoons  expected  from  Washington  had 
not  arrived — a  delay  which  gave  Lee  the  opportunity  of 
fortifying  the  heights  behind  the  town. 

The  national  army  thus  lay  on  the  range  of  hills  on 
The  armies  con-  the  uorth  side  of  the  Rappahannock,  the 
fronting  each  other.  Confederates  on  the  range  of  hills  on  the 
south  side.  Between  them  was  Fredericksburg.  The 
plain  on  which  the  city  stood  was  completely  commanded 
by  the  guns  of  both  sides.  Whichever  entered  it  must 
be  destroyed.  The  national  troops,  as  we  are  now  to  see, 
ventured,  and  met  with  a  bloody  repulse.  The  Confed- 
erates did  not  dare  to  pursue  them.  It  was  not  until  the 
night  of  December  10th  that  things  were  ready  for  throw- 
ing the  pontoons  across  the  river,  and  in  the  interval  the 
Confederate  cavalry  had  made  an  excursion  as  far  as 
Dumfries,  in  Burnside's  rear. 

There  was  a  sharp  struggle  in  completing  the  pontoon 
The  laying  of  the  opposite  the  city,  daylight  having  come 
pontoons.  bcforc  it  was  finished;  the  sharp-shooters, 

from  their  rifle-pits  and  from  the  houses  on  the  edge 
of  the  river,  made  it  impossible  to  continue  the  work. 
Through  the  fog  which  hung  over  the  city  columns  of 
smoke  were  seen  here  and  there  ascending  from  houses 
set  on  fire  by  the  furious  bombardment  with  which  Burn- 
side  hoped  to  drive  off  the  Confederate  riflemen.  The 
cannonading  was  in  vain,  except  as  a  cover  to  one  hun- 
dred volunteers  who  daringly  crossed  over  in  boats,  and 
expelled  the  Confederates  from  the  houses  and  rifle-pits 
with  the  bayonet  The  bridge  was  now  (4  P.M.)  fin- 
ished, and  troops  thrown  across. 

A  second  pontoon,  lower  do\yn  the  river,  was  laid  with- 
passageofthe     ^ut  interruption,  the  plain  in  front  of  it 
being  commanded  by  the  national  artillery. 


river. 


470  FREDERICKSBURG.  [Sect.  XL 

and  the  opposite  bank  having  thus  been  secured,  others 
were  added  without  delay,  and  the  passage  of  the  Kappa- 
hannock  completed.  Sumner's  grand  division  and  a  sec- 
tion of  Hooker's  crossed  before  dark  at  the  upper  bridge; 
that  of  Franklin,  consisting  of  the  corps  of  Eeynolds  and 
Smith,  at  the  lower.  The  movement  was  continued  on 
the  morning  of  the  next  day  (12th)  without  intermission. 
The  fortified  position  of  the  Confederates  on  the  heights 
in  the  rear  of  Fredericksburg  consisted  of 

The  Confederate  ,.  n  i      ,,       •  i       i  •  ±1  *± 

army  at  Freder-     two  Imcs  01  Dattcries  overlookmsT  the  city. 

icksburg.  ,  °  .      ^^ 

iheir  army,  about  80,000  strong,  lay  m  a 
semicircle  from  a  point  a  mile  above  Fredericksburg  to 
one  about  four  miles  below.  Stonewall  Jackson  com- 
manded on  their  right,  Longstreet  on  their  left.  On  the 
national  side,  Franklin  was  on  the  left,  Hooker  occupied 
the  centre,  and  Sumner  the  right. 

Behind  Fredericksburg,  the  plain,  gradually  ascending, 
presents  many  inequalities  of  surface,  and  the  bounding 
heights,  trending  toward  the  river,  not  only  command  the 
space  in  front,  but  also  flank  it.  The  Confederates  had 
planted  batteries  in  every  available  position  to  sweep 
this  plain.  There  was  a  narrow  road,  skirted  by  a  stone 
wall  about  four  feet  high,  which  ran  along  the  foot  of  the 
heights. 

Burnside  had  learned  from  a  prisoner  that  the  Confed- 
erates had  cut  another  road  in  the  rear  of  the  line  of 
heights,  by  means  of  which  they  connected  the  two  wings 
of  their  army,  and  avoided  a  long  detour  through  a  diffi- 
cult country. 

His  object,  therefore,  was  to  obtain  possession  of  this 
road  by  making;  a  powerful  attack  with  his 

Plan  of  the  battle.  •^  iii  ii 

leit,  and,  as  soon  as  that  had  succeeded,  to 
assault  the  position  with  his  right.  He  then  intended  to 
advance  his  centre  ao-ainst  their  front  and  drive  them  out 
of  their  works.     These  operations  would  therefore  bring 


Chap.LVIIL]       the  battle  of  FREDERICKSBURG. 


471 


BATTLE   OF   rilEDERICKSBURG. 


successively  into  action  Franklin,  wlio  was  on  the  left, 
,Sumner  on  the  ri2:ht,  and  Hooker  at  the  centre.  Frank- 
lin's  force  was  strengthened  by  two  of  Hooker's  best  di- 
visions, and  was  from  55,000  to  60,000  strong. 

By  some  alleged  misunderstanding,  Franklin,  instead 
of  making  a  vigorous — the  main — attack,  limited  his  op- 
erations to  a  mere  reconnoissance,  and,  as  we  are  now  to 
see,  the  direct  attacks  of  Sumner  and  Hooker,  being  un- 
supported, failed. 


A  dense  fog  had  covered  the  valley  of  the  Eappahan- 

The  battle  of  Fred-  nock  ou  the  momiug  of  the  13  th  of  Decem- 
ericksburg.  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^^'^  ^-y^^^^  o'clock  it  had  been 

dispersed  by  the  rays  of  the  sun.  Concealed  in  its 
cloudy  veil,  the  Confederate  General  Longstreet  had  per- 
sonally come  so  near  the  national  lines  that  he  could  hear 
their  officers'  commands.  He  found  that  an  attack  was 
to  be  made  on  Jackson,  and  notified  him  of  it. 


472  THK  battle  of  rREDERICKSBURG.  [Sect.  XI. 

The  attack  on  tlie  left  by  Franklin's  grand  division 
was  made  by  General  Meade  witk  about 
4500  men.  He  broke  tlirougli  the  Confed- 
erate lines,  reached  the  heights  they  had  occupied,  and 
got  into  the  presence  of  their  reserves,  but  the  divisions 
which  were  to  have  sustained  him  failed  to  do  so,  and 
he  was  driven  back.  If  he  could  have  held  his  ground, 
the  evacuation  of  the  works  in  the  rear  of  Fredericksburg 
must  have  taken  place.  He  lost  more  than  one  third  of 
his  force  in  this  attempt. 

Sumner,  on  the  right,  had  been  making  ready  to  storm 
the  fortifications  on  Marye's  Heights  in  his 

Snmner's  attack  on    n         ,         t-t     itt/Tii  ptts  i 

the  Confederate  frout.  He  had  sclectcd  the  corps  01  r  rencn 
and  Hancock  for  that  purpose,  and  had  How- 
ard's division  in  readiness  to  support  them.  A  little  be- 
fore noon,  French's  corps,  preceded  by  skirmishers,  was 
seen,  as  a  long  black  line,  deploying  in  the  rear  of  the 
city,  and  steadily  advancing  to  the  assault.  Behind  it 
followed  another  black  line.  It  was  Hancock's  corps. 
The  Confederate  batteries  were  silent  until  their  enemy 
was  half  way  across  the  plain,  when,  in  »an  instant,  from 
the  front,  the  right,  the  left,  they  poured  forth  a  tempest 
of  fire.  Longstreet  says  that  the  gaps  made  by  the  artil- 
lery could  be  seen  half  a  mile  off.  The  thin  line  moved 
through  the  focus  of  death,  quivering  but  still  advancing, 
its  own  batteries  in  the  distance  giving  it  what  help  they 
might— a  canopy  of  iron.  The  line  grew  thinner  and 
thinner ;  becoming  too  weak  to  hold  together,  it  halted, 
and  was  dispersed. 

Another  attempt  was  made.  The  line  moved  through 
the  rain  of  grape  and  canister,  and,  closing  the  gaps 
torn  through  it,  it  seemed  as  if  Fortune,  unable  to  re- 
sist such  daring,  was  about  to  smile  on  it.  Two  thirds 
of  the  plain  were  passed ;  a  few  steps  more,  and  the  flam- 
ing hill  itself  would  give  some  protection — one  moment 


Hooker's  attack. 


'      Chap.  LVIII.]       THE  BATTLE  OF  EEEDERICKSBURG.  473 

for  taking  breath,  then  a  bayonet  charge  up  the  heights, 
and  the  Confederates  would  be  hurled  out  of  their  forti- 
fications. 

In  front  was  the  gray  stone  wall.     The  Confederates 

Attack  on  the     ^^d  artillery  that  raked  it  right  and  left. 

stonewall.  j^  ^^  Instaut  it  was  fringed  with  fire  and 
hidden  in  smoke.  Enfiladed  by  the  batteries,  confronted 
by  a  mile  of  rifles,  which  were  securely  discharged  behind 
its  protecting  cover,  the  surviving  assailants  were  forced 
back  to  the  shelter  of  a  ravine,  within  musket-shot  of  the 
enemy.  Here  a  line  of  assault  was  once  more  formed, 
and  a  bayonet  charge  made  on  the  Confederate  artillery. 
Thrice  was  that  attack  made — thrice  vainly.  The  storm- 
ing party,  almost  annihilated,  was  compelled  to  retire. 

Such  was  the  fate  of  Sumner's  attack  on  the  right. 
That  of  Hooker  on  the  centre  fared  no  bet- 
ter. He  says :  "  I  proceeded  against  the  bar- 
rier as  I  would  against  a  fortification,  and  endeavored  to 
breach  a  hole  sufficiently  large  for  a  '  forlorn  hope'  to  en- 
ter. Before  that,  the  attack  along  the  line,  it  seemed  to 
me,  had  been  too  general — not  sufficiently  concentrated. 
I  had  two  batteries  posted  on  the  left  of  the  road,  within 
four  hundred  yards  of  the  position  upon  which  the  attack 
was  to  be'made,  and  I  had  other  parts  of  batteries  posted 
on  the  right  of  the  road,  at  the  distance  of  five  hundred 
or  six  hundred  yards.  I  had  all  these  batteries  playing 
with  great  vigor  until  sunset  upon  that  point,  but  with 
no  apparent  effect  upon  the  rebels  or  upon  their  works. 

"During  the  last  part  of  the  cannonading  I  had  given 
directions  to  General  Humphreys's  division  to  form,  un- 
der the  shelter  which  a  small  hill  afforded,  in  column  for 
assault.  When  the  fire  of  the  artillery  ceased,  I  gave  di- 
rections for  the  enemy's  works  to  be  assaulted.  General 
Humphreys's  men  took  off  their  knapsacks,  overcoats,  and 
haversacks.    They  were  ordered  to  make  the  assault  with 


474  BUKNSIDE  RECROSSES  THE  RIVER.  [Sect.  XI. 

empty  muskets,  for  there  was  no  time  then  to  load  and 
-fire.  When  the  word  was  given  the  men  moved  forward 
with  great  impetuosity.  They  ran  and  hurraed,  and  I  was 
encouraged  by  the  great  good  feeling  that  pervaded  them. 
The  head  of  General  Humphreys's  column  advanced  to 
within  perhaps  fifteen  or  twenty  yards  of  the  stone  wall, 
which  was  the  advanced  position  held  by  the  rebels,  and 
then  they  were  thrown  back  as  quickly  as  they  had  ad- 
vanced. Probably  the  whole  of  the  advance  and  the  re- 
tiring did  not  occupy  fifteen  minutes.  They  left  behind, 
as  was  reported  to  me,  1760  of  their  number  out  of 
4000." 

In  this  battle  of  Fredericksburg  the  national  losses 
.  .0,  n  .M    were  13,771;  the  Confederate  loss  was  about 

Losses  m  the  battle.  '  ' 

5309. 

It  was  Burnside's  intention  to  renew  the  struggle  on  the 
Burnside  proposes  ^^^xt  momlug,  but  finding,  upon  consulta 
another  movement,  ^on,  that  his  chicf  officcrs  regarded  the  en 
emy's  lines  as  impregnable,  he  countermanded  the  order 

On  the  night  of  the  15th  of  December,  Burnside  vaca 
But  he  repasses  ^cd  Frcdcricksburg,  retiring  to  his  former 
the  river.  posltiou.     He  fclt  that  the  position  in  front 

could  not  be  carried,  and  that  it  was  a  military  necessity 
either  to  attack  or  retire.  Another  repulse  i^ould  have 
been  disastrous.  The  army  was  withdrawn  in  the  night, 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy,  and  without  loss 
either  of  property  or  men. 

A  fortnight  subsequently  (December  30th)  Burnside 
made  preparations  for  another  advance  upon  Kichmond, 
when  he  was  suddenly  called  to  "Washington  by  the  Presi- 
dent. He  there  discovered  that  representations  had  been 
surreptitiously  made  by  certain  of  his  subordinate  ofiicers 
to  the  effect  that  the  temper  of  the  army  would  not  justi- 
fy the  movement,  and  that  it  would  inevitably  end  in  a 
great  disaster.    He  soon  ascertained  that  the  secessionists 


Chap.  LVin.]  HOOKER  IN  BURNSIDE'S  STEAD.  475 

in  Washington  had  obtained  intelligence  of  the  character 
of  his  proposed  movement,  and  was  therefore  compelled 
to  substitute  another  for  it.     The  attempt  to  carry  this 
into  effect  was,  however,  arrested  by  a  severe  sleet-storm, 
which  turned  the  roads  into  quagmires,  and  rendered 
movement  impossible.    The  march,  scarcely  begun,  was 
necessarily   abandoned,  and  the   troops   were    ordered 
back  to  their  old  camps.     Discovering  that  the  malign 
Dissatisfaction     influcnce  whlch  had  before  paralyzed  the 
mthe  army.       ^p^iy  of  the  Potomac  was  again  at  work,  he 
had  prepared  a  general  order  dismissing  from  the  service 
certain  officers,  but,  before  issuing  it,  he  submitted  it  to 
the  President.    It  was  decided,  in  view  of  public  necessi- 
ties, that  General  Burnside  himself  should  be  relieved 
from  command,  and  that  the  order  should  take  the  form 
that  this  was  at  his  own  request.    Against  this  he  remon- 
strated as  unjust,  urging  that  his  resignation  should  be 
Burnside's  noble    acccptcd  lustcad ;  but,  with  a  patriotism  that 
conduct.  might  have  been  an  example  to  all  the  of- 

ficers of  that  army,  he  nobly  consented  at  last  that  any 
order  whatever  might  be  published  respecting  him  per- 
sonally, if  it  were  considered  conducive  to  the  welfare  of 
the  republic,  and  that,  instead  of  resigning,  he  would 
serve  wherever  he  was  required.  In  the  same  order  Ma- 
jor General  Franklin  was  relieved  from  duty  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  as  was  also  Major  General  Sumner — the 
latter  at  his  own  request.     Major  General 

Hooker  assigned  to    -,-t       t  •  t    ;  -^    •       /-^ 

command  in^Burn-    Hooker  was  assi2:nea  to  command  m  Gen- 
side's  stead.  •  T   1  1 

eral  Burnside  s  stead. 
I  can  not  close  this  history  of  Lee's  sortie  more  in- 
structively than  by  presenting:  the  followins: 

Condition  of  the  .  ,         n  .     .  .  -fx  1  '1        x1 

Confederate         extract  01  a  statcmcut  written  while  the 

army. 

Confederate  army  lay  at  Winchester  (Sep- 
tember 26th),  after  the  retreat  from  Maryland.  Certainly 
nothing  can  depict  more  eloquently  the  military  virtues 


Its  battles  aud 
marches. 


475  CONDITION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY.       [Sect.  XL 

of  the  Southern  soldier.  It  is  an  appeal  to  the  people  of 
the  Confederacy  for  contributions  for  the  relief  of  the 
army. 

-  In  this  appeal,  the  sufferings  of  that  army  since  it  left 
the  banks  of  James  River  are  likened  to 
those  endured  by  the  French  in  their  dis- 
astrous retreat  from  Moscow.  It  is  not  only  a  plea 
for  help,  but  an  apology  for  those  who  had  left  their 
colors. 

"  This  army  proceeded  directly  to  the  line  of  the  Rap- 
pahannock, and,  moving  out  from  that  river,  it  fought  its 
way  to  the  Potomac,  crossed  the  stream,  and  moved  on 
to  Frederick  and  Hagerstown,  had  a  heavy  engagement 
at  Boonesborough  (Turner's  Gap),  and  another  at  Cramp- 
ton's  Gap  below,  fought  the  greatest  pitched  battle  of  the 
war  at  Sharpsburg  (Antietam),  and  then  recrossed  the 
Potomac  back  into  Virginia.  During  all  this  time,  cover- 
ing the  full  space  of  a  month,  the  troops  rested  but  four 
days.  And  let  it  be  always  remembered  to  their  honor, 
that  of  the  men  who  performed  this  wonderful  feat,  one 
fifth  were  barefooted,  one  half  in  rags,  and  the  whole  half 
famished.  The  country  from  the  Rappahannock  to  the 
Potomac  had  been  visited  by  the  enemy  with  fire  and 
sword,  and  our  transportation  was  insufi&cient  to  keep  the 
army  supplied  from  so  distant  a  base  as  Gordonsville,  and 
when  provision  trains  did  overtake  the  army,  so  pressing 
were  the  exigencies  of  their  position  that  the  men  seldom 
had  time  to  cook.  Their  difficulties  were  increased  by 
the  fact  that  cooking  utensils  in  many  cases  had  been  left 
behind,  as  well  as  every  thing  else  that  would  impede 
their  movements.  It  was  not  unusual  to  see  a  company 
of  starving  men  have  a  barrel  of  flour  distributed  to  them 
which  it  was  utterly  impossible  for  them  to  convert  into 
bread  with  the  means  and  in  the  time  allowed  them. 

"  Do  you  wonder,  then,  that  there  should  have  been 


Chap.  LVIIL]    CONDITION -OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  AEMY.  477 

stragglers  from  the  army?  that  brave  and 

Its  great  privations.     .         ^^   ^         ,         ^  -.   ^  ^t,  ,^  , 

true  men  should  have  fallen  out  irom  sheer 
exhaustion,  or  in  their  efforts  to  obtain  a  mouthful  to  eat 
along  the  roadsides  ?  or  that  many  seasoned  veterans — 
the  conquerors  in  the  Valley,  at  Richmond,  and  at  Manas- 
sas— should  have  succumbed  to  disease,  and  been-  for<3ed 
back  to  the  hospital?  I  look  to  hear  a  great  outcry 
against  the  stragglers.  Already  lazy  cavalrymen  and 
dainty  staff  officers  and  quartermasters,  who  are  mounted 
and  can  forage  the  country  for  something  to  eat,  are  con- 
demning the  w^eary  private,  who,  notwithstanding  his 
body  may  be  covered  with  dust  and  perspiration,  and  his 
feet  with  stone-bruises,  is  expected  to  trudge  along  under 
his  knapsack  and  cartridge-box,  on  an  empty  stomach, 
and  never  turn  aside  for  a  morsel  of  food  to  sustain  his 
sinking  limbs.  Out  upon  such  monstrous  injustice !  That 
there  has  been  unnecessary  straggling  is  readily  admitted, 
but  in  a  large  majority  of  cases  the  men  have  only  to 
point  to  their  bleeding  feet,  tattered  garments,  and  gaunt 
frames  for  an  answer  to  the  unjust  charge.  No  army  on 
this  continent  has  ever  accomplished  as  much  or  suffered 
as  much  as  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  within  the 
last  three  months.  At  no  period  during  the  first  Revo- 
lutionary War,  not  even  at  Valley  Forge,  did  our  fore- 
fathers in  arms  encounter  greater  hardships  or  endure 
them  more  uncomplainingly. 

"  But,  great  as  have  been  the  trials  to  which  the  army 
The  necessity  of  ^^^  bccu  subjcctcd,  they  arc  hardly  worthy 
sustaining  it.  ^^  ^^  named  in  comparison  with  the  suffer- 
ings in  store  for  it  this  winter,  unless  the  people  of  the 
Confederate  States  every  where,  and  in  whatever  circum- 
stances, come  to  its  immediate  relief  The  men  must 
have  clothing  and  shoes  this  winter.  They  must  have 
something  to  cover  themselves  when  sleeping,  and  to  pro- 
tect themselves  from  the  driving  sleet  and  snow-storms 


478  CONDITION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY.       [Sect.  XL 

when  on  duty.  This  must  be  done,  though  our  friends 
at  home  should  have  to  wear  cotton  and  sit  by  the  fire. 
The  Army  of  Virginia  stands  guard  this  day,  as  it  will 
stand  guard  this  winter,  over  every  hearthstone  through- 
out the  South.  The  ragged  sentinel  who  may  pace  his 
weary  rounds  this  winter  on  the  bleak  spurs  of  the  Blue 
Kidge,  or  along  the  frozen  valleys  of  the  Shenandoah  and 
Eappahannock,  will  be  your  sentinel,  my  friends,  at  home. 
It  will  be  for  you  and  your  household  that  he  encounters 
the  wrath  of  the  tempest  and  the  dangers  of  the  night. 
He  suffers,  and  toils,  and  fights  for  you  too,  brave,  true- 
hearted  w^omen  of  the  South.  Will  you  not  clothe  his 
nakedness,  then  ?  Will  you  not  put  shoes  and  stockings 
on  his  feet  ?  Is  it  not  enough  that  he  has  written  down 
his  patriotism  in  crimson  characters  from  the  Rappahan- 
nock to  the  Potomac  ?  And  must  his  bleeding  feet  also 
impress  the  mark  of  fidelity  upon  the  snows  of  the  com- 
ing winter  ? 

"  It  was  hoped  at  one  time  that  we  might  obtain  win- 
its  disappointment  ter  supplies  in  Maryland.  This  hope  was 
aryiand,  l^om  aftcr  thc  army  left  Richmond,  and  has 
now  miserably  perished.  The  government  is  unable  to 
furnish  the  supplies,  for  they  are  not  to  be  had  in  the 
country." 

In  truth,  the  condition  of  the  retreating  Confederate 
army  was  now  to  the  last  degree  deplorable.     It  was 
ragged,  barefoot,  hatless,  and  winter  was  coming  on.     It 
had  not  gathered  the  expected  plunder  of  Philadelphia, 
and  reduction  by    ^i^r  touchcd  the  rausoui  of  Ncw  York.    De- 
desertion.  sertlou  wcut  ou  without  a  parallel.     The 

President  and  other  officers  of  the  Confederate  and  state 
governments  were  constrained  to  appeal  to  the  women 
to  frown  on  the  deserters,  and  secure  their  apprehen- 
sion. In  this  the  Southern  press  earnestly  joined.  It 
was  affirmed  that  half  the  soldiers  from  certain  por- 


Chap.  LVIII.]  END  OF  LEE'S  SORTIE.  479 

tions  of  the  states  liad  escaped  to  their  homes'  without 
leave. 

Brave  as  they  were,  the  Confederate  troops  had  failed 
The  end  of  Lee's  ^o  break  through  the  investing  line.  Their 
^''''^'^'  sortie  had  culminated  at  Antietam.     Win- 

ter found  them  on  the  southern  side  of  the  Eappahan- 
nock. 


SECTION  XII. 

THE  BLOCKADE,  AND  OPERATIONS  CONNECTED 
WITH  IT. 


CHAPTEE  LIX. 

NAVAL  OPERATIONS  CONNECTED  WITH  THE  BLOCKADE. 

On  the  establishment  of  the  blockade,  it  was  found  necessary  to  have  a  Southern 
naval  station  for  the  supply  and  repair  of  the  ships.  Port  Koyal,  in  South  Caro- 
lina, was  therefore  seized  for  that  purpose. 

From  Port  Royal  an  expedition  was  sent  out,  which  reduced  Fort  Pulaski  and 
completed  the  blockade  of  Georgia.  Another  expedition,  which  was  also  suc- 
cessful, was  dispatched  to  the  coast  of  Florida. 

From  Fortress  Monroe  expeditions  were  sent  to  the  North  Carolina  coast.  One, 
under  Butler,  occupied  Hatteras ;  another,  under  Burnside,  occupied  Roanoke 
Island  and  places  in  its  vicinity. 

The  Confederate  government  commissioned  privateers. 

Very  soon  after  the  inauguration  of  Lincoln  the  proc- 
lamation of  a  blockade  of  the  Southern  ports  was  issued 
(p.  27).  In  the  opinion  of  foreign  nations  this  blockade 
was  effectually  maintained. 

On  its  part,  the  Confederacy  resorted  to  the  authoriza- 
tion of  privateers.  Some  of  these  sailed  from  American, 
some  from  English  ports. 

A  consideration  of  this  portion  of  the  naval  transac- 
ciassiflcation  of  tlous  is  thcrcforc,  pcrhaps,  best  conducted 
naval  affairs.  -^^  grouping  thc  various  events  under  two 
heads:  1st,  those  in  relation  to  the  blockade;  2d,  those 
in  relation  to  privateers.  Respecting  the  former,  it  is  ex- 
pedient not  to  relate  them  in  their  strict  order  of  occur- 
rence, but  rather,  viewing  them  in  the  aggregate,  to  give 


Chap.  LIX.]    A  SOUTHERN  NAVAL  STATION  NECESSARY.  431 

precedence  to  the  more  important  facts,  arranging  the 
others  so  that  their  mutual  connection  maybe  perceived. 
The  privateering  operations  may  be  more  appropriately 
considered  in  the  next  volume. 


THE  HARBOR  OF  PORT  ROYAL. 


The  blockade  once  established,  it  was  found  necessary, 

for  its  effective  maintenance,  to  have  a  large 

souSZ naval    uaval  statiou  at  some  point  near  the  centre 

station.  ,  ... 

of  the  line.  For  the  first  time  in  history,  a 
great  fleet  of  steam-ships  had  been  employed  for  blockad- 
ing purposes,  and,  to  enable  it  to  keep  the  sea  without 
long  voyages  for  supplies  and  repairs,  docks  and  machine 
shops  near  at  hand  were  required.  All  kinds  of  stores 
were  demanded — munitions  of  war,  powder,  shot,  shell, 
provisions,  medicines,  coal,  fresh  meats,"  ice,  fresh  water. 
Supply -ships,  in  a  continuous  line,  were  passing  from 
II.— H  H 


482  THE  PORT  EOYAL  EXPEDITION.  [Sect.  XII. 

point  to  point.  Their  task  would  be  rendered  less  oner- 
ous by  the  establishment  of  a  central  depot.  The  seizure 
of  Hatteras,  which,  as  we  shall,  presently  see,  had  been 
made,  did  not  meet  these  requisitions.  It  merely  shut 
a  gate  to  exclude  the  blockade  adventurer,  but  was  not 
the  acquisition  of  a  commodious  harbor. 

It  was  therefore  determined,  in  the  autumn  of  1861,  to 
Expedition  to  occupy  Port  Royal,  in  South  Carolina — a  har- 
port  Royal.  -^^^^  sltuated  bctwecu  Charleston  and  Savan- 
nah, and  the  best  upon  the  Southern  Atlantic  coast.  The 
fleet  assigned  for  this  purpose  was  the  most  powerful  that 
had  yet  been  fitted  out  in  America ;  it  consisted  of  the 
frigate  Wabash,  14  gun-boats,  34  steamers,  and  26  sailing 
vessels.  It  was  under  the  command  of  Commodore  Du- 
pont,  and  carried  more  than  15,000  troops,  under  Major 
General  Thomas  W.  Sherman.  Soon  after  leaving  Hamp- 
ton Roads  it  encountered  a  violent  storm,  by  which  the 
ships  were  dispersed  and  several  of  the  transports  lost. 
On  the  morning  of  November  4th,  however,  Dupont  reach- 
ed his  destination,  with  difficulty  getting  his  flag-ship,  the 
Wabash,  over  the  bar;  but  he  was  soon  after  joined  by 
his  fleet.  On  Hilton  Head  there  was  a  strong  earthwork, 
Fort  Walker,  mounting  23  guns,  Avith  an  outwork  on  the 
sea-front  having  a  rifled  gun.  The  plan  of  Fort  Walk- 
Defenses  of  61'  was  such  that  its  principal  guns  were 
Port  Royal.  n^ouutcd  ou  two  watcr-faccs  so  nearly  in 
line  as  to  admit  of  an  enfilading  fire  from  a  certain  point ; 
the  flanks  were  much  weaker.  On  the  opposite  side  of 
the  channel,  on  Phillip's  Island,  at  a  distance  of  2^  miles, 
was  another  earthwork,  Fort  Beauregard,  mounting  20 
guns,  several  of  them  heavy  rifles.  It  had  an  outwork 
mounting  five.  Two  miles  above,  at  the  junction  of  Beau- 
fort and  Broad  Rivers,  the  Confederate  Commodore  Tatt- 
nall had  a  fleet  of  five  or  six  gun-boats.  The  works  were 
manned  by  about  1700  South  Carolina  troops. 


Chap.  LIX.]    DUPONT'S  ATTACK  AT  POET  ROYAL. 


483 


II I  LTD  a  Hea 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  PORT  ROYAL  FORTS. 


^'  It  was  determined  to  direct  the  weight  of  the  attack 
Dnpont's  attack  fi^st  upoii  Fort  Walkcr,  and  then  turn  to 
on  the  forts.  y^^^.  Bcaurcgard.  The  plan  was  for  the 
deet  to  pass  up  midway  between  the  forts  and  engage 
both  at  long  range,  and,  when  the  line  reached  a  point  2^ 
miles  north  of  the  forts,  to  turn  to  the  south  round  by 
the  west,  and  come  into  close  action  with  Fort  Walker, 
attacking  on  the  weakest  flank,  while  at  the  same  time 
the  shot  would  enfilade  the  two  water-faces."  The  ships 
were  to  pass  the  forts  at  a  distance  of  800  yards  when 
moving  southward;  but,  when  they  made  the  second 
circuit,  they  were  to  come  nearer,  sighting  their  guns 
for  550  yards,  so  that  the  gunners  in  the  fort  had  not 
only  to  fire  at  a  moving  object,  but  the  ships  were  some 
300  yards  nearer  than  when  they  passed  at  first.  Of 
course  the  range  would  be  lost,  and  but  little  damage  in- 
flicted. Each  vessel,  as  it  came  down,  was  to  send  enfi- 
lading shot  from  its  pivot-guns,  and  then  give  the  whole 


484  CAPTURE  OF  PORT  ROYAL.  [Sect.  XII. 

starboard  broadside.  On  its  return  upward  it  was  to 
give  its  port  broadside. 

The  necessary  preparations  having  been  made,  the  flag- 
ship Wabash,  followed  by  the  other  war- 
ships,  passed  up  the  midst  of  the  channel. 
Sailing  in  the  designated  elliptical  track,  they  delivered 
their  fire  as  they  neared  the  forts.  They  made  the  cir- 
cuit three  times.  Meanwhile  some  of  the  smaller  vessels 
had  taken  stations  where  they  could  not  only  prevent  the 
Confederate  fleet  from  giving  any  assistance,  but  also 
maintain  a  fire  upon  the  left  flank  of  Fort  Walker.  In 
the  course  of  three  hours  the  fort  was  disabled,  and  its  gar- 
rison had  taken  to  flight,  leaving  even  Avatches  and  other 
valuables  behind.  Simultaneously  Fort  Beauregard  was 
abandoned.  The  loss  on  the  national  side  was,  in  killed 
and  wounded,  31;  the  Confederate  loss  was  probably 
much  more.  In  the  forts  were  found  49  cannon  and 
large  quantities  of  ammunition.  The  town  of  Beaufort 
and  the  adjoining  islands  were  soon  afterward  taken  pos- 
session of,  and  troops  were  landed  on  Hilton  Head,  which 
was  strongly  fortified. 

Port  Royal,  thus  secured,  was  made  abase  of  operations 
against  South  Carolina  and  Georgia.  It  became  a  great 
depot  for  munitions  and  stores  of  every  kind. 

Savannah,  which  is  situated  about  fifteen  miles  from 
the  mouth  of  the  Savannah  River  and  on 

Expedition  for  the     . ,  , ,  ,         ■,      .  •    t        t    p       t     t  i 

blockade  of  sa-      its  southem  bank,  is  mamly  deiended  by  a 

vannah.  '     ^  *'  "^    , 

strong  casemated  brick  work.  Fort  Pulaski, 
on  Cockspur  Island.  There  is  also  a  smaller  work.  Fort 
Jackson,  nearer  to  the  city. 

Between  Fort  Pulaski  and  Fort  Jackson  is  Jones's 
Island.  It  is  of  a  triangular  shape,  being  bounded  by 
Wright  River  on  the  east,  by  Mud  River  on  the  north, 
and  by  the  Savannah  itself  on   the   southwest.     It  is 


Chap.  LIX.]  THE  BLOCKADE  OF  SAVANNAH.  485 

about  five  miles  long,  and  two  or  three  broad.  Point 
Venus  is  on  tbe  face  of  it,  fronting  the  Savannah  Eiver. 
Jones's  Island  is  separated  from  Turtle  Island  by  Wright 
Eiver.  The  mouth  of  this  river  is  about  two  miles  above 
Fort  Pulaski. 

Information  had  been  given  by  some  negroes  that  there 
secret  passages  ^^.^^ts  a  passage  conuecting  Calibogue  Sound 
explored.  ^^^^|j  ^]^q   Savauuah  Eiver,  through  which 

gun-boats  might  pass  out  of  reach  of  Fort  Pulaski,  and 
cut  off  communication  between  that  work  and  Savan- 
nah. A  reconnoissance  of  boats  with  muffled  oars  success- 
fully eluded  the  Confederate  pickets,  the  exploring  party 
hiding  themselves  in  the  reeds  during  the  day  and  con- 
tinuing their  work  in  the  night.  They  found  that 
through  an  artificial  passage,  about  200  yards  in  length, 
known  as  Wall's  Cut,  access  might  readily  be  had  to 
Wright  Eiver.  This  passage  or  channel  was  obstructed 
by  three  rows  of  piles,  and  by  a  sunken  brig.  At  high 
water,  however,  they  were  able  to  get  over  these  obsta- 
cles. They  ascertained  that  gun-boats  often  feet  draught 
Reconnoissance  of  ^^^^^^  mako  their  Way  without  difficulty. 
Jones's  Island.  rpj^^  rccounoitring  party  passed  within  hear- 
ing of  the  sentinels  on  Pulaski,  and  proceeded  beyond 
Point  Venus  up  to  the  mouth  of  Mud  Eiver.  Through 
that  river  there  was  no  available  passage,  the  water  being 
too  shallow. 

An  expedition  was  therefore  sent  out  to  remove  the 
obstructions  in  Wall's  Cut.  The  piles  were  sawn  off, 
the  brig  turned  lengthwise  so  as  to  open  the  passage. 
The  work  lasted  for  three  weeks,  and  was  brought  to  its 
conclusion  without  detection.  A  few  runaway  negroes, 
who  were  hiding  in  the  marsh,  and  sportsmen  shooting 
wild  ducks,  were  seized. 

Information  was  in  like  manner  obtained  from  some 
negroes  of  a  similar  neglected  passage,  known  as  Wil- 


486 


FORT  PULASKI. 


[Sect.  XII. 


THE  DEFENSES  OF  SAVANNAH. 


mington  Narrows,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Savannah. 
Eeconnoissances  along  it  were  accordingly  made,  and  it 
was  determined  that  operations  should  be  commenced 
here  simultaneously  with  those  at  Wall's  Cut. 

Access  round  Fort  Pulaski  having  thus  been  obtained, 
Isolation  of  Fort  ^  ^^^^  ^^^  made  from  Wall's  Cut  over  the 
puiasku  marshes  of  Jones's  Island  to  Point  Venus, 

where  a  battery  was  constructed.  Another  battery  was 
placed  on  the  extremity  of  Long  Island,  and  a  third  on 
floats  at  the  mouth  of  Mud  Kiver.  These  cut  off  commu- 
nication between  Savannah  and  the  fort,  and  kept  the 
Confederate  gun-boats  at  a  distance. 

For  the  reduction  of  Fort  Pulaski,  eleven  batteries  were 
established  on  the  northwest  face  of  Tybee 

Its  bombardment.     __-  p,»  t/»  -t-\  !• 

Island,  controntmg  the  fort.  Every  thing 
being  in  readiness  (April  10th,  1862),  the  fort  was  sum- 
moned to  surrender.  Its  commandant  refused.  Fire  was 
therefore  opened  upon  it ;  in  fifteen  hours  it  was  so  much 
injured,  and  its  magazine  in  so  much  danger  of  being 
reached  by  the  shells,  that  it  surrendered.  The  posses- 
sion of  this  fort  completed  the  blockade  of  Savannah. 

There  were  some  interesting  incidents  connected  with 
the  reduction  of  Fort  Pulaski.     Jones's  Island  is  a  mere 


Chap.  LIX.]  REDUCTION  OF  FORT  PULASKI.  487 

marsh,  covered  witli  rank  grass,  and  flooded  at  liigli  wa- 
Difficnitiesiuits  tcr.  Ovev  this,  on  a  rude  corduroy  road, 
reduction.  ^^^  soMlcrs  dragged  cannon  weighing  three 

tons  -each.  The  wintry  nights  were  dark  and  stormy. 
The  men  had  frequently  to  work  waist-deep  in  the  slushy 
morass;  the  guns  slipped  off  the  track,  sank  in  the  mire, 
and  had  to  be  dragged  back  again.  On  Tybee  Island 
the  work  was  even  more  severe;  ten-inch  Columbiads 
had  to  be  dragged  two. miles  through  the  sand  by  hand. 
Up  to  this  time  it  had  been  supposed  that  walls  such 
as  those  of  Fort  Pulaski  could  not  be  breached  at  dis- 
tances greater  than  800  yards. 

The  guns  used  were  8  and  10  inch  Columbiads,  rifles 

from  24  to  42  pounders,  and  10  and  13  inch  mortars. 

The  nearest  batteries  were  almost  a  mile 

Great  distances  of    ^  .-i         n      ,     ,1  tji,  ^^ 

the  breaching  bat-  trom  tuo  lort,  the  more  distant  two  miles. 

teries. 

Though  the  walls  were  seven  and  a  half  feet 
thick,  they  could  not  withstand  the  guns.  The  rifles  per- 
forated them  deeply, honeycombing  them  completely;  and 
the  10-inch  solid  shot,  striking  with  less  velocity,  but  with 
what  was  designated  by  eye-witnesses  as  a  trip-hammer 
blow,  shook  the  damaged  masonry  down.  At  1 650  yards, 
which  was  the  distance  of  the  nearest  rifles,  the  shot  pen- 
etrated to  a  depth  of  from  twenty  to  twenty-six  inches — 
an  effect  so  unexpected  that  General  Gillmore,  who  con- 
ducted the  operation,  subsequently  reported  that,  had  he 
been  aware  of  what  he  now  had  learned,  he  might  have 
shortened  his  preparations  from  eight  weeks  to  one,  and 
increased  the  distance  of  his  nearest  batteries  to  even 
2500  yards. 

An  expedition  was  disj)atched  from  Port  Koyal  (Feb- 

ExpeditiontoFer-  Tuary  28th,  1862)  to  the  coast  of  Florida. 

nandma.  q^^  portlou  of  it  appToachcd  Fernandina, 

which  is  near  the  Atlantic  terminus  of  the  Cedar  Keys 


488 


THE  FLORIDA  EXPEDITIONS. 


[Sect.  XIL 


and  Fern^ndina  Railroad,  tlirougli  Cumberland  Sound, 
witli  a  view  of  turning  tlie  Confederate  works ;  tlie  re- 
mainder went  down  outside  of  Cumberland  Island.  On 
the  approach  of  the  ships  the  Confederates  abandoned 
Repossession  of  the  post.  The  towu  of  Femandiua  was  oc- 
Fort  Clinch.  cupied.  Fort  CHuch  was  repossessed,  and 
the  works  garrisoned  with  national  troops.  The  easy 
success  of  this  expedition  appears  to  have  turned  on  the 
previous  withdrawal  of  the  Florida  troops  for  service  in 
the  Confederate  army.  In  like  manner,  possession  was 
Expeditions  on  the  taken  (March  7th)  of  Brunswick,  the  At- 
lantic terminus  of  the  Brunswick  and  Pen- 


Florida  coast. 


THE   FLORIDA   EXPEDITIONS. 


sacola  Eailroad.  It  also  had  been  abandoned,  as  was  the 
case  with  Darien,  on  the  Altamaha  Eiver,  whence  1500 
troops  had  been  withdrawn.  But  one  white  man  and 
one  old  negro  were  found  in  the  place.  Jacksonville,  on 
the  St.  John's  River,  was  occupied  without  resistance 
(March  11th),  and  St.  Augustine  soon  after.  With  it 
Fort  Marion  was  taken. 


Chap.LIX.]     NOETH  CAROLINA  COAST  EXPEDITIONS.  489 

Florida,  out  of  a  white  population  of  77,778,  had  fur- 
nished nearly  10,000  men  to  the  Confederate  army. 
Thus  stripped,  she  was  unable  to  make  any  resistance,  or 
to  protect  the.  works  and  towns  upon  her  coast.  Com- 
modore Dupont,  referring  in  his  report  to  the  condition 
Sentiments  of  the  of  St.  Augustlue,  says  I  "  I  believo  there  are 
Fiondians.  mauy  citlzeus  who  are  earnestly  attached  to 

the  Union,  a  large  number  who  are  silently  opposed  to 
it,  and  a  still  larger  number  who  care  very  little  about 
the  matter.  There  is  much  violent  and  pestilent  feeling 
among  the  women.  They  have  a  theatrical  desire  to  fig- 
ure as  heroines.  Their  minds  have  doubtless  been  filled 
mth  the  falsehoods  so  industriously  circulated  in  regard 
to  the  lust  and  hatred  of  our  troops.  On  the  night  be- 
fore our  arrival,  a  party  of  them  assembled  in  front  of  the 
barracks,  and  cut  down  the  flag-staff,  in  order  that  it 
might  not  be  used  to  support  the  old  flag.  The  men 
seemed  anxious  to  conciliate  in  every  way." 

The  operations  on  the  coast  of  North  Carolina  were 
conducted  by  expeditions  organized  at  Fort- 

Objects  of  the  North  -,.--  rn-,  i  •    n        •     .         t     t 

Carolina  expedi-  rcss  Mouroe.  ,  iuey  were  chieiiy  intended 
.  for  the  enforcement  of  the  blockade  and  the 
stoppage  of  privateers  going  to  sea.  Subsequently  the 
possession  or  destruction  of  the  "Weldon  Railroad  was 
contemplated,  but  not  forcibly  attempted.  In  fact,  when 
the  correct  plan  of  the  war  came  to  be  understood,  it  was 
perceived  that  these  expeditions,  except  in  so  far  as  they 
aided  the  blockading  fleet,  were  of  no  use.  The  forces  of 
one  of  them  (Burnside's)  were  eventually  withdrawn,  and 
brought  on  a  more  correct  line  of  operations. 

The  expeditions  now  to  be  referred  to  are  two :  (1.) 
Butler's  expedition  to  Hatteras ;  (2.)  Burnside's  Koanoke 
expedition. 


490 


THE  HATTERAS  EXPEDITION. 


[Sect.  XII. 


0       Q.      "^     A,     ^ 


THE   NORTH  CAROLINA  EXPEDITIONS. 


The  waters  of  Pamlico  and  Albemarle  Sounds  are  con- 
The  expeditiou  nected  with  the  interior  of  North  Carolina 
to  Hatteras.  ^^  Canal,  rfvers,  and  railroads,  giving  singu- 
lar facilities  to  blockade  runners  to  carry  on  their  opera- 
tions. Through  these,  muskets,  cannon,  and  large  quanti- 
ties of  munitions  of  war  were  introduced  into  the  Con- 
federacy, and  cotton  carried  out.  To  guard  the  main 
channel  of  this  commerce,  two  forts  had  been  built  on  the 


chap.lix.]  the  hatteras  expedition.  491 

southwest  point  of  Hatteras  Island,  wMcli  is  between 
Oregon  atfd  Hatteras  Inlets — Fort  Clark,  a  small  water 
battery,  mounting  five  guns,  and  Fort  Hatteras,  a  stronger 
work,  covering  about  1^  acres,  and  having  ten  guns.  The 
island  itself  is  a  mere  sand-spit,  on  which  here  and  there 
are  scattered  clumps  of  dwarf  oaks:  the  sea-spray  dashes 
all  over  it.  A  miserable  population  of  ^ve  hundred  per- 
sons finds  occupation  in  piloting,  wrecking,  fishing.  In 
the  salt  marshes,  concealed  by  a  rank  grass,  are  swarms 
of  musquitoes. 

With  a  view  of  arresting  the  traffic  through  these 
sounds  and  enforcing  the  blockade,  an  expedition,  under 
General  Butler  and  Commodore  Stringham,  sailed  from 
Fortress  Monroe  (August  26, 1861),  its  immediate  object 
being  the  capture  of  the  two  forts.  It  consisted  of  three 
Its  naval  and  powerful  frfgatcs  aud  half  a  dozen  smaller 
military  force,  ycsscls.  Carrying  in  the  aggregate  158  guns 
and  about  900  soldiers.  It  passed  through  Hatteras  Inlet 
into  Pamlico  Sound.  Much  difficulty  was  experienced  in 
landing  the  troops  through  the  heavy  surf  rolling  on  the 
beach.  One  third  of  the  force,  300  men,  was,  however, 
got  on  shore,  but  without  either  provisions,  water,  or  am- 
munition. A  bombardment  was  opened  by  the  shipping 
upon  the  smaller  work,  which  replied  with  but  little  ef 
feet,  the  vessels  keeping  in  continual  motion,  each  steam- 
ing round  on  a  different  circle,  so  that  the  range  of  none 
Bombardment  of  thcm  could  bc  got.  Ou  their  part,  they 
threw  their  shells  with  so  much  accuracy  as 
to  compel  its  defenders  to  abandon  Fort  Clark  in  the 
course  of  a  couple  of  hours.  A  rainy  and  tempestuous 
night  set  in,  adding  not  a  little  to  the  discomfort  of  the 
troops  which  had  been  landed;  but,  as  soon  as  it  was  day, 
fire  was  resumed  on  the  larger  fort,  Hatteras,  and  it  was 
speedily  reduced.  The  Confederates,  though  re-enforced 
during  the  operations,  found  themselves  completely  over- 


492  KOANOKE  ISLAND.  [Sect.  XII. 

They  are  sur-     matclied,  and  were  compelled  to  surrender. 
ren  ered.         Among  tliose  who  Were  thus  taken  prisoners 
was  Barron,  wlio  had,  at  Lincoln's  accession,  nearly  been 
surreptitiously  appointed  to  one  of  the  most  confidential 
posts  in  the  United  States  Navy  Department  (p.  55). 
There  were  captured  more  than  700  prisoners,  25  cannon, 
and  1000  small-arms.    The  force  left  in  charge  of  the  posi- 
tion subsequently  undertook  an  expedition  to  Chickami- 
comico,  about  20   miles   distant,  but  was 
chickamicomico    compellcd  to  retire,  pursued  by  the  Confed- 
erates :  it  destroyed  its  tents  and  stores,  and 
lost  about  50  prisoners.     But  one  of  the  light-draught 
vessels,  coming  to  the  rescue,  put  the  pursuers  to  flight 
with  shells,  inflicting  on  them  a  considerable  loss  as  they 
passed  along  the  flat  sand-bank,  which  afforded  them  no 
cover  or  protection. 

The  seizure  of  these  forts  was  an  important  step  in  the 
Results  of  these  enforcement  of  the  blockadc.  It  gave  access 
operations.         ^^  ^j^  ^-^^  ^^^^^  Carolina  sounds,  and  threat- 

ened  the  power  of  the  Confederates  in  these  interior  wa- 
ters. 


Koanoke  Island,  lying  behind  Bodie's  Island,  the  sand- 
Bumside's  expedi-  ^^^  that  shuts  off  Upper  North  Carolina 
tion  to  Roanoke.     ^^^^^  ^^^  Atlautlc  Occau,  offci's  somc  of  the 

most  interesting  souvenirs  of  early  American  history.  It 
was  (vol.  i.,  p.  147)  the  scene  of  Sir  Walter  Ealeigh's  col- 
onizing expedition. 

As  stated  by  General  Wise,  to  whom  its  defense  was 
Military  value  of  Intrustcd  by  the  Confederate  government,  it 
Roanoke  Island.  ^^^  ^-^^  ^^^  ^^  ^^l  thc  rcar  dcfcnscs  of  Nor- 
folk. It  unlocked  two  sounds,  eight  rivers,  four  canals, 
two  railroads.  It  guarded  more  than  four  fifths  of  the 
supplies  of  Norfolk.  The  seizure  of  it  endangered  the 
subsistence  of  the  Confederate  army  there,  threatened  the 


Chap.  LIX.]  EXPEDITION  TO  EOANOKE  ISLAND. 


493 


navy  yard,  interrupted  the  communication  between  Nor- 
folk and  Richmond,  and  intervened  between  both  and 
the  South.  "  It  lodges  an  enemy  in  a  safe  harbor  from 
the  storms  of  Hatteras,  gives  him  a  rendezvous,  and  a 
large,  rich  range  of  supplies.  It  commands  the  sea-board 
from  Oregon  Inlet  to  Cape  Henry." 

After  the  capture  of  Hatteras  Inlet  in  August,  1861, 
light-draught  steamers,  armed  with  a  rifle  gun,  often 
stealthily  came  out  of  these  waters  to  prey  upon  com- 
merce. In  the  interior,  shipping,  and  even  iron-clads,  were 
building. 


THE  EXPEDITION   TO   ROANOKE   ISLAND. 


The  expedition  of  General  Butler,  as  has  been  stated 
(p.  491),  had  reduced  the  defensive  works  at  Hatteras  In- 
let and  opened  Pamlico  Sound.  The  Confederates  had 
retired  to  Roanoke  Island,  which,  intervening  between 
Pamlico  and  Albemarle  Sounds,  commands  the  passage  to 
the  latter.  The  channel  on  the  east  of  the  island  is  shal- 
low ;  that  on  the  west,  known  as  Croatan 
Sound,  was  defended  by  three  earth-works 


Defenses  of  the 
position. 


494  EXPEDITION  TO  ROANOKE  ISLAND.  [Sect.  XII. 

on  the  island,  one  at  Pork  Point,  one  at  Weir's  Point,  and 
a  smaller  work,  Fort  Blanchard,  between.  The  larger 
works  were  armed  with  twenty-two  guns,  some  of  them 
100-pound  rifles.  On  the  main  land,  at  Eedstone  Point, 
there  was  another  battery  Across  the  channel,  near  Pork 
Point,  obstructions  of  piles  and  sunken  vessels  had  been 
placed.  On  the  island  itself  there  were  other  works,  one 
giving  protection  toward  Nag's  Head,  on  the  bar,  and  an- 
other near  the  centre  of  the  island — a  redoubt,  with  a 
pond  on  its  front  and  flanks,  commanding  the  road  that 
comes  from  the  south. 

An  expedition  for  operating  on  this  part  of  the  North 
Carolina  coast  was  placed  under  command  of  General 
Burnside,  who  was  ordered  (January  7th,  1862)  to  unite 
with  Flag-officer  Goldsborough,  in  command  of  the  fleet, 
at  Fortress  Monroe,  capture  Newbem,  seize  the  Weldon 
Railroad,  and  reduce  Fort  Macon. 

The  force  consisted  of  31  steam  gun-boats,  some  of 
them  carryiner  heavy  s^uns;  11,500  troops. 

Naval  and  military  ,    ^       7^r   x  ,  n       .        t*         T. 

stjenghoftheex-   couvcycd  lu  47  tj^ausports ;  a  fleet  of  small 
vessels  for  the  transportation  of  sixty  days' 
supplies. 

It  left  Hampton  Roads  on  the  night  of  January  11th, 
Its  misfortunes  at  ^^^  aiTivcd  off  Hatteras  in  two  days,  as  a 
the  outset.  storm  was  coming  on.  The  commander  found 

with  dismay  that  the  draught  of  several  of  his  ships  was 
too  great  to  permit  them  to  enter.  There  were  not  more 
than  7i  feet  of  water  on  the  bar.  Some  dishonest  ship- 
sellers  in  New  Ygrk  had,  by  misrepresentation,  palmed 
off  on  the  government  unsuitable  transport  vessels,  of 
which  several  were  lost  in  that  tempestuous  sea.  The 
crowded  ships  were  in  each  other's  way.  The  steamer 
City  of  New  York,  with  a  cargo  valued  at  nearly  a  quar- 
ter of  a  million  of  dollars,  went  to  pieces.  The  clouds 
seemed  to  dip  down  to  the  vessels'  masts ;  so  violent  were 


Chap.  LIX.]  EXPEDITION  TO  ROANOKE  ISLAND.  495 

the  waves  that  no  one  could  keep  tlie  deck.  It  was  only 
by  the  greatest  exertion  and  perseverance,  and  not  until 
a  whole  fortnight  had  elapsed,  that  the  entrance  to  Pam- 
lico Sound  was  completed.  The  villainy  that  led  to  this 
delay  gave  the  Confederates  ample  time  for  preparation. 
Not  until  the  end  of  another  week  (February  7th)  had 
the  reorganized*  expedition  gained  the  entrance  to  Croa- 
tan  Sound,  and  worked  through  its  shallow,  marshy  pass- 
es. The  weather  was  beautiful  by  day;  there  was  a 
bright  moonshine  at  night.  The  gun-boats  found  a  Con- 
federate fleet  drawn  up  behind  the  obstructions,  across 
Attack  commenced  the  chauucl,  uear  Pork  Point.    They  open- 

by  the  fleet.  ^^    g^^    ^^    ^-^^    ^^^^^    ^^  ^^^^  ^^j^^^       j^  ^^^ 

returned  both  from  the  works  and  the  shipping.  Mean- 
time troops  were  being  landed  at  Ashby's,  a  small  force, 
w^hich  was  attempting  to  resist  them,  being  driven  off  by 
the  fire  of  the  ships.  The  debarkation  went  on,  though 
it  was  raining  heavily  and  night  had  set  in.  It  was  con- 
tinued until  10,000  men  had  been  landed  on  the  marsh. 
Before  dark,  however,  the  work  at  Pork  Point  had  been 
silenced,  and  the  Confederate  fleet  had  retired  to  Weir's 
Point.  Their  flag-ship,  the  Curlew,  had  been  set  on  fire 
by  a  100-pound  shell. 

When  day  broke  Burnside  commenced  forcing  his  way 
up  the  island.  He  moved  in  three  columns,  the  central 
one,  preceded  by  a  howitzer  battery,  upon  the  only  road, 
the  right  and  left  through  the  woods.  The  battery 
The  troops  carry  that  obstructcd  thls  Toad  was  soon  carried, 
the  batteries.  ^hough  uot  wlthout  rcsistaucc.  The  men 
had  to  wade  waist-deep  in  the  water  of  the  pond  that 
protected  it.  Finding  it  impossible  to  flank  it,  as  had 
been  intended,  they  charged  it  in  front.  It  was  here  that 
Captain  Wise,  the  son  of  the  Confederate  commander, 
was  mortally  wounded.  General  Wise  himself  lay  sick 
at  Nag's  Head.     It  added  not  a  little  to  the  bitterness 


496  EXPEDITIONS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA.  [Sect.  XII. 

of  this  needless  sacrifice  that  lie  had  protested  in  vain  to 
the  Kichmond  authorities  against  what  was  doing  at  Ko- 
anoke  Island,  and  had  told  them  what  the  result  must 
inevitably  be ;  but  the  Secretary  of  War,  Benjamin,  turn- 
ed a  deaf  ear  to  him.  Toward  Nag's  Head  the  Confed- 
erate force,  expelled  from  the  captured  work,  attempted 
to  retreat.  They  were,  however,  overtaken,  and  the  rest 
of  the  command  on  the  north  of  the  island,  2500  strong, 
was  compelled  to  surrender. 

The  Confederate  fleet  was  pursued  to  Elizabeth  City, 

Capture  of  Eden-   whithcr  it  had  fled,  and  there  destroyed.    A 
large  part  of  the  town  was  burned.    A  por- 
tion of  the  national  fleet  went  into  the  harbor  of  Eden- 
ton,  and  captured  that  town.     Winton,  on  the  Chowan 
Eiver,  shared  the  same  fate. 

Burnside  next  made  an  attack  (March  14th)  on  l^ew- 
bern,  one  of  the  most  important  sea-ports  of  North  Caro- 
lina. As  the  troops  advanced  from  the  place  of  landing, 
the  gun-boats  shelled  the  woods  in  front  of  them,  and 
thereby  cleared  the  way.  A  march  of  eighteen  miles  in 
a  rain-storm,  and  over  execrable  roads,  did  not  damp  the 
energy  of  the  soldiers.  They  bivouacked  at  night  by 
pitch-pine  fires.  Five  miles  below  Newbern  they  came 
upon  some  works,  which,  after  a  sharp  struggle,  were 
taken  by  assault,  and  the  enemy  pursued  toward  New- 
bern.     The  city  had  been  set  on  fire  in  several  places, 

and  also  of  New-    ^^^  ^^^  bridge  ovcT  the  Trcut  was  in  flames. 

Newbern  was  captured,  and  with  it  46  heavy 

guns,  3  batteries  of  light  artillery,  and  a  large  amount 

of  stores.     Burnside's  losses  wxre   90  killed  and  466 

wounded. 

Preparations  were  next  made  for  the  reduction  of  Fort 

Capture  of  Fort     Macou,  which  commauds  the  entrance  of 

^''"^'  Beaufort  Harbor.     On  April  25th  it  was 

bombarded  by  three  steamers  and  three  shore  batteries ; 


Chap.  LIX.]  STONE  BLOCI^DES.  497 

the  former,  however,  in  tlie  course  of  an  hour  and  a  half, 
were  compelled  to  withdraw.  But  the  shore  batteries, 
continuing  their  attack,  silenced  the  guns  of  the  garri- 
son, and,  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon,  compelled  the 
surrender  of  the  fort. 

In  connection  with  this  expedition  some  operations  of 
minor  importance  occurred — an  affair  at  South  Mills ;  the 
obstructing  of  the  entrance  to  the  Dismal  Swamp ;  an  en- 
gagement near  Pactolus.  The  chief  result,  however,  was 
the  closure  of  the  ports  and  suppression  of  commerce. 
General  Burnside's  forces  were  eventually,  for  the  most 
part,  withdrawn.  They  were  taken  to  Alexandria,  and 
joined  the  army  of  General  Pope. 

Before  the  close  of  1862  a  large  part  of  the  Atlantic 
Southern  coast  had  been  recovered  from  the 

General  result  of     ^        ^    -,  ,^,  .     -.     , 

these  coast  expe-   Coniederacv.     ine  navy  was  occupied  m 

ditions.  .*'  ,*^  Tr»*ni 

suppressing  the  batteries  and  fortified  w^orks 
which  had  been  constructed  on  the  interior  water  net- 
work. Many  of  these,  as  on  Otter  Island  and  up  the 
Coosaw,  were  found  to  have  been  abandoned.  This  was, 
perhaps,  in  part  due  to  the  terror  of  gun-boats  inspired 
by  the  attack  on  Port  Royal,  and  in  part  to  the  fact  that 
the  force  of  the  Confederacy  was  already  declining. 
Among  the  methods  resorted  to  for  completing  the 

blockade,  and  preventing:  the  es^ress  of  pri- 

The  stone  blockade.  ^  -^  ^.  °  .  ^ 

vateers  seeking  to  commit  depredations  on 
commerce,  was  that  of  sinking  in  the  channels  of  some  of 
the  ports  vessels  laden  with  stone.  This  was  first  done 
at  Ocracoke  Inlet,  on  the  North  Carolina  coast. 

A  number  of  old  whale-ships  which  had  become  un- 
seaworthy,  having  been  laden  with  stone,  were  sunk,  on 
the  21st  of  December  (1861),  at  the  principal  entrance 
of  Charleston  Harbor.  They  were  placed  in  checkered 
rows  across  the  channel.  It  was  expected  that  they  w^ould 
form  a  nucleus  for  the  accumulation  of  sand,  and  thus  af- 
II.— 1 1 


498  CONFEDERATE  PRIVATEERS.  [Sect.  XII. 

ford  the  required  obstacle.  Tlie  result,  however,  proved 
to  be  a  failure. 

As  the  most  important  privateering  operations  of  the 
The  Confederate  Confederacy  have  to  be  considered  in  the 
privateers.  foUowiug  volumc,  I  shall  uot,  at  this  point, 

devote  much  space  to  that  subject.  The  incidents  that 
have  to  be  related,  or,  rather,  refen-ed  to,  were  intrinsical- 
ly of  very  little  importance.  They  exerted  no  influence 
on  the  general  issue,  and  were  wdthout  any  political  re- 
sult, except  in  so  far  as  they  raised  the  question  of  the 
treatment  of  privateersmen  as  pirates. 

On  June  2d.,  1861,  the  Savannah,  a  schooner  of  50 
tons,  carrying  an  18-pound  swivel,  eluded  the  blockading 
squadron  off  Charleston.  Next  day  she  fell  in  with  a 
Maine  brig,  laden  with  sugar,  bound  to  Philadelphia. 
Having  decoyed  her  within  reach  by  hoisting  an  Amer- 
ican flag,  the  privateer  captured  her  without  difficulty. 
Soon  after  the  Savannah  fell  in  with  another  brig,  and 
her  captain  expected  to  make  as  easy  a  prize  of  it.  It 
was,  however,  the  United  States  brig  of  war  Perry.    Dis- 

captiireofthe     coveriug  the  mistake  when  it  was  too  late, 

Savannah.  ^-^^  Savauuah  was  obliged  to  surrender.  Her 
crew  were  sent  to  New  York.  It  was  intended  to  try 
them  for  piracy ;  but  a  threat  from  the  Confederate  gov- 
ernment that  it  would  retaliate,  led  to  their  exchange 
along  with  other  prisoners  of  w^ar. 

Still  worse  fortune  befell  the  Petrel,  which  likewise 

Sinking  of  the     ^au  out  through  the  blockade  of  Charleston. 

Petrel.  g^^  ^^^  hardly  at  sea  when  she  fell  in  with 

what  geemed  to  be  a  large  merchant  vessel.  She  accord- 
ingly gave  chase,  and  fired  a  shot  across  the  stranger's 
bow  to  bring  her  to.  The  crew  of  the  Petrel  reported 
that  they  were  at  a  loss  to  know  what  had  next  happen- 


Chap.  LIX,]  CONFEDERATE  PRIVATEERS.  499 

ed  to  them.     They  were  floating  among  splinters  and 
wreck ;  their  vessel  had  disappeared.     They  had  been 
chasing  the  frigate  St.  Lawrence,  which  had  opened  her 
ports  and  instantly  sent  the  Petrel  to  the  bottom.    Four 
men  were  drowned,  and  thirty-six  rescued  from  the  water. 
Several  prizes  were,  however,  made  by  other  vessels 
The  Confederate    Sailing  Under  the  Confederate  flag.     At  the 
^'''^^^'  close  of  the  year  (1861)  these  prizes  were 

fifty-eight  in  number.  The  Confederate  government  car- 
ried its  point  that  its  prisoners  captured  at  sea  should  be 
treated  as  ordinary  prisoners  of  war.  Colonel  Corcoran, 
of  the  New  York  69th  Kegiment,  who  had  been  wounded 
and  captured  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  was  handcuffed, 
placed  in  a  solitary  cell,  and  attached  to  the  floor  by  a 
chain  in  the  Libby  Prison  at  Richmond.  This  was  done 
to  compel  the  national  government  to  recede  from  the 

position  taken  by  the  President  in  his  proc- 
j|spectiiig  priva-     lauiatlou  of  April  19th,  that  persons  thus 

captured  at  sea  "  will  be  held  amenable  to 
the  laws  of  the  United  States  for  the  prevention  and  pun- 
ishment of  piracy,"  and  the  measure  proved  successful. 
Among  other  naval  operations  may  be  mentioned  the 
Burning  of  the     dcstructiou,  lu  tho  harbor  of  Pensacola,  of 

the  Judah,  a  privateer.  She  was  boarded 
early  on  the  morning  of  September  14th  by  a  party  from 
the  flag-ship  Colorado,  who  spiked  a  10-inch  gun  with 
which  she  was  armed,  and  set  her  on  fire.  Their  loss 
was  15  in  killed  and  wounded.  The  Confederates,  how- 
ever, shortly  after  retaliated.     On  the  night  of  October 

9th  they  sent  a  force  from  Pensacola  to  San- 

The  Confederates      i-r>TiT  t-tt 

rout  a  Zouave       ta  Kosa  island,  and  surprised  the  camp  of  a 
Zouave  regiment  stationed  near  Fort  Pick- 
ens.   They  were  successful ;  the  camp  was  destroyed,  and 
the  Zouaves  lost  about  60  killed  and  wounded. 

The  steamer  Sumter,  Captain  Semmes,  had  evaded  the 


500  CONFEDERATE  PRIVATEERS.  [Sect.  XII. 

Successes  of  the    l^l^^^^^^^^  of  the  Mississippi  about  the  begin- 
sumter.  nliig  of  Julj,  aiid  captui'ed  several  merchant- 

men in  the  West  India  Seas.  She  then  went  to  Nassau 
for  supplies.  Having  made  many  captures  in  the  Atlan- 
tic, she  was  blockaded  in  the  harbor  of  Gibraltar  by  the 
national  steamer  Tuscarora.  Here  she  was  sold,  her  offi- 
cers repairing  to  Liverpool,  and  being  eventually  trans- 
ferred to  the  Alabama,  which  had  been  built  for  them  at 
that  port. 

The  Nashville,  which  had  slipped  out  of  Charleston, 
Successes  of  the  captuTcd  and  burnt  a  valuable  merchant- 
Nashviue.  msiJiy  the  Harvey  Birch,  near  the  English 

coast,  and  then  went  into  Southampton,  where  the  Tusca- 
rora happened  to  be.  She,  however,  escaped  from  this 
national  ship,  as  it  was  detained  by  the  English  govern- 
ment for  twenty-four  hours  after  the  privateer  had  sailed. 
An  attempt  was  made  (October  11th)  to  drive  the 
Attack  on  a  block-  "blockadiug  squadrou  from  the  mouths  of 
adiug  squadron,  ^j^^  Misslssippi.  For  this  purpose,  a  ram, 
three  fire-ships,  and  ^ve  small  steamers  came  down  the 
river.  The  ram  struck  the  national  flag-ship  Eichmond, 
and  stove  in  her  side.  The  other  ships  slipped  their 
cables  and  ran  down  to  the  Southwest  Pass.  One  of 
them,  the  Vincennes,  got  aground,  her  captain  attempt- 
ing, without  success,  to  set  her  on  fire.  The  alarm  was, 
however,  veiy  quickly  over,  and  the  blockade  remained 
unbroken. 


SECTION  XIII. 

FOREIGN  RELATIONS  AND  DOMESTIC  POLICY  OF  THE 

REPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  LX. 


FOREIGN  RELATIONS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.     STATE  OF'  EUROPEAN 
OPINION  ON  AMERICAN  AFFAIRS. 

Public  opinion  in  Europe  respecting  the  American  Civil  War  was,  to  a  great  ex- 
tent, founded  on  the  views  of  the  English  press. 

The  middle  classes  in  England  were  brought  to  coincide  with  the  privileged  classes 
in  sentiments  unfavorable  to  the  American  Union,  paitly  by  appeals  to  historical 
recollections,  and  partly  by  considerations  connected  with  the  revenue  legislation 
of  the  American  Congress. 

The  people  of  the  Confederacy  very  confidently  expect- 
ed foreign  aid,  both  moral  and  material,  in 
expected  foieig J    the  establishment  of  their  independence.    It 
was  affiimed  that  promises  of  that  kind  had 
been  given  before  the  first  public  movements  of  secession 
in  Charleston  were  undertaken  (vol.  i.,  p.  512). 

The  national  government  also,  not  without  reason, 
looked  for  the  favorable  opinion  of  that 

and  the  national  t^   t    *     a  '-r^  t  •    t 

government  for-    powcriul  mlluence  lu  Europe  which  repre- 

eign  sympathy.         ■■-  *         t  n  tt  t  t 

sents  itself  as  dedicated  to  the  support  of 
law,  order,  and  liberty. 

Both,  however,  were  disappointed  If  a  French  army 
appeared  on  the  American  continent,  it  was  not  in  avowed 
support  of  the  Confederacy,  but  for  the  carrying  out  of 
European  purposes  in  Mexico.  The  intellectual  power 
of  England  was  engaged,  as  far  as  circumstances  permit- 
ted, in  promoting  a  partition  of  the  republic. 


5Q2  PUBLIC  OPINION  IN  J:NGLAND.  [Sect.  XIII. 

It  is  impossible  to  express  the  pain  felt  by  loyal  and 
conservative  men  in  America  v^hen  it  was  announced  that 
the  ministry  of  Lord  Palmerston  had  determined  to  con- 
cede belligerent  rights  to  the  South. 

Eepublican  America  did  not  solicit  the  moral  support 
of  Constitutional  England  as  a  boon.  She  expected  it  as 
a  right.  Not  without  the  deepest  regret  did  she  find 
that  she  must  fight  the  battle  of  Representative  Institu- 
tions and  human  freedom  alone. 

Though  no  one  imagined  that  the  privileged  classes  of 
•  England  would  look  with  disfavor  on  the 

Course  of  the  priv-      ~i  n  ii        (*  i  •       t  i 

iieged  classes  of  downiall  01  a  dcmocracy,  no  one  m  loyal 
America  supposed  that  they  could  regard 
without  horror  a  resort  to  conspiracy  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  political  ends,  or  contemplate  without  disdain 
great  officers  of  state,  who,  with  atrocious  perfidy,  had  be- 
trayed their  trust. 

No  one  supposed  that  the  religious  middle  classes  of 
The  religious  mid-  England,  who  had  ever  been  foremost  in 
die  classes.  support  of  humau  liberty,  could  forget  their 

traditions,  and  lend  their  influence  to  those  who  were 
attempting,  by  'armed  force,  to  perpetuate  and  extend 
human  slavery. 

No  one  supposed  that  the  literature  of  England,  of 
which  it  is  the  glory  to  have  been  the  cham- 
pion of  Order,  Progress,  and  all  that  is  be- 
neficent in  modern  civilization,  could  view  unmoved  the 
resort  of  a  faction  to  brute  violence,  insurrection,  and  the 
horrors  of  civil  war — still  less  that  it  would  seek  to  par- 
alyze a  loyal  people  in  their  efforts  to  uphold  a  just,  a 
great,  a  good  government. 

No  one  supposed  that  a  commercial  community  would 
The  commercial  ^^^  ^^^  pcrilous  example  of  building  and 
classes.  equipping  war-ships   to  destroy  the   com- 

merce of  its  friend. 


Chap.  LX.]  PUBLIC  OPINION  IN  ENGLAND.  5Q3 

Not  without  profound  disappointment  did  loyal  and 
educated  Americans  witness  the  direction  of  English  in- 
fluence. In  their  eyes  it  seemed  false  to  the  destinies  of 
our  race. 

Of  a  conflict  which  has  cost  half  a  million  of  lives, 
which  in  four  years  has  imposed  financial  burdens  and 
occasioned  a  destruction  of  property  equal  in  aggregate 
value  to  the  public  debt  of  England,  what  is  the  result  ? 
Only  this — the  Confirmation  of  Free  Institutions.  The 
price  to  be  paid  was  very  great,  but  it  has  been  paid  by 
America  without  a  murmur. 

Not  among  the  titled — not  among  the  educated — not 
The  plain  people  ^vcu  amoug  the  rcligious  classes  of  England 
ofEngian  .  ^-^  Yvee  Amcrlca  find  favor.  Her  cause, 
however,  was  not  without  supporters  in  the  ancestral 
land.  The  plain  people,  those  who  earn  their  daily  bread 
by  honorable  industry,  who  recognized  that  her  cause 
was  their  cause,  were  her  friends,  and  that,  too,  though 
they  were  the  chief  sufferers  by  the  commercial  embar- 
rassments of  the  war. 

One  illustrious  man  there  was  in  England  who  saw 
The  Prince  Consort  that  thc  great  iutcrcsts  of  the  Future  would 
Queen.  -^^  bcttcr  subscrvcd  by  a  sincere  friendship 
with  America  than  by  the  transitory  alliances  of  Europe. 
He  recognized  the  bonds  of  race.  His  prudent  counsels 
strengthened  the  determination  of  the  sovereign  that  the 
Trent  controversy  should  have  an  honorable  and  peace- 
ful solution.  Had  the  desires  of  these,  the  most  exalted 
personages  in  the  Eealm,  been  more  completely  fulfilled, 
the  administration  of  Lord  Palmerston  would  not  have 
cast  a  disastrous  shadow  on  the  future  of  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  race. 

With  the  exception  of  Eussia,  the  Continent  of  Europe 
was  greatly  influenced  by  the  representations  of  the  En- 


504  INFLUENCE  OF  ENGLISH  JOURNALISM.       [Sect.  XIII. 

Opinion  in  Europe     gl^sll  piCSS,  wHcll  WaS  SUppOSed,  for  obvioUS 

onAmericanaffairs.  peasoiis,  to  be  Well  informed  on  the  state  of 
American  affairs.  The  German  settlers  in  America  ex- 
erted what  perhaps  may  be  spoken  of  as  a  correcting  in- 
fluence in  their  native  country,  but  they  were  not  able  to 
neutralize  the  power  of  the  English  press. 

The  appreciation  of  European  opinion  on  affairs  con- 
it  was  influenced  by  nected  with  the  Civil  War  turns,  therefore, 
Engiishjournaiism  egg^^tially  ou  a  study  of  the  views  which 
were  taken  in  England.  The  material  for  such  a  study 
is  very  ample.  It  is  to  be  found  in  the  journalism  of  the 
country,  in  the  Parliamentary  proceedings,  and  in  the  acts 
of  the  government.  In  truth,  nothing  more  for  this  pur- 
pose is  needed  than  may  be  found  in  the  Times  newspa- 
per, that  powerful  journal  which  not  only  reflects,  but  in 
no  inconsiderable  degree  forms  the  public  opinion  of  En- 
gland 

On  this  occasion  I  shall  follow  the  course  I  have  taken 
(vol.  i.,  chap,  xxvi.)  in  representing  the  opinions  of  the 
South,  simply  collecting  and  arranging  together  such 
statements  as  seem  to  have  an  important  bearing  on  the 
subject,  preserving,  whenever  possible,  the  language,  and 
always  the  spiiit,  of  the  sources  from  which  they  are  de- 
rived. 

Perhaps  it  may  not  be  inappropriate  to  make  the  pref- 
and  English  histori-  ^tory  remark  that  from  the  outset  there  ex- 
cai  recollections,  j^^^^  -^  Eugkud  a  dispositiou  to  bcar  iu  re- 
membrance the  colonial  war.  It  was  said.  The  Southern 
States  have  as  much  right  to  assert  their  independence 
of  the  Union  as  the  Colonies  had  to  assert  their  independ- 
ence of  England.  The  reasons  that  justified  the  latter 
justify  the  former.  The  cases  are  precisely  alike.  Amer- 
ica is  suffering  no  more  than  she  caused  England  to  suf 
fer.     She  should  be  the  last  of  nations  to  complain. 

The  cases  would  have  been  more  nearly  alike  if  a  sue- 


Chap.  LX.]  COLONIAL  AND  CONFEDERATE  MOVEMENTS.  505 

Parallel  between  ^^^sioii  of  American  prfiices  had  for  many 
£MsEe.  years  sat  upon  the  English  throne;  if  all 
™®''*^*  the  great  offices  of  state,  all  the  places  of 

profit  and  power,  had  been  largely  engrossed  by  Ameri- 
cans ;  if  Parliament  had  been  entirely  occupied  in  legis- 
lating for  American  interests,  or,  more  truly,  for  one  inter- 
est, and  that  one  interest  revolting  to  the  conscience  of 
the  free  Englishman;  if  there  had  been  a  slave-pen  in  the 
vicinity  of  Guildhall,  and  the  cry  of  the  slave-auctioneer 
echoing  from  the  walls  of  Westminster  Abbey;  if  the 
citizens  of  London  had  seen  the  agony  of  waives  parted 
forever  from  their  husbands,  and  children,  even  those  at 
the  breast,  separated  from  their  parents.  The  cases  would 
have  been  more  nearly  alike  if,  when  under  the  Constitu- 
tion of  England  it  became  unavoidable  that  an  English 
prince  must  displace  those  who  had  so  long  held  the  reins 
of  government,  the  cabinet  ministers  of  the  retiring  dy- 
nasty had  engaged  in  the  most  atrocious  treason ;  if  the 
army  had  been  sent  to  remote  territories  for  the  pur- 
pose of  being  entrapped,  the  navy  scattered  on  fictitious 
errands  in  distant  seas,  so  that  not  more  than  two  or 
three  ships  were  to  be  found  upon  the  coast;  if  large 
sums  of  money  had  been  purloined  from  the  treasury  for 
the  purposes  of  the  conspiracy ;  if  every  musket  that 
could  be  secured  had  been  stealthily  sent  across  the  At- 
lantic ;  if  the  great  arsenal  at  Woolwich  had  been  seized 
and  robbed  of  its  thousands  of  cannon ;  if  officers  of  the 
army  and  navy  had  been  seduced  to  resign  their  commis- 
sions, and  judges  had  refused  to  act ;  if  the  House  of 
Lords  had  become  the  focus  of  a  conspiracy  against  the 
government,  and  members  of  the  House  of  Commons  had 
retained  their  seats  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  obstruct 
legislation;  if  the  new  sovereign  had  gone  to  his  corona- 
tion in  peril  of  being  assassinated;  if  the  malcontents 
had  openly  declared  that  they  would  either  rule  or  ruin 


506  TACTICS  OF  THE  NEWSPAPERS.  [Sect.  XIII. 

the  nation,  then  there  would  have  been  an  analogy  be- 
tween the  causes  of  the  War  of  the  American  Eevolution 
and  those  of  the  American  Civil  War. 

Considered  merely  as  a  matter  of  policy,  the  ministry 
Influence  of  English  of  Lord  Palmerstou  regarded  it  as  not  unde- 
newspapers.  sirable  to  promotc  a  partition  of  the  Amer- 

ican Union.  With  very  great  skill  the  journalism  of 
England  manufactured  public  opinion,  and  brought  the 
-  middle  classes  into  accord  with  the  privileged.  The  tra- 
\  ditions  of  old  dissensions  furnished  a  starting-point,  and 
the  dexterous  presentation  of  American  revenue  legisla- 
tion accomplished  the  rest. 

The  manner  in  which  an  extensively  circulated  and 
pow^erful  newspaper  can  imperceptibly  direct  public  opin- 
ion, and  thereby  accomplish  its  ends,  offers  one  of  the  most 
interesting  subjects  of  psychological  study.  Very  strik- 
ing examples  of  the  kind  are  occasionally  observed  in 
America. 

Let  us  notice  the  successive  phases  of  opinion  exhibited 
by  such  a  foreign  j ournal  in  1 8 6 1 .    It  begins 

The  successive  .,,  ,-t  n  n  •        -l^ 

opinions  they      wath  a  sjcnerous  sympathy  tor  a  iriendly 

present.  j       ±  »j  */ 

nation  in  trouble,  and  insensibly  leads  its 
unsuspecting  reader  to  very  different  sentiments  at  last. 
It  says: 

"The  Southern  States  have  sinned  more  than  the  Korth- 
The  Southern  states  ^^^'  They  have  cxhibltcd  a  passionate  ef- 
in  the  wrong.  frontcry,  uot  content  with  the  sufferance  of 
slavery,  but  determined  on  its  extension.  They  refuse 
to  have  any  man  for  President  unless  he  regards  a  black 
servant  and  a  black  portmanteau  as  chattels  of  the  same 
category  and  description.  The  right,  with  all  its  advan- 
tages, belongs  to  the  states  of  the  North.  The  North  is 
for  freedom,  the  South  for  the  tar-brush  and  pine-fagot. 
Free  and  democratic  communities  have  applied  them- 


Chap.  LX.]  THE  SOUTH  ALTOGETHER  WRONG.  507 

selves  to  the  honorable  office  of  breeding  slaves  to  be 
consumed  on  the  free  and  democratic  plantations  of  the 
South;  thus  replacing  the  African  trade  by  an  internal 
one  of  equal  atrocity.  The  South  has  become  enamored 
of  her  shame. 

"If  the  Slave  States  be  joined  by  the  Border  States,  they 
will  constitute  the  real  United  States ;  the  North  will  be 
a  rump.  She  would  have  only  a  coast  of  a  few  hundred 
miles,  from  the  British  frontier  to  the  Delaware ;  all  the 
sea-line  and  the  great  rivers  will  belong  to  the  South.  Vir- 
ginia pushes  a  spur  of  territory  to  within  a  hundred  miles 
of  Lake  Erie,  and  splits  the  Free  States  of  the  Atlantic 
from  those  of  the  West.  It  is  very  well  to  speculate  on 
Not  likely  that  they  ^hc  rctum  of  au  crriug  sister,  but  it  is  the 
will  return.  naturc  of  cracks  to  widen.     In  this  country 

there  is  only  one  wish — that  the  Union  may  survive  this 
terrible  trial." 

Of  the  declaration  by  South  Carolina  of  the  causes 
which  led  to  her  secession,  it  is  said  that  "it 

The  South  Carolina    -,       ^  '  n  *  •     i       t    t  i  •,,  1 

declaration  de-        looKS  as  II  it  had  bccn  ioiiQ'  writtcu,  and 

scribed.  •     t       i  ti  i 

carried  about,  like  the  redoubtable  cane  of 
the  ever-to-be-regretted  Brooks,  ready  to  be  put  into  re- 
quisition on  the  first  convenient  opportunity.  It  is  not 
so  lively  and  spirit-stirring  a  composition  as  a  little  more 
literary  skill  might  have  made  it,  but  we  can  not  tell  how 
much  a  man  is  allowed  to  know  of  the  history  of  the 
world  in  that  fortunate  country  without  being  exposed 
to  the  vengeance  of  the  halter  and  the  tar-barrel.  Noth- 
ing can  be  more  frivolous  than  the  grounds  of  this  mani- 
festo ;  its  statements  are  utter  falsehoods.  Without  law, 
without  justice,  without  delay.  South  Carolina  is  treading 
the  path  that  leads  to  the  downfall  of  nations  and  to  the 
misery  of  families.  The  hollowness  of  her  cause  is  seen 
beneath  all  the  pomp  of  her  labored  denunciations. 
Charleston,  without  trade,  is  an  animal  under  an  exhaust- 


508  SECESSION  IS  TKEASON.  [Sect.  XIII. 

ed  receiver.  Trade  is  her  very  breath.  She  had  better 
look  before  she  takes  the  dark  leap ;  she  may  light  on 
something  worse  than  the  present,  or — on  nothing  at  all. 
It  is  easy  to  decide  any  day  in  the  affirmative  the  ques- 
tion  whether  to  cut  one's  throat  or  not,  but  when  once 
one  has  come  to  that  decision  and  acted  on  it,  it  is  not  so 
easy  to  review  the  arguments  leading  to  a  contrary  view 
of  the  case. 

"  Time,  the  Avenger,  is  doing  j  ustice  between  the  Amer- 
ican people  and  ourselves.  With  what  willingness  would 
they  not  see  their  sonorous  Fourth  of  July  rhetoric  cov- 
ered by  the  waters  of  oblivion !  They  have  fallen  to 
pieces,  but  we  have  shown  no  joy  at  secession ;  we  have 
given  no  encouragement  to  the  South;  we  have  turned 
away  from  the  bait  of  free  trade,  and  have  strengthened 
them  by  our  sympathy  and  advice.  The  secession  of 
South  Carolina  is  to  them  what  the  secession  of  Lanca- 
secession  is  nothing  sMrc  would  bc  to  US — it  is  trcasou,  and 

bat  treason.  ^^^^-^^  ^^  ^^^^  ^^^^^      -g^^  ^^^  ^^^^^  .^  ^^^^ 

of  sophists,  rhetoricians,  logicians,  and  lawyers ;  it  has  not 
a  man  of  action.  Mr.  Seward  can  tell  us  what  will  not 
save  the  Union,  but  not  what  will.  He  looks  upon  se- 
cession as  ideal  and  impossible.  While  he  is  dreaming, 
the  Confederacy  is  strengthening.  The  Union  seems  to 
be  destined  to  fall  without  a  struggle,  without  a  lament, 
without  an  epitaph.  Each  individual  state  finds  num- 
berless citizens  ready  to  lay  down  their  lives  for  its  pres- 
ervation ;  but  for  the  Union,  the  mighty  firmament  in^ 
which  those  stars  are  set,  and  which,  though  dark  itself, 
lends  them  their  peculiar  lustre,  nothing  is  done.  The 
Imbecility  of  the  Presidcut  says  he  can  do  nothing.  His 
countrymen  boast  of  the  smallness  of  his  sal- 
ary, but,  according  to  our  estimate,  he  is  the  most  over- 
paid of  mortals.  With  provoking  inconsistency,  he  will 
neither  fight  nor  run  away.     But  perhaps  his  policy  has 


Chap.LX,]     prospective  DISASTERS  OF  THE  SOUTH.  5()9 

not  been  unwise.  Since  the  traitors  Floyd,  and  Cobb, 
and  Thompson  have  departed,  he  has  adopted  the  best 
possible  course — to  stand  on  the  defensive.  His  message 
is  a  greater  blow  to  the  American  people  than  all  the 
rants  of  the  Georgia  governor  or  the  ordinances  of  the 
Charlestonians.  He  has  dissipated  the  idea  that  the 
states  which  elected  him  are  one  people.  The  federation 
is  not  a  nationality,  it  is  only  a  partnership. 

"  Considering  the  probable  action  of  the  Border  States, 
Virginia  will  be     ^^  ^^y  be  expectcd  that  Virginia  will  go 
ir'SmiglnSr.  with  the  South,  for  the  simple  reason  that 
..^^*^*  the   South  will  buy  her  negroes,  and  the 

North  will  not.  The  Gulf  States  know  the  power  which, 
as  the  purchasers  of  slaves,  they  possess  over  the  specious, 
but  unreal  neutrality  of  the  Border  States.  If  Virginia 
should  take  that  course,  the  North  must  find  a  new  cap- 
ital. Washington  w^ill  be  lost.  Every  thing  now  turns 
on  what  the  Border  States  will  do;  but  their  demands 
are  exorbitant.  Our  own  belief  is  that  the  ultimate  set- 
tlement of  the  question  turns  on  the  mutual  dependence 
of  the  two  sections,  and  the  essential  identity  of  the  peo- 
ple. The  force  of  political  cohesion  will  probably  be  too 
strong  even  for  the  ambition  and  the  sectional  hatred  of 
the  Charleston  demagogues.  Though  things  look  so 
promising  for  them,  it  is  evident  that  the  secession  lead- 
ers and  their  too  willing  followers  are  at  the  beginning 
of  terrible  disasters.     Southern  credit  does 

The  financial  credit  ,       ,         ii»i        •|^  •       .i       tt    •  •       .i 

of  the  South  very     uot  stanci  uigu  eitJier  m  the  Union  or  m  the 
world.     Capital  flies  from  a  land  ruled  by 
fanatical  demagogues. 

"  At  a  moment  when  the  destinies  of  the  Union  are 
trembling  in  the  balance,  and  the  republic  is  menaced 
with  the  worst  catastrophe  of  civil  war,  its  Legislature  is 
engaged  upon  a  measure  which  seems  calculated  at  once 
to  alienate  foreign  nations  and  embitter  domestic  strife. 


510  EFFECT  OF  THE  MORRILL  TARIFF.  [Sect.  XIIL 


The  folly  of  the  The  MoitIII  tariff  bill  is  an  act  for  the  estab- 
Morriii  tariff.  lishmeiit  of  protectlve  duties  on  a  most  ex- 
travagant scale.  It  will  almost  prohibit  all  imports  into 
the  United  States  from  England,  France,  and  Germany. 
It  has  been  said  that  slavery  does  not  constitute  the  es- 
sence of  the  quarrel ;  that  it  is  a  blind,  and  that  the  real 
point  of  contention  is  the  tariff.  We  believe  that  the 
contest  for  territory  is  the  real  contest  between  the  North 
and  the  South;  but  it  is  true  that  free  trade  is  the  natural 
system  of  the  South.  It  is  doubtful,  however,  if  the 
Southern  States  have  clearly  conceived  the  object  of  their 
secession.  *Is  it  the  question  of  slavery  or  that  of  free 
trade  ?  We  have  never  read  a  public  document  so  diffi- 
cult to  interpret  as  the  inaugural  of  the  anti-President. 
He  says  that  divine  Providence  is  on  the  side  of  slavery, 
which,  probably  from  motives  of  delicacy,  he  never  men- 
tions by  name.  It  is  useless  to  disguise  the  fact  that, 
whatever  may  be  thought  of  Mr.  Davis's  rhetoric,  so  long 
as  the  Washinsfton  Cons^ress  adds  new  re- 

The  North  is  alien-       ....  ,  ,       ,•  t 

ating  the  sympathy    striCtlOUS    tO    a   protCCtlVC  pollCV,  it    CUtS    it- 

of  Its  friends,  ^  n     nt*  n  i  i 

self  off  from  the  sympathy  of  its  friends.  It 
will  not  be  our  fault  if  the  inopportune  legislation  of  the 
!N'orth,  combined  with  the  reciprocity  of  wants  between 
and  modifying  En-  ourselvcs  aud  the  South,  should  bring  about 
ghsh  opimon.  ^  considerable  modification  in  our  relations 
with  America.  The  tendencies  of  trade  are  inexorable. 
It  may  be  that  the  Southern  population  will  now  become 
our  best  customers.  The  Free  States  will  long  repent  an 
act  which  brings  needless  discredit  on  the  intrinsic  merits 
of  their  cause." 

It  wanted  no  more  than  statements  of  this  kind  to  give 
currency  to  the  opinion  that  the  manufactur- 

Scandalous  motives    .  -. -^  t^        i         ■^    c^  i     t  1,1 

of  New  England      mo;  JN  cw  Ensflaiid  fetates,  and  the  iron-pro- 

and  Pennsylvania.  ~  ,  "--'  /  ,     .     ■"• 

ducing  state,  Pennsylvania,  were  willing  to 
push  matters  to  the  extremity  of  civil  war,  not  for  the 


» 


Chap.  LX.]         DIVISION  OF  THE  UNION  INEVITABLE.  qH 

sake  of  upholding  the  Union,  but  for  the  incurring  of  a 
vast  national  debt,  the  interest  of  which  would  insure  a 
high  tariff  in  perpetuity.     At  this  time  "  one  sixth  of  the 
population  of  England — four  millions  of  persons — were 
depending  on  cotton  manufactures  for  their  daily  bread, 
and  77  per  cent,  of  the  cotton  consumed  came  from  Amer- 
ica.    There  was  imminent  danger  that  the  mills  would 
only  work  half  time."    But  let  us  continue  our  extracts. 
"  It  is  our  duty  to  point  out  the  tendency  of  this  retro- 
The  trade  of  the    g^^^^  commcrclal  pollcy  in  the  North.     It 
S£'iHd  to  '    will  transfer  the  European  trade  from  Bos- 
the  south.  ^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  York  to  Charleston  and  New 

Orleans.  The  warmest  friends  of  the  Union  can  not  ex- 
pect our  merchants  to  celebrate  its  obsequies  by  self  im- 
molation. But  let  the  Free  States  prove  themselves  ca- 
pable of  postponing  sectional  interests  to  a  truly  national 
policy,  and  it  will  soon  become  evident  on  which  side  En- 
glish sympathies  are  engaged.  From  the  commercial 
point  of  view,  we  are  not  blind  enough  to  suppose  that 
we  shall  gain  by  the  disintegration  of  the  American 
Union  into  such  fragments  as  Mexico  and  the  South 
American  republics. 

"  The  Union  is  effectually  divided  into  two  rival  confed- 
The  Union  com-  ©racics.  The  Southern  is  tainted  by  slavery, 
pieteiy  divided,  fiiii^^gtering,  aud  called  into  existence,  it 
would  seem,  by  a  course  of  deliberate  and  deep-laid  trea-, 
son  on  the  part  of  high  officers  of  the  government  at 
Washington.  In  the  Northern,  the  principles  avowed 
are  such  as  to  command  the  sympathies  of  every  free  and 
enlightened  people.  But  mankind  will  not  ultimately 
judge  by  sympathies  and  antipathies ;  they  will  be  great- 
ly swayed  by  their  own  interests.  If  the  Northern  Con- 
federacy evinces  a  determination  to  act  in  a  narrow,  ex- 
clusive, unsocial  spirit,  it  will  lose  the  sympathy  and  the 
regard  of  mankind.     Up  to  this  time  Congress  has  done 


512  LIBERAL  STATESMANSHIP  OF  THE  SOUTH.    [Sect.  XIIL 

nothing  against  tlie  rebellion,  but  has  struck 

The  blow  struck  by,,  •        ,    e*  ,        -x  tt^*'! 

the  North  agaiust     a  olow  asTamst  tree  trade.     In  Jiirminsrhani, 

English  trade.  ^  i         o  i  • 

nearly  £3,800,000  worth  of  cutlery  is  made 
worthless.  Ill  will  against  the  North  is  every  where 
arising.  We  can  only  wonder  at  the  madness.  Protec- 
tion was  quite  as  much  a  cause  of  the  disruption  as  slav- 
ery. We  warn  the  government  of  the  United  States  that 
in  attempting  to  exclude  at  one  blow  .£20,000,000  of  ex- 
ports from  their  territory,  they  have  undertaken  a  task 
quite  beyond  their  power.  They  can  not  prevent  En- 
glish manufactures  from  permeating  the  United  States 
from  one  end  to  the  other.  The  smuggler  will  redress 
the  errors  of  the  statesman. 

"  In  the  South  we  find  the  most  convincing  proofs  of 
Superior  statesman-  forcthought  aud  deliberation.  The  leaders 
sh  p  of  the  South.  ^^^  hurried  away  by  no  momentary  impulse. 
There  are  strong  evidences  of  a  deep-laid  and  carefully- 
matured  conspiracy — a  perfect  understanding  between 
the  chiefs  of  the  movement  and  the  Federal  officials.  Ee- 
union  can  never  be  expected.  Men  do  not  descend  to 
such  depths  of  treachery  and  infamy  unless  they  are 
about  to  take  a  step  which  they  believe  to  be  irrevoca- 
ble. The  men  who  devised  and  directed  the  great  plot 
of  secession  knew  that  they  must  appeal  for  recognition 
to  the  world  without,  but  they  thought  that,  as  the  world 
^could  not  do  without  cotton,  it  could  not  do  without 
them.  They  have  lost  that  monopoly.  The  policy  of 
the  North  has  been  equally  suicidal.  By  enriching  a  few 
manufacturers  at  the  ex]3ense  of  the  whole  country,  they 
have  played  into  the  hands  of  the  seceders.  They  have 
alienated  the  feelings  of  Europe.  While  the  North  is 
passing  a  prohibitory  tariff,  and  speculating  on  balancing 
the  loss  of  the  cotton  regions  by  annexing  Canada,  the 
Liberality  of  South-  Confederates  are  on  their  good  behavior. 
em  trade  views.      rpj^^^  ^^.^  frcc-tradcrs.     Thc  coasting  trade 


Chap.LX.]  common  interest  of  ENGLAND  AND  THE  SOUTH.  513 

from  Charleston  to  Galveston  is  thrown  open  to  the  Brit- 
ish flag, but  the  North  interprets. a  coasting  trade  to  in- 
clude a  voyage  from  New  England  round  Cape  Horn  to 
California. .  It  is  not  for  us  to  sneer  when  an  American 
community  abolishes  its  navigation  laws,  declares  that 
duties  shall  never  be  levied  to  foster  particular  branches 
of  industry,  and  adopts  a  resolution  for  establishing  an 
international  copyright.  But  that  is  what  the  South  has 
done.  Will  the  South  ever  return  to  a  Union  in  which 
native  manufactures  are,  by  an  advantage  taken  of  the 
absence  of  Southern  representatives,  defended  by  some- 
^. thing  like  a  prohibition?  The  South  offers  to  the  Bor- 
der States  a  market  for  their  slaves,  and  a  law  against 
the  slave-trade  to  protect  their  commodity ;  the  North  re- 
quires them  to  contribute  to  New  England  and  Pennsyl- 
vania. The  high  price  of  manufactures  and  a  good  mar- 
ket for  slaves  will  avail  more  than  the  con- 

A  common  interest       ,•■,•  ni       .  o  n/r     T  '  i       •      i* 

of  England  and  the  stitutioual  Iccturcs  01  Mr.  Liincoln  m  nis  in- 
augural. It  is  for  their  trade  that  the  South 
are  resolved  to  fight.  They  dissolved  the  Union  to  create 
more  slave  states — that  is,  to  make  more  cotton.  They 
undertook  the  war  for  the  very  object  that  we  have  most 
at  heart." 

Before  Mr.  Adams,  the  minister   accredited  by  Lin- 
coln's administration  to  the  British  court, 

England  admits  -,  -,  i      i  •  ixi         "r>'j.*i 

the  belligerent        could  rcach  uis  Dost,  tuc  Jiritisn   erovern- 

rights  of  the  South.  .  t  •   i  •  t 

ment,  m  accordance  with  a  pr^i21iS«iiB4er- 
standing  with  the  French,  had  admitted  the  belligerent 
rights  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  It  was  not  possible 
but  that  this  measure  should  be  regarded  by  the  Amer- 
ican government  as  unfriendly,  and,  considering  the  haste 
with  which  it  was  taken,  as  offensive.  It  made  so  pro- 
found and  ineffaceable  an  impression  that  the  conse- 
II.— Kk 


514  CONCESSION  OF  BELLIGERENT  RIGHTS.       [Sect.  XIIL 

quences  of  it  will  doubtless  be  recognized  in  tlie  foreign 
policy  of  the  republic  for  many  generations. 

The  neutrality  proclamation  was  issued  by  the  British 
government  on  the  13  th  of  May.    It  was  shortly  followed 
by  a  circular  from  the  Foreign  Office  interdicting  the  arm- 
ed ships  and  privateers  of!  both  parties.     This  was  suc- 
ceeded, on  the  11th  of  June,  by  a  proclama- 

Neutrality  procla-      ..  ^  if,        •  it  it        tt* 

mations  of  France  tiou  01  neutrality  issucd  by  the  JLmperor 
Napoleon,  and  still  again  (June  17th)  by 
a  neutrality  proclamation  of  the  Queen  of  Spain.  The 
three  governments,  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Spain,  were 
at  this  time  in  perfect  accord  on  American  affairs. 


CHAPTER  LXI. 

THE  FRENCH  EXPEDITION  TO  MEXICO.     ITS  INFLUENCE  ON  THE 
OPINION  OF  EUROPE  RESPECTING  AMERICAN  AFFAIRS. 

The  Southern  conspirators  had  intrigued  with  the  Mexicans  for  a  new  Union.    The 

•  Emperor  Napoleon  resolved  to  turn  that  scheme  to  his  own  advantage  in  his  re- 
lations with  the  Austrian  Empire. 

He  encouraged  the  disruption  of  the  American  Union  with  a  view  of  neutralizing 
the  power  of  the  republic.  He  drew  England  and  Spain  into  a  joint  expedition 
to  Mexico.  After  the  expedition  had  reached  that  country,  those  powers  discov- 
ered his  real  intentions  and  withdrew. 

His  army  entered  the  City  of  Mexico.  He  established  an  empire,  and  presented 
its  crown  to  the  Austrian  Archduke  Maximilian,  who  accepted  it. 

Meantime,  to  his  disappointment,  the  United  States  overthrew  secession.  The 
American  government  insisted  that  he  should  abandon  his  Mexican  undertaking. 

Finding  that  it  would  be  hopeless  to  contend  with  the  Republic,  he  ordered  the 
withdrawal  of  the  French  army,  abandoning  to  its  fate  the  empire  he  had  cre- 
ated. 

For  the  clear  eompreliension  of  the  agreement  which 
I  The  Mexican  expe-  ^^^  ^^^^  entered  into  between  England, 
S^smptS^^^^  France,  and  Spain,  it  is  necessary  to  under- 
the  United  states.     ^^^^^  ^-^^   advcnturous  projccts  in  which 

they  were  about  to  engage,  affecting  the  whole  North 
American  continent.  The  Mexican  expedition — a  drama 
the  scenes  of  which  were  acted  in  Eome,  London,  Wash- 
ington, Charleston,  Paris^  Mexico— was  the  immediate  re- 
sult  of  this  unhappy  coalition,  and  the  basis  on  which 
that  ill-starred  tragedy  rested  was  the  breaking  of  the 
United  States  into  separate  confederacies. 

After  the  peace,of  Villafranca,  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
I  secret  intention  of  I^I-  ^as  siuccrely  dcsirous  to  heal  the  polit- 
[Napoleon,  ^^^^  wouuds  which  had  been  made  by  his 

military  operations  in  Italy — to  find  some  compensation/^ 
for  the  injuries  he  had  inflicted  on  the  Emperor  of 
Austria. 


between 

em 

ico. 


.516  THE  FRENCH  EXPEDITION.  TO  MEXICO.       [Sect.  XIII. 

There  were  certain  Mexicans  of  eminence — among  them 
who  is  informed  by  Almonte,  Gutierrez  de  Estrada,  the  ex-Pres- 
Mexican  refugees  ^^^^^  Miramon,  and  La  Bastida,  the  Arch, 
bishop  of  Mexico — who  were  residing  in  Paris,  and  car- 
rying on  various  political  intrigues  with  the  Papal  gov- 
ernment and  with  the  Tuileries.  From  these  the  em-*^ 
peror  learned  that  attempts  had  been  made  by  leaders 
of  influence  in  the  Southern  States  to  come  to  an  un- 
derstanding with  persons  of  similar  position  in  Mexico 

ofapropoeed union    ^^^^  ^  ^1^^  tO  a  political  UuioU.       Thcse  UC- 

stat'es^andMex-  gotiatlous  had  tateu  a  serious  aspect  shortly 
after  Fremont  was  made  the  Republican  can- 
didate for  the  presidency  in  1856,  when  it  had  become 
plain  that  the  South  must  before  long  inevitably  lose  its  v^ 
control  of  the  government  of  the  Union. 

Among  the  advantages  expected  by  the  South  from 
such  a  scheme  were  deliverance  from  the< 
vantages  of  that     threatened  domination  of  the  Free  States, 

SCu6in6 

and  another  period  of  jDolitical  supremacy  in 
a  new  Union,  of  which  the  members  would  be  bound  to- 
gether by  a  community  of  interest,  and  be  the  dispensers 
of  some  of  the  most  valuable  products  of  the  New  World. 
Slavery  had  without  difficulty  been  re-established  in  Tex- 
as; it  was  supposed  that  the  same  might  be  done  in 
other  provinces  of  Mexico.  There  was,  moreover,  the  al- 
luring prospect  of  a  future  brilliant  empire,  encircling  the 
West  India  Seas,  and  eventually  absorbing  the  West  In- 
dia Islands.  To  the  Mexicans  there  would  be  the  un-  ^ 
speakable  advantage  of  a  stable,  a  strong,  a  progressive 
government. 

The  Mexican  refugees  in  Paris  saw  in  the  success  of 
this  scheme  an  end  of  their  influence  in  their 

Napoleon  tnms  that  ..  .  t.  i     ±i^        j>        J^  ±.     ^ 

Bcheme  to  his  own    native  couutrv.     It  was  better  tor  them  to  <. 

use.  •' 

introduce  a  French  protectorate.     The  em- 
peror perceived  with  satisfaction  that  an  opportunity  had 


Chap.  LXL]       DIVISION  OF  THE  UNION  NECESSARY.  517 

now  arrived  for  carrying  out  his  friendly  intentions  to- 
ward the  house  of  Austria.     Thereupon  he  determined  to  ^ 
encourage  the  secession  of  the  Southern  States  with  the 
view  of  neutralizing  the  power  of  the  Union,  to  ove^/ 
throw,  by  a  military  expedition,  the  existing  government 
of  Juarez  in  Mexico,  to  establish,  by  French  arms,  an  em-j 
pire,  and  offer  its  crown  to  the  Austrian  Archduke  Max-j 
imilian. 

Gutierrez  de  Estrada  says  the  Mexican  affair  is  "  exclu- 
sively confined  to  the  Emperor  Napoleon  and  the  arch- 
duke (Maximilian),  with  the  approbation  of  the  emperor, 
his  brother.  This  state  of  things  is  favorable  to  Austria, 
inasmuch  as  it  puts  Venetia  or  any  other  compensation 
out  of  the  question." 

Count  Keratry,  in  his  history  of  these  transactions, 
says  "  France  granted  belligerent  rights  to  the  Southern 
rebels,  anxious  as  she  was  to  inaugurate  a  military  dicta- 
torship, the  future  head  of  which,  the  celebrated  Confed- 
erate general,  had  commenced  negotiations  with  Mexico 
itself." 

Of  this  complicated  intrigue,  the  first  step  was  the  se- 
cession  of  the   Southern   States  from  the 
Southern  seces-     Uuion.     A  large  portion  of  the  population 


sion 


I 


of  the  South  was  loyal,  but  it  was  rightly 
judged  that  political  unanimity  could  be  secured  by  caus- 
ing the  action  to  turn  on  the  slave  question.  The  elec- 
tion of  a  Eepublican  president  was  all  that  was  necessary, 
and  that  could  be  accomplished  without  difficulty. 

Without  war  or  with  war,  the  secession  might  be  made 
good — better  the  latter  than  the  former,  for  it  would  give 
and  the  creation  of  ^  grcat,  a  wcll-drilled,  a  veteran,  an  indis- 
a  Southern  army,  p^j^s^j^ig  army — iudispeusable  for  the  com- 
pletion of  the  plan.  It  would  accustom  the  Southern 
people  to  habits  of  discipline  and  subordination,  and, 
from  the  bitterness  inevitably  produced,  it  would  effectu- 


518  FEENCH  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  SOUTH.        [Sect.  XIII. 

ally  alienate  them  from  their  recollections  of  the  old 
Union. 

The  powers  who  had  interests  in  the  West  India  Seas 
were  not  disposed  to  look  with  disfavor  on 
o^EuropeaSPpow-  tho  first  portion  of  this  plan.     It  was  for 
them,  as  far  as  they  could  with  propriety, 
to  promote  secession.    To  divide  the  republic  was  to  rule 
it.     They  never  regarded  the  action  of  the  South  in  se- 
ceding as  having  a  shadow  of  justification.    In  their  eyes 
'^  it  was  a  purely  political  movement,  which,  if  it  failed, 
would  probably  entail  ruin  on  the  communities  who  had 
attempted  it. 

Encouragement  was  accordingly  given  to  the  leaders 

of  secession.     It  strengthened  them  greatly 

belligerent  rights  iu  their  actlou.    But  the  momentous  hazard 

to  the  South,  ,  i  t         i* 

of  separation  once  taken,  and  at  Montgomery 
or  Richmond  a  government  apparently  able  to  maintain 
itself  established,  it  was  not  the  interest  of  the  powers  of 

"Western  Europe  to  permit  the  carrying  out 
*^    its  union  witKi  ofthc  sccoud  portlou  of  the  plan.     It  suited 

them  to  have  the  Cotton  States — "  an  An- 
glo-Saxon Brazil  easily  curbed,"  hemmed  in  by  the  fleets 
of  Europe  on  the  south  and  east,  by  a  strong  military 
government  on  the  west,  and  on  the  north  by  the  pow- 
erful and  embittered  relict  of  the  old  republic. 

To  separate  the  Union  for  the  purpose  of  crippling  it,^ 
but  not  to  give  such  a  preponderance  to  the  South  as  to 
enable  it  to  consummate  its  Mexican  desio-ns — such  was 
the  principle  guiding  the  French  government.    That  prin- 
ciple was  satisfied  by  the  recognition  of  belligerent  rights,< 
and  by  avoiding  a  recognition  of  independence.     Herein 

we  may  see  clearly  the  explanation  of  those 

Explanation  of  the  •Tin  r»i'Tiii 

half  measures  of     seemino*  hall  measures  tor  which  that  2rov- 

the  French,  ^  ...  ^ni 

ernment  was  so  severely  criticised.  Thus 
Keratry  says:  "  Here,  too,  one  can  not  help  being  pain- 


Chap.  LXI.]       FRENCH  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  SOUTH.  ^l^ 

fully  impressed  with  the  vacillations  of  the  imperial  gov- 
ernment, which  seemed  as  if  it  dared  not  adopt  a  decided 
character  in  its.  trans-oceanic  policy,  and  from  the  com- 
mencement to  the  conclusion  of  the  expedition  resorted 

to  little  else  but  half  measures It  is  very  certain 

that  there  was  a  favorable  opportunity  in  1862,  looking 
at  the  secession  of  the  Southern  States  from  those  of  the 
North.  Then  was  the  time  for  France  to  have  acted  vig-  < 
orously,  and  to  have  obtained  allies  even  in  the  enemy's 
camp.  Two  courses  were  open,  and  both  were  practica- 
ble, but  here  we  shall  not  pretend  to  decide  between 
them.  Either  it  was  necessary  at  the  first  onset  to  de- 
cide in  good  earnest  for  the  cause  of  the  Union,  and  to 
restrain  the  South  by  a  threatening  demonstration  on  the 
frontier  of  the  Eio  Bravo,  or,  if  the  belligerent  character 
of  the  secession  party  was  recognized,  it  was  essential  to 
2^0  the  whole  lenejth  without  hesitation,  and  ^ 

who  are  blamed  for    ^  •        ,  i  in  *  -, 

not  recognizing  the  to  cousummato  tho  work  of  separation  by 

declaring  openly  for  the  planters  of  the<. 
Southern  States,  who,  fired  with  the  recollections  of  French 
glory,  waited  but  the  succor  of  our  promise  to  offer  tri- 
umphantly a  helping  hand  to  our  expeditionary  force 
which  was  marching  on  Mexico.     Through  an  inconsist- 
ency which  one  can  now,  on  looking  back,  hardly  con- 
ceive possible,  the  imperial  policy  wandered  away  from  < 
every  logical  tradition.     The  belligerent  character  which 
had  been  accorded  to  the  Southern  States  served  only  to 
prolong  to  no  purpose  a  sanguinary  contest,  and  our  gov- 
ernment repulsed  the  reiterated  overtures  of  the  South-  Uy^ 
ern  planters,  whom  they  had  encouraged,  as  it  were,  only     . 
yesterday,  and  then  finally  abandoned  to  their  fate." 

In  that  extraordinary  conversation  which  took  place 
between  Marshal  Bazaine  and  Maximilian  at  the  Haci- 
enda de  la  Teja,  a  similar  opinion  is  expressed :  "  From 
the  moment,"  said  the  marshal, "  that  the  United  States 


520  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO.  [Sect.  XIII. 

boldly  pronounced  their  veto  against  the  imperial  system, 
your  throne  was  nothing  but  a  bubble,  even  if  your  maj- 
esty had  obtained  the  help  of  a  hundred  thousand  French- 
men. Supposing  even  that  the  Americans  had  observed 
neutrality  during  the  continuance  of  the  intervention,  the 
^monarchy  itself  had  no  spirit  of  vitality.  A  federal  com- 
bination would  have  been  the  only  system  to  be  attempt- 
ed in  the  face  of  the  Union,  who  would  no  doubt  have 
acceded  to  it  if  the  South  had  been  recognized  by  France 
^  at  the  proper  time.  My  advice  is  that  your  majesty 
should  voluntarily  retire." 

The  French  Mexican  expedition  was  thus  based  on  the 

disruption  of  the  United  States — a  disruption 

the^uS^cmfsid-   considered  not  only  by  the  Spanish  court  and 

ered  inevitable.  i       -r,  t^t  t  •  •      i  n      i 

by  the  Emperor  JNapoleon  as  inevitable,  but 
^  even  by  Lord  Palmerston,  who  might  have  been  better  in- 
formed, and  who  regarded  it  as  a  predestined  event.  In 
Parliament  he  remarked, "  Any  one  must  have  been  short- 
sighted and  little  capable  of  anticipating  the  j)robable 
course  of  human  affairs  who  had  not  for  a  long  time  fore- 
seen events  of  a  similar  character  to  those  which  we  now 
deplore — the  causes  of  disunion  were  too  deeply  seated 
to  make  it  possible  that  a  separation  would  not  take 
place." 

The  SjDanish  minister  in  Paris,  in  November,  1858,  had 
suggested  to  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
Count  Walewski,  the  advantages  that  would  accrue  from 
the  establishment  of  a  strong  government  in  Mexico. 
Subsequently  the  views  of  the  English  government  were 
ascertained,  and  in  April,  1860,  the  Spanish  Minister  for 
The  Western  Pow-  Forcigu  Affairs  statcd  that  France  and  En- 
flvofabiy'Xiite?-  gl^ud  werc  looking  favorably  upon  the  mat- 

vention  in  Mexico.     ^^^,^       rpj^^    stumbHug-block   iu   the  Way  WaS 

the  opposition  which  might  be  expected  from  the  United 
States.    That  opposition  had  for  a  long  time  been  embod- 


Chap.  LXI.]    EXPECTATIONS  OF  THE  THREE  POWEKS.  521 

led  in  a  formula  under  tlie  designation  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine,  whicli  expressed  a  determination  not  to  permit 
the  interference  of  European  powers  on  the  North  Amer- 
ican continent.  In  April,  1860,  the  project  having  ad- 
vanced sufficiently.  Lord  John  Russell  informed  Isturitz, 
the  Spanish  minister,  that  England  would  require  the* 
protection  of  the  Protestant  worship  in  Mexico.  The  ob- 
The  advantages  ex-  j^^ts  of  the  thrco  coutractlng  partlcs  event- 
pected  by  each.  ^^^^^  bccauie  apparent.  Sp^n  expected  that 
a  Bourbon  prince  would  be  placed  on  the  Mexican  throne, 
and  that  she  would  thereby  recover  her  ancient  prestige, 
and  find  security  for  her  valuable  possession,  Cuba ;  per- 
haps she  might  even  recover  Mexico  itself  Enjrland, 
remembering  the  annexation  of  Texas,  saw  that  it  was 
desirable  to  limit  the  ever -threatening  progress  of  the 
rei)ublic  westwardly;  to  prevent  the  encircling  of  the 
West  India  Seas  by  a  power  which,  possibly  becoming 
hostile,  might  disturb  the  rich  islands  she  held ;  nor  was 
she  insensible  to  the  importance  of  partitioning  what 
seemed  to  be  the  cotton -field  of  the  world.  Fr||.nr.e 
Napoleon's  osten-  anticipated — but  the  emperor  himself,  con- 
sibie  reasons.  ccaliug  his  Tcal  motivo  of  compensating  Au^ 
tria  for  his  Italian  victories,  has  given  us  his  ostensible 
expectations  in  a  letter  to  General  Forey. 

In  this  letter  (July  3d,  1862)  Napoleon  III.  says:  "There 
His  letter  to  Gen-  ^^111  uot  be  Wanting  pcoplc  who  will  ask  you 
erai  Forey.  ^^^  ^^^  expcud  mcu  aud  moucy  to  found  a 

regular  government  in  Mexico.  In  the  present  state  of 
the  civilization  of  the  world,  the  prosperity  of  America  is 
not  a  matter  of  indifference  to  Europe,  for  it  is  the  coun- 
try which  feeds  our  manufactures  and  gives  an  impulse 
to  our  commerce.  We  have  an  interest  in  the  republic 
of  the  United  States  being  powerful  and  prosperous,  but . 
not  that  she  should  take  possession  of  the  whole  Gulf  o^ 
Mexico,  thence  commanding  the  Antilles  as  well  as  SoutM 


522  LETTER  OF  THE  EMPEROR  NAPOLEON.       [Sect.  XIIL 

America,  and  be  the  only  dispenser  of  the  products  of  the 
New  World.  We  now  see  by  sad  experience  how  pre- 
carious is  the  lot  of  a  branch  of  manufactures  which  is 
compelled  to  procure  its  raw  material  in  a  single  market, 
all  the  vicissitudes  of  which  it  has  to  bear.  If,  on  the 
contrary,  Mexico  maintains  her  independence  and  the  in- 
tegrity of  her  territory,  if  a  stable  government  be  there 
established  with  the  assistance  of  France,  we  shall  have 

^restored  to  the  Latin  race  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlan- 
tic all  its  strength  and  prestige ;  we  shall  have  guaran- 
teed security  to  our  West  India  colonies  and  to  those  of 
Spain ;  we  shall  have  established  a  friendly  influence  in 
the  centre  of  America,  and  that  influence,  by  creating  nu- 

*^merous  markets  for  our  commerce,  will  procure  us  the 
raw  materials  indispensable  for  our  manufactures.  Mex- 
ico, thus  regenerated,  will  always  be  well  disposed  to  us, 
not  only  out  of  gratitude,  but  because  her  interests  will 
be  in  accord  with  ours,  and  because  she  will  find  supjDort 
in  £er  friendly  relations  with  European  powers.  At 
present,  therefore,  our  military  honor  engaged,  the  neces- 
sities of  our  policy,  the  interests  of  our  industry  and  com- 
merce, all  conspire  to  make  it  our  duty  to  march  on  Mex- 

"^ico,  boldly  to  plant  our  flag  there,  and  to  establish  either 
a  monarchy,  if  not  incompatible  with  the  national  feeling, 
or  at  least  a  government  which  may  promise  some  sta- 
bility." 

As  soon  as  it  was  ascertained  that  the  Southern  States 
were  sufficiently  powerful  to  resist  the  na- 

Secession  occurs.      ,'  ^  ,  t,i.  ,«,•  r» 

The  allies  mature  tioual  sfovemment,  aud  that  a  partition  ot 

their  scheme.  P  ,  -,.  ,         ^^r^^ 

the  Union  was  impending,  the  chief  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  the  Mexican  movement  seemed  to  be  re- 
moved. Throughout  the  spring  and  summer  of  ISGl,"^ 
the  three  contracting  powers  kept  that  result  steadfastly 
in  mind,  and  omitted  nothing  that  might  tend  to  its  ac- 
complishment.   This  was  the  true  reason  of  the  conces- 


Chap.lxl]  the  expedition  sails.  523 

fiion  of  helligerer^t  rights  to jthe _ Souikerii-XiMifbi^^ 
May.     The  downfall  of  Juarez  was  the  next  business  in 
hand. 

Affairs  had  so  far  progressed  that,  on  November  20th, 
The  convention  of  1861,  a  conveutiou  was  signed  in  London 
London.  betweeu  France,  England,  and  Spain.     In 

this  it  was  agreed  that  a  joint  force  should  be  sent  by 
the  three  allies  to  Mexico;  that  no  special  advantages 
should  be  sought  for  by  them  individually,  and  no  in- 
ternal influence  on  Mexico  exerted.  A  commission  was 
designated  to  distribute  the  indemnity  they  proposed  to 
exact.  The  ostensible  reason  put  forth  for  the  move- 
ment was  the  decree  of  the  Mexican  government,  July 
17th,  1861,  suspending  payment  on  the  foreign  debt. 

The  allied  expedition  reached  Vera  Cruz  about  the 
The  expedition  ^ud  of  tho  ycar.  Not  without  justice  did 
sails  to  Mexico.    ^^^  Mexicau  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

complain  of  their  "  friendly  but  indefinite  promises,  the 
real  object  of  which  nobody  unravels."  Although  M. 
Thouvenel  was  incessantly  assuring  the  British  govern- 
ment, even  as  late  as  May,  1862,  that  France  had  no  in- 
tention of  imposing  a  government  on  Mexico,  it  became 
obvious  that  there  was  no  more  sincerity  in  this  engage-  ^ 
ment  than  there  had  been  in  imputing  the  grievances  of 
the  invaders  to  the  Mexican  decree  of  the  preceding  July. 
The  ostensible  cause  was  a  mere  pretext  to  get  a  military  ^ 
foothold  in  the  country.  Very  soon,  however,  it  became 
impossible  for  the  French  to  conceal  their 
discover  the  inten-  iuteutions.     Euoiland  and  Spain  withdrew 

tions  of  France,  Jp  ,  J^ 

from  the  expedition,  the  alleged  cause  on 
the  part  of  the  former  being  the  presence  of  Almonte,  and 
other  Mexican  emigrants  of  known  monarchical  opinions, 
wdth  the  French,  and  a  resolution  not  to  join  in  military 
operations  in  the  interior  of  the  country ;  on  the  part  of 
the  latter,  the  true  reason  was  that  not  a  Spanish  prince, 


524  THE  CITY  OF  MEXICO  SEIZED.  [Sect.  XIII. 

but  Maximilian,  was  to  be  placed  on  the  Mexican  throne 
and  abandon  the    — ^  disappointment  to  the  Spanish  com. 
expedition.         niandcp,  the  Count  de  Keuss  (General  Prim), 
who  had  pictured  for  himself  a  viceroy's  coronet. 

It  is  not  necessary,  on  the  present  occasion,  to  enter  into 
details  respecting  the  French  military  movements,  which 
besran  by  a  breach  of  that  article  of  the  con-  '^ 

The  French  break  . 

faith  with  the Mexi-  veutiou  of  La  Solcdad  which  required  that 

cans.  -•- 

the  French,  who  had  been  permitted  to  come 
into  the  healthy  country,  should  retire  beyond  the  strong 
pass  of  Chiquehuite  in  case  negotiations  were  broken 
off.  Had  the  Paris  press  been  free,  such  events  would 
never  have  occurred,  and,  indeed,  as  has  been  truly  af 
firmed  by  the  French  themselves,  this  shameful  expedi-v^ 
tion  w^ould  never  have  been  undertaken.  As  it  was, 
things  were  done  in  Mexico  which,  could  they  have  been 
brought  to  a  knowledge  of  the  French,  would  have  thrown 
that  great  people  into  a  profound  reverie. 

The  French  entered  the  city  of  Mexico  in  July,  1863. 
They  seize  the  city  Tho  time  had  uow  come  for  throwing  off 
or  exico.  the-«msk,  and  the  name  of  Maximilian  was 

introduced  as  a  candidate  for  the  empire.  Commission- 
ers were  appointed  to  go  through  Paris  and  Eome  to 
Miramar  with  a  view  of  soliciting  the  consent  of  that 
prince.  A  reg;ency  was  appointed  until  he  could  be  heard 
from.  It  consisted  of  Almonte,  Salas,  and 
empi?ofMaxi- ^  tho  Archblshop  La  Bastida.     Maximilian 

miliau.  iTTT  I'liT^ 

had  already  covenanted  with  the  Pope  to 
restore  to  the  Mexican  Church  her  mortmain  property, 
estimated  at  two  hundred  millions  of  dollars.  In  Mex- 
ico there  are  but  two  parties,  the  Liberal  and  the  Eccle- 
siastical. The  latter  was  conciliated  by  that  covenant; 
but  as  to  the  national  sentiment,  the  collection  of  suf- 
frages in  behalf  of  the  new  empire  was  nothing  better 
than  a  mere  farce. 


Chap.LXI.]  the  MEXICAN  empire.  525 

An  empire  was  established  in  Mexico.     Well  might 

the  leaders  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  be 

find  that  t^h?y  havl  thundcrstruck.    Was  this  the  fulfillment  of 

been  deceived.  .  i»iiti 

that  promise  which  had  lured  them  into  the 
gulf  of  revolt — the  promise  which  had  been  used  with 
such  fatal  effect  in  Charleston?  (vol.  i., pi  512)  Well  ^  ^ 
might  it  be  expected  in  France,  as  is  stated  by  Keratry, 
that  "  the  Confederates  proposed  to  avenge  themselves 
for  the  overthrow  of  the  secret  hopes  which  had  been  en- 
couraged from  the  very  outset  of  the  contest  by  the  cab- 
inet of  the  Tuileries,  which  had  accorded  to  them  the  bel- 
ligerent character,  and  had,  after  all,  abandoned  them." 
Yet  no  one  in  America,  either  of  the  Northern  or  the 

Southern    States,  imputed  blame    to    the 

Discrimination  be-    -p,  ,  i»,i  ttt  ttt 

tween  the  French    J^  reucu  people  -  lu  thcsc  bloodv  aud  dark 

and  the  emperor.  'at 

transactions.  All  saw  clearly  on  whom  the 
responsibility  rested.  And  when,  in  the  course  of  events, 
it  seemed  to  become  necessary  that  the  French  army 
should  leave  Mexico,  it  w^as  the  general  desire  that  noth- 
ing should  be  done  which  might  by  any  possibility  touch 
the  sensibilities  of  France.  But  the  Kepublic  of  the  West  ^ 
was  forever  alienated  from  the  dynasty  of  Napoleon. 

Events  showed  that  the  persons  who  were  charged 

with  the  administration  of  the  Kichmond  government 

had  not  ability  equal  to  their  task.     The  South  did  not 

select  her  best  men.    In  the  unskillful  hands 

The  American  gov-       ^     ,  i  i       i       i  p    • , 

ernment  overthrows  01  tJiose  wiio   nacl  cuar^re   01  it,  secession 

secession.  o  ' 

proved  to  be  a  failure.  The  Confederate 
resources  were  recklessly  squandered,  not  skillfully  used. 
Euin  was  provoked. 

When.it  became  plain  that  the  American  Kepublic  was 
about  to  triumph  over  its  domestic  enemies  in  the  Civil 
War,  and  that  it  was  in  possession  of  irresistible  mili- 
tary power,  they  who  in  the  Tuileries  had  plotted  the 


526  REMOVAL  OF  THE  FRENCH.  [Sect.  XIII. 

rise  of  Maximilian  in  1861,  now  plotted  Ms  ruin.    The 
betrayed  emperor  found  that  in  that  palace 

Thereupon  Napo-      ,  ,  . 

leon  finds  he  must  two  lano;uag:es  were  spoken.     In  the  aaro- 

recede.  .  o       o  j.  o 

;  TLj  of  his  soul  he  exclaimed,  "I  am  tricked!" 
In  vain  his  princess  crossed  the  Atlantic,  and,  though  de- 
He  abandons  Maxi-  i^i^d  acccss,  forccd  her  way  into  the  presence 
miiian.  of  Napoleou  III.,  in  her  frantic  grief  upbraid- 

ing herself  before  him  that,  in  accepting  a  throne  from 
his  hand,  she  had  forgotten  that  she  was  a  daughter  of 
the  race  of  Orleans — in  vain  she  fell  at  the  feet  of  the 
Pope,  deliriously  imploring  his  succor. 

It  is  questionable  whether  the  United  States  govern- 
v4-\    Impolicy  of  Amer-    ^^^ut  pui'sued  a  corrcct  policy  in  pressing  ^ 
,         remS  of fhe"  '^'  the  removal  of  the  French.     It  may  possi- 
bly prove  to  have  been  a  mistake  similar  to 
that  committed  by  the  English  respecting  Canada,  which 
hastened,  if  indeed  it  did  not  occasion  the  separation  of 
the  colonies  (vol.  i.,  p^l62).     During  the  Civil  War  very  i^ 
conspicuous  advantages  accrued  to  the  republic  from  the 
circumstance  that  Canada  was  a  British  possession.     A 
foresight  of  the  military  consequences  which  might  possi- 
bly ensue  .acted  as  a  restraint  on  the  ministry  of  Lord 
Palmerston,  and  strengthened  whatever  desire  it  had  to 
maintain  an  honorable  peace.     European  establishments 
on  the  North  American  continent  can  never  be  a  source 
of  disquietude  to  the  republic.     To  those  powers  who 
maintain  them  they  are  ever  liable  to  be  a  source  of  em- 
barrassment.    Considering  the  questions  which  must  in- 
evitably arise  with  the  rapid  development  of  the  Pacific 
States  respecting  commercial  supremacy  on  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  the  trade  of  Eastern  Asia,  and  the  British  empire 
^  in  India,  a  correct  policy  would  probably  have  indicated 
\   "^^he  encouragement  of  an  exotic  French  establishment  in 
Mexico.     The  Russian  government  recognized  the  truth 


Chap.LXL]  removal  of  the  FRENCH.  52^ 

of  these  political  principles  in  its  action  in  1867  respect- 
ing its  American  possessions,  which  it  disposed  of  to  the 
United  States. 

Admitting,  however,  the  correctness  of  the  policy  of 

removing  the  French  from  Mexico,  the  firm 

S?I*sewa?d^on^he  but  dimlficd  couTso  takcH  by  Mr..  Seward 

subject. 

in  his  correspondence  entitles  him  to  the 
highest  praise.  In  him  there -was  no  intrigue,  no  decep- 
tion, nothing  which  his  countrymen  can  condemn,  noth- 
ing at  which  they  need  blush.  .  Even  by  the  French 
themselves  it  was  said,  "The  United  States  tracked 
French  policy  step  by  step ;  never  had  the  French  gov- 
ernment been  subject  to  such  a  tyrannical  dictation.  The 
American  correspondence  is  full  of  a  logic  never  incon- 
sistent with  its  purposes."  With  a  courteous  audacity, 
the  Secretary  of  State  did  not  withhold  his  doubts  as  to 
the  sincerity  and  fidelity  of  the  emperor;  with  inexora- 
ble persistence  he  demanded  categorically  that  the  French 
occupation  should  come  to  an  end.  A  date  once  set,  he  ^ 
held  the  French  government  to  its  word.  "  Tell  M.  Mou^- 
tier,"  he  says,  in  a  dispatch  to  the  American  minister  in 
Paris,  "  that  our  government  is  astonished  and  distressed 
at  the  announcement,  now  made  for  the  first  time,  that 
the  promised  withdrawal  of  French  troops  from  Mexico, 
which  ought  to  have  taken  place  in  November  (this 
month),  has  been  put  off  by  the  emperor."  "  You  will 
The  American  gov-  Inform  tho  cmperor's  government  that  the 
thedlpartui'ofthe  Prcsideut  dcslrcs  and  sincerely  hopes  that 
French  army.  ^^^  evacuatiou  of  Mcxico  will  be  accom-< 
plished  in  conformity  with  the  existing  arrangement,  so 
far  as  the  inopportune  complication  necessitating  this  dis- 
patch will  permit.  On  this  point  Mr.  Campbell  will  re- 
ceive instructions.  Instructions  will  also  be  sent  to  the 
military  forces  of  the  United  States,  which  are  placed  in\ 
a  post  of  observation,  and  are  waiting  the  special  orders 


528  FAILURE  OF  THE  MEXICAN  EMPIRE.  [Sect.  XUL 

of  the  President ;  and  this  will  be  done  with  the  con- 
fidence that  the  telegraph  or  the  courier  will  bring  ns  in- 
telligence of  a  satisfactory  resolution  on  the  part  of  the 
emperor  in  reply  to  this  note.  You  will  assure  the  French 
government .  that  the  United  States,  in  wishing  to  free< 
Mexico,  have  nothing  so  much  at  heart  as  preserving 
jDcace  and  friendship  with  France." 

The  French  themselves  recognized  that  the  position 
and  on  the  removal  ^f  the  two   uatlous  had  bccomc  invcrtcd.  -^ 

aximi  lan.  ■  ^  rJ^^^  United  Statcs  now  gives  orders.  For- 
merly .France  had  spoken  boldly,  saying,  through  M. 
Drouyn  de  Lhuys  to  Mr.  Dayton,  the  American  repre- 
sentative at  Paris,  ^Do  you  bring  us  peace  or  war?' 
Now  Maximilian  is  falling  in  obedience  to  orders  from 
Washington.  He  is  falling  a  victim  to  the  weakness  of 
our  government  in  allowing  its  ^conduct  to  be  dictated  by 
American  arrogance.  Indeed,  before  rushing  into  such 
perilous  contingencies,  might  not  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  have  been  easily  foreseen?  Our  states- 
men needed  no  rare  perspicuity  to  have  discovered  the 
dark  shadow  of  the  Northern  Eepublic  looming  up  on 
the  horizon  over  the  Rio  Bravo  frontier,  and  only  biding  H 
its  time  to  make  its  appearance  on  the  scene." 

"  Only  one  thing  was  now  thought  of  in  Paris,  and 
that  was  to  leave  as  soon  as  possible  this 

The  Mexican  expe-   ^        -i       n    i       i  i    m       •  i   ^  •  i  j 

dition  ends  in  a  to-  laud  01  dcstrovcd  illusions  and  bitter  sacri-  ■, 

fices.  In  this  great  shipwreck  every  thing 
was  swallowed  up^the  re2:eneration  of  the  Latin  race  as 
w^ell  as  the  hopes  of  the  monarchy,  the  interests  of  our 
countrymen  (which  had  been  the  pretext  for  the  war)  as 
well  as  the  two  French  loans  which  had  but  served  to 
bring  it  to  this  disastrous  conclusion.  The  only  thing 
which  swam  safe  upon  the  surface  was  the  claim  of  Jeck-  <' 
er,  the  Swiss,  who  had  obtained  his  twelve  millions." 


Chap.LXI.]         failure  OF  THE  MEXICAN  EMPIRE.  529 

Was  there  ever  sucli  a  catalogue  of  disappointed  ex- 
The  results  obtain-  pectatioDs  as  is  presented  by  this  Mexican 
spuEn'seceS^  tragedy?  The  Soujjiifn  secession  leaders 
siomsts ;  engaged  in  it  dreaming  of  a  tropical  empire 

which  they  never  realized ;  they  hoped  it  would  bring  a 
recognition  of  their  independence,  and  they  were  betray- 
ed.    The  English  were  beguiled  into  it  as  a  means  of 
by  the  English     chccMng  the  growth  of  a  commercial  rival, 
governmeSt;       ^^^  ^^  protcctlug  their  West  Indian  posses- 
sions.    They  were  duped  into  the  belief  that  there  was 
no  purpose  of  interfering  with  the  government  of  Mexi- 
co.   They  consented  to  the  perilous  measure  of  admitting 
the  belligerent  rights  of  the  South.     They  lent  what  ai( 
they  could  to  the  partition  of  a  nation  with  which  they 
were  at  peace.    They  found  that  the  seci^gj^ intention  was 
the  establishment  of  an  empire  in  the  interest  of  France, 
the  conciliation  of  Austria  for  military  reverses  in  Italy, 
and  the  curbing  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  by  the  Latin  rac( 
England  expected  to  destroy  a  democracy,  and  has  gath- 
ered her  reward  by  becoming  more  democratical  herself 
The  Pope  gave  his  countenance  to  the  plot,  having  re- 
by  the  Papal  gov-   ccl vcd  a  promisc  of  the  elevation  of  the  Mex- 
ernment;  j^^^  Church  to  her  prlstiue  splendor,  and 

the  restoration  of  her  mortmain  estates ;  but  the  Arch- 
bishop La  Bastida,  who  was  one  of  the  three  regents  rep- 
resenting her  great  influence,  was  insulted  and  removed 
from  his  political  office  by  the  French.  In  impotent  re- 
taliation, he  discharged  at  his  assailants  the  rusty  ecclesi- 
astical blunderbuss  of  past  days — he  Excommunicated  the 
French  army.  The  Spaniards  did  not  regain  their  former 
colony ;  the  brow  of  the  Count  de  Reuss 

by  the  Spaniards ;  *'  t         •   i 

was  never  adorned  with  a  vice-regal  coro- 
net.    The  noble  and  devoted  wife  of  Maximilian  was 
made  a  wanderer  in  the  sight  of  all  Europe, 

by  the  Anstrians ;  tt  ti  -i,  -, 

her  diadem  removed,  her  reason  dethroned. 
II.— L  L 


530  FAILURE  OF  THE  MEXICAN  EMPIRE.         [Sect.  XIII. 

For  Maximilian  himself  there  was  not  reserved  the  pag- 
eantry of  an  imperial  court  in  the  Indian  palaces  of  Mon- 
tezuma, but  the  death- volley  of  a  grim  file  of  Mexican  sol- 
diers, under  the  frowning  shadow  of  the  heights  of  Quere- 
taro.  For  the  Emperor  of  Austria  there  was  not  the  hom- 
Jage  of  a  transatlantic  crown ;  Mexico  sent  him  across  the 
ocean  a  coffin  and  a  corpse.  For  France,  ever  great  and 
lust,  in  whose  name  so  many  crimes  were 

by  France ;  *^  .  "^  . 

perpetrated,  but  who  is  responsible  for  none 
of  them,  there  was  a  loss  of  that  which  in  her  eyes  is  of 
infinitely  more  value  than  the  six  hundred  millions  of  ^ 
francs  which  were  cast  into  this  Mexican  abyss.  For  the 
and  bv  the  Emperor  Empcror — cau  any  thing  be  more  terrible 
Napofeon.  ^^^  ^^  dispatch  which  was  sent  to  Amer- 

ica at  the  closing  of  the  great  Exposition  ? — "  There  re- 
main now  no  sovereigns  in  Paris  except  the  Emperor 
Napoleon  III.  and  the  spectre  of  Maximilian  at  his  el- 
bow." 


CHAPTEE  LXII. 

STATE  OF  EUROPEAN  OPINION  ON  AMERICAN  AFFAIRS  {Continuedy 
THE  TRENT  QUESTION. 

The  Mexican  expedition  led  to  the  propagation  in  Europe  of  views  unfavorable  to 

the  American  republic. 
Some  Confederate  officials  were  forcibly  taken  by  an  American  captain  from  the 

Trent,  an  English  mail  steam-ship.     The  British  government  demanded  their 

restoration  and  a  suitable  apology.     The  American  government  acceded  to  that 

demand. 

The  engagements  wLich  had  been  mutually  contracted 

by  the  French  Emperor  and  the  ministry  of 

pean  journals  on    Lord  Palmcrstou  iu  rclatiou  to  American  af- 

the  Union.  .  it 

fairs  were  essentially  based  on  the  disrup- 
tion of  the  United  States.  The  journalism  of  both  En- 
gland and  France,  suitably  inspired,  spared  no  labor  to 
accomplish  that  result.     Thus  we  read : 

"The  ferocity  with  which  this  war  has  been  entered 

on  shows  that  the  government  of  Washing- 

onheAmJrica'k^  tou  A\^  Soou  lose  all  coutrol  ovcr  events. 

war.  ,  1    /»  • 

It  is  a  jnere  quarrel  tor  territory,  a  struggle 
for  aggrandizement.  With  the  deepest  sorrow  we  see 
this  people  precipitating  itself  into  civil  war  like  the  half 
breeds  of  Mexico.  Lord  John  Russell  and  his  advisers 
have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Southern  Confeder- 
acy must  be  treated  as  a  belligerent ;  it  has  acquired  a  cer- 
tain •degree  of  force  and  consistency.  The  South  has  not 
understood  the  war.  It  calculated  on  a  war  with  men 
holding  its  own  opinions  about  slavery.  Even  Mr.  Lin- 
coln declared  that  he  would  not  meddle  with  that  mat- 
ter.   On  the  part  of  the  North  it  is  a  war  to  keep  South- 


532  LITERARY  ATTACKS  ON  THE  UNION.  [Sect.XIIL 

ern  debtors  and  their  property  from  going  beyond  the 
grasp  of  Northern  merchants. 

"  Stripped  of  its  trappings,  it  is  a  mere  quarrel  for  ter- 
it  is  a  savage  quar-  Htory.    The  antagonists  are  acting  like  Del- 
reiaboutterritory.  awai'es  or  Pawnees.    War  to  the  knife, push- 
ed to  absolute  extermination,  is  what  they  have  resolved 
on;  government  and  people  breathe  language  of  massa- 
cre and  extermination.     Massachusetts  is  enforcing  the 
doctrines  of  legitimacy  and  Toryism.    It  is  a  congregation 
of  seceders  protesting  against  a  repetition  of  secession. 
Mr.  Seward  has  in-  Mr.  Scward's  Icttcr  to  Ml'.  Day  tou,  the  Amer- 
suited  the  French.    |^^^  representative  in  Paris,  is  a  message  of 
defiance,  if  not  of  insult,  to  France. 

"  The  march  of  events  has  made  us  regard  this  dispute 

as  a  more  commonplace  quarrel  than  at  first  it  appeared 

to  be.     The  South  received  no  provocation  and  enjoyed 

AbsnrdityofLin-    '^^  sovcrcigu  prcrogativcs,  and  Mr.  Liucolu 

coin's  views.         -^  jj^y^j^j^g  rcsolutious  made  by  one  tenth 

of  the  present  population  nearly  eighty  years  ago ;  he 
thinks  that  by  such  a  document  as  that  all  living  Amer- 
icans must  be  bound. 

"Lord  John  Kussell's  accordance  of  belligerent  rights  to 
the  South  is  discussed  in  a  tone  highly  hostile  to  En- 
gland ;  but  what  have  we  done  to  deserve  this  American 
tornado  of  abuse  ?  We  are  neither  to  have  liberty  of  ac- 
tion nor  of  inaction.  That  people  has  acquired  a  habit 
of  petulance  and  insolence.  The  grievance  is  simply  this 
— that  we  think  as  they  thought  six  weeks  before ;  and 
yet  we  are  expected  to  join  in  hounding  on  the  invaders. 
But  the  French  emperor  has  followed  our 

France  views  the  ,  • ,  i  •  i         p  i  <  • 

matter  in  accord    examplc  wituout   a  word  01  explanation. 

with  England.  ■*■  ti  i  i 

The  terms  he  uses  are  like  those  that  we 
employed.  He  places  the  two  on  an  equality — "  one  or 
other  of  the  belligerents."  The  North  has  had  to  take  a 
great  moral  "  cocktail,"  but  it  is  of  its  own  mixing.    Nei- 


Chap.  LXII.]  THE  NORTH  CAN  NOT  CONQUER  THE  SOUTH.    533 

ther  England,  nor  France,  nor  any  other  state  supposes 
there  to  be  any  rights  or  any  wrongs  about  it.  It  is  sim- 
ply a  quarrel. '  This  is  intensely  disagreeable  to  the  North, 
who  thinks  that  heaven  and  earth  are  bound  to  avenge 
its  cause.     People  give  themselves  no  con- 

The  war  a  mere  -•  .  i    i      •  ,  •       i 

quarrel  between    cem   aoout  a   Quarrcl  between  two   rival 

two  rival  shops.  -^  , 

shops,  or  are  only  concerned  that  there  is  a 
breach  of  the  peace  and  public  scandal.  For  some  un- 
known reason  the  Northern  States  empty  all  their  vials 
of  wrath  on  the  English  nation.  They  are  wounded  be- 
cause we  Jaave  not  admired  their  movements  sufficiently. 
Our  course,  however,  has  been  followed  by  the  French 
government." 

On  the  news  of  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  reaching  Eu- 
Derision  at  the  bat-  ^oj^e,  it  was  Said,  "  Thc  Noi'th  has  lost  all — 
tie  of  Bull  Run.  ^^^^  military  honor;  her  people  were  bel- 
lowing behind  the  army.  It  is  a  complete  victory  for  the 
South — as  complete  a  victory  as  Austerlitz.  We  have 
been  cheated  out  of  our  sympathies;  we  don't  like  to 
laugh.  They  are  shaking  their  knives  at  each  other  and 
their  fists  at  us.  But  an  American  battle  is  not  as  dan- 
gerous as  an  American  steam-boat.  It  is  carried  on  upon 
strict  humanitarian  principles.  Seventy-five  thousand 
American  patriots  have  fled  twenty  miles  in  an  agony  of 
fear,  though  there  was  nobody  pursuing  them." 

The  solemn  resolution  passed  by  the  houses  of  Con- 
The  gasconading  g^^^^s  ou  thc  uatioual  dcfcat  at  Bull  Run  (p. 
vote  of  Congress.    ^^^^^  -^  gtigmatizcd  as  a  "  gasconading  vote." 

"  The  two  sections  of  the  late  republic  had  better  part  and 
be  friends.  The  North  is  undertaking  more  than  Napo- 
leon did  in  his  Russian  campaign.  It  is  better  for  it  to 
accept  the  situation,  as  we  did  eighty  years 
mo?e  conquerthT   ago  OU  their  ow'u  soil.     Let  it  consider  if  it 

South  than  Napo-  -,  i      1      xt  t  -  it  .  rr-ii 

leon  could  conquer   cau   Qo   wuat  JN  aDolcou   could   uot.     The 

Russia.  TT      •  T      O  PA 

United  States  of  America  have  ceased  to 


534  THE  SOUTH  RISING  IN  FAVOR.  [Sect.  XIII. 

be ;  tlie  subjugation  of  tlie  South  is  impossible,  and  its 
submission  improbable.  The  almost  unanimous  opinion 
in  England  is  that  they  should  part  on  fair  terms. 

"  The  Americans  should  give  us  credit  for  fair  feeling 
and  honest  wishes.  At  first  we  regretted  their  quarrel, 
and  any  idea  that  a  partition  of  the  domineering  republic 
would  be  advantageous  was  repressed.  "We  inclined,  if 
at  all,  to  the  North.  The  slavery  of  the  South  was  an 
abomination  to  us ;  we  thought  that  it  was  the  cause  of 
the  war.  Our  ideas  of  fair  play  were  offended;  the  South 
had  been  fairly  beaten  in  an  election;  it  was  perhaps 
their  turn  to  lose.  They  could  not  take  their  beating. 
Moreover,  we  attributed  the  arrogance  of  the  government 
tQ  them.  They  were  identified  with  the  disgraceful  sys- 
tem of  repudiation. 

"  But  then  a  change  came  over  us,  owing  to  the  conduct 
of  the  North ;  its  behavior  was  so  unwar- 

Cauee  of  the  South.  i    ^  i         'i  •         i       j.       'x 

rising  in  favor  in  Tautable ;  its  mcuaccs  so  insolent ;  its  exac- 
tions so  fierce  and  irrational.  We  w^ould 
not  stigmatize  the  South  as  rebels;  they  suggested  to  it 
to  be  friends,  and  together  make  war  on  us.  They  want- 
ed us  to  regard,  as  a  worthless  rabble,  ten  millions  of 
people  fighting  for  independence,  and  not  to  recognize  as 
belligerents  a  confederacy  holding  their  government  in 
check  with  two  hundred  thousand  soldiers.  Meantime 
the  South  was  winning  its  way  to  favor.  It  was  not  in 
human  nature  to  consider  their  Bull  Bun  achievement 
without  admiration.  But  the  one  great  fact  which 
swayed  English  opinion  was  the  decided  and  multiform 
antao-onism  between  the  North  and  the  South  which 
events  disclosed.  Secession  had  been  in  contemplation 
for  thirty  years,  and  the  South  is  doing  no  more  than 
hundreds  of  other  states  have  previously  done.  They 
may  be  wrong,  but  they  are  ten  millions.  So  long  as 
the  insurrection  seemed  only  a  spiteful  rebellion  against 


Chap.  LXII.]    ADVANTAGES  OF  SECESSION  TO  EUROPE.  535 

the  results  of  a  particular  election,  we  regarded  it  as  ut- 
terly unjustifiable.  But  it  is  not  so ;  tlie  difference  is  as 
irreconcilable  as  that  between  the  Greeks  and  Turks.  If 
the  whole  case  of  the  war  is  to  be  analyzed,  we  must 
needs  say  the  Northerners  have  the  right. on  their  side, 
for  the  Southerners  have  destroyed,  without  provocation, 
a  mighty  political  fabric,  and  have  impaired  the  glory  and 
strength  of  the  great  American  republic.  But,  as  they 
have  chosen  to  do  this ;  as  they  have  shown  themselves 
hitherto  no  less  powerful  than  their  antagonists ;  as  the 
decision  of  so  large  a  population  can  not  be  contemned, 
and  as  we  can  not  persuade  ourselves  that  a  genuine 
peace  is  likely  to  spring  from  a  protracted  war,  we  should 
rejoice  to  see  the  pacification  of  America  promoted  by 
other  means.  The  secession  of  the  Slave  States  takes 
away  from  the  North  all  the  violence,  and 

Secession  will  be.,,.  tttt  ii*  i  , 

for  the  benefit  of  injusticc,  auQ  blasphemous  teachmg  about 
the  scriptural  sanction  of  slavery.  English- 
men think  that  the  recognition  of  the  Confederacy  will 
accomplish  all  that  the  anti-slavery  party  has  been  advo- 
cating for  years.  It  is  perfectly  true  that  the  North  is 
only  fighting  for  empire.  Separation  will  take  away  the 
horsewhips  and  revolvers  from  Northern  Legislatures,  and 
the  blasphemy  from  Northern  pulpits.  It  will  diminish 
the  power  of  the  slave-owning  filibusters,  who  will  no 
longer  have  the  Union  to  back  them.  The 
beanAng^S-salon  South  will  be  3.  Mud  of  Anfiflo-Saxon  Bra- 
zil,  easily  curbed.  It  would  have  demand- 
ed the  extension  of  slavery  over  Mexico,  and  the  North 
would  have  conceded  it,  but  now  the  South  will  have  a 
rival,  and  the  cause  of  justice  and  civilization  will  gain  by 
the  quarrel  of  these  partners  in  guilt. 

"  Let  us  review  the  course  we  have  taken.  The  Amer- 
icans allege  that  we  precipitately  gave  up  the  Union. 
We  did  no  such  thing.     We  showed  that  South  Caro- 


536  IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  CONQUERING  THE  SOUTH.    [Sect.  XIII. 

summa  of  the  ^^^^  ^^^  neither  right  nor  reason — no  more 
jBIEily'^  right  to  secede  than  Lancashire;  that  the 
'*^^^^  Southern  resentment   about  Mr.  Lincoln's 

election  was  unwarrantable,  and  that  nothing  could  be 
gained  by  breaking  the  Union.  Americans  were  contem- 
plating the  destruction  of  their  government  with  indiffer- 
ence, while  Englishmen  were  protesting  against  it  on 
such  unwarrantable  grounds.  Then  came  Sumter,  and 
they  changed.  They  were  indignant  that  we  would  not 
denounce  their  antagonists  as  pirates.  Then  one  third 
of  the  whole  population  seceded.  Numbers  make  right 
as  well  as  might.  It  became  superfluous  to  discuss  their 
arguments ;  however,  it  appeared  they  had  more  warrant 
for  disaffection  than  was  at  first  imagined.  The  insurrec- 
tion might  be  traitorous,  unprovoked,  unreasonable,  wick- 
ed ;  but  there  stood  the  insurgents.  We  did  not  believe 
that  they  could  be  subdued.  At  that  point 
of  conquering  the  tho  North  bccame  angry  with  us;  it  got  in- 
dignant about  our  declaration  of  neutrality ; 
it  rebuked  us  for  our  cold-blooded  serenity.  Up  to  this 
time  they  have  not  made  one  step  toward  subjugation. 
The  seceders  are  a  match  for  them.  The  head  and  front 
of  our  offending  is  that  we  formed  a  just  estimate.  The 
one  great  argument  with  us  has  been,  not  the  injustice, 
but  the  impossibility  of  the  object  proposed  by  the 
North.     . 

"  We  are  very  low  in  the  good  graces  of  the  multitudi- 
nous monarch  of  the  United  States.     We 

Contemptuone  in-  •    t    ,     i  t  • ,     i      r>  mi    ^    a 

difference  to  Amer-  miMt  havc  kuowu  it  bciorc.     ihc' Amcr- 

loan  opinion.  ,      "-^ 

icans  sympathized  with  the  French  Cana- 
dians; th^y  held  violent  language  about  the  Oregon 
boundary;  they  refused  the  right  of  search  in  connec- 
tion with  the  slave-trade ;  they  seized  the  island  of  St. 
Juan  when  in  controversy  with  England.  We  bore  all 
these  things  patiently,  and  do  not  regret  it.     We  have 


Chap.  LXIL]    INDIFFERENCE  TO  AMERICAN  OPINION.  537 

got  accustomed  to  their  dislike,  as  we  have  to  Wet  sum- 
mers and  foggy  autumns — " 

The  American  government  had  desired  the  people,  in 
view  of  the  great  national  affliction  that 

Views  on  the  proc-    Tii/»n.i  .  i  i  n -t 

lamationofaday  had  Deiallen  tucm,  to  observe  a  day  oi  hu- 
miliation, and,  in  their  several  places  of  wor- 
ship, to  cast  themselves  on  the  goodness  of  the  Almighty. 
On  this  it  is  said, "  The  republic  has  betaken  itself  to 
mortification  on  an  appointed  day,  and  has  sought  by 
mournful  litanies  to  avert  its  dangers,  in  the  hopes  that 
a  rupture  may  be  avoided.  Americans  are  religious  even 
to  superstition,  and  more  than  usually  prone  to  those  ac- 
cesses of  fanaticism  which,  in  their  effect  on  the  human 
frame,  approach  the  confines  of  madness  and  epilepsy.  In 
their  national  capacity  they  have  been  sufficiently  pagan. 
Individually  they  have  been  miserable  sinners;  as  a 
people  they  have  l^en  the  greatest,  the  most  powerful, 
the  most  enlightened  and  virtuous  that  ever  defied  the 
universe.  So  they  prayed  yesterday.  That  great,  pow- 
erful, unscrupulous  government,  which  inspired  uneasi- 
ness among  politicians  and  anger  among  philanthropists, 
has  not  come  to  its  end  by  means  of  those  it  had  injured. 
The  class  to  which  it  truckled  has  destroyed  it.  The 
Union  has  burst  asunder  by  explosive  forces  generated 
within  itself,  and  now  the  two  republics  stand  like  cliffs 
which  of  old  were  the  same  rock,  but  which  can  never 
again  be  united." 

Such  were  the  views  and  opinions  scattered  over  En- 
gland, and,  indeed,  all  over  Europe,  in  the 
sidious  misrepre-     summcr  aud  autumu  of  1861.    No  impartial 

PPTlt3.tiODS 

person  can  now  peruse  these  publications 
without  being  shocked.  The  poison  did  its  w^ork  the 
more  effectually  since  it  was  doled  out  in  daily  doses,  a 


538  RETALIATIONS  OF  AMERICAN  JOURNALISTS.    [SEcx.XnL 

little  at  a  time.  Europe  was  drugged  before  she  detect- 
ed tlie  insidious  practice  perpetrated  upon  her. 

Again  and  again  the  guilt  not  only  of  provoking,  but 
of  declaring  war,  was  laid  upon  Lincoln.  He  was  accused 
of  working  upon  the  pugnacity  of  an  excitable  people,  and 
making  them  fight  for  a  shadow.  *'  It  is  only  a  boyish 
pati^iotism  which  regrets  to  see  the  great  republic  rent 
asunder."  Not  a  measure  taken  by  the  government  was 
suffered  to  pass  without  misrepresentation  and  derision. 
By  a  profligate  press,  powerful  and  persistent  attempts 
were  unceasingly  made  to  write  down  American  finance 
and  ruin  American  credit.  Threats  of  the  joint  inter- 
ference of  England  and  France  in  American  affairs  be- 
came more  and  more  frequent  as  the  Mexican  understand- 
ing matured. 

Such  persistent  provocation  could  bring  no  other  re- 
sult than  retaliation.  ^When  the  London 

Retaliation  of  ,       ,      t      •        ,  i  n  t 

Americau  uevvs-    ucwspapcrs  protested.in  the  name  of  hu- 

papers.  .-•■•'■  ...         . 

manity  and  civilization,  against  the  closing 
of  Charleston  Harbor  by  the  sinking  of  ships  laden  with 
stone,  they  were  answered  by  the  New  York  newspapers 
with  engravings  of  Sepoys  blown  from  the  mouths  of 
cannon  in  India. 

When  Earl  Eussell  stated  in  the  House  of  Lords  that 
the  principle  upon  which  England  acted  was  always  to 
encourage  the  independence  of  other  countries,  he  was 
asked  to  illustrate  his  declaration  by  beginning  with  Ire- 
land. 

Sometimes  these  bitter  repartees  occurred  in  places 
more  responsible  than  newspaper  printing-offices.  Ad- 
vantage had  been  taken  of  the  "Stone  Blockade"  to  cause 
a  singular  excitement  in  Europe.  The  French  and  En- 
glish journals  denounced  it  in  the  name  of  modern  civili- 
zation. Earl  Eussell  stated  to  the  Liverpool  s)iip-owners 
that  Lord  Lyons  would  inform  the  American  govern- 


Chap.  LXII.]    CAUSE  OF  THE  CHANGE  IN  EOREIGN  OPINION.    539 

ment  that  England  regarded  it  as  unjustifiable  even  as  a 
measure  of  war.  In  his  subsequent  communication  with 
Earl  Eussell,  Lord  Lyons  reported  that  "  Mr.  Seward  said 
the  best  proof  he  could  give  me  that  the  harbor  of 
Charleston  had  not  been  rendered  inaccessible  was  that, 
in  spite  of  the  sunken  vessels  and  of  the  blockading 
squadron,  a  British  steamer,  laden  with  contraband  of 
war,  had  just  gone  in." 

With  an  air  of  injured  innocence,  the  London  journal- 
ist raised  up  his  hands  and  exclaimed,What 

Injured  innocence      ,  y,  'i     ii  '     -n         i       j?  1  i 

of  the  Loudon  jour-  Jiavc  i  Qouc  to  mci'it  this  ilood  01  trausat- 

nalists,  ,      , 

lantic  insolence  ?  "  Like  Lord  Clive,  we  are 
absolutely  astonished  at  our  own  moderation.  We  shall 
probably  be  driven  to  give  terrible  proofs  of  our  strength." 

It  is  said  by  Sallust, "  Neither  place  nor  friends  pro- 
tect him  whom  his  own  arms  have  not  protected."  The 
conquest  of  the  South — ^a  work  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  been  declared  too  great  even  for  the  power  and  ge- 
nius of  Napoleon,  transcending  immeasurably  in  difficul- 
ty his  Russian  campaign,  had  been  thoroughly  completed. 
American  battles,  leaving  their  tens  of  thousands  of  dead 
and  wounded  on  the  field,  had  proved  to  be,  both,  in  hor- 
ror and  result,  something  more  than  "  the  mere  cricket- 
matches  of  Cockneys"— something  more  than  the  "  blow- 
ing urwof  Western  steam-boats."  A  navy  of  many  hun- 
dred war-ships,  some  of  them,  perhaps,  not  unworthy  an- 
tagonists of  the  most  powerful  cuirassed  ships  of  Europe, 
kept  watch  and  ward  on  the  American  coast,  from  the 
Bay  of  Fundy  to' the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande.  The  Re- 
public had  placed  in  the  field,- and  for  years  had  main- 
tained, an  army  of  more  than  a  million  of  men.  Dis- 
banded without  difficulty  when  their  work  was  done, 
those  soldiers  would  reassemble  at  a  word.  Not  even 
the  most  profligate  journalism  could  conceal  the  portent- 


540  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR.  [Sect.  XIII. 

ous  facts  that  one  of  the  greatest  military  monarchies 
of  Europe  had  been  constrained  to  obey  an  order  from 
Washington,  and  that  the  Power  which  remembered  Se- 
bastopol  had  come  into  firm  accord  with  the  Power  which 
had  been  insulted  by  the  concession  of  belligerent  rights 
to  its  domestic  assailant.  No  longer  could  it  be  hidden 
that  the  Eepublic  of  the  West  must  inevitably  share  in 
the  determination  of  the  destinies  of  Europe.  Then 
who  finally  modify  Hiauy  of  those  whose  sentiments  we  have 
their  opmions.       }^qqj^.  reading  made  haste  to  unsay  what 

they  had  said. 

The  United  States  sloop  ofwar  San  Jacinto  was  return- 
The  affair  of  the  ^^g  fr^^i^i  thc  Afrlcau  coast  (Octobcr,  1861). 
Treut.  jj^^  commander,  Captain  Wilkes,  learning 

that  the  Confederate  privateer  Sumter  was  cruising  in  the 
West  India  Seas,  sailed  from  the  port  of  St.  Thomas  in 
pursuit.  While  at  Havana  he  was  informed  that  the 
Confederate  agents,  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell,  with  their 
secretaries,  were  about  to  proceed  to  Europe  in  the  char- 
acter of  embassadors  to  England  and  France.  They  had 
escaped  from  Charleston  on  October  12th,  in  a  small 
steam-boat,  running  the  blockade  successfully  on  a  dark 
and  rainy  night.  They  had  taken  passage  from  Havana 
in  the  English  mail  steamer  Trent. 

Captain  Wilkes  determined  to  intercept  them.  He 
Capture  of  the  wcut  out  luto  the  Bahama  Channel,  two 
Southern  envoys,   j^^^j^,^^  ^^^^  fifty  j^^q^  from  Havaua,  aud 

waited  for  them.  On  the  approach  of  the  Trent  he  re- 
quired her  to  heave  to,  and  on  being  disregarded,  fired  a 
shell  across  her  bow.  A  party  was  sent  on  board,  and 
the  four  passengers  seized.  They  were  first  carried  to 
New  York,  and  then  confined  at  Fort  Warren,  in  Boston 
Harbor. 

Although  the  conduct  of  Captain  Wilkes  met  with 


Chap.  LXII.]     EXCITEMENT  PRODUCED  IN  ENGLAND.  541 

popular  commendation,  Lincoln  did  not  ap- 
SS"'''"  prove  of  it.  When  the  intelligence  of  it 
proceeding.  ^^^  ^^^^^  brought  to  him,  he  said,  "  Captain 

Wilkes  has  undoubtedly  meant  well  in  seizing  these 
traitors,  but  it  will  never  answer.  This  is  the  very  thing 
the  British  captains  used  to  do.  They  claimed  the  right 
of  searching  American  ships  and  carrying  men  out  of 
them.  That  was  the  cause  of  the  War  of  1 8 1 2.  Now,  we 
can  not  abandon  our  own  principles ;  we  shall  have  to 
give  these  men  up,  and  apologize  for  what  we  have  done." 

The  news  reaching  England  produced  at  once  a  violent 
excitement.  Without  waiting  to  hear  from 
ducecfS^En-^''^"  the  United  States,  the  government  at  once 
made  preparations  for  war.  Troops  were 
hurriedly  prepared  for  transportation  to  Canada;  a  proc- 
lamation was  issued  prohibiting  the  export  of  arms  and 
munitions  of  war ;  the  shipment  of  saltpetre  was  forbid- 
den. Without  delay,  a  special  queen's  messenger  was 
dispatched  to  Washington,  directing  the  British  minister. 
Lord  Lyons,  to  demand  the  liberation  of  the  prisoners, 
their  restoration  to  the  protection  of  England,  and  a  suit- 
able apology  for  the  aggressions  which  had  been  com- 
mitted. 

"  Her  majesty's  government,  bearing  in  mind  the  friend- 
.  ,.       ly  relations  which  have  lons^   existed  be- 

Communication         •/  ~ 

[^SeSS  tween  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
government.  ^^^  wilHug  to  bclicve  that  the  United  States 
naval  officer  who  committed  the  aggression  was  not  act- 
ing in  compliance  with  any  authority  of  his  government, 
or  that,  if  he  conceived  himself  to  be  so  authorized,  he 
greatly  misunderstood  the  instructions  which  he  had  re- 
ceived ;  for  the  government  of  the  United  States  must 
be  fully  aware  that  the  British  government  could  not  al- 
low such  an  affront  to  the  national  honor  to  pass  without 
full  reparation,  and  her  majesty's  government  are  unwil- 


542  VIEWS  OF  THE  ENGLISH  GOVERNMENT.        [Sect.  XUI. 

ling  to  believe  that  it  could  be  the  deliberate  intention 
of  the  government  of  the  United  States  unnecessarily  to 
force  into  discussion  between  the  two  governments  a 
question  of  so  grave  a  character,  and  with  regard  to  which 
the  whole  British  nation  would  be  sure  to  entertain  such 
unanimity  of  feeling. 

"Her  majesty's  government  therefore  trusts  that  when 
this  matter  shall  have  been  brought  under  the  considera- 
tion of  the  government  of  the  United  States,  that  govern- 
ment will,  of  its  own  accord,  offer  to  the  British  govern- 
ment such  redress  as  alone  could  satisfy  the  British  na- 
tion, namely,  the  liberation  of  the  four  gentlemen,  and 
their  delivery  to  your  lordship,  in  order  that  they  may 
again  be  placed  under  British  protection,  and  a  suitable 
apology  for  the  aggression  which  has  been  committed." 

At  the  same  time,  Earl  Russell  sent  private  instruc- 
tions to  Lord  Lyons : 

"  In  my  previous  dispatches  of  this  date  I  have  instruct- 
ed you,  by  command  of  her  majesty,  to  make 
twnsofEariRus-  ccrtaiu  dcmauds  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States. 

"  Should  Mr.  Seward  ask  for  delay,  in  order  that  this 
grave  and  painful  matter  should  be  deliberately  consid- 
ered, you  will  consent  to  a  delay  not  exceeding  seven 
days.  If  at  the  end  of  that  time  no  answer  is  given,  or 
if  any  other  answer  is  given  except  that  of  a  compliance 
with  the  demands  of  her  majesty's  government,  your  lord- 
ship is  instructed  to  leave  Washington,  with  all  the  mem- 
bers of  your  legation,  bringing  with  you  the  archives  of 
the  legation,  and  to  repair  immediately  to  London. 

"If,  however,  you  should  be  of  opinion  that  the  re- 
quirements of  her  majesty's  government  are  substantially 
complied  with,  you  may  report  the  fact  to  her  majesty's 
government,  and  remain  at  your  post  until  you  receive 
farther  orders." 


Chap.LXIL]    views  of  the  FRENCH  government.  543 

The  French  government  interposed  its  offices,  its  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs  writing  (December 
thrFrJncrgover/  10th)  to  the  Frcnch  minister  atWashins:- 
ton,  mformmg  him  that  "  the  arrest  had  pro- 
duced in  France,  if  not  the  same  emotion  as  in  England, 
at  least  extreme  astonishment  and  sensation.  Public  sen- 
timent was' at  once  engrossed  with  the  unlawfulness  and 
consequences  of  such  an  act."  He  says  "the  desire  to 
contribute  to  prevent  a  conflict,  perhaps  imminent,  be- 
tween two  powers  for  which  the  French  government  is 
animated  by  sentiments  equally  friendly,  and  the  duty  of 
upholding  certain  principles  essential  to  the  security  of 
neutf-als,  and  of  placing  the  rights  of  its  ow^n  flag  under 
shelter  from  any  attack,  have,  after  mature  reflection,  con- 
vinced it  that  it  could  not,  under  the  circumstances,  re- 
main entirely  silent." 

He  concludes :  "  There  remains,  therefore,  to  invoke,  in 
explanation  of  their  capture,  only  the  pretext  that  they 
were  the  bearers  of  official  dispatches  from  the  enemy; 
but  this  is  the  moment  to  recall  a  circumstance  which 
governs  all  this  aflfair,  and  which  renders  the  conduct  of 
the  American  cruiser  unjustifiable. 

"  The  Trent  w^as  not  destined  to  a  point  belonging  to 
one  of  the  belligerents.  She  was  carrying  to  a  neutral 
country  her  cargo  and  her  passengers ;  and,  moreover,  it 
was  from  a  neutral  port  that  they  were  taken. 

"The  cabinet  at  "Washington  could  noty  without  strik- 
ing a  blow  at  the  principles  which  all  neutral  nations  are 
alike  interested  in  holding  in  respect,  nor  wdthout  taking 
the  attitude  of  contradiction  of  its  own  course  up  to  this 
time,  give  its  approbation  to  the  proceedings  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  San  Jacinto.  In  this  state  of  things,  it  evi- 
dently should  not,  according  to  our  views,  hesitate  about 
the  determination  to  be  taken." 

The  Austrian  and  Prussian  governments,  in  like  man- 


544  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  MR.  ADAMS.  [Sect.  XIII. 

ner,  presented  their  views,  wMcli  were  to  the  same  ef- 
fect. 

In  England,  those  journalists  who  had  been  occupied 
during  the  summer  in  creating  an  anti-Amer- 

Denunciations  of     .  .  ,1,11 

Captain  Wilkes  in  icau  seutiment,  exerted  themselves  to  pro- 

England.  '  .  -•■ 

duce  as  much  exasperation  as  possible.  They 
took  it  for  granted  that  Captain  Wilkes  had  acted  by  or- 
der of  his  government,  and  yet  assailed  him  intemperate- 
ly.  "  He  is,  unfortunately,  but  too  faithful  a  type  of  the 
people  in  whose  foul  mission  he  is  engaged.  He  is  an 
ideal  Yankee.  Swagger  and  ferocity  built  up  on  a  foun- 
dation of  vulgarity  and  cowardice — these  are  his  charac- 
teristics ;  and  these  are  the  two  most  prominent  marks 
by  which  his  countrymen,  generally  speaking,  are  known 
all  over  the  world.  To  bully  the  weak,  to  triumph  over 
the  helpless,  to  trample  on  every  law  of  country  and  cus- 
tom, willfully  to  violate  all  the  most  sacred  interests  of 
human  nature,  to  defy  as  long  as  danger  does  not  appear, 
and,  as  soon  as  real  peril  shows  itself,  to  sneak  aside  and 
run  away — these  are  the  virtues  of  the  race  which  pre- 
sumes to  oifer  itself  as  the  leader  of  civilization  and  the 
prophet  of  human  progress  in  these  latter  days.  By  Cap 
tain  Wilkes  let  the  Yankee  breed  be  judged." 

On  the  same  day  that  Earl  Russell  was  writing  in  Lon- 
don to  Lord  Lyons,  Mr.  Seward  was  writing 

Mr.  Seward's  in-       .       -^^j-      ,,         ,  ,        -%r        at  t  •  i» 

structious  to  Mr.  lu  Washington  to  Mr.  Adams,  drawing  his 
attention  to  the  fact  that  Captain  Wilkes 
had  not  acted  under  instructions  from  his  government, 
and  desiring  him  to  read  the  dispatch  to  Lord  Palmerston 
and  Earl  Russell.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that,  consider- 
ing the  state  of  feeling,  these  facts  were  not  promptly 
made  known  in  England. 

The  American  government  had  no  easy  task  to  per- 
form in  doing  its  duty.  If  there-  was  bitterness  of  feel- 
ing in  England,  there  was  no  less  bitterness  of  feeling  in 


Chap.  LXIL]  RESTORATION  OF  THE  CAPTIVES.  545 

America.     Captain  Wilkes's   act  had  met 

Popular  opinion  of         .   ,  ,  ,  it        r\ 

the  transactiou  iu  With  popular  approval-j-iiay,  more,  the  Sec- 
retary of, the  Navy  had  commended  it ;  and 
in  the  House  ofRej)resentatives  a  motion  had  been  made 
"  tendering  the  thanks  of  Congress  to  Captain  Wilkes  for 
his  arrest  of  the  traitors  Slidell  and  Mason."  In  the  com- 
munications whjph  ensued,  Mr.  Seward,  in  a  letter  to  Mr. 
Adams,  reviewed  the  whole  subject,  reiterating  that  no 
orders  had  been  given  to  any  one  for  the  arrest  of  the 
four  persons  named,  that  Captain  Wilkes  had  acted  in 
conformity  with  the  law  in  relation  to  neutrals  as  ex- 
pounded by  English  authority,  but  that  he  had  not  exer- 
cised the  right  of  capture  in  the  manner  allowed  and  rec- 
ognized by  the  law  of  nations,  since  it  was  not  his  busi- 
ness, but  that  of  a .  court  of  admiralty,  to  decide  on  the 
validity  of  his  prize.  It  was  for  him  to  have  carried  the 
Trent  into  port.  "  But,"  wrote  Mr.  Seward,  "  if  I  decide 
this  case  in  favor  of  my  own  government,  I  must  disallow 
its  most  cherished  principles,  and  reverse  and  forever  aban- 
don its  essential  policy.  Our  country  can  not  afford  that 
sacrifice.  If  I  maintain  these  principles  and  adhere  to  that 
policy,  I  must  surrender  the  case  itself  It  will  be  seen, 
therefore,  that  this  government  can  not  deny  the  justice 
of  the  claims  presented  to  us  in  this  respect  upon  its 
merits.  We  are  asked  to  do  to  the  British  nation  what 
we  have  always  insisted  all  nations  ought  to  do  unto  us." 
He  therefore  declared  that  the  British  de- 
ernment  restores  maud  would  bc  acccdcd  to,  aud  the  four  per- 
sons cheerfully  liberated. 
The  Confederate  authorities  had  expected  that  the 
t  Trent  question  would  lead  to  war  between 
the  sSaTthis'"   the  United  States  and  Ensrland.     Their  dis- 

decision.  ,  .  -., 

appomtment  at  its  ending  in  the  manner  it 
did  was  very  great.     After  this  time  all  hopes  of  Euro- 
pean aid  in  their  affaii's  were  abandoned.    The  two  agents 
II.— M  M 


546  1^0^^  LYONS  ON  THE  STATE  OF  AFFAIRS.     [Sect.  XIII. 

who  had  thus  been  delivered  up  were  personally  unpop- 
ular in  England.  It  was  affirmed  that  they  had  been  in 
the  habit  of  reviling  Great  Britain.  They  were  declared 
to  be  "  most  worthless  booty,"  and  that  "  England  would 
have  done  just  as  much  for  two  negroes." 

During  the  Civil  War  the  views  takeiti  by  the  Frenc]i 
and  English  governments,  and  the  attitude 

Mistaken  views  of     ,  -,  -^     -,  -,     -,  .  , . 

England  and         thcv  assumeQ,  depenaed  on  a  misconception 

France.  *^  .        ,  ,  ^       , 

of  the  state  of  affairs  in  America.  They  did 
not  understand  the  patriotic  determination  of  the  people, 
which  rose  far  above  all  party  ties.  Lord  Lyons, 'the  En- 
glish minister  at  Washington,  though  never  wanting  in  a 
courteous  relation  to  the  government  to  which  he  was  ac- 
credited, was  not,  as  those  who  were  intimately  acquaint- 
ed with  passing  events  perceived  with  regret,  a  friend  of 
the  republic.  But  if  he  misconceived  the  patriotism  of 
the  American  people,  he  was  not  without  some  justifica- 
tion. They  can  not  peruse  his  correspondence  with  his 
government  without  pain. 

In  a  letter  to  Earl  Russell  (November  17th,  1862)  he 

describes  the  position  and  intentions  of  the 

AmericSTpa?-'     Dcmocratlc  leaders.     He  says  that  several 

ties. 

of  them  had  soughtminterviews  with  him  in 
relation  to  foreign  mediation.  They  were  exulting  in 
their  recent  successes  in  the  elections,  hoping  that  the 

s:overnment  would  be  constrained  to  desist 

His  communica-      o  ^ 

Democmtifield^   ^^^^  ^^^  cxtraordluary  powers  it  had  as- 
^''''  sumed,  and  that  the  President  would  increase 

their  party  element  in  his  cabinet,  and  endeavor  to  effect 
a  reconciliation  with  the  people  of  the  South,  and  re- 
nounce the  idea  of  subjugation  or  extermination. 

He  adds  that  McClellan  had  been  regarded  as  the  rep- 
resentative of  their  principles  in  the  army,  and  when  in- 
telligence arrived  that  he  had  been  dismissed  from  com- 


Chap.  LXII.]    LOED  LYONS  ON  THE  STATE  0:f  AFFAIRS.  547 

mand,  their  hopes  were  dashed  and  their  irritation  very 
great.  Though  they  seemed  to  think  that  foreign  media- 
tion must  be  resorted  to,  they  deprecated  it  at  present 
from  an  apprehension  that  it  would,  if  proposed  now, 
strengthen  their  opponents. 

Lord  Lyons  stated  that  he  avoided  giving  any  opinion 
on  the  subject.  But  listened  attentively  to  their  plans; 
that  he  thought  he  perceived  a  desire  to  put  an  end  to 
the  war,  even  at  the  risk  of  losing  the  Southern  States 
altogether,  but  it  was  plain  that  it  was  not  thought  pru- 
dent to  avow  that  desire. 

He  related  what  he  understood  to  be  the  plan  of  the 
who  desire  Euro-  Democratlc  Icadcrs,  and  also  that  of  the  gov- 
peau  intervention,  gmmeut ;  that  thc  kttcr  wouM  reject  any 
offer  of  foreign  intervention,  and  it  might  increase  the 
virulence  with  which  the  war  was  prosecuted ;  that,  if 
the  Democratic  party  were  in  power,  they  would  be  dis- 
posed to  accept  foreign  mediation  if  it  appeared  to  be 
the  only  means  of  stopping  hostilities.  They  would  de- 
sire that  the  offer  should  come  from  the  great  powers  of 
Europe  conjointly,  and,  in  particular,  that  as  little  promi- 
nence as  possible  should  be  given  to  Great  Britain. 

Lord  Lyons  therefore  inferred  that  it  would  bet  vain  to 
offer  mediation  to  the  government  in  its  existing  mood, 
but  that  there  was  a  prospect  that  a  change  of  mood 
might  take  place  should  military  reverses  occur.  He  con- 
cluded that  the  immediate  and  obvious  interest  of  Great 
Britain,  as  well  as  of  the  rest  of  Europe,  was,  that  peace 
and  prosperity  should  be  restored  to  America  as  soon  as 
possible,  the  point  chiefly  worthy  of  consideration  ap- 
pearing to  be  whether  separation  or  reunion  would  be 
the  more  likely  to  effect  this  object. 

The  misapprehension  conveyed  in  this  communication 
consisted  in  the  undue  weight  which  it  gave  to  the 


548  LOBD  LYONS  ON  THE  STATE  OF  AFFAIRS.     [Sect.  XIII. 

wishes  of  the  Democratic  leaders  referred  to.  Whatever 
their  former  influence  might  have  been,  they  were  now 
without  support.  The  Democratic  party,  as  a  mass,  would 
have  rejected  such  suggestions  with  indignation. 


CHAPTEE  LXIII. 

RESOURCES  AND  DEFENSES  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  IN  1862.    ITS  FI- 
NANCES, ARMY,  AND  NAVY. 

Financial  condition  of  the  republic  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 

The  measures  of  Mr.  Chase,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  for  1861  and  1862.  His 
financial  recommendations  to  Congress.  Financial  condition  of  the  republic  at 
the  close  of  1862. 

The  war  measures  of  Mr.  Cameron.  Accession  of  Mr.  Stanton  as  Secretary  of 
War.  His  report  on  the  state  of  the  Army  and  general  military  condition  for 
1862. 

The  navy  measures  of  Mr.  Welles.  Complete  enforcement  of  the  blockade.  Op- 
erations against  the  enemy,  and  condition  of  the  Navy  at  the  close  of  1862. 

'No  portion  of  the  history  of  the  republic  is  more  wor- 
thy of  attention  than  that  which  relates  to  the  financial 
measures  connected  with  the  Civil  War. 

Until  the  great  conspiracy  of  secession,  taxation  in 
The  financial  bur-     Auicrlca  for  uatloual  purposes  had  been  al- 

densof  the  republic.    ^^^^^  ^^^^^^^       ^^^^j,  ^^^^^  ^^^^^  .^  rapidly  bc- 

came  more  and  more  oppressive,  yet  it  was  borne  not 
only  submissively,  but  with  cheerfulness.  In  its  unstint- 
ed appropriations  of  money,  Congress  only  reflected  the 
determination  of  the  people. 

There  was  a  resemblance  between  the  attitude  assumed 
Formation  of  a  pub-  by  Cougrcss  aud  that  exhibited  by  the  Long 
lie  debt  in  England,  parliament  iu  Eugkud.  No  political  pur- 
pose was  permitted  to  fail  through  want  of  pecuniary 
suj^plies.  The  national  income  under  Charles  I.  had  bare- 
ly amounted  to  ^ve  millions  of  dollars  a  year,  but,  in  a 
period  of  nineteen  years,  under  the  Commonwealth,  not 
less  than  four  hundred  millions  were  levied ;  yet  it  was 
held  that  the  object  gained  was  a  full  equivalent  for  the 
cost. 


550  THE  NATIONAL  DEBT.  [Sect.  XIIL 

Considering  tlie  population  and  the  resources  of  En- 
gland at  that  time,  such  a  revenue  must  be  regarded  as 
very  great ;  yet  more  than  half  of  it  was  raised  by  direct 
taxation,  sequestrations  and  the  sales  of  forfeited  land  for 
the  most  part  supplying  the  rest.  It  was  not  until  the 
accession  of  the  Orange  dynasty  that  the  government 
learned  the  dangerous  secret  of  borrowing  money  on  pub- 
lic credit,  and  founding  a  national  debt. 

Not  without  curiosity  may  we  compare  some  of  the  ar- 
its  supposed  poiit-  guments  used  by  the  American  Secretary  of 
icai  a  vantages.  ^|^^  Trcasury  lu  support  of  his  measures 
with  those  offered  by  English  statesmen  almost  two  cen- 
turies ago.  In  their  opinion,  a  very  great  advantage  must 
incidentally  arise  from  the  distribution  of  a  public  debt 
among  many  holders,  since  an  influential  body  would 
thus  be  created,  bound  by  the  tie  of  individual  interest 
to  the  existing  government,  and  ever  ready  to  defend  it 
against  its  opponents,  whose  jirst  act  would  be  to  disre- 
gard or  repudiate  their  claims.  Nor  was  it  overlooked 
that,  through  the  means  thus  acquired  by  borrowing,  the 
influence  of  the  government  might  be  increased  far  be- 
yond what  was  possible  by  the  restricted  supplies  of  each 
year. 

In  America,  every  one  could  see  how  powerfully  a  wide- 
spread interest  in  a  common  institution — 
the  slave  system  and  slavcry — had  actcd  iu  unifyinsT  the  South. 

a  national  debt.  **  ^  . 

It  was  not  discontentment  with  the  govern- 
ment, for  there  was  no  cause  of  discontent,  but  apprehen- 
sions,  real  or  imaginary,  of  peril  to  that  common  interest 
which  had  banded  together  the  populations  of  so  many 
states.  If  at  the  South  slave  property,  sometimes  valued 
at  three  thousand  millions  of  dollars,  had  been  made 
available  as  a  lever  to  attempt  to  overturn  the  govern- 
ment, a  national  debt  of  three  thousand  millions,  held  in 
portions  scattered  all  over  the  North,  might  be  made 


Ghap.lxiil]  direct  taxation.  551 

equally  available  to  sustain  it.  Should  the  slave  system, 
in  the  issues  of  the  w^r,  be  destroyed,  and  should,  as  in- 
deed was  inevitable,  a  national  debt  l?e  created,  the  North 
would  succeed  the  South  in  the  possession  of  a  principle 
of  unification,  the  efficiency  of  which  would  not  be  im- 
paired, as  was  that  of  slavery,  by  any  moral  or  conscien- 
tious scruples. 

It  is  true  that  this  principle  of  unification  is  not  with- 
But  a  debt  implies  ^^^  ^  drawback.  By  direct  or  indirect  tax- 
opposition.  ation,  and,  in  fact,  by  both,  means  must  be 

raised  to  pay  the  interest  which  the  debt  requires.  From 
this  point  of  view  the  political  effect  is  therefore  to  de- 
compose society  into  two  portions,  one  of  which  is  an- 
tagonistic to  the  debt  through  the  taxation  it  demands. 
But  if  the  slaveholders  of  the  South  had  found  it  possi- 
ble to  carry  with  them  thoroughly  the  slaveless  whites, 
so  the  bondholders  of  the  North  might  reasonably  ex- 
pect that  the  influences  of  capital  would  draw  all  ranks 
of  society  to  a  general  concord  with  them.  It  would  be 
very  difficult  to  resist  capital  and  patriotism  combined. 

Nevertheless,  it  ought  n.ever  to  be  forgotten  that  there 
Disadvantages  of  di-  will  always  bc  discoutentnient  with  direct 
rect  taxation.  taxatlou,.  aud  particularly  if  it  implies  espi- 
onage. Perhaps  nothing  exerted  a  more  powerful  influ- 
ence in  accelerating  the  fall  of  the  Roman  empire  than 
the  policy  of  the  Emperor  Constantine,  who  replaced  the 
Experience  of  the  systcm  of  iudircct  taxatiou  —  the  customs 
Romans.  ^^^  dutics  of  formcr  time^ — by  the  grind- 

ing direct  taxation  of  Indictions.  It  was  this  that,  un- 
der his  successors,  tore  from  the  emperor  the  whole  of 
North  Africa,  Egypt,  Syria,  Asia  Minor.  The  tribute  de- 
manded by  the  Mohammedan  Khalif  was  not  one  third 
of  that  which  had  been  extorted  by  the  emperor,  and  the 
provinces  were  unable  to  withstand  the  temptation  of 
the  advantages  arising  from  a  change  of  rulers. 


552  PROTECTIVE  TARIFFS.  [Sect.  XIII. 

In  America,  until  the  Civil  War,  indirect  taxation  had 
supplied  the  wants  of  the  national  government,  and,  so 
far  as  that  purpose *was  involved,  was  not  objected  to  in 
any  part  of  the  country ;  but  very  generally  throughout 
the  South,  and  to  no  small  extent  in  the  North  itself,  very 
Political  effect  of  scrious  objcctiou  was  made  to  the  heavy 
protective  tariffs,    ^^^^g^^^^  imposcd  iu  this   mauucr  for  the 

avowed  benefit  of  a  single  interest — the  manufacturing. 
New  England  and  Pennsylvania  were  the  chief  benefi- 
ciaries of  this  dangerous  system.  The  proffer  of  tariff 
enactments  for  the  benefit  of  specified  branches  of  indus- 
try had  become  as  important  an  element  in  the  deter- 
mination of  presidential  elections  as  were  the  donatives 
to  the  legions  of  old  in  the  exaltation  of  Eoman  emper- 
ors. 

The  cheerful  manner  in  which  the  American  people 
accepted  every  form  of  taxation  during  the 

Cheerful  assump-  ,  ,  -,     -,  ,    .,  .  . 

tion  of  tax-burdens  war  must  cvcr  be  reo;arded  as  a  strikmsr  m- 

iu  America.  ,  ,  ,      .      ,  ,  ,^r^,      .  ■,,-,, 

cident  m  their  history.  Their  zeal  m  this 
respect  outran  the  acts  of  the  government.  Not  only  did 
they  bear  these  financial  burdens  with  alacrity,  but  they 
dedicated  large  additional  sums  to  secure  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  purpose  they  had  in  view.  There  never  has 
existed  a  more  splendid  example  of  organized  benevo- 
lence than  the  "  Sanitary  Commission,"  and  yet  it  was 
only  one  of  many  forms  which  voluntary  contribution 
assumed. 

For  a  clear  comprehension  of  the  financial  condition 
The  finance  report  ^^^  mcasurcs  of  thc  rcpublic  duriug  the  first 
for  1860.  ^^^  years  of  the  war,  it  is  necessary  to  pre- 

sent an  abstract  of  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  for  the  year  ending  on  the  30th  of  June,  1860. 
The  American  fiscal  year  commences  on  the  1st  of  July 
and  ends  on  the  30th  of  the  following  June. 


Chap.  LXIII.]  THE  FINANCES  IN  1861.  553 

In  that  report  the  secretaiy,  Mr.  Cobb,  stated  that  the 
a2f2rre2:ate  means  for  the  service  of  that  year 

Means  for  the  year.       °°      o  pit 

were  more  than  eighty-one  millions  oi  dol- 
lars ($81,091,309  43). 

The  expenditures  for  that  year  were  more  than  seven- 
Expenditures  for  ty-seven  millions  ($77,462,102  72).  Abal- 
the  year.  ^^^^  therefore  remained  in  the  treasury  of 

more  than  three  and  a  half  millions  ($3,629,206  71). 

He  farther  estimated  the  means  for  the  fiscal  year  next 
Estimates  for  the  foUowiug,  1861,  at  more  than  eighty-four 
following  year.  ^^^^^^^^  ($84,348,996  75),  aud  the  expendi- 
ture at  nearly  the  same  amount  ($84,103,105  17).  He 
remarked,  however,  that  in  practice,  for  many  years  past, 
the  sums  drawn  from  the  treasury  during  any  year  had 
been  much  less  than  the  amounts  estimated  as  required 
during  such  year,  and,  applying  such  deductions  to  the 
case  before  him,  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  there 
would  probably  remain  in  the  treasury  on  the  1st  of 
July,  1862,  a  balance  of  about  eight  millions  of  dollars. 

During  the  year  1860  the  country  had  been  in  a  very 
state  of  the  coun-  prospcrous  coudltiou.  The  crops  had  bccu 
try  at  that  ume.  ^^^^  abuudaut  aud  prfccs  vciy  remunera- 
tive. The  exports  of  the  preceding  year  had  reached 
the  enormous  sum  of  four  hundred  millions  of  dollars 
($400,122,296),  the  imports  more  than  three  hundred 
and  sixty-two  millions  ($362,163,941),  the  revenue  from 
customs  having  been  fifty-three  millions  ($53,187,511  87). 
The  exports  of  domestic  produce  for  the  current  year,  as 
far  as  they  had  been  received,  indicated  an  increase  fully 
equal  to  that  of  preceding  years,  and  probably  surpass- 
ing it,  thus  authorizing  an  estimate  of  increased  revenue 
from  that  source. 

But  Mr.  Cobb  added  that  a  threatened  financial  revul- 
An  unfavorable  fa-  siou  was  impending,  which  threw  uncertain- 
ture  prospect.        ^^  ^^  ^-^^  forcgoiug  calculatious.   The  causes 


554  THE  FINANCES  IN  1861.  [Sect.  XIU. 

of  this  were  outside  of  the  financial  and  commercial  oper- 
ations of  the  country,  and  were  of  a  political  character. 
Already  they  had  seriously  affected  the  treasury,  as  shown 
by  the  diminished  receipts  from  customs. 

The  permanent  public  debt,  on  the  30th  of  June,  1860, 
The  public  debt  was  $45,079,203  08,  and  the  outstanding 
^"  ^^'^:  treasury  .notes  at  that  date  $19,690,500. 

By  the  act  of  June  22d,  1860,  provision  was  made  for 
the  redemption  of  treasury  notes  and  payment  of  the  in- 
terest thereon.  This  act  provided  for  the  issuing  of  stock 
for  ^an  amount  not  exceeding  twenty-one  millions  of  dol- 
lars, at  a  rate  of  interest  not  exceeding  six  per  cent,  per 
annum,  and  to  be  reimbursed  within  a  period  not  beyond 
twenty  years  and  not  less  than  ten  years.  For  satisfac- 
The  government  ^oiy  rcasous  spccificd  by  the  secretary,  no 
negotiates  a  loan,  jj^gotiatiou  of  any  portiou  of  this  loan  was 
attempted  until  the  8th  of  September,  1860,  when  pro- 
posals were  invited  for  ten  millions  of  the  loan,  which 
was  ample  to  meet  all  the  treasury  notes  falling  due  be- 
fore January  1st,  1861.  The  rate  of  interest  was  fixed  at 
five  per  cent,  per  annum,  under  the  conviction  that  the 
loan  could  be  readily  negotiated  at  that  rate,  for  at  that 
time  the  five  per  cent,  stock  of  the  United  States  was  sell- 
ing in  the  market  at  a  premium  of  three  per  cent.  The 
result  realized  the  just  expectation,  and  the  whole  amount 
offered  was  taken  either  at  par  or  a  small  premium.  How- 
it  is  disturbed  by  ever,  before  the  time  had  arrived  for  pay- 
a  financial  crisis.  ^^^^  ^^  ^-^^  p^^,^  ^£  ^}^^  biddcrs,  thc  finan- 
cial crisis  referred  to  came.  New  arrangements,  looking 
to  an  extension  of  the  term  of  payment,  had  been  neces- 
sarily accorded,  and  even  with  that  some  persons  still  re- 
mained unable  to  make  their  payments.  Meantime  the 
necessities  of  the  treasury  demanded  prompt  action.  JSTot 
only  were  the  treasury  notes  past  due  rapidly  coming  in 
for  redemption,  but  those  not  due  were  being  paid  in  for 


Chap.  LXIIL]  INTRUSION  OF  SLAVERY.  555 

customs,  thereby  withdrawing  from  tlie  regular  operations 
of  the  government  its  principal  source  of  revenue. 

To  meet  the  remaining  outstanding  treasury  notes,  and 
An  issue  of  treasury  interest  thcrcou,  thcrc  were  yet  to  be  nego- 
notes  uecessary.  tiatcd  elcvcu  millious  of  the  stock  author- 
ized by  the  act  of  June  22d,  1860.  The  difficulties  at- 
tending  the  payment  for  the  stock  already  sold,  in  con- 
nection with  the  fact  that  capitalists,  in  the  existing  con- 
dition of  the  country,  seemed  unwilling  to  invest  in 
United  States  stocks  at  par,  rendered  it  almost  certain 
that  this  remainino;  eleven  millions  could  not  be  nes^o- 
tiated  upon  terms  acceptable  to  the  government.  To 
meet  the  difficulty,  Mr.  Cobb  therefore  recommended  a 
repeal  of  the  act  so  far  as  these  eleven  millions  were  con- 
cerned, and  the  authorization  of  an  issue  of  treasury  notes 
to  that  amount,  pledging  unconditionally  the  public  lands 
for  their  ultimate  redemption.  He  also  recommended,  to 
relieve  the  treasury  from  its  present  embarrassments,  the 
issuing  of  an  additional  amount  of  treasury  notes  of  not 
less  than  ten  millions  of  dollars. 

Among  other  matters,  such  a>^  the  revenue  marine  serv- 
Intrusion  of  slavery  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^s,  etc,  thc  sccrctary  drcw  atten- 
into  these  affairs.     ^^^^  ^^  ^^  iucideut  wMch,  though  Hot  stric<> 

ly  pertaining  to  the  subject  of  his  report,  strikingly  illus- 
trates the  cause  of  the  political  difficulty  which  had 
brought  so  much  embarrassment  to  the  treasury,  and 
shows  how  the  influences  of  slavery  were  felt  every 
where.  Congress  had  authorized  the  appointment  of  del- 
egates to  represent  the  United  States  in  the  International 
Statistical  Congress  which  met  in  London,  with  a  view 
of  promoting  the  establishment  of  uniform  standards  of 
weights  and  measures,  a  uniform  unit  of  currency,  etc. 
To  this  meeting  the  Hon.  Mr.  Longstreet,  of  South  Caro- 
lina, repaired — the  only  delegate  from  the  United  States. 
His  statement  is  as  follows : 


556  INTRUSION  OF  SLAVERY.  [Sect.  Xill. 

"At  the  appointed  time,  a  preliminary  meeting  was 
siave-oAvners  in-  ^^^^^^  ^o  appoint  officers  and  arrange  the  or- 
suited  in  London,  ^^j,  q£  business  for  the  regular  meetings. 
All  the  foreign  delegates  were  declared  to  be  vice-presi- 
dents, and,  by  invitation  of  the  chairman,  took  their  seats 
as  such  upon  the  stand.  Lord  Brougham  was,  I  think, 
the  last  member  of  the  Congress  who  entered  the  hall, 
and  was  applauded  from  the  first  glimpse  of  him  until  he 
took  his  seat ;  it  was  near,  and  to  the  left  of  the  chair. 
Mr.  Dallas  (the  American  minister),  appearing  as  a  com- 
plimentary visitor,  was  seated  to  the  right,  in  a  rather 
conspicuous  position.  Things  thus  arranged,  the  assem- 
bly awaited  the  presence  of  his  Eoyal  Highness  the  Prince 
Consort,  who  was  to  p^^eside  and  open  the  meeting  Avith 
an  address.  He  soon  appeared,  delivered  his  address,  and 
took  his  seat.  As  soon  as  ho  concluded,  and  the  long- 
continued  plaudits  ceased.  Lord  Brougham  rose,  compli- 
mented the  speech  very  highly  and  deservedly,  and  re- 
quested all  who  approved  of  it  to  hold  up  their  right 
hands.  We  did  so,  of  course.  This  done,  he  turned  to 
Mr.  Dallas,  and,  addressing  him  across  the  prince's  table, 
said :  "  I  call  the  attention  of  Mr.  Dallas  to  the  fact  that 
there  is  a  negro  present  (or  among  the  delegates),  and  I 
hope  he  will  have  no  scruples  on  that  account.  This  ajD- 
peal  was  received  by  the  delegates  with  general  and  en- 
thusiastic applause.  Silence  being  restored,  the  negro, 
who  goes  by  the  name  of  Delany,  rose  and  said:  "I  thank 
your  Eoyal  Highness  and  Lord  Brougham,  and  have  only 
to  say  that  I  am  a  man."  This,  too,  was  applauded  warm- 
ly by  the  delegates.  I  regarded  this  as  an  ill-timed,  un- 
provoked assault  upon  our  country,  a  wanton  indignity 
offered  to  our  minister,  and  a  pointed  insult  offered  to  me. 
I  immediately  withdrew  from  the  body.  The  propriety 
of  my  course  is  respectfully  submitted  to  my  govern- 
ment." 


chap.lxiil]  Mil.  chase  secrp:tary  of  the  treasury.      557 

The  Secretary  of  tlie  Treasury  adds ;  "  It  is  only  neces- 
sary to  say  that  the  withdrawal  of  Judge  Longstreet  from 
the  Congress,  and  his  refusal  to  return  to  its  deliberations, 
received  the  entire  approval  of  his  government." 

In  conclusion  of  his  report,  Mr.  Cobb  adds:  "Until 
within  a  short  period,  I  had  confidently  expected  to  pre- 
sent to  Copgress,  at  its  present  session,  a  gratifying  state- 
ment of  the  financial  condition  of  the  government.  A 
different  result  has,  however,  been  brought  about  by 
causes  which  could  not  be  foreseen,  and,  if  foreseen,  could 
not  have  been  averted  by  any  action  of  the  department." 

The  administration  of  Lincoln  had  succeeded  that  of 
Buchanan,  and  Mr.  Chase  had  become  Secre- 

Mr.  Chase  becomes     ,  p    1 1         m  mi  ^ 

secretarj  ofthe      tarv  01  the   ircasurv.     I  he  years  dunns: 

Treasui'v-  •/  «/  o 

which  he  held  this  most  important  office 
were  the  years  of  greatest  peril  that  the  republic  had 
ever  known.  His  financial  measures,  which  were  of  a 
singularly  able  and  decisive  kind,  not  only  bore  upon  the 
current  requirements  of  the  war,  but  gave  a  permanent 
impress  to  the  business  relations  of  the  country,  and  will 
continue  to  be  felt  for  a  long  time  to  come. 

On  the  9th  of  December,  1861,  Mr.  Chase  submitted  his 
His  report  of  De-    ^fst  fomial  report  to  Cougrcss.     He  had,  in 
cember,i8ci.        -(-j^g  prcccding  July,  at  the  extra  session,  pre- 
sented estimates  of  an  aggregate  expenditure  for  the  year 
endmg  on  the  30th  of  June,  1862,  of  nearly  three  hundred 
and  twenty  millions  of  dollars  ($318,519,581  87).    Con- 
gress had  made  provision,  by  customs  and  internal  taxes, 
and  by  loans,  to  secure  the  requisite  sums. 
The  acts  authorizing  loans  had  provided, 
(1.)  For  a  national  loan  of  one  hundred  millions  of 
dollars,  or  any  larger  sum  not  exceeding  the 

Loan  provisions  ,,  i  ,^         •        i    •      i  t  . 

made  at  the  ex-     wholc  amouut  authorized,  m  bonds  or  treas- 

tra  session,  .  ^  r»/^ 

ury  notes,  bearmg  7.30  per  cent,  mterest. 


558  FINANCIAL  PROVISIONS,  FOR  1862.  [Sect.  XIIL 

payable  three  years  after  date,  and  convertible,  at  or  be- 
fore maturity,  into  twenty  years'  six  per  cent,  bonds. 

(2.)  For  a  loan  in  Europe  or  in  tlie  United  States,  at 
tlie  discretion  of  the  secretary,  of  one  hundred  millions  of 
dollars,  payable  twenty  years  after  date,  and  bearing  in- 
terest not  exceeding  seven  per  cent. 

(3.)  For  the  issue,  in  payments  to  public  creditors  or 

andissueoftreas-    ^^  cxchange  for  coiu,  of  trcasuiy  notes,  pay- 

ury  notes.  ^^^je  oue  ycar  after  date,  bearing  an  interest 

of  3.65  per  cent.,  and  convertible  into  the  three  years' 

7.30  bonds  or  treasury  notes. 

(4.)  For  the  issue  of  notes  payable  on  demand,  and  re- 
ceivable for  all  public  dues,  to  be  used  as  coin  in  pay- 
ments and  exchanges. 

The  aggregate  of  notes  of  the  two  last  descriptions  was 
limited  to  fifty  millions  of  dollars,  in  denominations  less 
than  fifty,  but  not  less  than  ^ve  dollars. 

A  farther  authority  was  conferred  by  the  act  to  issue 
treasury  notes  of  any  of  the  specified  denominations,  bear- 
ing six  per  cent,  interest,  and  payable  not  over  twelve 
months  from  date,  to  an  amount  not  exceeding  twenty 
millions  of  dollars. 

To  provide  for  immediate  exigencies,  the  secretary  is- 
sued, under  authority  conferred  by  various  acts,  for  pay- 
ment to  public  creditors  or  for  advances  of  cash, 
$14,019,034  66  in  treasury  notes,  payable  in  two  years, 
and  bearing  six  per  cent,  interest,  and  $12,877,750  in 
treasury  notes  bearing  the  same  rate  of  interest,  but  pay- 
able sixty  days  after  date. 

To  provide  for  the  regular  and  continuous  disburse- 
Negotiations  with  ^^^^^  ^^  ^^^^  War,  thc  sccrctary  had  inter- 
the  banks.  yicws  wlth  representatives  of  the  banking 

institutions 'of  the  three  chief  commercial  cities  of  the  sea- 
board, who  agreed  to  unite  as  associates  in  moneyed  sup- 
port of  the  government,  and  to  subscribe  at  once  a  loan 


Chap.lxiil]    arrangements  with  the  banks.  559 

of  fifty  millions  of  dollars,  of  which  five  millions  were  to 

be  paid  immediately  to  the  assistant  treasurers  in  coin, 

and  the  residue  also  in  coin,  as  needed  for  disbursement. 

The  secretary,  on  his  part,  agreed  to  issue 

Particulars  of  ar-         ,  i   ^  r*  rv    i  t  i  ■ 

rangemeuts with  tlirce  ycars  Y.oO  Douds,  or  treasury  notes, 
bearing  even  date  with  the  subscription,  and 
of  equal  amount ;  to  cause  books  of  subscription  to  the 
national  loan  to  be  opened ;  to  ireimburse  the  advances 
of  the  banks  as  far  as  practicable  from  this  national  sub- 
scription, and  to  deliver  to  them  7.30  bonds,  or  treasury 
notes,  for  the  amount  not  thus  reimbursed.  It  was  far- 
ther understood  that  the  secretary  should  issue  a  limited 
amount  of  United  States  notes,  payable  on  demand,  in  aid 
of  the  operations  of  the  treasury,  and  that  the  associated 
institutions,  when  the  first  advance  of  fifty  millions  should 
be  expended,  would,  if  practicable,  make  another,  and 
when  that  should  be  exhausted,  still  another  advance  to 
the  government,  of  the  same  amount,  and  on  shuilar 
terms. 

The  objects  of  this  arrangement  were :  (1.)  To  place 
Objects  secured  by  ^t  thc  commaud  of  the  government  the  large 
t  ese  arrangements,  g^j^^g  immediately  nccdcd  for  the  payment 

of  maturing  treasury  notes,  and  for  other  disbursements 
ordinary  or  extraordinary ;  (2.)  To  secure  to  the  people 
equal  opportunity  with  the  banks  for  participation  in  the 
loan ;  (3.)  To  avoid  competition  between  the  government 
and  the  associated  institutions  in  the  disposal  of  bonds ; 
(4.)  To  facilitate  and  secure  farther  advances  to  the  gov- 
ernment by  the  associations  if  required ;  (5.)  To  insure, 
if  possible,  the  maintenance  of  payments  in  specie,  or  its 
actual  equivalents  or  representatives. 

These  objects  were  accomplished.     Fifty  millions  of 

Success  of  the  loan  dollars  wcrc  immediately  advanced  by  the 

subscriptions.        fcauks.     Subscriptiou  -  books   were   opened 

throughout  the  country ;  the  people  freely  subscribed  to 


560  AKRANGEMENTS  WITH  THE  BANKS.  [Sect.  XIII. 

the  loan.  The  amounts  subscribed  were  reimbursed  to 
the  banks,  and  the  sum  thus  reimbursed,  though  then 
covering  but  little  more  than  half  the  amount,  enabled 
those  institutions,  when  a  second  loan  was  required,  to 
make  a  second  advance  of  fifty  millions. 

These  two  loans  of  fifty  millions  each  were  negotia- 
ted for  three  years'  7.30  bonds  at  par.  The  first  was  ne- 
gotiated, and  the  first  iasue  of  bonds  bears  date  on  the 
19th  of  August;  the  second  on  the  1st  of  October,  1861. 

A  third  loan  was  negotiated  on  the  16th  of  November 
'A  third  loan  nego-  wlth  the  assoclatcd  institutions,  the  secre- 
tiated,  ^^^  issuing  to  them  fifty  millions  of  dollars 

in  six  per  cent,  bonds,  at  a  rate  equivalent  to  par,  for  the 
bonds  bearing  seven  per  cent,  interest,  authorized  by  the 
act  of  July  17th.  This  loan  was  coupled  with  no  ar- 
rangement for  reimbursement ;  and  there  was  an  under- 
standing, in  the  form  of  an  option  to  the  associations,  that, 
on  or  after  the  1st  of  January,  a  fourth  advance  of  fifty 
millions  should  be  made,  on  the  same  terms  with  the  first 
and  second,  if  practicable,  and  required  by  the  secretary. 

In  addition  to  the  loan  thus  made,  the  secretary  issued 
United  States  notes,  payable  on  demand,  in 

and  additional  ,  •.•  n  jy  ,  i.  ^        i    ^ 

treasury  notes  is-  denominatious  ot  ilve,  tcu,  auQ  twenty  dol- 

sued.  /»       1  .    1        1  •  •         1       • 

lars,  of  which  there  were  m  circulation,  on 
the  30th  of  November,  1861,  $21,165,220,  while  there 
remained  in  the  treasury  at  that  date  $3,385,105.  The 
amount  thus  issued,  so  far  as  it  entered  into  the  circula- 
tion of  the  country,  might  be  regarded  as  a  loan  from 
the  people,  payable  on  demand,  without  interest. 

Eecapitulating  the  preceding  statements,  and  reducing 
Aggiegate  realized  the  loau  of  Novcmbcr  16th  to  the  equiv- 

fromtSese  loans.      ^|^^^  ^^  SCVCUS,  iucludiug  iutcrest,  it  is  SCCU 

that  an  aggregate  was  realized  from  these  various  loans  of 

nearly  two  hundred  millions  of  dollars  ($197,242,588  14). 

Turning  next  to  the  receipts  of  revenue  from  duties, 


Chap.  LXIII.]   THE  PROVISIONS  PROVE  INADEQUATE.  55 1 

The  receipts  from  ^^e  Secretary  had  to  report  a  falling  otf  from 
famS'etcfSV  the  estimates.  The  revenue  from  customs 
miuished.'  ^^^  ^-^^  ^g^^-j^  ^^^^  -^g^^  ^^^  ^^^^  estimated 

at  fifty-seven  millions ;  it  must  be  reduced  to  a  little  more 
than  thirty-two  ($32,198,602  55). 

So,  too,  the   receipts   from  lands   and  miscellaneous 

sources  must  be  reduced  from  $3,000,000  to  $2,354,062  89. 

To  the  foregoing  is  to  be  added,  as  the  only  remaining 

FaiiiiKToffinthe   source  of  revcuue,  the  direct  tax  of  twenty 

actuaiWnue.     ^n^^^^  authorized  by  Congress.     The  ag- 

gregate  of  revenue  is  therefore  estimated  at  fifty-four  and 

a  half  millions  ($54,552,665  44),  which  is  less  by  about 

twenty-five  and  a  half  millions  than  was  estimated  in 

July. 

A  more  important  fact  than  this  reduction  of  the  rev- 
inadequacyofesti.  ^HUG  remained,  however,  to  be  dealt  with. 
Seased^army'ex-'''  The  estlmatcs  of  expcudlture  had  been  ba^d 
peaditures.  ^^  ^  ^^^^-^  ETmy  force  of  about  three  hun- 

dred thousand  men.  Congress  had,  however,  authorized 
the  employment  of  a  force  which,  including  the  existing 
regular  army,  would  be  about  four  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  men.  This  large  increase  of  men  and  officers, 
the  liberal  addition  made  by  Congress  to  pay  and  ra- 
tions, the  increase  of  the  navy,  and  other  objects,  must 
necessarily  augment  the  expenditure  far  beyond  the  orig- 
inal estimates,  and  make  it  nearly  two  hundred  and  four- 
teen millions  ($213,904,427  68)  beyond  the  estimates  of 
July. 

To  meet  the  difficulties  thus  presented,  the  secretary 
suggested  a  rigorous  supervision  of  all  contracts,  abolition 
of  all  unnecessary  salaries,  reduction  of  pay,  sequestration 
or  confiscation  of  the  property  of  rebels,  and  application 
of  the  proceeds  to  the  use  of  the  state.  Pointing  out. 
Necessity  of  greatly  howcvcr,  that,  after  all  this  had  been  done, 

increased  provision,    j^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^^  ^^  prOvidcd  for,  hc  iusistcd 
II.— N  N 


562  NEW  PROVISIONS  RECOMMENDED.  [Sect.  XIII. 

that  adequate  provision  by  taxation  for  ordinary  expend- 
itures, for  the  prompt  payment  of  interest  on  the  public 
debt,  and  for  the  gradual  extinction  of  the  principal,  is 
indispensable  to  a  sound  system  of  finance. 

The  provision  made  at  the  last  session  of  Congress  was 

of  two  descriptions:  (1.)  A  direct  tax  of 

gress  had  already   tweuty  millious ;  aud,  (2.)  An  internal  duty 

of  three  per  cent,  on  all  annual  incomes, 

with  certain  exceptions  and  deductions.     The  secretary 

proceeds  to  consider  the  expediency  of  farther  provisions 

of  a  similar  character. 

In  his  judgment,  it  is  necessary  to  increase  the  direct 
New  proTisions  tax  SO  as  to  producc  from  the  loyal  states 
recommended,  ^^^jj^g  ^  revcuue  of  at  Icast  twcuty  millions, 
and  to  lay  such  duties  on  stills  and  distilled  liquors,  on 
tobacco,  bank-notes,  carriages,  legacies,  evidences  of  debt, 
aild  instruments  for  conveyance  of  property,  as  will  pro- 
duce an  equal  additional  sum.  He  supposes  that  the  in- 
come tax  may  produce  ten  millions  more,  making  an  ag- 
gregate of  fifty  millions  of  dollars. 

That  sum  is  large,  but  there  is  no  probability  that  the 
revenue  from  ordinary  sources  will  exceed  forty  millions 
of  dollars ;  and  to  meet  even  economized  disbursements, 
to  pay  the  interest  on  the  debt,  and  provide  a  sinking 
fund  for  the  gradual  reduction  of  the  principal,  not  less 
than  ninety  millions  will  be  necessary. 

But,  if  the  sum  be  large,  the  means  of  the  people  are 
also  large — the  object  to  be  attained  price- 
to  miuhese^S  ^  Icss.  Thc  real  property  of  the  loyal  states 
is  valued  in  round  numbers  at  seven  and  a 
half  thousands  of  millions,  the  personal  property  at  three 
and  a  half  thousands  of  millions,  and  the  annual  surplus 
earnings  of  the  loyal  people  at  not  less  than  three  hun- 
dred millions  of  dollars.    The  whole  sum  proposed  to  be 


chap.lxiii.]  bank  circulation.  553 

raised  by  taxation  is  little  more  tlian  one  sixth  of  the  sur- 
plus earnings  of  the  country. 

But  the  amount  to  be  derived  from  taxation  forms  but 
Necessity  of  addi-  ^  Small  proportiou  of  the  sums  required  for 
tionai  loans.  ^^^  expeuses.  For  the  rest  reliance  must  be 
placed  on  loans. 

Already,  beyond  the  expectations  of  the  most  sanguine, 
Cheerful  support  ^^^  couutry  has  responded  to  the  appeals  of 
?hltlnkfand^^  the  Secretary.  The  means  adopted  for  se- 
peopie.  curing  the  concurrence  of  all  classes-  of  citi- 

zens in  financial  support  to  the  government  have  been 
already  explained.  It  remains  only  to  be  said  here  that, 
while  the  action  of  the  banking  institutions  in  assuming 
the  immediate  responsibility  of  all  the  advances  hither- 
to required,  as  v^ell  as  the  final  responsibility  of  much 
the  largest  portion  of  these  merits  high  eulogium,  the 
prompt  patriotism  with  which  citizens  of  moderate  means, 
and  workingmen,  and  workingwomen,  have  brought  their 
individual  offerings  to  the  service  of  their  country,  must 
command  even  warmer  praise. 

To  enable  the  government  to  obtain  means  for  the 
prosecution  of  the  war  without  unnecessary  cost,  the  sec- 
retary offered  the  following  suggestions : 

The  circulation  of  the  banks  of  the  United  States  on 
Nature  of  the  bank  the  Ist  day  of  Jauuary,  1861,  was  computed 
circulation.  ^^  ^^  ^j^^^^  ^^.^  huudrcd  miUious  of  dol- 

lars. This  constitutes  a  loan,  without  interest,  from  the 
people  to  the  banks,  costing  them  nothing  except  the  ex- 
pense of  issue  and  redemption,  and  the  interest  on  the. 
specie  kept  on  hand  for  the  latter  purpose ;  and  it  de- 
serves consideration  whether  sound  policy  does  not  re- 
quire that  the  advantages  of  this  loan  be 
be%?aSrrirtS^^^  transfciTed,  in  part  at  least,  from  the  banks, 
representing  only  the  interests  of  the  stock- 


the  jrovernment. 


564  NATIONAL  CIRCULATION.  [Sect.XIIL 

holders,  to  tlie  government,  representing  the  aggregate 
interests  of  the  whole  people. 

He  shows  that  Congress  may  constitutionally,  and  with 
Methods  by  which   great  advantage  to  the  people,  exercise  the 

this  may  be  done.  j  i        •  i  -t  •     •  .       . 

necessary  authority,  and  points  out  two 
plans  by  which  the  object  may  be  effected :  (1.)  The  grad- 
ual withdrawal  from  circulation  of  the  notes  of  private 
corporations,  and  the  issue  in  their  stead  of  United  States 
notes,  payable  in  coin  on  demand,  in  amounts  sufficient 
for  the  useful  ends  of  a  representative  currency;  (2.)  The 
preparation  and  delivery,  to  institutions  and  associations, 
of  notes  prepared  for  circulation  under  national  direction, 
and  to  be  secured,  as  to  prompt  convertibility  into  coin, 
by  the  pledge  of  United  States  bonds,  and  other  needful 
regulations. 

For  reasons  considered  to  be  satisfactory,  he  declines 
the  first  of  these  plans,  and  examines  in  detail  the  second, 
stating  that  its  principal  features  are,  (1),  a  circulation  of 
notes  bearing  a  common  impression,  and  authenticated  by 
a  common  authority ;  (2),  the  redemption  of  these  notes 
by  the  associations  and  institutions  to  which  they  may  be 
delivered  for  issue ;  (3),  the  security  of  that  redemption 
by  the  pledge  of  United  States  stocks,  and  an  adequate 
provision  of  specie. 

In  this  plan,  the  people,  in  their  ordinary  business, 
Advanta-esofana-  would  find  tho  advautagcs  of  uniformity  in 
tionai  ciixuiation.  ^^^^.^^^^ .  ^£  uiiiformity  lu  sccurity ;  of  effect- 
ual safeguard,  if  effectual  safeguard  is  possible,  against  de- 
preciation ;  and  of  protection  from  losses  in  discounts  and 
exchanges;  while  in  the  operations  of  the  government  the 
people  would  find  the  farther  advantage  of  a  large  de- 
mand for  government  securities,  of  increased  facilities  for 
obtaining  the  loans  required  by  the  war,  and  of  some  al- 
leviation of  the  burdens  on  industry  through  a  diminu- 
tion in  the  rate  of  interest,  or  a  participation  in  the  profit 


Chap.  LXIII.]  ADVANTAGES  OF  A  NATIONAL  CIRCULATION.      5^5 

of  cireulation  without  risking  tlie  perils  of  a  great  money 
monopoly.  A  farther  and  important  advantage  to  the 
people  may  be  reasonably  expected  in  the  increased  secu- 
rity of  the  Union  springing  from  the  common  interest  in 
its  preservation,  created  by  the  distribution  of  its  stocks 
as  the  basis  of  their  circulation  to  associations  through: 
out  the  country. 

The  notes  thus  issued  would,  in  the  judgment  of  the 
Its  advantages  to  secretary,  form  the  safest  currency  which 
the  people,  j.^^^  couutry  has  ever  enjoyed,  while  their 

receivability  for  all  government  dues,  except  customs, 
would  make  them,  wherever  payable,  of  equal  value  as  a 
currency  in  every  part  of  the  Union.  The  large  amount 
of  specie  now  in  the  United  States,  reaching  a  total  of 
not  less  than  two  hundred  and  seventy-five  millions  of 
dollars,  will  easily  support  payments  of  duties  in  coin, 
while  these  payments  and  ordinary  demands  will  aid  in 
retaining  this  specie  in  the  country  as  a  solid  basis  both 
of  circulation  and  loans. 

The  plan  thus  submitted,  if  adopted,  with  the  limita- 
and  advantages  to  tloiis  aud  Safeguards  which  the  experience 
the  government.  ^^^  wlsdom  of  scuators  aud  representatives 
will  doubtless  suggest,  will  probably  impart  such  value 
and  stability  to  government  securities  that  it  will  not  be 
difficult  to  obtain  the  additional  loans  required  for  the 
service  of  the  current  and  the  succeeding  year  at  fair  and 
reasonable  rates. 

The  secretary  then  shows  that  the  amount  of  loans  re- 
quired for  the  fiscal  year  1862,  in  addition  to  the  amount 
already  authorized,  will  not  exceed  two  hundred  millions 
of  dollars. 

Report  of  Decern-       Oil  the  4th  of  Dcccmber,  1862,  Mr.  Chase 
ber,i862.  again  made  his  customary  financial  report. 

From  this  it  apjDeared  that  the  aggregate  receipts  for 


556  FINANCIAL  PROVISIONS  FOR  1863.  [Sect.  XIII. 

the  fiscal  year  1862,  from  all  sources,  were 

Eeceipts  and expen-       t         ,    n         -,  -■-,  i      '    i  >       n  mt 

dituresofthepast  aoout  II ve  hundred  and  eighty-iour  millions 
^'^'  ($583,885,247  06),  and  the  aggregate  ex- 

penditures about  ^ye  hundred  and  seventy-one  millions 
($570,841,700  25),  leaving  a  balance  in  the  treasury,  on 
the  1st  of  July,  1862,  of  $13,043,546  81. 

He  estimates  that  for  the  fiscal  year  1863,  the  receipts. 

Estimate  of  receipts  actual  and  anticipated,  uudcr  existiug  laws, 

for  18C3,  ^'^Yi  "be  more  than  ^ve  hundred  and  eleven 

millions  ($511,646,259  96).     The  aggregate  of  expendi- 

andofexpendi-    tures  he  placcd  at  more  than  seven  hundred 

^''''''  and  eighty-eight  millions  ($788,558,777  62): 

There  must  therefore  be  provided  by  Congress  for  this 

The  provision  re-  J^^^^  about  two  huudrcd  and  seventy-seven 

'^'''^'  millions  ($276,912,517  66), 

Considering  in  like  manner  the  probable  receipts  and 

expenditures   of  the   next  folio winsf  fiscal 

and  that  for  1SG4.  ^        ^^^.,i  t  ',t      ^  ,♦,         i 

year,  1864,  though  with  less  certainty,  he 
conjectures  that  the  necessary  provision  for  that  year 
will  be  upward  of  six  hundred  and  twenty-two  millions 
($622,388,183  56),  and  that  therefore  the  whole  amount 
to  be  provided  by  Congress  beyond  resources  available 
under  existing  laws  will  be  nearly  nine  hundred  millions 
($899,300,701  22). 

With  a  view  to  the  necessary  provision  for  the  antici- 
pated expenditures,  the  secretary  had  pro- 

The  measures  al-  -,    ,        ^  ;     •  i       i       i  >  i 

ready  recommended  pOSCd  tO  ColiefreSS  at  itS  last  SCSSIOU  SUCll 
to  Congress  ■*■  ^  •      i  i  r^\^ 

measures  as  seemed  to  be  suitable.  Ihese 
were :  (1.)  An  increase  of  duties  on  various  imports ; 
(2.)  An  increase  of  the  direct  tax ;  (3.)  The  levying  of 
internal  duties ;  (4.)  A  limited  emission  of  United  States 
notes  convertible  into  coin ;  (5.)  The  negotiation  of  loans, 
facilitated  by  the  organization  of  banking  associations, 
whose  circulation  should  consist: only  of  notes  uniform  in 
character,  furnished  by  the  government,  and  secured  as 


Chap.  LXIII.]      SUSPENSION  OF  SPECIE  PAYMENTS.  5^7 

to  convertibility  into  coin  by  United  States  bonds  de- 
posited in  the  treasury. 

But  unexpected  military  delays  increased  expenditures, 

diminished  confidence  in  public  securities, 

quale  by  military    aud  madc  it  Imposslblc  for  the  banks  and 

delays,  etc.  •      t  i       i       i        t 

capitalists  who  had  taken  the  previous  loans 
to  dispose  of  the  bonds  held  by  them  except  at  ruinous 
loss,  and  impossible  for  the  government  to  negotiate  new 
loans  except  at  like  or  greater  loss. 

These  conditions  made  a  suspension  of  specie  payments 

inevitable.  The  banks  of  New  York  sus- 
cilp^ymShar   pcudcd  ou   thc   30th   of  December,  1861. 

occurred.  ^  ,  ' 

Their  example  was  followed  by  most  of  the 
banks  throughout  the  country,  and  the  government  yield- 
ed to  the  same  necessity  in  respect  to  the  United  States 
notes  then  in  circulation. 

These   changed  circumstances  required  a  change   of 

measures.     The   expenditures  had  already 

Point  to  which  daily  -,       ,  n  -,  .tt  i 

expenditures  had     rcachcd  au  avcras^c  oi  nearly  a  million  and 

riseu.  o  */ 

a  quarter  of  dollars  each  secular  day,  while 
the  revenue  from  all  sources  hardly  exceeded  one  tenth 
of  that  sum. 

Careful  inquiries  had  satisfied  the  secretary  that  suc- 
cessive loans  could  only  be  had  on  increas- 

Difficulty  in  obtain-    .        i       t       t  ,  .  rm       r>      i      • 

ing  corresponding  lugly  disadvautagcous  tcrms.  1  he  first  six- 
ty millions  would  require  an  issue  of  bonds 
to  the  amount  of  seventy-five  millions,  and  the  third  sixty 
millions,  if  attainable  at  all,  would  require  one  hundred 
and  twenty  millions.  It  was  easy  to  see  that,  on  this  road, 
utter  discredit  and  paralysis  would  soon  be  reached. 

There  remained  but  one  way  of  raising  money  by  the 
negotiation  of  bonds  in  the  usual  mode.  It  was  to  re- 
ceive in  payment  of  loans  the  notes  or  credits  of  the 
banks  in  suspension.  The  secretary  set  forth  the  reasons 
that  led  him  to  discountenance  and  reject  this  method. 


568  ^  NATIONAIi  CIRCULATION.  [Sect.  XIII. 

No  other  mode  seemed  likely  to  accomplisli  tlie  ob- 
A  national  circuia-  j^^t  111  vjew  SO  Well  as  the  Issue  of  United 
tionrecommended.  g^^^^^  ^^^^^  adapted  to  circulatioii  as  money, 

and  available  therefor  immediately  in  government  pay- 
ments. Things  were  now  in  that  condition  that  a  choice 
would  have  to  be  made  between  a  currency  furnished  by 
numerous  and  unconnected  banks  in  various  states  and  a 
currency  furnished  by  the  government.  The  secretary 
had  already  declared  his  unhesitating  preference  for  a  cir- 
culation authorized  and  issued  by  national  authority.  The 
finance  committees  of  the  two  houses  saw  clearly  the 
necessities  created  by  the  suspension,  and  at  once  adopt- 
ed the  measures  required  by  them. 

An  emission  of  fifty  millions  had  been  authorized  by 
Congress  at  the  July  session,  1861,  not  with 

How  far  that  system     .it.  r>  n         •   i  '  i 

had  been  already  the  dcsigu  01  lumisning  a  general  currency, 
but  for  the  purpose  of  making  good  any  dif 
ferences  between  the  amounts  obtained  by  loans  and  the 
sums  required  by  the  public  service.  Of  these  notes  thir- 
ty-three and  a  half  millions  ($33,460,000)  were  in  circu- 
lation at  the  time  of  the  suspension.  Up  to  that  date 
every  note  presented  for  payment  had  been  promptly  re- 
deemed in  coin.  After  the  suspension  an  additional 
emission  of  ten  millions  was  authorized  on  the  12th  of 
the  previous  February.  Both  these  issues,  amounting  al- 
together to  sixty  millions,  were  made  receivable  for  all 
public  dues,  including  customs. 

It  now  became  the  duty  of  Congress  not  merely  to  pro- 
vide the  means  of  meeting  the  vast  demands  on  the  treas- 
ury, but  to  create  a  currency  with  which,  until  after  the 
close  of  the  war  at  least,  loans  and  taxes  might  be  paid 
to  the  government,  debts  to  individuals  discharged,  and 
the  business  of  the  country  transacted. 

This  duty  Congress  partially  performed  by  authorizing 
an  emission  of  ninety  millions  in  United  States  notes,  in 


Chap.lxiii.]     congeessional  financial  acts.  559 

Successive  acts     addition  to  the  sixty  millions  previously  is- 

of  Congress.  g^ed,  making  one  hundred  and  fifty  millions 
in  all.  The  ninety  millions  last  issued  were  made  receiv- 
able for  all  national  loans  and  dues,  except  customs,  pay- 
ment of  which  was  required  in  specie  or  in  notes  of  the 
two  first  issues.  At  a  later  period  of  the  session  Con- 
gress authorized  a  farther  issue  of  one  hundred  and  fifty 
millions,  of  which,  however,  fifty  millions  were  to  be  re- 
served from  issue  until  actually  required  for  payment  of 
deposits.  Still  later  Congress  authorized  the  use  of  post- 
age and  revenue  stamps  as  a  fractional  currency. 

These  various  acts,  taken  together,  authorized  the  emis- 
Ag'rregate  emission  slou  of  two  huudrcd  aud  fifty  milHous  in 
United  States  notes,  and  a  farther  emission, 
if  needed,  of  fifty  millions  for  the  payment  of  deposits. 
Of  these  emissions,  the  sixty  millions  receivable  for  cus- 
toms were  not  available  as  circulation,  but  might  be  re- 
placed, as  paid  in,  by  notes  of  the  new  issues,  which  were 
thus  available ;  so  that,  in  the  end,  a  total  circulation  of 
two  hundred  and  fifty  millions  might  be  reached,  and,  in 
an  improbable  contingency,  increased  by  fifty  millions 
more.  An  emission  of  fractional  currency,  as  just  stated, 
was  also  authorized. 

In  aid  of  these  provisions  for  public  payments  the  sec- 
retary recommended,  and  Congress  by  different  enact- 
ments authorized,  the  receipt  on  temporary  deposit,  at  an 
interest  not  exceeding  ^ve  per  cent.,  of  such  sums  as  might 
be  offered,  not  exceeding,  in  the  whole,  one  hundred  mil- 
lions, and  the  payment,  to  such  creditors  as  might  choose 
to  receive  them,  of  certificates  of  indebtedness  payable  in 
one  year,  and  bearing  six  per  cent,  interest.  Congress 
also  authorized  the  issue  of  national  bonds  to  the  amount 

Issue  of  five-      <^^  fi^'^   huudrcd   millions   of  dollars,  into 

^liicli  the  United  States  notes  issued  might 

be  converted  at  the  will  of  the  holder.     It  was  provided 


570  KESULTS  OF  THOSE  ACTS.  [Sect.  XIII. 

that  these  bonds  should  carry  an  interest  of  six  per  cent. 
in  specie,  and  be  redeemable  after  ^ve  and  payable  in 
twenty  years.  They  have  received  the  name  of  five-twen- 
ties, or  five-twenty  sixes.  Experience  show^ed  that  all 
these  measures  worked  well. 

A  short  statement  will  exhibit  the  practical  workings 
of  the  laws  enacted. 

Up  to  the  1st  day  of  July,  1862,  $57,926,116  57  had 
Resume  of  the  beeu  Tecelved  and  were  remaining  on  depos- 
finances.  ^^^     United  Statcs  notes  to  the  amount  of 

$158,591,230  had  been  issued  and  were  in  circulation; 
$49,881,979  73  had  been  paid  in  certificates  of  indebted- 
ness, and  $208,345,291  86  had  been  paid  in  cash.  ]N'ot  a 
single  requisition  from  any  department  upon  the  treasury 
All  demands  on  the  remained  unanswered.  Every  audited  and 
government  paid.     ^^^^^^^  ^j^-^  ^^  ^^  govemmeut,  aud  cvery 

quartermaster's  check  for  supplies  furnished,  which  had 
reached  the  treasury,  had  been  met.  And  there  remain- 
ed in  the  treasury  a  balance  of  $13,043,546  81. 

The  reverses  of  June,  July,  and  August  affected,  of 
course  injuriously,  this  financial  condition. 

The  effect  of  the       ,^,  ,  -.. ,  •        t  i        ,  i       t 

military  reverses    ihe  vast  expcuditures  rcquired  by  the  lar2:e 

in  Virginia.  .  -^  ^        *       -i  ^        r-i 

increase  oi  the  army  authorized  by  Congress 
and  directed  by  the  President  made  exhausting  demands 
on  all  available  resources.  The  measures  of  Congress, 
however,  enabled  the  secretary  to  provide,  if  not  fully,  yet 
almost  fully,  for  the  constantly  increasing  disbursements. 

The  actual  payments,  other  than  for  princi- 

Congressional  pro-  in         -i  t        t    i  i      t       •  ii  i  i 

visions  thus  far  ad-  pal  01  public  dcbt,  durmsf  the  quarter  end- 
equate,  t  ^  \         ^  ^ 

mg  on  the  30th  day  oi  September,  were 

$111,084,446  75;  during  the  month  of  October  they 
were  $49,243,846  04;  and  during  the  month  of  Novem- 
ber, $59,847,077  34;  while  the  accumulation  of  requisi- 
tions beyond  resources  amounted  to  less  than  the  fourth 
of  the  aggregate  of  these  sums,  namely,  to  $48,354,701  22. 


Chap.  LXIII.]    RECEIPTS  AND  DEFICIENCY  FOR  THE  YEAR.        571 

It  remains — says  the  secretary  in  his  report — to  con- 
sider what  farther  resources  for  satisfying  the  debt  now 
existing  in  the  form  of  requisitions,  and  meeting  other 
present  and  prospective  demands  upon  the  treasury  may 
be  provided  under  existing  legislation,  and  what  addi- 
tional measures  may  be  most  beneficially  adopted. 

The  whole  power  to  borrow  money  under  the  act  of 
Those  of  the  extra  J^ty,  1861,  is  uow  (December,  1862)  ex- 
session  exhausted,  jj^^g^g^j^    '^jjg  ^j^ij  available  laws  are  those 

of  the  last  session. 

These  are  of  two  classes:  (1.)  Those  providing  revenue 
by  duties  and  taxes ;  (2.)  Those  providing  it  by  loans. 

The  laws  of  the  first  class  are,  (1),  the  several  acts 
Character  of  those  imposiug  dutics  ou  imports ;  (2),  the  act. to 

now  available.  •  1      •    j.  1 

provide  internal  revenue. 

The  actual  and  estimated  receipts  under  these  laws  for 
the  current  fiscal  year,  including  the  balance  of  last  year, 
and  receipts  from  all  other  sources,  will  amount  to 
$180,495,345  60,  leaving,  therefore,  to  be  provided  by 
loans  in  some  form,  $608,063,432  02. 

The  laws  of  the  second  class  are,  (1),  the  act  authoriz- 
ing the  issue  of  United  States  notes  and  of  six  per  cent, 
bonds  of  the  United  States,  redeemable  after  ^ve,  and 
payable  in  twenty  years,  to  the  amount  of  ^ve  hundred 
millions  of  dollars ;  (2),  the  two  acts  authorizing  the  is- 
sue of  certificates  of  indebtedness  and  the  purchase  of 
coin;  (3),  the  act  authorizing  an  additional  issue  of 
United  States  notes ;  and,  (4),  the  act  authorizing  pay- 
ments in  stamps. 

The  secretary  then  shows  in  detail  that  the 

Eeceipts  and  defi-     ,     ,    -t       n  mit^ 

ciency  for  the  cur-  total  01  Tcsourccs  available  lor  the  current 

rent  year. 

year,  under  existing  laws,  is  $131,021,197  35. 
These  credit  resources,  with  the  actual  receipts  from 
like  sources  added  to  the  revenue  in  all  forms,  may  sup- 
ply the  treasury  with  more  than  five  hundred  and  eleven 


572  THE  VALUE  OF  GOLD.  [Sect.  XIIL 

millions  ($511,646,259  96).  There  remains  a  balance 
of  disbursements  of  nearly  two  hundred  and  seventy- 
seven  millions  ($276,912,517  66)  to  be  provided  for. 

Considering  how  this  is  to  be  done,  the  first  suggestion 
Plans  for  meeting  IS  au  issue  of  the  required  amount  in  United 
that  deficiency.  gtates  uotes ;  but  this,  on  the  whole,  he  re- 
jects. He  does  not,  however,  concur  in  the  opinion  en- 
tertained by  some  that  the  currency  of  the  country,  now 
composed  of  United  States  notes  and  notes  of  corpora- 
tions, is  greatly  in  excess  of  legitimate  demands  for  its 
employment.  Much  less  does  he  admit  that  any  actual 
excess  is  due  to  the  issues  of  United  States  notes  already 
in  circulation. 

It  is  true  that  gold  commands  a  premium  in  notes; 
Variations  in  the  1^  other  words,  that  to  purchase  a  given 
value  of  gold.  amouut  of  gold  a  greater  amount  of  notes 
is  required.  But  it  is  also  true  that  on  the  suspension 
of  specie  payments  and  the  substitution  for  coin  of 
United  States  notes,  convertible  into  six  per  cent,  specie 
bonds,  as  the  legal  standard  of  value,  gold  became  an  ar- 
ticle of  merchandise,  subject  to  the  ordinary  fluctuations 
of  supply  and  demand,  and  to  the  extraordinary  fluctua- 
tions of  mere  speculation.  The  ignorant  fears  of  foreign 
investers  in  national  and  state  bonds,  and  other  American 
securities,  and  the  timid  alarms  of  numerous  nervous  in- 
dividuals in  our  own  country,  prompted  large  sacrifices 
upon  evidences  of  public  or  corporate  indebtedness  in 
our  markets,  and  large  purchases  of  coin  for  remittance 
abroad  or  hoarding  at  home.  Taking  advantage  of  these 
and  other  circumstances  tending  to  an  advance  of  gold, 
speculators  employed  all  the  arts  of  the  market  to  stim- 
ulate that  tendency  and  carry  it  to  the  highest  point. 
This  point  was  reached  on  the  15th  of  October.  Gold 
sold  in  the  market  at  a  premium  of  37|  per  cent. 

The  secretary  then  gives  reasons  sustaining  his  opinion 


Chap.LXIIL]    effects  OF  A  NATIONAL  CIRCULATION.  5^3 

that  tMs  rise  was  not  due  wholly  nor  even  in  greatest 
part  to  the  increase  of  the  currency ;  that  especially  it 
was  not  attributable  to  increase  of  United  States  notes ; 
but  that  any  redundancy  of  circulation,  and  any  depreci- 
ation of  currency,  is  really  due  to  the  increase  of  bank 
circulation  and  deposits. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  path  is  very  clear.     It 
leads  to  the  support  of  a  national  circula- 
nsSg  KtSiaf  tion,  and  to  the  reduction  of  the  bank-note 
circulation,  the  central  idea  being  the  estab- 
lishment of  one  sound,  uniform  circulation  of  equal  value 
throughout  the  country,  upon  the  foundation  of  national 
credit,  combined  with  private  capital.     It  seems  difficult 
to  conceive  of  a  note   circulation  which  will  combine 
higher  local  and  general  credit  than  this.     Every  dollar 
will  represent  real  capital  actually  invested  in  national 
stocks.     It  will  establish  a  steady  market  for  the  nation- 
al bonds,  and  facilitate  the  nesrotiation  of 

Its  financial  effect.        .  .^ 

them  greatly.  It  will  reconcile,  as  far  as 
practicable,  the  interests  of  existing  banking  institutions 
with  those  of  the  w^hole  people.  It  will  supply  a  firm 
anchorage  to  the  union  of  the  states.  Every  banking  as- 
sociation whose  bonds  are  deposited  in  the  treasury  of 
the  Union,  every  individual  who  holds  a  dollar  of  the 
circulation  secured  by  such  deposit,  every  merchant,  every 
manufacturer,  every  farmer,  every  mechanic  interested  in 
transactions  dependent  for  success  on  the  credit  of  that 
circulation,  will  feel  as  an  injury  every  attempt  to  rend 

the  national  unity,  with  the  permanence  and 

Its  political  effect.        ,    t  ... ,  ^       i  •    i        ii      i      •      • 

stability  ot  which  all  their  interests  are  so 
closely  and  vitally  connected.  Had  the  system  been  pos- 
sible, and  had  it  actually  existed  two  years  ago,  can  it  be 
doubted  that  the  national  interests  and  sentiments  en- 
listed by  it  for  the  Union  would  have  so  strengthened 
the  motives  for  adhesion  derived  from  other  sources  that 


574  WEALTH  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.  [Sect.  XIIL 

the  wild  treason  of  secession  would  have  been  impos- 
sible? 

With  the  resources  at  the  disposal  of  the  republic,  no 
Intrinsic  wealth  oue  ueed  be  alarmed  lest  the  United  States 
of  the  republic.  ^^^  become  unable  to  pay  the  interest  on 
its  own  debt,  or  to  reduce  the  principal  to  whatever  point 
the  public  interest  may  indicate.  There  still  remain  im- 
mense resources  w^hich  have  not  yet  been  called  into  con- 
tribution. The  gold-bearing  region  of  the  United  States 
stretches  through  nearly  eighteen  degrees  of  latitude,  from 
British  Columbia  on  the  north  to  Mexico  on  the  south, 
and  through  more  than  twenty  degrees  of  longitude,  from 
the  eastern  declivities  of  the  Kocky  Mountains  to  the  Pa- 
cific Ocean.  It  includes  two  states,  California  and  Oregon, 
four  entire  territories,  Utah,  Nevada,  New  Mexico,  and 
Washington,  and  parts  of  three  other  territories,  Colorado, 
Nebraska,  and  Dakotah.  It  forms  an  area  of  more  than 
a  million  of  square  miles,  the  whole  of  which,  with  com- 
paratively insignificant  exceptions,  is  the  property  of  the 
nation.  It  is  rich  not  only  in  gold,  but  in  silver,  copper, 
iron,  lead,  and  many  other  valuable  minerals.  Its  product 
of  gold  and  silver  during  the  current  year  will  not  prob- 
ably fall  very  much,  if  at  all  short  of  one  hundred  millions 
of  dollars,  and  it  must  continue  gradually,  yet  rapidly  to 
increase. 

It  has  been  already  stated  that  the  amount  to  be  j^ro- 
The  deficiency  of  ^Idcd  beyoud  resourccs  available  under  ex- 
mc^  be'Sppiied  istlug  laws  is,  for  the  current  fiscal  year, 
byfoans.  $276,912,517  66,  and  for  the  ensuing  year, 

$627,388,183  56.  To  provide  these  amounts  loans  must 
be  negotiated.  Without  any  issues  of  United  States  notes 
beyond  the  amount  now  authorized,  it  seems  certain  that 
loans  for  the  whole  amount  required  for  the  current  year 
may  be  negotiated  at  fair  rates ;  and  it  may  be  confident- 
ly hoped  that  before  its  close  the  resources  of  the  coun- 


Chap.  LXIII.]    EESUME  OF  CHASE'S  RECOMMENDATIONS.  575 

try  will  be  so  well  understood,  and  the  restoration  of  its 
territorial  integrity  so  well  assured,  that  capitalists  will 
not  hesitate  to  suj)ply  whatever  may  be  needed  for  the 
subsequent  year. 

In  conclusion,  therefore,  the  secretary  thus  briefly  sums 
up   his  recommendations — that   whatever 

Eesume  of  Mr.  ,  n     t    t  1      i 

Chase's  lecom-  amouuts  mav  be  needed  beyond  the  sums 
supplied  by  revenue  and  through  other  in- 
dicated modes,  be  obtained  by  loans,  without  increasing 
the  issue  of  United  States  notes  beyond  the  amount  fixed 
by  law,  unless  a  clear  public  exigency  shall  demand  it. 
He  recommends  also  the  organization  of  banking  associa- 
tions for  the  improvement  of  the  public  credit,  and  for 
the  supply  to  the  people  of  a  safe  and  uniform  currency. 
And  he  recommends  no  change  in  the  law  providing  for 
the  negotiation  of  bonds,  except  the  necessary  increase  of 
amount,  and  the  repeal  of  the  absolute  restriction  to  mar- 
ket value  and  of  the  clauses  authorizing  convertibility  at 
AvilL 

The  great  ability  and  power  with  which  the  money 
Financial  contrast  rcsourccs  of  the  uatlou  wcro  wicMcd  are 
andM?c?oSeder-  sufficicutly  manifested  by  the  tone  and  char- 
^^^'  acter  of  the  foregoing  measures.    They  stand 

in  very  strong  contrast  with  the  course  that  was  taken  in 
the  Confederacy,  which  from  the  beginning  descended 
rapidly  down  to  the  inevitable  gulf  of  bankruptcy.  But 
Mr.  Chase's  success  in  carrying  the  affairs  of  the  nation 
forward  was,  in  an  eminent  degree,  due  to  the  resolute 
manner  in  which  he  w^as  seconded  by  the  banking  insti- 
tutions of  the  country.  He  has  himself  rendered  to  them 
a  well-merited  acknowledgment :  "  The  promptitude  and 
zeal  with  which  many  of  the  existing  (banking)  institu- 
tions came  to  the  financial  support  of  the  government  in 
the  dark  days  which  followed  the  outbreak  of  the  rebel- 


576  ^'^^  EEPOET  OF  1861.  [Sect.XIII. 

lion  is  not  forgotten.  They  ventured  largely,  and  boldly, 
and  patriotically  on  tlie  side  of  tlie  Union  and  the  consti- 
tutional supremacy  of  the  nation  over  states  and  citizens. 
It  does  not  at  all  detract  from  the  merit  of  the  act  that 
the  losses  which  they  feared,  but  unhesitatingly  risked, 
were  transmuted  into  unexpected  gains." 

That  is  a  very  strong  government  which  every  citizen, 
from  the  humblest  laborer  to  the  richest  capitalist,  is  will- 
ing to  risk  his  whole  means  to  ^stain. 

From  the  opinions  thus  lucidly  expressed  by  this  great 
finance  minister  we  may  2:ather — ^thou^rh 

The  tendency  of  •/     o  ^     o 

wealth  to  concen-  tho  War  was  as  vet  not  half  over — the  inev- 

tration.  'it  i  n 

itable  tendency  of  wealth,  like  power,  to 
concentration.  The  diffused  financial  lesources  of  the  na- 
tion were  fast  finding  a  focal  point. 

From  the  resources  of  the  Eepublic  I  now  turn  to  its 
means  of  defense  at  the  close  of  18G2.  And,  first,  of  the 
army. 

Mr.  Cameron  was  the  first  Secretary  of  War  in  Mr. 
Lincoln's  administration.     He  held  that  of 

State  of  the  army.  m     i       i         •        • 

fice  until  the  beginning  of  1862,  when  he  was 
succeeded  by  Mr.  Stanton. 

In  his  report,  made  December  1st,  1861,  Mr.  Cameron 
War  re  ort  of  18G1  I'^P^^^euted  the  total  strength  of  the  army 
at  660,971  men.     He  says: 

"  In  organizing  this  great  army  I  was  effectively  aided 
by  the  loyal  governors  of  the  different  states.  ...  So 
thoroughly  aroused  was  the  national  heart,  that  I  have 
no  doubt  this  force  would  have  been  swollen  to  a  million 
had  not  the  department  felt  compelled  to  restrict  it.  .  .  . 
It  is  said  of  Napoleon  by  Jomini  that,  in  the  campaign 
of  1815,  that  great  general  had,  on  the  1st  of  April,  a  reg- 
ular army  of  200,000  men.  On  the  1st  of  June  he  had 
increased  this  force  to  414,000.     The  like  proportion, 


Chap.LXIIL]  MR.  CAMERON'S  REPORT.  577 

adds  Jomini,  ^had  he  thought  proper  to  inaugurate  a  vast 
system  of  defense,  would  have  raised  it  to  700,000  men 
by  the  1st  of  September.'     At  the  commencement  of  this 
streDgthofthe     rebellion,  inaugurated  by  the  attack  upon 
giSSifgonhl*    Fort  Sumter,  the  entire  military  force  at 
^^'''  the  disposal  of  this  government  was  16,006 

regulars,  principally  employed  in  the  West  to  hold  in 
check  marauding  Indians.  In  April,  75,000  volunteers 
were  called  upon  to  enlist  for  three  months'  service,  and 
responded  with  such  alacrity  that  77,875  were  immediate- 
ly obtained.  Under  the  authority  of  the  act  of  Congress 
of  July  22d,  1861,  the  states  were  asked  to  furnish  500,000 
volunteers  to  serve  for  three  years  or  during  the  war,  and 
by  the  act  approved  the  29th  of  the  same  month  the  ad- 
dition of  25,000  men  to  the  regular  army  of  the  United 
States  was  authorized.  The  result  is  that 
o/the  mllfta^ry"^^^    we  havc  uow  au  armv  of  upward  of  600,000 

power,  «/  J.  / 

men.  If  we  add  to  this  the  number  of  the 
discharged  three-months'  volunteers,  the  aggregate  force 
furnished  to  the  government  since  April  last  exceeds 
700,000  men.  ...  In  view  of  the  alacrity  and  enthu- 
siasm that  have  been  displayed,  I  do  riot  hesitate  to  ex- 
press the  belief  that  no  combination  of  events  can  arise 
in  which  this  country  will  not  be  able  not  only  to  pro- 
tect itself,  but,  contrary  to  its  policy,  which  is  peace  with 
all  the  world,  to  enter  upon  aggressive  operations  against 
any  power  which  may  intermeddle  with  our  domestic  af- 
fairs." 

This  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  made  a  profound 
Effect  of  this  report  scusatiou  iu  Europc.  Already  the  unex- 
in  Europe.  pectcd  military   strength   of  the  republic 

was  a  subject  of  solicitude  in  the  English  Parliament, 
and  it  was  evident  that  any  interference  in  American 
affairs  would  have  to  be  conducted  in  a  very  guarded 
manner. 

II.— O  0 


578  MR.  STANTON'S  REPORT.  [Sect. XIII. 

^    '    ^  ^^^^^        Mr.  Stanton,  as  Secretary  of  War,  made  a 

War  report  of  1862.  '  -,        «\, 

report,  JJecemDer  1st,  1862,  to  tne  following 
effect : 

He  stated  tliat  tlie  armies  acting  under  the  authority 
of  the  United  States  in  those  departments  that  had  been 
the  scene  of  military  operations  were,  during  the  past 
strength  of  the  J^ar  (775,336),  seven  hundred  and  seventy- 
army  at  that  date,  j^^^  thousaud  three  huudrcd  and  thirty-six 
officers  and  privates,  fully  armed  and  equipped.  Since 
the  date  of  the  returns  this  number  had  been  increased 
to  over  eight  hundred  thousand  men.  He  adds :  "When 
the  quotas  are  filled  up,  the  force  will  number  a  million 
of  men,  and  the  estimates  for  next  year  are  based  upon 
that  number. 

"  From  a  survey  of  the  whole  field  of  operations,  it  is 
apparent  that,  whatever  disasters  our  arms  may  have  suf 
fered  at  particular  points,  a  great  advance  has  neverthe- 
less been  made. since  the  commencement  of  the  war. 
When  it  began  the  enemy  were  in  possession  of  Norfolk 
and  every  part  of  the  Southern  coast.  They  held  the 
Mississippi  from  Cairo  to  New  Orleans.  Now  the  block- 
Great  mmtary  sue-  aded  ports  of  Charleston  and  Mobile  alone 
cesses  gained.  rcmalu  to  them  on  the  sea-board,  and  N^w 
Orleans  and  Memphis  have  been  wrested  from  them. 
Their  possession  of  Vicksburg  obstructs  the  Mississippi, 
but  it  is  to  them  of  no  commercial  use.  Their  strong- 
holds on  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  Eivers  have 
been  captured.  General  Andrew  Johnson,  as  Military 
Governor  of  Tennessee,  holds  Nashville.  The  enemy 
have  been  driven  from  Kentucky,  West  Tennessee,  Mis- 
souri, part  of  Arkansas,  are  fleeing  before  Grant  in  Mis- 
sissippi, and  all  their  hopes  in  Maryland  are  cut  off.  In 
commercial,  political,  and  strategical  points  of  view,  more 
success  has  attended  the  Union  cause  than  was  ever  w^it- 
nessed  upon  so  large  a  theatre  in  the  same  brief  period 


Chap.  LXIIL]  WAR  REPORT  FOR  1862.  579 

against  so  formidable  an  enemy.  ...  A  chief  hope  of 
Disloyal  practices  those  who  Set  the  Tebellioii  on  foot  was  for 
in  the  North.  ^-^  ^^^  comfort  ffom  disloyal  sympathizers 
in  the  Northern  States,  whose  efforts  were  relied  upon  to 
divide  and  distract  the  people  of  the  North,  and  prevent 
them  from  putting  forth  their  whole  strength  to. preserve 
the  national  existence.  The  call  for  volunteers  and  a 
draft  of  the  militia  afforded  an  occasion  for  disloyal  per- 
sons to  accomplish  their  evil  purposes  by  discouraging 
enlistments,  and  encouraging  opposition  to  the  war  and 
the  draft  of  soldiers  to  carry  it  on. 

"Anxiety  was  felt  in  some  states  at  the  probable  suc- 
Measures  for  their  ccss  of  thcsc  disloyal  practiccs,  aud  the  gov- 
suppression.  emmcut  was  urged  to  adopt  some  measures 
of  protection  by  temporary  restraint  of  those  engaged  in 
these  hostile  acts.  To  that  end  provost-marshals  were 
appointed  in  some  of  the  states,  upon  the  nomination  of 
their  governors,  to  act  under  the  direction  of  the  state  ex- 
ecutive, and  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  was  suspended  by 
your  (the  President's)  order.  By  the  order  of  the  depart- 
ment, arrests  were^  forbidden  unless  authorized  by  the 
state  executive  or  by  the  judge  advocate.  Some  instan- 
ces of  unauthorized  arrests  have  occurred,  but  when 
brought  to  the  notice  of  the  department  the  parties  have 
been  immediately  discharged.  By  a  recent  order,  all  per- 
sons arrested  for  discouraging  enlistments,  or  for  disloyal 
practices  in  states  wkfire  the  quotas  of  volunteers  or  mili- 
tia are  filled  up,  have  been  released.  Other  persons  ar- 
rested by  military  commanders,  and  sent  from  depart- 
ments where  their  presence  was  deemed  dangerous  to  the 
public  safety,  have  been  discharged  upon  parole  to  be  of 
good  behavior,  and  do  no  act  of  hostility  against  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States.  While  military  arrests 
of  disloyal  persons  form  the  subject  of  complaint  in  some 
states,  the  discharge  of  such  persons  is  complained  of  in 


580  MAGNITUDE  OF  MILITARY  OPERATIONS.      [Sect.  XIII. 

other  states.  It  has  been  the  aim  of  the  department  to 
avoid  any  encroachment  upon  individual  rights  as  far  as 
might  be  consistent  with  public  safety  and  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  government.  But  reflecting  minds  will  per-' 
ceive  that  no  greater  encouragement  can  be  given  to  the 
enemy,  no  more  dangerous  act  of  hostility  can  be  perpe- 
trated in  this  war,  than  efforts  to  prevent  recruiting  and 
enlistments  for  the  armies  upon  whose  strength  national 
existence  depends.  The  expectations  of  the  rebel  leaders 
and  their  sympathizers  in  loyal  states  that  the  call  for 
volunteers  would  not  be  answered,  and  that  the  draft 
could  not  be  enforced,  have  failed,  and  nothing  is  left  but 
to  clamor  at  the  means  by  which  their  hopes  were  frus- 
trated, and  to  strive  to  disarm  the  government  in  future, 
if  in  the  chances  of  war  another  occasion  for  increasing 
the  military  force  should  arise. 

"  The  successful  movement  of  the  various  expeditions 
by  sea,  the   transportation   of  such  lar^e 

Magnitude  of  the      it  /».  tii*  ^  t 

military  opera-  Dodies  01  troops  aud  their  regular  supply 
at  distant  points  of  the  coast,  afford  striking 
proofs  of  the  greatness  of  the  military  resources  of  the 
nation.  These  movements  have  been  upon  a  scale  of 
great  magnitude.  The  collection  of  the  vast  armies 
which  have  been  raised,  and  their  transport  to  the  field 
of  operations  in  so  brief  a  period,  would  not  have  been 
possible  but  for  the  extent  of  our  system  of  steam  trans- 
port by  railroad,  river,  and  sea.        • 

..."  In  general  terms,  it  may  be  stated  that  the  issues 
by  the  Ordnance  Department  include  1926  field  and  siege, 
and  1206  fortification  cannon;  7294  gun-carriages,  cais- 
sons, mortar-beds,  traveling  forges,  and  battery  wagons ; 
1,276,686  small-arms;  987,291  sets  of  equipments  and 
accoutrements,  and  213,991,127  rounds  of  ammunition 
for  artillery  and  small-arms,  still  leaving  large  supplies 
of  ordnance  stores  at  the  arsenals  and  depots. 


Chap.  LXIIL]  THE  SLAVE  ELEMENT.  53^ 

...  "It  appears  from  tlie  report  of  the  acting  paymas- 
ter general  that  during  the  fiscal  year  ending  the  30th  of 
June,  1862,  the  sum  of  $5,560,039  was  paid  to  the  regu- 
lar troops;  that  $91,116,610  were  paid  to  volunteers; 
and  that  $38,597,819  have  been  paid  since  the  30th  of 
June,  1862. 

.  .  .  From  this  report "  it  is  seen  that  a  force  has  been 
Great  strength  of  pl^ccd  by  thc  pcople  of  thc  United  States 
the  army.  ^^  ^^^  commaud  of  thc  government  to  main- 

tain its  authority  more  mighty  in  all  the  elements  of 
warfare  than  was  ever  before  arrayed  under  one  banner. 
How  shall  that  force  be  employed?  To  smite  the  ene- 
my on  every  hand,  to  attack  his  armies  and  strong-holds, 
to  occupy  his  ports,  clear  the  great  rivers  of  the  West 
from  his  obstructions,  and  pause  not  until  he  is  subdued, 
is  our  great  duty.  Above  all,  it  is  our  duty  to  disdain 
Necessity  of  usin-  no  legitimate  aid  that  may  save  the  lives  of 

the  slave  element:     ^^^    ^^^j^^^    SOldicrS,  diminish    their  kbOTS, 

provide  for  their  want^,  and  lessen  the  burdens  of  our 
people.  No  aphorism  is  more  universally  received  than 
that '  the  sole  object  of  a  just  war  is  to  make  the  enemy 
feel  the  evils  of  his  injustice,  and  by  his  sufferings  amend 
his  ways ;  he  must  therefore  be  attacked  in  the  most  ac- 
cessible quarter.'  The  power  of  the  rebels  rests  upon 
their  peculiar  system  of  labor,  which  keeps  laborers  on 
their  plantations  to  support  owners  who  are  devoting 
their  time  and  strength  to  destroy  our  armies  and  de- 
stroy our  government.  "Whenever  that  system  is  in  hos- 
tility to  the  government,  it  is,  in  my  opinion,  the  duty  of 
those  conducting  the  war  to  strike  down  the  system,  and 
turn  against  the  rebels  the  productive  power  that  sup- 
ports the  insurrection.  Eightly  organized  in  the  recover- 
Advantages  of  its  ^d  territory,  the  laborers  of  the  rebel  states 

military  use.  ^j|j  ^^^    ^^^^   ^.^  j^  holdiug    fortificd  posi- 

tions,  but  their  labor  will,  as  in  India,  free  the  white  sol- 


5S2  EFFECTS  OF  USING  THE  SLAVES.  [Sect.  XIII. 

diers  from  the  most  unwholesome  exposnre  of  the  South. 
They  will  cultivate  the  corn  and  forage,  which  will  feed 
our  cavalry  and  artillery  horses,  and  save  the  country  a 
portion  of  the  enormous  burden  now  attending  their  pur- 
chase and  transportation  from  the  North.  This  cultiva- 
tion would  have  been  of  greater  advantage  to  us  on  the 
southeastern  coast  than  even  that  of  the  great  staple  of 
the  Sea  Islands.  Probably  the  people  who  remained 
upon  these  islands,  within  protection  of  our  armies,  could, 
under  wise  control,  have  supplied  all  the  forage  needed 
Its  effect  on  military  ^hls  year  by  thc  forces  in  the  department 

transportation;  ^^  ^-^^    g^^^j^^       rj.^^  ^^^^i  ratioU    for    a  horSe 

weighs  twenty-six  pounds,  that  of  a  soldier  three  pounds. 
An  army,  well-organized  and  equipped  for  active  opera- 
tions, with  a  due  proportion  of  cavalry,  artillery,  and  bag- 
gage-trains, will  have  not  less  than  one  horse  or  mule  to 
every  four  soldiers,  so  that  the  weight  of  food  for  the  an- 
imals is  more  than  double  that  of  the  rations  for  the  men. 
How  important  an  aid,  how  great  an  economy,  in  a  long 
contest,  therefore,  there  would  be  in  raising  by  this  cheap 
labor  the  greater  part  of  the  forage  alone  for  the  South- 
ern department — thus,  for  a  great  portion  of  our  wants, 
transferring  the  base  of  supplies,  now  at  New  York,  to 
Hilton  Head  or  New  Orleans. 

"  The  department  has  found  it  difficult  to  transfer  this 
labor  from  one  part  of  the  seat  of  war  to  another.  Local 
and  family  ties  seem  to  be  very  strong  with  these  peo- 
ple, and,  with  all  their  faith  in  the  power  and  good- will 
of  our  military  commanders,  it  was  found  difficult  to  get 
volunteer  laborers  to  leave  Port  Eoyal  for  other  depots. 

"A  population  of  four  millions,  true  to  the  interests  of 
the  Union,  with  a  slight  assistance  from  the  army,  will, 
under  proper  regulation  and  government,  be  of  the  great- 
est assistance  in  holding  the  territory  once  recovered. 
The  principal  staples  of  the  South  are  the  products  ex- 


Chap.  LXIII.]         EFFECTS  OF  USING  THE  SLAVES.  5g3 

clusively  of  their  labor.  If  protected  upon  the  lands 
they  have  heretofore  cultivated,  with  some  organization, 
and  with  support  from  small  detachments  of  loj^al  troops, 
they  would  not  only  produce  much  of  what  is  needed  to 
feed  our  armies  and  their  trains,  but  they  would  forever 
cut  off  from  the  rebellion  the  resources  of  a  country  thus 
occupied. 

"  The  rebel  armies  move  with  ease  through  portions 
of  the  Border  States,  living  upon  the  country  in  which 
our  commanders  find  no  supplies.  The  people  bring 
forth  their  hoards  and  offer  them  to  the  rebels  for  sale  or 
gift.  Protect  the  laboring  population,  who  are  the  ma- 
jority in  the  greater  part  of  the  South,  in  the  possession 
of  the  land  and  its  products,  and  this  great  advantage 
will,  for  whatever  portion  of  the  country  we  occupy,  be 
transferred  to  us.  As  soon  as  the  coast  is  thoroughly 
occupied  and  the  people  organized,  trade  will  revive. 
Cotton,  rice,  sugar,  and  other  products  will  be  exchanged 
by  the  prodiicer  for  what  he  needs.  Their  wants  will  be 
in  restoring  indus-  suppHcd  dircct  from  the  Northern  factories, 
try  to  the  ^outh.  ^^^  ^^^  cultivatiou  of  the  great  staples  will 
pay  for  what  they  use.  A  perfectly  free  trade  may  thus 
again  grow  up  between  the  North  and  the  South,  and, 
with  greater  or  less  rapidity,  it  will  spread  over  the 
whole  country  as  our  forces  succeed  in  meeting  and  dis- 
persing the  rebel  armies. 

"The  greater  part  of  the  whole  country  which  formerly 
produced  the  sea-island  cotton  is  now  thoroughly  restored 
to  the  Union.  The  laborers  are  there — the  soil  and  cli- 
mate. It  needs  only  assurance  of  protection  to  revive 
the  cultivation  of  the  staple,  as  well  as  to  produce  vast 
quantities  of  corn  and  forage  for  our  troops.  Since  this 
war  must  be  conducted  by  marches,  and  battles,  and 
sieges,  why  neglect  the  best  means  to  make  them  success- 
ful and  their  results  permanent  ?     It  is  worthy  of  notice 


584  LOYALTY  OF  THE  SLAVES.  [Sect.  XHI. 

that  thus  far  the  portions  of  territory  which,  once  recov- 
and  in  hoidin-  con-  ^red,  we  have  most  firmly  held,  are  precisely 

quered  territory.        ^^^^^  -^  ^j^ .  ^^  ^^^  gPCatCSt  proportioU  of  CoL 

ored  men  are  found.  By  their  assistance  our  armies  will 
be  able  permanently  to  operate  in  and  occupy  the  country; 
and  in  labor  for  the  army  in  raising  its  and  their  own  sup- 
plies, full  occupation  can  be  given  them,and  with  this  there 
will  be  neither  occasion  nor  temptation  to  them  to  emi- 
grate to  a  northern  and  less  congenial  climate.  Judging 
by  experience,  no  colored  man  will  leave  his  home  in  the 
South  if  protected  in  that  home.  All  possibility  of  com- 
petition from  negro  labor  in  the  North  is  avoided  by  giv- 
ing colored  men  protection  and  employment 
thejg masters'  upou  the  soil  which  they  have  thus  far  cul- 
tivated, and  the  right  to  which  has  been  va- 
cated by  the  original  proprietors,  deeply  involved  in  the 
ci:imes  of  treason  and  rebellion.  No  great  territory  has 
been  permanently  reduced  without  depriving  the  leaders 
of  its  people  of  their  lands  and  property.  It  is  these  that 
give  power  and  influence.  Few  men  have  the  command- 
ing genius  and  talent  to  exercise  dangerous  influence  over 
their  fellow-men  without  the  adventitious  aid  of  money 
and  of  property.  By  striking  down  this  system  of  com- 
pulsory labor,  which  enables  the  leaders  of  the  rebellion 
to  control  the  resources  of  the  people,  the  rebellion  would 
die  of  itself 

"  Under  no  circumstances  has  any  disposition  to  servile 
Universal  loyalty  iusurrcctiou  bccu  exhibited  by  the  colored 
of  the  slaves.  population  iu  any  Southern  State,  while  a 
strong  lo^^alty  to  the  federal  government  has  been  dis- 
played on  every  occasion  and  against  every  discourage- 
ment. By  the  means  suggested,  the  rebellion  may  be 
disarmed  and  subdued  swiftly  and  effectually,  and  the 
lives  of  our  own  people  saved  from  slaughter  on  the  bat- 
tle-field.   By  the  occupation  of  all  their  ports  on  the  Mis- 


Chap.  LXIII.]  WEAKNESS  OF  THE  SOUTH.  585 

sissippi  and  the  sea-coast,  a  market  will  be  opened  in 
every  rebel  state  for  the  industry  of  our  people  to  supply 
the  wants  of  the  army,  and  also  of  a  loyalpopulation,  in 
exchange  for  the  valuable  products  of  their  labor.  An- 
other point  of  attack  is  by  armed  settlements  upon  the 
vacant  government  lands  in  Florida  and  Texas.  Thou- 
sands in  the  Northern  and  Western  States  are  impatient- 
ly waiting  the  signal  of  military  movements  to  plant  their 
homes  in  the  best  territory  of  this  continent,  and  bring  it 
Political  weakness  back  to  the  Union  as  loyal  states.  So  far 
of  the  south.         ^^,^^  ^^^  Southern  States  being  invincible, 

no  enemy  was  ever  so  vulnerable,  if  the  means  at  hand  are 
employed  against  them.  If  your  (the  President's)  prop- 
osition for  compensated  emancipation  and  a  voluntary  re- 
turn to  loyalty  be  blindly  rejected,  still  the  proper  appli- 
cation of  the  means  at  command  of  the  government  can 
not  fail  to  accomplish  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion 
and  a  restoration  of  those  peaceful  relations  which  were 
designed  to  be  establisjied  forever  on  this  continent  by 
the  Union  of  the  States." 

As  respects  the  navy.     Mr.  Welles  was  the  Secretary 
,,„  ^   of  the  Navy  durincr  the  war.     He  made  a 

Navy  report  of  1862.  /  j^  , 

report  of  its   condition   on  December  1st, 
1862,  to  the  following  effect : 

"  Since  the  commencement  of  our  national  difficulties 
Four  great  squad-  ^^^  powcrful  squadrous  havc  been  collect- 
rons  collected.  ^^^  orgauized,  and  stationed  for  duty  on  our 
maritime  frontier,  with  a  rapidity  and  suddenness  which 
finds  no  approach  to  a  parallel  in  previous  naval  history, 
and  which  it  is  believed  no  country  but  our  own  could 
have  achieved.  These  squadrons  have  been  incessantly 
maintaining  a  strict  blockade  of  such  gigantic  propor- 
tions that  eminent  foreign  statesmen  in  the  highest  scenes 
of  legislation  did  not  hesitate,  at  its  commencement,  pub- 


58$  NAVY  KEPORT  FOR  1862.  [Sect.  XIII. 

licly  to  denounce  it  as  a  '  material  impossibility ;'  and  yet, 

after  this  most  imposing  naval  undertaking  liad  been  for 

a  period  of  eighteen  months  in  operation,  and  after  its 

reach  had  been  effectively  extended  along 

pietJiy  blockaded  the  entire  sweep  of  our  Atlantic  and  Gulf 

the  South.  ^  n    ^        r^-i 

coasts,  from  the  outlet  oi  the  Chesapeake  to 
the  mouth  of  the  Eio  Grande,  the  same  eminent  authori- 
ties, with  a  list  in  their  hands  of  all  the  vessels  which  had 
evaded  or  escaped  the  vigilance  of  our  blockading  forces, 
could  not  refuse,  in  thfeir  official  statements,  to  admit,  with 
reluctant  candor,  that  the  proof  of  the  efficiency  of  the 
blockade  was  conspicuous  and  wholly  conclusive,  and 
that  in  no  previous  wsly  had  the  ports  of  an  enemy's 
country  been  so  effectively  closed  by  a  naval  force.  But 
even  such  testimony  was  not  needed.     The  proof  of  the 

fact  abounds  in  the  current  price  of  our 

Proofs  of  the  com-     o        ii  i        i  •        j^i  j_  •    1 

pietenessofthe      feouthem  staplcs  lu  the  2:reat  commercial 

blockade.  .,111  1  •    n        • 

marts  of  the  world,  and  more  especially  m 
the  whole  industrial  and  commercial  condition  of  the  in- 
surgent region.  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  no  cir- 
cumstance is  wanting  to  attest  the  magnitude  of  this 
greatest  of  all  naval  triumphs.  The  industrial  necessi- 
ties and  the  commercial  cupidity  of  all  the  principal  mar- 
itime nations,  armed  and  empowered  as  they  are  by  the 
resources  of  modern  invention,  are  kept  at  bay.  A  mul- 
titude of  island  harbors  under  foreign  jurisdiction,  look- 
ing nearly  upon  our  shores,  and  affording  the  most  con- 
venient lurking-places  from  which  illicit  commerce  may 
leap  forth  to  its  prohibited  destination  and  purpose,  are 
so  closely  watched  as  to  render  the  peril  of  all  such  vent- 
ures far  greater  than  even  their  enormous  gains  when 
successful.  And,  finally,  a  vast  line  of  sea-coast,  nearly 
three  thousand  miles  in  extent,  much  of  it  with  a  double 
shore,  and  nearly  honeycombed  with  inlets  and  harbors, 
has  been  so  beleaguered  and  locked  up  that  the  whole 


chap.lxiil]  success  of  the  naval  operations.  587 


Southern  commerce 
no  longer  exists. 


immense  foreign  commerce  whicli  was  tlie 
very  life  of  the  industry  and  opulence  of 
the  vast  region  which  it  borders  has  practically  ceased  to 
exist." 

The  secretary  then  reports  that  the  navy  has  teen  or- 
ganized into,  (1),  the  North  Atlantic  squadron ;  (2),  the 
South  Atlantic  squadron ;  (3),  the  Eastern  Gulf  squad- 
ron ;  (4),  the  Western  Gulf  squadron.  These  great  squad- 
rons were  on  the  maritime  frontier.  Besides  them,  there 
were  on  the  interior  waters,  (5),  the  Mississippi  flotilla ; 
(6),  the  Potomac  flotilla. 

A  succinct  account  is  then  given  of  the  expeditions  un- 
dertaken and  operations  executed  by  these  squadrons,  the 
remark  being  premised  that  these  were  undertaken  in 
addition  to  the  unrelaxing  labors  of  the  blockade;  the 
The  Mississippi    general  result  being  that  the  Mississippi,  the 

nearly  opened^       ^^^^j^  ^^^^^^,  ^^^^^  ^^^^^  ^^^^^^-^  ^^^^^^  ^^^^^ 

Union,  with  its  principal  tributaries,  embracing  many 
thousand  miles  of  inland  navigation,  which  had  been  in- 
terrupted, was  brought  under  control,  except  at  Vicks- 
The  Atlantic  sea-  l>urg.  Nearly  the  entire  sea-board  of  the 
board  nearly  seized,  ij^g^rgent  rcgiou,  ou  its  main  points  of  com- 
mercial and  strategic  importance,  from  Norfolk  and  the 
outlet  of  the  Chesapeake,  through  Roanoke,  Newbern,  and 
Beaufort,  N.  C.,Port  Royal,  Tybee,  Fernandina,  Key  West, 
•Pensaeola,  to  New  Orleans  and  Galveston,  is  practically 
in  our  hands,  held  fast  and  irrecoverably  under  the  guns 
of  our  navy,  or  else  garrisoned  and  governed  by  military 
force. 

Referring  then  to  the  naval  operations  of  the  enemy, 
Naval  operations  ^^^  Secretary  says :  "  The  rebel  armed  steam- 
of  the  enemy.       ^^  Sumter,  which,  after  committing  depreda- 
tions, was,  at  the  date  of  my  last  report,  fleeing  to  escape 
our  cruisers,  crossed  the  Atlantic.     She  was  tracked  to 
Gibraltar,  where  she  has  since  remained,  one  of  our  cruisers 


588  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  NAVY.  [Sect.  XIII. 

vigilantly  guarding  her  from  Algeziras.  With  this  ex- 
ception, no  other  armed  vessel  had  plundered  our  com- 
merce or  inflicted  injury  on  our  countrymen  until  within 

The  Alabama,     ^  rcceut  pcriod,  whcu  a  steamer  known  as 

^'  '''•  290,  or  Alabama,  built  and  fitted  out  in  En- 

gland, her  crew  composed  almost  exclusively  of  British 
subjects,  w^ent  forth  to  prey  on  our  shipping.  She  has 
no  register,  no  record,  no  regular  ship's  papers,  no  evi- 
dence of  transfer.  Built  in  England,  she  was  permitted 
by  the  authorities  of  that  country  to  sail  from  one  of 
their  ports,  though  informed  by  the  recognized  official 
agents  of  this  government  of  her  character  and  purposes. 

As  regards  the  development  of  the  naval  force  of  the 
Rapid  development  Ecpubllc,  the  sccrctary  says :  "When  I  enter- 
of  the  navy.  ^^  upou  the  discharge  of  my  public  duties 

in  March,  1861,  there  were  but  42  vessels  in  commission, 
and  but  76  then  attached  to  the  navy  have  been  made 
available.  Most  of  those  in  commission  were  abroad ; 
and  of  the  7600  seamen  in  pay  of  the  government,  there 
were,  on  the  10th  of  March,  1861, but  207  men  in  all  the 
ports  and  receiving-ships  on  the  Atlantic  coast  to  man 
our  ships  and  protect  the  navy  yards  and  depots,  and  to 
aid  in  suppressing  the  rising  insurrection. 

"Neither  the  expiring  administration  nor  Congress, 
which  had  been  in  session  until  the  4th  of  March,  had 
taken  measures  to  increase  or  strengthen  our  naval  power,* 
notwithstanding  the  lowering  aspect  of  our  public  affairs, 
so  that  when,  a  few  weeks  after  the  inauguration,  I  desired 
Its  deficiencies  at  troops  for  thc  protcctlou  of  the  public  prop- 
the  outset.  ^^,^^  ^^  Norfolk  and  Annapolis,  or  sailors  to 

man  and  remove  the  vessels,  neither  soldiers  nor  sailors 
could  be  procured.  There  were  no  men  to  man  our  ships, 
nor  were  the  few  ships  at  our  yards  in  a  condition  to  be 
put  into  immediate  service. 

"  The  proclamation  of  April,  placing  our  entire  coast. 


Chap.  LXIII.]        CONDITION  OF  THE  NAVY  IN  1862.  539 

from  the  mouth  of  the  Chesapeake  to  the  Kio  Grande, 
under  blockade,  found  us  with  a  naval  force,  even  were 
every  vessel  on  our  coast,  inadequate  to  the  work  re- 
quired. I  have,  in  former  reports,  made  full  exposition 
of  the  steps  Avhich  were  promptly  taken  to  recall  our  for- 
eign squadrons,  and  the  progress  which  had  been  made 
in  auo^mentinc:  our  navy  by  repairinsr  and 

steps  takeu  to  ren-    n,,'  t,«  i  mi 

der  the  navy  for-  tittiug,  as  cxpeditiously  as  possiblc,  every 
available  vessel  owned  by  the  government ; 
by  purchasing  such  others  as  could  be  made  speedily 
useful  in  guarding  our  shallow  and  peculiar  coast ;  and 
by  rapidly  constructing  as  many  steamers  as  could  be 
built  at  our  navy  yards,  and  employing,  to  the  extent 
that  we  could  procure  materials,  engines,  and  machinery, 
the  resources  of  the  country  in  adding  others  from  pri- 
vate ship-yards.  The  result  is  that  we  have  at  this  time 
afloat,  or  progressing  to  rapid  completion,  a  naval  force 

Condition  of  the    cousisting  of  427  vessels,  there  having  been 

navy  at  this  time,  ^^^j^^j  j-^  those  of  the  old  uavy,  exclusive  of 
those  that  were  lost,  353  vessels,  armed  in  the  aggregate 
with  1577  guns,  and  of  the  capacity  of  240,028  tons.  The 
annals  of  the  world  do  not  show  so  great  an  increase  in 
so  brief  a  period  to  the  naval  power  of  any  country. 
"  The  appropriations  made  by  Congress  for  the  navy  for 

Financial  provi-  the  fiscal  ycar  ending  June  30, 1862,  were 
.  '''"' '"' '"'  upward  of  forty-three  and  a  half  millions  of 
dollars ;  for  the  year  ending  June  30th,  1863,  nearly  fifty- 
three  millions ;  and  for  the  following  year,  June  30th, 
1864,  upward  of  sixty-eight  millions." 


CHAPTER  LXIV. 

PROGRESS  OF  THE  ANTI-SLAVERY  MOVEMENT. 

The  Republican  party,  attaining  to  power,  was  constrained  by  its  position,  and  in- 
duced by  its  political  sentiments,  to  adopt  many  anti-slavery  measures,  such  as 
the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  its  prohibition  in  the 
Territories. 

President  Lincoln,  at  his  accession,  considered  it  his  chief  duty  to  save  the  Union 
without  reference  to  slavery.  Finding,  however,  that  the  slave  question  could 
not  be 'avoided,  he  proposed  plans  of  colonization  and  compensated  emancipation. 

JVIilitary  events  by  degrees  rendering  the  abolition  of  slavery  an  unavoidable  neces- 
,  sity,  he  at  length  issued  a  Proclamation  of  Emancipation. 

The  anti-slavery  measures  of  tlie  government  may  be 
Classification  of  an-  coHveniently  groiiped  Under  two  heads  I  1st. 
ti-siavery  measures,  rj.^^^^  originating  iu  Cougress ;  2d.  Tliose 

originating  witli  the  President. 

On  the  retirement  of  the  Southern  members  from  Con- 
Attitude  of  the  Re-  gress,  the  Eepublican  party  occupied  a  posi- 
pubiican  party.  ^-^^  ^f  irresistiblo  influence  in  that  body. 
In  accordance  with  the  principles  laid  down  at  its  first 
Convention  in  Philadelphia  (June,  1856),  and  reaffirmed 
at  its  second  Convention  in  Chicago  (May,  1860),  it  was 
not  possible  for  it,  in  view  of  the  assaults  that  the  slave 
power  was  now  making,  to  do  otherwise  than  enter  on  a 
course  of  legislation  aiming  at  the  destruction  of  its  an- 
tagonist. 

With  President  Lincoln  it  was  different.  Though  he 
Attitude  of  the  was  always  true  to  the  principles  of  the 
President.  party  which  had  placed  him  in  his  eminent 

position,  he  was  compelled,  from  that  very  position,  to  re- 
gard things  from  a  point  of  view  of  his  own.  With  him 
the  restoration  of  the  Union,  the  integrity  of  the  republic, 
was  the  primary,  the  great  object. 


Chai-.lxiv.]  anti-slaveey  measures  of  congress.  591 

But,  though  thus  the  dominant  power  in  Congress  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  President  on  the  other,  had  each  a 
special  intention,  there  was  no  conflict,  nor  even  any  mis- 
understanding between  them.  Each  appreciated  and 
strengthened  the  other. 

1st.  The  Anti-slavery  measures  of  Congress. 

Among  the  measures  taken  by  Congress,  there  are  six 
Congressional  anti-  to  which  attention  may  be  particularly  di- 

slavery  measures.       ^^^^^^^        rpj^^^    ^^^  .    (1)^  thc    liberation     of 

slaves  used  for  insurrectionary  purposes ;  (2),  the  prohi- 
bition of  persons  in  the  army  returning  fugitive  slaves ; 
(3),  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia  ; 
(4),  the  prohibition  of  slavery  in  the  Territories;  (5), the 
employment  of  colored  soldiers ;  (6),  the  Confiscation  Act. 

Mr.  Henry  Wilson,  one  of  the  senators  from  Massachu- 
setts, who  took  a  very  prominent  part  in  promoting  the 
adoption  of  these  measures,  has  given  a  record  of  them 
under  the  title  of "  History  of  the  Anti-slavery  Measures 
of  the  Thirty-seventh  and  Thirty^eighth  United  States 
Congresses."  To  that  work  I  may  refer  the  reader  for 
details. 

(1.)  The  liberation  of  slaves  used  for  iifisnrrectioiiary 
purposes.  , 

From  the  commencement  of  hostilities  the  Confederates 

had  employed  their  slaves  in  aid  of  military 

msur^ection  made   purposcs.   Thc  batterfcs  which  rcduccd  Fort 

Sumter  were  constructed  by  negro  hands; 

the  labor  of  slaves  lightened  the  toils  of  the  rebel  soldiers 

and  augmented  the  power  of  rebel  armies. 

On  the  6th  of  August,  1861,  a  bill  was  approved  by 
the  President  making  forever  free  all  slaves  so  used. 
This  was  the  only  anti-slavery  act  passed  at  the  extra 
session  of  Congress. 

(2.)  The  proliibition  of  persons  in  ilie  army  returning 
fugitive  slaves. 


592;  ANTI-SLAVERY  MEASURES  OF  CONGRESS.     [Sect.  XIII. 

As  the  national  armies  advanced  into  the  slaveliolding 
districts,  many  fugitive   slaves   escaped  to 

Army  officers  not  to.,  .         .-,         •,  pii»*/»         ^ 

return  fiigitive        tncm   m  the  hoDC   01  obtammg*  ireedom, 

sljivcs* 

some  coming  with  a  view  of  offering  their 
services  to  work  or  fight;  some  bringing  intelligence; 
some,  such  as  old  persons,  and  particularly  women,  with 
their  children,  seeking  refuge  under  the  national  flag. 

Some  officers  of  the  army  accorded  to  these  fugitives 
protection ;  some  refused  to  admit  them  into  their  lines ; 
some  drove  them  out ;  some  even  permitted  slave-masters 
to  search  the  camps  and  carry  off  their  slaves. 

On  the  13th  of  March,  1862,  the  President  approved  a 
bill  enacting  an  article  of  war  dismissing  from  the  service 
officers  guilty  of  surrendering  such  fugitives. 

(3.)  The  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columhia. 

About  three  thousand  persons  were  held  in  slavery  in 
Slavery  aboiishea  thc  Dlstrlct  of  Columbia,  the  seat  of  the  na- 
in  the  District.      ^-^^^^-^  capital.     They  were  subject  to  laws 

and  ordinances  of  great  severity,  known  under  the  title 
of  the  "Black  Code."  In  the  City  of  Washington  itself 
the  slave-trade  was  carried  on. 

On  the  16th  of  April,  1862,  a  bill  was  signed  by  the 
President  abolishing  slavery  in  the  District,  granting 
compensation  to  the  owners  of  slaves,  and  abrogating 
the  Black  Code. 

On  the  approval  of  the  act  by  the  President, "  the  en- 
franchised bondmen  assembled  in  their  churches  and 
offered  up  the  homage  and  gratitude  of  their  hearts  to 
God  for  this  boon  of  personal  freedom." 

(4.)  The  'prohibition  of  slavery  in  the  Territories. 

The  political  condition  of  the  Territories  as  to  freedom 
Slavery  prohibited  or  skvcry  had  been,  for  many  years  before 
in  the  Territories.  ^^^  geccssion  of  thc  Southcm  Statcs,  a  sub- 
ject  of  incessant  and  bitter  controversy. 

In  volume  i.  the  reader's  attention  has  been  repeatedly 


chap.lxiv.]  anti-slavery  measures  of  congress.  593 

drawn  to  this  as  one  of  the  most  prominent  facts  in  the 
history  of  the  Eepublic. 

A  bill  was  passed  by  Congress  after  vehement  opposi- 
tion from  certain  Democratic  members  and  members  from 
the  Border  States.  It  was,  on  June  10th,  1862,  approved 
by  the  President,  and  is  to  the  following  effect : 

A7i  Act  to  secure  Freedom  to  all  Persons  withm  the  Territories  of 
the  United  States. 

"To  the  end  that  freedom  may  be  and  remain  forever  the  law  of 
the  land  in  all  places  whatsoever,  so  far  as  it  lies  within  the  power 
or  depends  upon  the  action  of  the  government  of  the  United  States 
to  make  it  so,  therefore, 

''''Be  it  enacted,  That,  from  and  after  the  passage  of  this  act,  there 
shall  be  neither  slavery  nor  involuntary  servitude  in  any  of  the  Ter- 
ritories of  the  United  States  now  existing,  or  which  may  at  any 
time  hereafter  be  formed  or  acquired  by  the  United  States,  other- 
wise than  in  punishment  of  crime  whereof  the  party  shall  have  been 
duly  convicted." 

(5.)  The  employment  of  colored  soldiers. 
On  the  failure  of  McClellan's  expedition  in  the  Peninsu- 
AMcans  to  be  em-    1^,  it  bccame  apparent  that  the  organization 

ployed  in  the  army,    ^f  j^^gp^j  regimCUtS  COuld  UOt  bc  pOStpOUCd. 

The  President  was  therefore  empowered  to  "  receive  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States,  for  any  military  or  naval 
service  for  which  they  may  be  found  competent,  persons 
of  African  descent,  who  shall  be  enrolled  and  organized 
under  such  regulations,  not  inconsistent  with  the  Consti- 
tution and  the  laws,  as  he  may  prescribe."  It  was  also 
enacted  that  any  slave  of  a  person  in  rebel- 

and  certain  of  their    ,.  -,.  ,  •inn 

relatives  to  be  made  jiou  rendering  any  such  service  shall  forever 
thereafter  be  free,  together  with  his  wife, 
mother,  and  children,  if  they  also  belong  to  persons  in 
rebellion.     The  bill  was  approved  July  17th,  1862. 
(6.)  Tlie  Confiscation  Act 

It  had  become  plain  that,  though  the  Confederate  au- 
thorities abstained  from  the  employment  of  slaves  as  sol- 
II.— P  p 


594  ANTI-SLAVERY  MEASURES  OF  CONGRESS.     [Sect.  XIII. 


The  Confiscation    di^rs,  a  vcpy  great  advantage  was  derived 
^'^^'  from  tlieir  use  in  civil  life.    They  took  charge 

of  all  agricultural  operations  on  the  plantations  and  farms, 
not  only  thereby  furnishing  subsistence  to  the  armies,  but 
releasing  for  military  purposes  large  numbers  of  white 
men. 

Of  all  the  anti-slavery  measures  of  Congress,  those  in- 
tended to  bear  on  these  points  were  the  most  energetic- 
ally contested,  and  that  not  only  by  members  who  were 
considered  to  be  the  defenders  of  slavery,  but  by  some 
of  the  Eepublican  party.  The  original  propositions  un- 
derwent much  modification.  There  were  also  differences 
of  opinion  between  the  Senate  and  House.  The  shape 
which  the  act  eventually  took  was,  in  effect,  a  combina- 
tion of  what  were  known  as  the  Confiscation  and  Eman- 
cipation bills.  It  provided  that  all  slaves  of  persons  who 
shall  give  aid  and  comfort  to  the  rebellion,  who  shall 
take  refuge  within  the  lines  of  the  army;  all  slaves  cap- 
tured from  such  persons,  or  deserted  by  them  and  coming 
under  the  control  of  the  government ;  and  all  slaves  of 
such  persons  found  or  being  within  any  place  occupied 
by  rebel  forces  and  afterward  occupied  by  the  forces 
of  the  United  States,  shall  be  deemed  captives  of  war, 
and  shall  be  forever  free  and  not  again  held  as  slaves; 
that  fugitive  slaves  shall  not  be  surrendered  to  persons 
who  have  given  aid  and  comfort  to  the  rebellion;  that 
no  person  engaged  in  the  military  or  naval  service  shall 
surrender  fugitive  slaves  on  pain  of  being  dismissed  from 
the  service ;  that  the  President  may  employ  persons  of 
African  descent  for  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion,  and 
organize  and  use  them  in  such  manner  as  he  may  judge 
best  for  the  public  welfare.  This  bill  passed  the  House 
and  Senate  by  large  majorities,  and  was  approved  by  the 
President  July  17th,  1862. 

These  were  not  all  the  anti-slavery  measures  adopt- 


Chap.  LXIV.]  ANTI-SLAVERY  MEASURES  OF  CONGRESS.  595 

Certain  minor  anti-  ed  by  Congress  I  thePG  weiG  others  which, 
slavery  measures.  ^^^^^^-^  perhaps  of  less  piessliig  liiterest, 
showed  equally  the  direction  of  public  policy.  Among 
these  may  be  mentioned  the  admission  of  colored  wit- 
nesses into  the  courts  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  the  re- 
striction of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Act,  except  the  claimant 
made  oath  that  he  had  not  given  aid  and  comfort  to  the 
rebellion,  the  concession  of  the  right  of  search  in  the  case 
of  suspected  slave-ships,  the  recognition  of  Hayti  and  Li- 
beria. 

From  the  speeches  delivered  in  both  houses,  it  may  be 
gathered  that  the  !N"orth  was  resting  on  an  intellectual 
basis — it  was  enforcing  an  idea.  The  burden  of  these 
speeches  is  the  immorality  of  slavery,  the  accountability 
of  the  nation  to  God  and  to  the  civilized  world,  the  ne- 
cessity of  ending  a  great  wrong  and  of  sustaining  the 
rights  of  humanity,  the  enforcement  of  justice,  law,  order, 
the  denunciation  of  domestic  tyranny  and  civil  war.  A 
single  extract  will  illustrate  their  spirit : 

"  Slavery  is  in  itself  wrong,  and  can  only  be  secure  in 
Sentiments  of  the  ^  wroug  govemmeut.  It  knows  no  laws  but 
Repubucan  party,  ^j^^^^  of  aggrcssiou  aud  forcc ;  being  in  the 

habitual  exercise  of  despotic  power  over  an  inferior  race, 
it  learns  to  despise  and  disregard  the  rights  of  all  races. 
It  has  sown  the  wind — ^let  it  reap  the  whirlwind.  By 
the  laws  of  peace  it  was  entitled  to  protection,  and  it  had 
it ;  by  the  laws  of  war  it  is  entitled  to  annihilation.  In 
God's  name,  let  it  have  that  too." 

Such  being  the  incentive  of  the  Eepublican  orators, 
Arguments  of  their  their  Parliamentary  antagonists  in  the  slav- 
opponents.  ^^^  intcrcst  IB.  the  Border  States,  and  their 

allies  still  representing  themselves  as  of  the  Democratic 
party,  declined  all  appeal  to  moral  considerations,  and 
rested  their  arguments  on  the  rights  which  they  affirmed 
they  had  under  the  Constitution,  and  the  material  advan- 


596  ANTI-SLAVERY  ACTS  OF  THE  PRESIDENT.     [Sect.  XIIL 

tages  or  disadvantages  wMcli  would  result  from  the  adop- 
tion or  rejection  of  the  measure  under  consideration. 

On  these  occasions  we  still  trace  without  difficulty  the 
idealistic  tendency  of  the  North,  the  materialistic  tend- 
ency of  the  South — a  tendency  displayed  throughout  all 
their  previous  history  (vol.  i.,  p.  146).  The  one  was 
guided  by  what  it  conceived  to  be  right,  the  other  by 
what  it  conceived  to  be  advantageous. 

Moreover,  it  can  not  be  overlooked  that  some  of  the 
Views  of  the  North-  ^^^st  forcible  aud  ablest  efforts  on  the  Ke- 
western  people.  publlcau  sido  wero  made  by  members  from 
the  Northwestern  States,  who  doubtless  completely  rep- 
resented the  tone  of  thought  of  their  constituencies.  One 
of  the  most  serious  political  mistakes  made  by  the  Con- 
federate government  was  its  belief  that  anti-slavery  in- 
tentions were  substantially  limited  to  New  England.  To 
a  late  period  of  the  war  it  indulged  the  expectation  that 
the  Northwestern  States  would  abandon  the  Union  and 
join  in  the  secession  movement.  In*  this  it  overlooked 
the  fact  that  the  population  of  those  states  was  substan- 
tially an  offshoot  from  New  England,  and  it  did  not  clear- 
ly appreciate  that  the  influence  of  Nature  throughout 
those  regions  perpetually  strengthens  the  tendency  to 
Teutonic  modes  of  thought. 

2d.  Anti-slavery  acts  of  the  President. 

At  the  time  of  his  accession  to  the  Presidency,  Lin- 
coln, in  his  inaugural  address,  reiterated  a  declaration  he 
had  formerly  made,  affirming  that  he  had  no  purpose,  di- 
rectly or  indirectly,  to  interfere  with  slavery 
views  on  slavery  at  in  tho  statcs  whcre  it  exists.  "I  believe  I 
have  no  lawful  right,  and  I  have  no  inten- 
tion to  do  so." 

No  better  exposition  of  the  President's  views  can  be 
given  than  that  which  he  himself  has  furnished  in  a  let- 
ter to  his  friend  Mr.  Greeley,  who  had  addressed  to  him 


Chap.  LXIV.]  LINCOLN'S  VIEWS  ON  SLAVERY.  597 

an  appeal  exhorting  him  to  proclaim  the  slaves  free,  and 
assuring  him  that "  all  attempts  to  put  down  the  rebel- 
lion, and  at  the  same  time  to  uphold  the  inciting  cause, 
are  preposterous  and  futile." 

"My  paramount  object,"  says  Lincoln  (August,  1862), 
"  is  to  save  the  Union,  and  not  either  to  save 

His  paramount  ob-  ,        t       i  t  t/»  x  it  ji 

jectto  save  the  or  to  desti'oy  slavcry.  It  i  could  save  the 
Union  without  freeing  any  slave,  I  would  do 
it ;  if  I  could  save  it  by  freeing  all  the  slaves,  I  would  do 
it ;  and  if  I  could  save  it  by  freeing  some  and  leaving 
others  alone,  I  would  also  do  that."  "  I  have  here  stated 
my  purpose  according  to  my  views  of  official  duty;  and  I 
intend  no  modification  of  my  oft-repeated  personal  wish 
that  all  men  every  where  should  be  free." 

He  thus  acted  upon  the  principle  that  the  preservation 

He  regards  slavery  <^^  thc  Rcpublic  was  Ms  first  duty,  aud  that, 

as  a  minor  matter.     ^J^g^^gygj.  Jj]g  perSOUal  OpiuloUS  aud  wlshcS 

in  relation  to  slavery  might  be,  he  must  regard  it  as  a 
"  minor  matter." 

Very  soon,  however,  he  began  more  clearly  to  perceive 
that  Unionism  and  slavery  were  incompatible,  and  that 
the  latter  Was  the  instrument  by  which  the  leaders  of  se- 
cession were  destroying  the  life  of  the  nation. 

Directing  his  attention  to  the  Border  States,  he  saw 
that  in  Delaware  there  was  but  one  slave  to  sixty  free 
persons ;  in  Maryland,  one  to  seven ;  in  Western  Virginia, 
one  to  eighteen ;  in  Kentucky,  one  to  four ;  in  Missouri, 
one  to  ten.  Moreover,  the  distribution  of  these  slaves 
Gradnai  changes  in  was  vcry  uncqual.  To  a  very  large  extent 
his  views.  ^i^^y  ^^^^,^  concentrated  in  limited  localities. 

There  were  whole  counties  in  these  states  that  had  only 
three  or  four  slaves.  And  as  soon  as  it  was  evident  that 
war  was  unavoidable,  the  proportion  underwent  a  great 
change.  To  prevent  their  escape  to  the  national  armies 
or  into  the  Free  States,  the  negroes  w^ere  transferred  to- 
ward the  Gulf. 


598  COMPENSATED  EMANCIPATION.  [Sect.XIIL 

K  the  Border  States   could  be   detached  from  the 

He  tries  to  detach  Confederacy,  its  population  would  be  re- 
the  Border  states,  ^^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^^^^  ^^^  ^  quartcr  miUions 

(12,239,996)  to  less  than  eight  and  three  quarter  mil- 
lions (8,709,780),  and  a  blow,  perhaps  fatal,  would  be 
struck  at  it. 

We  have  already  seen  (vol.  i.,  p.  296,  307)  that  the 
translation  of  the  black  population  to  the  cotton  regions 
was  taking  place  under  an  irresistible  law,  and  that,  had 
not  the  Civil  War  occurred,  the  Border  States  must  neces- 
sarily have  soon  been  free. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  appeared  to  Lincoln  that 
his  sense  of  duty  as  regarded  the  safety  of 

compensated  tho  Ecpublic,  Ms  bcHcf  that  there  was  a  con- 

emancipation.  ..,  .  rt  1  1»T 

stitutional  protection  for  slavery  binding 
upon  the  Free  States,  his  personal  desire  "  that  all  men 
should  be  free,"  might  be  satisfied  by  some  scheme  of 
emancipation  with  compensation  in  the  Border  States. 
He  would  pay  the  owners  of  slaves  in  those  states  a  fair 
equivalent  for  their  freedom.  That  done,  since  the  Cotton 
States  can  not  politically  exist  without  the  Border  States, 
the  insurgent  communities  must  gravitate  back  to  the 
Union. 

So  thought  Abraham  Lincoln,  a  just  and  most  merciful 
man.  With  rectitude  of  purpose  he  tried  to  discharge 
what  he  considered  to  be  his  obligations  to  the  Constitu- 
tion, acknowledging,  however,  that  he  knew  himself  to  be 
in  the  hands  of  One  who  tolerates  no  excuses  for  wrong, 
and  with  whom  Justice  is  paramount. 

Accordingly  the  President  passed  by  degrees,  which 
perhaps  were  insensible  to  himself,  from  a  denial  of  his 
power  of  interference,  to  absolute  and  unconditional 
emancipation.  He  has  told  us  of  his  hesitations  and 
doubts  in  a  letter  written  not  long  (1864)  before  his 
death :  "  I  felt  that  measures  otherwise  unconstitutional 


Chap.  LXIV.]         LINCOLN'S  KELUCTANCE  TO  ACT.  599 

might  become  lawful  by  becoming  indispensable  to  the 

preservation  of  the  nation.     Right  or  wrong,  I  assumed 

that  ground,  and  now  avow  it.     I  could  not  feel  that,  to 

the  best  of  my  ability,  I  had  tried  to  pre- 

avoidThlPdeci-^    serve  the  Constitution,  if  to  save  slavery  or 


8ive  measure. 


any  minor  matter  I  should  permit  the  wreck 
of  government,  country,  and  Constitution  altogether. 
When,  early  in  the  war,  General  Fremont  attempted  mili- 
tary emancipation,  I  forbade  it,  because  I  did  not  then 
think  it  an.  indispensable  necessity.  When,  a  little  later. 
General  Cameron,  then  Secretary  of  War,  suggested  the 
arming  of  the  blacks,  I  objected,  because  I  did  not  yet 
think  it  an  indispensable  necessity.  When,  still  later. 
General  Hunter  attempted  military  emancipation,  I  again 
forbade  it,  because  I  did  not  yet  think  the  indispensable 
necessity  had  come.  When,  in  March,  and  May,  and  July, 
1862, 1  made  earnest  and  successive  appeals  to  the  Border 
States  to  favor  compensated  emancipation,  I  believed  the 
indispensable  necessity  for  military  emancipation  and 
arming  the  blacks  would  come  unless  averted  by  that 
measure.  They  declined  the  proposition,  and  I  was,  in 
my  best  judgment,  driven  to  the  alternative  of  either  sur- 
rendering the  Union,  and  with  it  the  Constitution,  or  of 
laying  a  strong  hand  upon  the  colored  element.  I  chose 
the  latter.  In  choosing  it,  I  hoped  for  greater  gain  than 
loss,  but  of  this  I  was  not  entirely  confident.  More  than 
a  year  of  trial  now  shows  no  loss  by  it  in  our  foreign  re- 
lations, none  in  our  home  popular  sentiment,  none  in  our 
white  military  force — no  loss  by  it  anyhow  or  any  where. 
On  the  contrary,  it  shows  a  gain  of  quite  a  hundred  and 
thirty  thousand  soldiers,  seamen,  and  laborers.  These 
are  palpable  facts,  about  which,  as  facts,  there  can  be  no 
caviling.  We  have  the  men,  and  we  could  not  have  had 
them  without  the  measure. 

"I  claim  not  to  have  controlled  events,  but  confess 


600  CONTRADICTORY  ARMY  ORDERS.  [Sect.  XTTT. 

plainly   that    events   have    controlled  me. 

noi  resist, 
eof 
events, 


the  force  of         JSTow,  at  the  end  of  three  vears  of  strue:- 

events.  _.       '       _  "^  o 


gling,  the  nation's  condition  is  not  what 
either  party  or  any  man  devised  or  expected.  God  alone 
can  claim  it.    Whither  it  is  tending  seems  plain.     If  God 

now  wills  the  removal  of  a  great  wrong,  and 
higher  power  is      wlUs,  also,  that  WO  of  tho  North,  as  well  as 

compelling  him.  r»     t         o 

you  of  the  South,  shall  pay  fairly  for  our 
complicity  in  that  wrong,  impartial  history  will  find 
therein  new  causes  to  attest  and  revere  his  justice  and 
mercy." 

The  army  orders  and  instructions  in  relation  to  slaves 

show  in  a  very  interesting  manner  how  im- 

oTdeSinxeSt^l  perfectly  the  true  method  of  dealing  with 

slaves.  1.  »/  o 

the  Confederacy  was  understood  by  the  na- 
tional leaders.  McClellan  would  put  the  slaves  down 
"  with  an  iron  hand."  Cameron  would  not  surrender  any 
coming  within  the  army  lines.  Patterson  would  repress 
all  servile  insurrection.  Mansfield  would  harbor  none  in 
his  camps.  Butler  looked  upon  them  as  contraband. 
Fremont  proclaimed  them  free  in  his  department.  Dix 
would  not  interfere  between  the  slave  and  his  master. 
Wool  would  give  the  slaves  employment,  and  regulate 
their  pay  and  allowances.  Halleck  would  drive  them 
out  of  his  lines ;  he  prohibited  the  stealing  and  conceal- 
ment of  them  by  his  soldiers.  Burnside  declared  that  he 
would  not  interfere  with  slavery.  Subserviency  to  the 
slave  interest  may  be  considered  as  having  reached  its 
shameful  climax  in  the  American  army  when  Buell  and 
Hooker  actually  authorized  slaveholders  to  search  the 
national  camps  for  fugitives  and  carry  them  away.  The 
major  commanding  one  of  the  regiments  under  the  latter 
general  reported  that  so  great  was  the  visible  dissatisfac- 
tion and  murmuring  among  the  soldiers  that  he  almost 
feared  for  the  safety  of  the  slaveholders.    He  added  that 


Chap.lxiv.]    colonization  and  compensation.  ^01 

"when  they  were  within  one  hundred  yards  of  our  camp, 
one  of  their  number  discharged  two  pistol-shots  at  a  ne- 
gro who  was  running  past  them,  with  the  evident  inten- 
tion of  taking  his  life.    This  greatly  enraged  our  men." 

This  surrendering  of  negroes  was  positively  forbidden 
by  Doubleday,  who  ordered  them  to  be  treated,  not  as 
chattels,  but  as  persons.  Hunter,  in  his  department,  pro- 
claimed them  all  free,  and  the  President,  in  another  proc- 
lamation, rescinded  that  of  Hunter. 

In  his  first  annual  message  (December  3d,  1861)  Lin- 
Lincoin  proposes   colu  proposcd  colouizatiou,  lu  some  terri- 
colonization.       ^^^^  outsido  of  the  republic,  of  those  ne- 
groes who  through  the  operations  of  the  war  might  be- 
come free.     He  even  suggested  that  it  might  be  well  to 
consider  whether  the  free  colored  people  already  in  the 
United  States  could  not,  so  far  as  individuals  might  de- 
sire, be  included  in  such  colonization.    The  measure,  how- 
ever, met  with  no  very  emphatic  approval  in  Congress. 
One  hundred  thousand  dollars  were  appropriated  to  aid 
in  the  colonization  of  the  free  blacks  of  the  District  of 
Total  failure      ColumHa.   A  fsw  werc  taken  to  Cow  Island, 
of  that  plan.      ^^  ^^^  ^^^^^  ^f  Ilsijti,  but  thc  schcmc  speed- 

ily  proved  a  failure. 

In  the  following  spring  (March  6th,  1862),  in  a  special 
message  to  the  houses  of  Congress,  Lincoln  suggested 
that  they  should  adopt  the  following  joint  resolution : 

"  JResolved,  That  the  United  States  ought  to  co-operate  with  any 
„  state  which  may  adopt  STradiial  abolishment  of  slav- 

He  proposes  com-  j  i     » 

pensated  emanci-    ery,  giving  to  such  State  pecuniary  aid,  to  be  used 
^^  ^"°'  by  such  state,  in  its  discretion,  to  compensate  for  the 

inconvenience,  public  and  private,  produced  by  such  change  of  sys- 
tem." 

"  If  the  proposition  contained  in  the  resolution  does 
not  meet  the  approval  of  Congress  and  the  country,  there 


gQ2  COMPENSATED  EMANCIPATION.  [SECT.Xm. 

is  an  end  of  it;  but  if  it  does  command  such  approval,! 
deem  it  of  importance  that  the  states  and  people  imme- 
diately interested  should  be  at  once  distinctly  notified  of 
the  fact,  so  that  they  may  begin  to  consider  whether  to 
accept  or  reject  it.  The  federal  government  would  find 
its  highest  interest  in  such  a  measure,  as  one  of  the  most 
efficient  means  of  self-preservation.  The  leaders  of  the 
existing  insurrection  entertain  the  hope  that  this  govern- 
ment will  ultimately  be  forced  to  acknowledge  the  inde- 
pendence of  some  part  of  the  disaffected  region,  and  that 
all  the  Slave  States  north  of  such  part  will  then  say, '  The 
Union  for  which  we  have  struggled  being  already  gone, 
we  now  choose  to  go  with  the  Southern  section.'  To  de- 
prive them  of  this  hope  substantially  ends  the  rebellion, 
and  the  initiation  of  emancipation  has  that  effect.  .  .  . 
While  it  is  true  that  the  adoption  of  the  proposed  reso- 
lution would  be  merely  initiatory,  and  not  within  itself 
a  practical  measure,  it  is  recommended  in  the  hope  that 
it  would  soon  lead  to  important  practical  results." 

In  the  discussion  which  ensued  in  the  House,  it  was 

apparent  that  the  representatives  of  the  Border  States, 

and  the  Democratic  members  generally,  were  determined 

Congressional  re-  ^o  Tcslst  emancipation,  whether  compensated 

sistance  to  it.       ^^  ^^^^     q^^  declarcd  that  his  people  were 

not  prepared  to  enter  upon  the  proposed  work  of  pur- 
chasing the  slaves  of  other  people,  and  turning  them  loose 
in  their  midst ;  another  demanded  what  clause  of  the 
Constitution  gives  power  to  Congress  to  appropriate  the 
treasure  of  the  United  States  to  buy  negroes  and  set  them 
free;  another  did  not  understand  that  the  House  must 
follow  the  beck  of  the  President.  It  had  its  duties  to  dis- 
charge as  well  as  he. 

Notwithstanding  this  opposition,  the  joint  resolution 
The  joint  resoiixtion  passcd  both  houscs,  and  was  approved  by 
inoperative.  ^^  President  (April  10th,  1862).     It  re- 


Chap.LXIV.]  HUNTER'S  proclamation.  gQg 

mained,  however,  practically  a  dead  letter  —  no  Slave 
State  ever  claimed  its  benefits. 

It  was  shortly  after  this  that  Lincoln  felt  himself  con- 
strained to  issue  a  proclamation  indicating  his  relations 
to  slavery  at  the  time  (May  19th,  1862).     Major  General 
Hunter,  in  command  at  Hilton  Head,  South 
counte?-prodama-  Oaroliua,  had,  as  is  mentioned  (p.  601),  is- 

tion  to  Hunter.  _  '         _V    .,^  ^,,      ^^^^x      t      i       • 

sued  an  order  (May  9th,  1862)  declaring 
the  states  Georgia,  Florida,  and  South  Carolina  to  be  un- 
der martial  law ;  and  that,  since  slavery  and  martial  law 
are  incompatible  in  a  free  country,  all  persons  held  as 
slaves  in  those  states  he  declares  to  be  henceforth  and 
forever  free. 

President  Lincoln,  in  his  proclamation,  recites  the  order 
of  General  Hunter,  and  continues : 

"  And  whereas  the  same  is  producing  some  excitement 
and  misunderstanding;  therefore  I,  Abraham  Lincoln, 
President  of  the  United  States,  proclaim  and  declare  that 
the  government  of  the  United  States  had  no  knowledge 
or  belief  of  an  intention  on  the  part  of  General  Hunter  to 
issue  such  a  proclamation,  nor  has  it  yet  any  authentic 
information  that  the  document  is  genuine,  and,  farther, 
that  neither  General  Hunter  nor  any  other  commander 
or  person  has  been  authorized  by  the  government  of  the 
United  States  to  make  proclamation  declaring  the  slaves 
of  any  state  free ;  and  that  the  supposed  proclamation 
now  in  question,  whether  genuine  or  false, 

He  reserves  eman-     •         t  .  .  i  •  i  /»  ,  i 

cipation  to  him-  IS  altogether  void,  so  lar  as  respects  such 
declaration.  I  farther  make  known  that, 
whether  it  be  competent  for  me,  as  commander-in-chief  of 
the  army  and  navy,  to  declare  the  slaves  of  any  state  or 
states  free,  and  whether,  at  any  time  or  in  any  case,  it 
shall  have  become  a  necessity  indispensable  to  the  main- 
tenance of  the  government  to  exercise  such  supposed 
power,  are  questions  which,  under  my,  responsibility,  I  re- 


^04  LINCOLN  AND  THE  BORDER  STATES.  [Sect.  XIII. 

serve  to  myself,  and  wHch  I  can  not  feel  justified  in  leav- 
ing: to  the  decision  of  commanders  in  the  field. 

"  These  are  totally  different  questions  from  police  reg- 
ulation in  armies  or  in  camps." 

The  President  then  refers  to  and  quotes  the  joint  reso- 
lution he  had  recommended  to  Congress  (p.  601),  and 
continues : 

"  The  resolution,  in  the  language  above  quoted,  was 

Heimpioresthe    ^doptcd  by  large  majorities  in  both  branch 

ac°cete%ahff  ^'^    ^^  of  Cougress,  aud  now  stands  an  authen 

views.  ^-^^  definite,  and  solemn  proposal  of  the  na 

tion  to  the  states  and  people  most  interested  in  the  sub 

ject-matter.    To  the  people  of  those  states  now  I  appeal 

I  do  not  argue.     I  beseech  you  to  make  the  arguments 

for  yourselves.     You  can  not,  if  you  would,  be  blind  to 

the  signs  of  the  times — " 

Notwithstanding  this  earnest  appeal,  no  response  came 

from  the  Border  States.     Yet  Lincoln  did 

grefs^ti'^complnsT  uot  2:ive  up  his  poHcv.     Shortlv  before  the 

ted  emancipation.  tat  •! 

close  of  the  session,  he  sent  a  special  mes- 
sage to  Congress  suggesting  the  passage  of  a  bill  which 
should  provide  that,  on  any  state  abolishing  slavery, 
bonds  of  the  United  States  should  be  delivered  to  it  of 
a  certain  sum  for  every  slave,  the  whole  to  be  paid  at 
once  if  the  emancipation  was  immediate,  or  in  instal- 
ments if  gradual.  No  final  action  was,  however,  taken 
by  Congress  upon  it,  the  general  impression  being  that 
all  such  measures  were  useless.  Even  the  Border  States 
would  not  hearken  to  emancipation,  whether  with  com- 
pensation or  not. 

Still  tenaciously  clinging  to  his  idea,  he  now  (July 

12  th)  requested  an  interview  with  all  the 

He  has  an  interview  ,  r»     /-i  (*  j  i  t^        t 

with  the  Border  del-  mcmoers    01    Con2:ress    from   the   Border 

egations.  ,  *-^ 

States,  in  which  he  urged  them  to  accept 
his  plan.     He  told  them  that  through  the  war  the  slave 


Chap.  LXIV.]  LINCOLN'S  RELUCTANCE  TO  ACT.  QQ^ 

property  among  tliem  tad  greatly  diminislied  in  value, 
and  before  long  would  altogether  disappear;  lie  asked  if 
it  were  not  best  to  secure  substantial  compensation  for 
what  would  otherwise  be  wholly  lost.  On  their  part, 
they  could  not  see  why  they  were  called  upon  to  make 
so  great  a  sacrifice. 

Meantime  the  Confederate  government  had  brought  its 
Effect  of  the  penin-  couscrfpts  luto  the  field.  They  had  termin- 
suiar  disasters.  ^^^^  McClellau's  Campaign ;  they  had  over- 
thrown  Pope,  had  threatened  Washington,  and  invaded 
Maryland.  It  was  clearly  perceived  throughout  the 
North  that  th^se  disasters,  with  all  the  waste  of  life  and 
money  that  had  attended  them,  could  not  have  occurred 
had  the  poor  whites,  by  whom  the  Southern  armies  were 
recruited,  been  compelled  to  remain  at  home.  The  slaves 
were  attending  to  the  plantations  and  raising  provisions, 
while  the  whites  were  repairing  to  the  armies. 

Incited  by  such  considerations,  public  opinion  began  to 
Public  opinion  in-  P^css  upou  Llucolu,  requiring  him  to  bring 
fiaencedbythem.    ^-^^  ^^^^^  element  over  to  the  national  side 

by  proclaiming  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves.  The  im- 
pression was  becoming  universal  that  either  that  must  be 
done  or  the  Union  must  be  given  up. 

On  the  occasion  of  an  interview  which  he  had  with 
some  religious  persons  who  had  come  from 

The  President's  in-     x-^,  •  ^        ,  i  n  •  t  • 

terview  with  certain  Chicaffo  lor  the  DurDoso  01  urfirmfij  upon  him 

religious  persons.  *-*  ,  «  .  .  t  •  i        • 

the  necessity  oi  emancipation,  Lincoln,  m  a 
simple  but  clear  manner,  explained  the  views  he  enter- 
tained of  the  position  of  affairs ;  among  other  things,  he 
said: 

"What  good  would  a  proclamation  of  emancipation 
from  me  do  as  we  are  now  situated  ?  I  do  not  want  to 
issue  a  document  which  the  whole  world  will  see  must 
necessarily  be  inoperative,  like  the  Pope's  Bull  against 
the  Comet.     Would  my  word  free  the  slaves,  when  I  can 


^06  LINCOLN'S  POSITION.  [Sect.XIIL 

not  even  enforce  tlie  Constitution  in  tlie  rebel  states  ?  Is 
there  a  single  court,  or  magistrate,  or  individual  tliat 
would  be  influenced  by  it  there  ?  And  what  reason  is 
there  to  think  it  would  have  any  greater  effect  upon  the 
slaves  than  the  late  law  of  Congress  which  I  approved, 
and  which  offers  protection  and  freedom  to  the  slaves  of 
rebel  masters  who  come  within  our  lines  ?  Yet  I  can  not 
learn  that  that  law  has  caused  a  single  slave  to  come 
over  to  us — 

"Now  tell  me,  if  you  please,  what  possible  result  of 
good  would  follow  the  issuing  of  such  a  proclamation  as 
you  desire.  Understand,  I  raise  no  objections  against  it 
on  legal  or  constitutional  grounds ;  for,  as  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  army  and  navy,  in  time  of  war  I  suppose  I 
have  a  right  to  take  any  measure  which  may  best  subdue 
the  enemy ;  nor  do  I  urge  objections  of  a  moral  nature 
in  view  of  possible  consequences  of  insurrection  and  mas- 
sacre at  the  South.  I  view  this  matter  as  a  practical  war 
measure,  to  be  decided  on  according  to  the  advantages 
or  disadvantages  it  may  offer  to  the  suppression  of  the 
rebellion. 

"  I  admit  that  slavery  is  at  the  root  of  the  rebellion, 
or  at  least  its  sine  qua  non.  The  ambition  of  politicians 
may  have  instigated  them  to  act,  but  they  would  have 
been  impotent  without  slavery  as  their  instrument.  I 
will  also  concede  that  emancipation  would  help  us  in 
Europe,  and  convince  people  there  that  we  are  incited 
by  something  more  than  ambition.  I  grant  farther  that 
it  would  help  somewhat  at  the  North,  though  not  so 
much,  I  fear,  as  you  and  those  you  represent  imagine. 
Still,  some  additional  strength  would  be  added  in  that 
way  to  the  war;  and  then, unquestionably, it  would  weak- 
en the  rebels  by  drawing  off  their  laborers,  which  is  of 
great  importance,  but  I  am  not  so  sure  we  could  do  much 
with  the  blacks.     If  we  were  to  arm  them,  I  fear  that  in 


Chap.  LXIV.]     HE  IS  CONSTRAIKED  TO  EMANCIPATION.  ^Q? 

a  few  weeks  the  arms  would  be  in  tlie  hands  of  tlie  reb- 
els, and,  indeed,  tlius  far,  we  have  not  bad  arms  enough 
to  equip  our  white  troops.  ... 

"Do  not  misunderstand  me  because  I  have  mentioned 

The  conclusion  to  these  objectious.  They  indicate  the  diffi- 
which  he  had  come.  ^^^^-^^  ^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^  prevented  my  ac- 

tion  in  some  such  way  as  you  desire.  I  have  not  decided 
against  a  proclamation  of  liberty  to  the  slaves,  but  hold 
the  matter  under  advisement.  And  I  can  assure  you 
that  the  subject  is  on  my  mind,  by  day  and  by  night, 
more  than  any  other.  Whatever  shall  appear  to  be  God's 
will,  that  I  will  do." 

A  depreciated  currency,  heavy  and  steadily  increasing 
taxation,  the  terrors  of  a  coming  military  draft,  the  clamor 
of  the  peace  party,  and,  above  all,  a  profound  disappoint- 
ment in  the  result  of  McClellan's  campaign,  weighed  heav- 
ily on  the  spirit  of  the  nation.     More  and 

Anti-slavery  action  ,         ,  ,  t  ,  -, ,  . . 

becoming  more  im-  more  clcarlv  was  the  stern  alternative  pre- 

perative.  ,  "^  ,  ,  ^     i        m 

sented  to  it — ^^emancipation  of  the  ISlave,  or 
destruction  of  the  Eepublic. 

There  is  reason  to  suppose  that  when  Lincoln  saw  the 
wreck  of  McClellan's  expedition  coming  back  from  the 
Peninsula,  he  made  up  his  mind.  To  repair  the  dreadful 
losses  of  that  and  Pope's  campaign,  a  vast  number  of  men 
must  be  raised.  He  reflected  that  the  balance  would  be 
equally  made  to  incline  by  putting  white  men  in  one 
scale,  or  by  taking  black  men  out  of  the  other.  During 
that  summer  he  had  read  at  a  cabinet  meeting  a  draft  of 
Thepresident'sfh-st  ^  proclamatlou  of  emancipation.  The  Sec- 
pSion  prodaSr"-  Tctary  of  state,  Mr.  Seward,  though  com- 
^'°''*  pletely  approving  of  its  character,  thought 

the  time  inopportune,  and  that,  instead  of  coming  after  a 
disaster,  it  ought  to  come  after  a  victory.  In  this,  on  con- 
sideration, Lincoln  agreed.  The  time  for  such  a  proclama- 
tion was  not  when  Lee  was  in  view  of  Washington,  and 


608  LINCOLN'S  VOW.  [Sect.  XHL 

He  still  withholds  ^^6   expulsion   of  the  national  authorities 
action,  £^^^  ^j^^  Capitol  itself  by  no  means  an  im- 

probability. There  was  a  day  on  which  it  seemed  more 
likely  that  the  Confederacy  would  dictate  terms  than 
have  to  submit  to  them — a  day  on  which  it  would  have 
been  absurd,  indeed,  for  the  vanquished  President  to  tell 
his  antagonists,  flushed  with  victory,  that  he  was  going 
to  free  their  slaves. 

"  I  made  a  solemn  vow  before  God,"  said  Lincoln,  sub- 
•  butmakesareiig-  scqucutly, "  that  if  General  Lee  was  driven 
back  from  Maryland,  I  would  crown  the  re- 
sult by  a  declaration  of  freedom  to  the  slaves." 

The  battle  of  Antietam  was  fought,  and  Lee,  driven 
across  the  Potomac,  retreated  into  Virerinia 

Events  call  upon  ,  •!,       /.,i       ^  ^,i        ^n        .         -i  rr^i 

hjm  for  its  fulfill-  ou  the  uight  01  the  1 9th  of  September.  The 
losses  of  the  South  in  this  sortie  had  been 
awful.  Mourning  w^as  sitting  in  black  at  every  South- 
ern fireside.  And  now  Lincoln  remembered  the  vow  he 
had  made.  "  Whatever  shall  appear  to  be  God's  will, 
that  I  will  do." 

"A  PROCLAMATION. 
"  I,  Abraham  Lincoln,  President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
The  proclamation  of  ^"^^  Commander  -  in  -  chief  of  the  army  and  navy 
the22dofSeptem-     thereof,  do  hereby  proclaim  and  declare  that  here- 
after, as  heretofore,  the  war  will  be  prosecuted  for 
the  object  of  practically  restoring  the  constitutional  relation  be- 
deciares  the  object  twccn  the  United  States  and  each  of  the  states,  and 
of  the  war.  ^^^  people  thereof,  in  which  states  that  relation  is  or 

may  be  suspended  or  disturbed. 

"  That  it  is  my  purpose,  upon  the  next  meeting  of  Congress,  to 
again  recommend  the  adoption  of  a  practical  measure  tendering 
pecuniary  aid  to  the  free  acceptance  or  rejection  of  all  Slave  States 
so  called,  the  people  whereof  may  not  then  be  in 
Sr  whfchXre''''"  rebellion  against  the  United  States,  and  which  states 
satfon^for^sTv^sr  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^^^  voluntarily  adopted,  or  thereafter 
may  voluntarily  adopt,  immediate  or  gfadual  abol- 
ishment of  slavery  within  their  respective  limits ;  and  that  the  ef- 


CiiAP.LXIV.]       PROCLAMATION  OF  SEPTEMBER  22d.  5Q9 

and  colonization  of   foi't  to  colonize  persons  of  African   descent,  with 
thefreedmeu.  their   conscnt,  upon  the    continent   or  elsewhere, 

with  the  previously  obtained  consent  of  the  governments  existing 
there,  will  be  continued. 

"  That  on  the  first  day  of  January,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one 
He  will  rociaim     thousand  eight  hundred  and  sixty-three,  all  persons 
emancipation  in     held  as  slavcs  within  any  state,  or  designated  part 
of  a  state,  the  people  whereof  shall  then  be  in  rebel- 
lion against  the  United  States,  shall  be  then,  thenceforward  and  for- 
ever, free ;  and  the  executive  government  of  the  United  States,  in- 
cluding the  military  and  naval  authority  thereof,  will  recognize  and 
maintain  the  freedom  of  such  j^ersons,  and  will  do  no  act  or  acts  to 
repress  such  persons,  or  any  of  them,  in  any  efforts  they  may  make 
for  their  actual  freedom. 

"That  the  executive  will,  on  the  first  day  of  January  aforesaid, 
on  the  first  day  of  by  proclamation,  designate  the  states,  and  parts  of 
the  following  year,  g^^^^g^  if  SLiij,  in  which  the  people  thereof  respect- 
ively shall  then  be  in  rebellion  against  the  United  States ;  and  the 
fact  that  any  state,  or  the  people  thereof,  shall  on  that  day  be  in 
good  faith  represented  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  by 
members  chosen  thereto  at  elections  wherein  a  majority  of  the  qual- 
and  will  then  desi'^-  ^^^^  voters  of  such  State  shall  have  participated, 
nate  the  states  in  re-   shall,  in  the  absence  of  stronoj  countervailinsr  testi- 

bellion.  '  ,     o        _  & 

mony,  be  deemed  conclusive  evidence  that  such 
state,  and  the  people  thereof,  are  not  in  rebellion  against  the  United 
States. 

"  That  attention  is  hereby  called  to  an  act  of  Congress,  entitled 
He  cites  certain  *  An  Act  to  make  an  additional  Article  of  War,'  ap- 
laws,  proved  March  13th,  1862,  and  which  act  is  in  the 

words  and  figures  following : 

*"^e  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  in  Congress  assembled,  That  hereafter  the  following  shall  be  promul- 
gated as  an  additional  Article  of  War  for  the  government  of  the  army  of  the  United 
States,  and  shall  be  obeyed  and  obsen^ed  as  such  : 

"  *  Section  I.  All  officers  or  persons  in  the  military  or  naval  service  of  the  United 
States  are  prohibited  from  employing  any  of  the  forces  under  their  respective  com- 
mands for  the  pui-pose  of  returning  fugitives  from  service  or  labor  who  may  have  es- 
caped from  any  persons  to  whom  such  service  or  labor  is  claimed  to  be  due ;  and  any 
officer  who  shall  be  found  guilty  by  a  court-martial  of  violating  this  article  shall  be 
dismissed  from  the  senice. 

*' '  Section  IL  And  be  it  further  enacted,  That  this  act  shall  take  effect  from  and 
after  its  passage.' 

"Also  to  the  ninth  and  tenth  sections  of  an  act,  entitled  'An  Act 
to  suppress  Insurrection,  to  punish  Treason  and  Rebellion,  to  seize 
II.— Q  Q 


QIQ  PROCLAMATION  OF  SEPTEMBER  22d.  [Sect.  XIII. 

and  confiscate  property  of  Rebels,  and  for  other  purposes,'  approved 
July  16th,  1862,  and  which  sections  are  in  the  words  and  figures 
following: 

"  *  Section  9.  And  be  it  further  enacted,  That  all  slaves  of  persons  who  shall 
hereafter  be  engaged  in  rebellion  against  the  government  of  the  United  States,  or 
who  shall  in  any  way  give  aid  or  comfort  thereto/  escaping  from  such  persons  and 
taking  refuge  within  the  lines  of  the  army,  and  all  slaves  captured  from  such  persons, 
or  deserted  by  them,  and  coming  under  the  control  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  and  all  slaves  of  such  persons  found  on,  or  being  within  any  place  occupied 
by  rebel  forces  and  afterward  occupied  by  forces  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  deemed 
captives  of  war,  and  shall  be'  forever  free  of  their  servitude,  and  not  again  held  as 
slaves.  .  . 

"  '  Section  10.  And  he  it  further  enacted,  That  no  slave  escaping  into  any  state, 
Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia,  from  any  other  state,  shall  be  delivered  up,  or 
in  any  way  impeded  or  hindered  of  his  liberty,  except  for  crime  or  some  offense 
against  the  laws,  unless  the  person  claiming  such  fugitive  shall  first  make  oath  that 
the  person  to  whom  the  labor  or  service  of  such  fugitive  is  alleged  to  be  due  is  his 
lawful  owner,  and  has  not  borne  arms  against  the  United  States  in  the  present  rebel- 
lion, nor  in  any  way  given  aid  or  comfort  thereto ;  and  no  person  engaged  in  the 
military  or  naval  service  of  the  United  States  shall,  under  any  pretense  whatever,  as- 
sume to  decide  on  the  validity  of  the  claim  of  any  person  to  the  service  or  labor  of 
any  other  person,  or  surrender  up  any  such  person  to  the  claimant,  on  pain  of  being 
dismissed  from  the  semce.' 

"And  I  do  hereby  enjoin  upon  and  order  all  persons  engaged  in 
.  .     .,     ^        the  military  and  naval  service  of  the  United  States 

reqiiu-ing  the  army  •' 

and  navy  to  observe  to  obscrvc,  obey,  and  cnforcc,  within  their  respect- 
ive spheres  of  service,  the  act  and  sections  above 
recited. 

"And  the  executive  will  in  due  time  recommend  that  all  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  who  shall  have  remained  loyal  thereto 
throughout  the  rebellion  shall  (upon  the  restoration  of  the  consti- 
tutional relation  between  the  United  States  and  their  respective 
states  and  people,  if  that  relation  shall  have  been  suspended  or  dis- 
turbed) be  compensated  for  all  losses  by  acts  of  the  United  States, 
including  the  loss  of  slaves. 

"  In  witness  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand,  and  caused 
the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

"  Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  this  twenty-second  day  of 
September,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred 
and  sixty-two,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States  the 
eighty-seventh.  Abraham  Lik^col:n^. 

"  By  the  President :  • 

"William  H.  Seward,  Secretary  of  State." 

In  tills  considerate  manner  tlie  President  earnestly  of- 


Chap.LXIV.]    LINCOLN  resolves  on  emancipation.  qh 

fered  compensation  to  those  whose  slaves  he  foresaw 
must  inevitably  be  made  free. 

. "  I  claim  not  to  have  controlled  events,  but  confess 
plainly  that  events  have  controlled  me."  Such,  as  we 
have  just  seen,  was  his  solemn  declaration  a  short  time 
before  his  death.  He  added, "  The  condition  of  the  na- 
tion is  not  what  any  party  or  any  man  expected  or  de- 
vised." With  that  religious  feeling  which  seemed  to  pos- 
sess him  more  and  more  thoroughly  as  he  approached  his 
end,  he  affirmed, "  It  is  the  work  of  God." 
prltltiof  °of  ceVSin  Sinccrclv  believing:  that  God  not  only  reis^ns, 

military  events.  •'  ^.,  .       .     ^  ^  . 

but  governs,  he  saw,  m  the  events  transpir- 
ing before  him,  that  there  was  something  more  than  the 
wishes  and  will  of  man.  In  every  phase  of  the  conflict 
he  perceived  the  arbitrament  of  a  Higher  Power.  Not 
as  a  delusion  of  fancy,  but  as  a  reality,  he  recognized  the 
dread  alternative  presented  to  his  nation — do  justice  or 
die.  To  his  surrounding  friends  he  pointed  out  that, 
though  the  North  was  pouring  forth  her  blood  like  wa- 
ter, and  squandering  treasuries  of  money,  success  was  de- 
nied. The  rebukes  he  had  given  to  Fremont  and  Hunt- 
er had  been  confronted  by  the  horrible  catastrophe  of 
the  Chickahominy,  and  by  the  repulse  of  Pope  into  the 
fortifications  of  Washington.  Once  more  a  day  of  grace 
had  been  granted  at  Antietam,  but  that  only  half  regard- 
ed, the  stern  summons  had  been  again  renewed  from  the 
cannon  that  were  permitted  to  sweep  off  fourteen  thou- 
sand men  at  Marye's  Hill,  and  hurl  Burnside's  army 
across  the  Eappahannock.  "  What  am  I,"  said  Lincoln, 
"  that  I  should  contest  the  will  of  God  ?' 

From  the  rivers  of  Virginia  to  the  Mexican  confines  of 
the  Kepublic  arose  a  mournful  wail — How  long,  O  Lord  ! 
The  slaves  expect-  ^^w  loug !     It  Came  fi'om  the  weary  labor- 
ing dehverauce.      ^^,^  leaning  on  his  hoe  in  the  cotton-field  un- 


(5J^2  THE  SLAVES  EXPECTING  EREEDOM.  [Sect.  XIII. 

der  the  noontide  sun — :it  came  through  the  moaning  mid- 
night forests,  solemn  and  clear  above  their  multitudinous 
inarticulate  sounds — it  came  from  children  torn  from  their 
parents,  from  wives  and  husbands  j)arted  at  the  auction 
block,  from  mothers  in  despair,  from  strong  men  fainting 
under  the  lash,  from  the  aged  whose  heads  were  frosted 
by  time.  In  their  quaint  prayers  the  Africans  talk  to' 
God  as  a  man  talks  face  to  face  with  his  friend.  Slavery 
had  made  Him  their  friend.  By  the  flickering  fires  of 
their  cabins  they  stealthily  spelt  out  the  Bible  to  see 
what  He  had  promised  to  them.  It  was  their  dreadful 
lot  that  had  caused  Jefferson,  himself  a  slave-owner,  to 
expostulate  solemnly  with  his  countrymen,  and  to  dep- 
recate the  wrath  of  God.  For  who  shall  escape  when 
from  the  hand  of  Eternal  Justice  her  scales  have  dropped 
as  useless — when  from  her  brow  the  bandage  has  been 
raised  that  her  uncovered  and  angry  eyes  may  gaze  upon 
unutterable  wrong  —  when  her  uplifted  arm,  quivering 
with  indignation,  is  ready  to  strike  a  blow  that  shall 
make  a  w^hole  continent  tremble  ? 

On  the  evening  of  the  last  day  of  the  year  1862,  many 
of  those  Africans,  who  were  living  in  towns,  and  who 
were  connected  with  various  Christian  denominations,  re- 
paired to  their  places  of  worship,  and  waited  for  the  mid- 
night clock  to  strike.  Many  of  those  who  were  living  on 
plantations  knelt  down  in  their  humble  cabins,  w^ith  their 
wives  and  children.  Many  of  those  who  were  alone,  and 
had  no  friend  in  the  world,  went  into  the  woods,  in  pres- 
ence of  that  eye  which  pierces  the  darkness  as  well  as  the. 
light.  They  prayed  that  Almighty  God  w^ould  take 
pity  upon  them,  and  strengthen  the  hand  of  Abraham 
Lincoln  on  the  coining  day. 

And  on  that  day,  being  the  first  day  of  January,  eight- 
een hundred  and  sixty-three,  there  was  issued 


Chap.  LXIV. ]    THE  EMAKCIPATION  PROCLAMATION.  Qi^ 

"A  PROCLAMATION, 
"by  the  president  of  the  united  states. 

"  Whereas,  on  the  twenty-second  day  of  September,  in  the  year 
Emancipation  of  the  of  our  Lord  One  thousand  eight  hundred  and  sixty- 
^^'^^'®^'  two,  a  proclamation  was  issued  by  the  President  of 

the  United  States,  containing,  among  other  things,  the  following, 
to  wit : 

" '  That  on  the  first  day  of  January,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  sixty-three,  all  persons  held  as  slaves 
within  any' state,  or  designated  part  of  "a  state,  the  peojile  whereof 
shall  then  be  in  rebellion  against  the  United  States,  shall  be  then, 
.  who  are  henceforth  thenceforward  and  forever,  free ;  and  the  executive 
^'"^^  government  of  the  United  States,  includmg  the  mil- 

itary and  naval  authority  thereof,  wall  recognize  and  niaintain  the 
freedom  of  such  persons,  and  will  do  no  act  or  acts  to  repress  such 
persons,  or  any  of  them,  in  any  efibrts  they  may  make  for  their  act- 
ual freedom. 

" '  That  the  executive  will,  on  the  first  day  of  January  aforesaid, 
by  proclamation,  designate  the  states,  and  parts  of  states,  if  any,  in 
which  the  people  thereof  respectively  shall  then  be  in  rebellion 
against  the  United  States ;  and  the  fact  that  any  state,  or  the  peo- 
ple thereof,  shall  on  that  day  be  in  good  faith  represented  in  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  by  members  chosen  thereto  at  elec- 
tions wherein  a  majority  of  the  qualified  voters  of  such  states  shall 
have  participated,  sliall,  in  the  absence  of  strong  countervailing  tes- 
timony, be  deemed  conclusive  evidence  that  such  state,  and  the  peo- 
ple thereof,  are  not  then  in  rebellion  against  the  United  States.' 

"  !N"ow,  therefore,  I,  Abraham  Lincol:n",  President  of  the  United 
States,  by  virtue  of  the  power  in  me  vested  as  commander-in-chief 
of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and  as  a  fit  and  neces- 
sary war  measure  for  suppressing  said  rebellion,  do,  on  this  first 
day  of  January,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hun- 
dred and  sixty-three,  and  in  accordance  with  my  purpose  so  to  do, 
publicly  proclaimed  for  the  full  period  of  one  hundred  days  from 
the  day  first  above  mentioned,  order  and  designate  as  the  states, 
and  parts  of  states,  wherein  the  people  thereof  respectively  are  this 
day  in  rebellion  against  the  United  States,  the  folloAving,  to  wit : 
in  places  now  in  Arkansas,  Texas,  Louisiana  (except  the  parishes  of 
^«v°^^-  St.  Bernard,  Plaquemine,  Jefierson,   St.  John,  St. 

Charles,  St.  James,  Ascension,  Assumption,  Terrebonne,  Lafourche, 
St.  Mary,  St.  Martin,  and  Orleans,  including  the  city  of  New  Or- 


514  END  OF  SLAVERY  IN  AMERICA.  [Sect.  XIII. 

leans),  Mississippi,  Alabama,  Florida,  Georgia,  South  Carolina,  North 
Carolina,  and  Virginia  (except  the  forty-eight  counties  designated 
as  West  Virginia,  and  also  the  counties  of  Berkely,  Accomac,  North- 
ampton, Elizabeth  City,  York,  Princess  Anne,  and  Norfolk,  includ- 
ing the  cities  of  Norfolk  and  Portsmouth),  and  which  excepted 
parts  are  for  the  present  left  precisely  as  if  this  proclamation  were 
not  issued. 

"  And  by  virtue  of  the  power  and  for  the  purpose  aforesaid,  I  do 
order  and  declare  that  all  persons  held  as  slaves  within  said  desig- 
nated states  and  parts  of  states  are,  and  henceforth  shall  be,  free ; 
The  armed  force  of  ^^^  *^^^  *^^  executive  government  of  the  United 
the  iicotion  will  main-  States,  iucludinsj  the  military  and  naval  authorities 

taiu  their  freedom.  n      ^^^  • 

thereof,  will  recognize  and  maintain  the  freedom  of 
said  persons. 

"  And  I  hereby  enjoin  upon  the  people  so  declared  to  be  free  to 
Recommendations  abstain  from  all  violence  unless  in  necessary  self- 
to  the  slaves.  defense ;  and  I  recommend  to  them  that,  in  all  cases 

when  allowed,  they  labor  faithfully  for  reasonable  wages. 

"And  I  further  declare  and  make  known  that  such  persons  of 
They  may  serve  in  Suitable  Condition  will  be  received  into  the  armed 
the  army  and  navy,  geryice  of  the  United  States,  to  garrison  forts,  posi- 
tions, stations,  and  other  places,  and  to  man  vessels  of  all  sorts  in 
said  service. 

"And  upon  this  act,  sincerely  believed  to  be  an  act  of  justice. 
Invocation  of  the  warranted  by  the  Constitution  upon  military  neces- 
favorof  God.  sity,I  iuvokc  the  considerate  judgment  of  mankind, 
and  the  gracious  favor  of  Almighty  God. 

"  In  witness  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand,  and  caused 
the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

"Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  this  first  day  of  January,  in 
the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  sixty-three, 
and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America  the  eigh- 
ty-seventh. Abraham  Lincoln. 

' '  By  the  President : 
"William  II.  Seward,  Secretary  of  State." 


END    OF   VOL.  II. 


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